MEMORANDUM ORDER On July 13, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See July 13, 2023, Memorandum Order (Dkt. 60) (the “Order”). Specifically, the Order granted summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s negligence claim, finding she had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of economic injury, and granted summary judgment as to all claims with respect to certain other defendants who had no involvement in the underlying conduct, but denied summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FRCA”) claim as to the remaining defendants, finding that emotional distress damages are available under the FRCA and a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to causation and the willfulness of defendants alleged violation. Defendants have now moved for reconsideration of this last portion of the Order, arguing the case should have been dismissed in its entirety. A motion for reconsideration should generally be granted “only when the defendant identifies [1] an intervening change of controlling law, [2] the availability of new evidence, or [3] the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and internal citation omitted). The movant generally must “point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). In support of their motion for reconsideration, defendants do not identify any error of law or new evidence. Rather, they argue that the Court misapprehended the factual record in denying their prior motion and that correcting this error is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Specifically, a key question in this case was whether defendants knew or should have known that LeForest — plaintiff’s brother-in-law — was acting without authorization when LeForest purchased a vehicle from defendants in plaintiff’s name. Defendants argue that the Order erroneously suggested that, on the day LeForest purchased the vehicle, the dealership first pulled LeForest’s credit, then the credit of LeForest’s friend Jami Singer, and then finally the credit of plaintiff, when in fact the record demonstrates that plaintiff’s credit was pulled second and Singer’s credit was pulled third. According to defendants, in light of this clarified order of credit pulls, there was no basis for the Court to conclude that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to either the question of willfulness or causation. As explained below, the Court disagrees that this single factual determination warrants reconsideration. I. Good Faith/Willfulness Much of this case turns on the factual question of whether defendants knew or should have known that LeForest was acting without Francois’ authorization, a question this Court left to the jury to decide. If defendants pulled Francois’ credit either knowing Francois’ had not authorized any use of her credit to back LeForest’s car purchase in her name, or in reckless disregard of the lack of any such authorization, then that would constitute a willful violation of the FRCA. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007); Williams v. USAA Sav. Bank, 2022 WL 16951665, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2022) (“Under the FCRA, willfulness encompasses both knowing and reckless violations of the statute.”). By contrast, if defendants reasonably believed Francois had given LeForest permission to purchase a vehicle in her name, defendants would have had a permissible purpose to pull her credit, providing a complete defense. See 15 U.S.C. §1681b(a)(3)(A). As the Court’s prior order explained, the fact that the dealership ran the credit of LaForest, Singer, and Francois before submitting a credit application in Francois’ name suggests “that defendants were aware of the possibility or even likelihood that LaForest was acting without authorization and simply running as many peoples’ credits as he could to get a sale consummated.” July 13, 2023 Order, at 20. The fact that Francois’ credit was pulled second, and Singer’s credit was pulled third, does not undermine this inference. Rather, the key fact, and the one the remains undisputed, is that the credit of all three individuals — LeForest, Francois and Singer — was pulled before any credit application was filed for Francois. If, as defendants suggest, LeForest came in with the intent of purchasing a vehicle in Francois’ name and brought with him someone to impersonate Francois (as defendants insist took place), there would have been no need even to pull LeForest’s credit, let alone LeForest’s and Singer’s. The fact that the dealership ran all three individuals’ credit, and only after doing so submitted a credit application in the name of the individual who had the best credit, supports an inference of misconduct by suggesting that LeForest, and perhaps even the dealership, were simply fishing for credit without regard to whether there was authorization to do so. The fact that Singer’s and Francois’ credits were both run before any sale was consummated is relevant for another reason. Defendants’ employees, including Spartan’s corporate representative, insisted at their respective depositions that the dealership has a firm policy of never pulling a customer’s credit if the customer is not physically present at the dealership. See Defs. 56.1 Statement 22; Vallejo Dep. (Dkt. 53-2), at 94:5-13, 160:2-164:2; Resp. to Pls. Counter-56.1 Statement (Dkt. 57-1) 217. Indeed, these witnesses had only vague recollections of the actual day LeForest purchased the vehicle, and the witnesses cited this policy as the principal basis for their conclusion that the store did not engage in any misconduct that day. But documentary evidence clearly establishes that Singer’s credit was pulled that day, even though Singer testified she was not present at the dealership. See Keshavarz Decl. Ex. J (Dkt. 53-10); Defs. Counter 56.1 Statement (Dkt. 57-1)
