OPINION & ORDER This class action was filed on November 21, 2022, on behalf of all people who were allegedly inappropriately billed for an “office visit” after they received a COVID test from Summit Health Management, LLC d/b/a CityMD (“Summit Health”). (Doc. 1 4.) This billing allegedly caused people to be inappropriately charged for services that should have been provided for free. (Id. 2-3.) Before me is the unopposed motion filed by Plaintiff Ana Martinez Reyes (“Reyes”) and her attorneys for preliminary approval of the Class Action Settlement (the “Settlement”) with Defendant Summit Health (the “Approval Motion”). (Doc. 24.) As part of this motion, the Parties have also submitted a proposed settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement,” Doc. 25-1 Ex. A) to govern the Settlement. Because I find after a preliminary evaluation that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and the result of good faith negotiation, Reyes’s motion is GRANTED. I. Background and Procedural History I adopt the factual and procedural background set out in the “Overview of the Litigation” section of the Approval Motion. (Doc. 26 at 2-4.) In brief, Reyes claims that Summit Health violated the Family First Coronavirus Response Act and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, Economic Security Act by inappropriately charging those who came to its facilities for COVID tests. (Id. 2.) Reyes filed her complaint on November 21, 2022, alleging violations of New York General Business Law §349(a)’s prohibition on deceptive business practices, (Doc. 1
41-48), and unjust enrichment, (id. 49-54.) The proposed class (the “Class”) includes “all persons who obtained a COVID-19 Test at a CityMD facility during the class period defined below and have been billed for any part of CityMD’s charge for an ‘Office Visit’ in connection with their Covid Test.” (Id. 32.) Following an extended discovery period, (Doc. 26 at 3-4), the parties held a mediation session on May 31, 2023, that resulted in a settlement in principle. (Id. 4.) Reyes now asks that I (1) preliminarily approve the Settlement; (2) authorize the sending of the Parties’ proposed settlement notice (the “Settlement Notice”, Doc. 25-1 Ex. A Ex. 3); (3) appoint Class Counsel, a Class Representative, and a Settlement Administrator; and (4) establish dates for the final approval of the Settlement, (Doc. 24.) The notice required by 28 U.S.C. §1715 was filed on July 21, 2023. (Doc. 27.) II. Legal Standards A. Preliminary Approval of the Settlement It is within a district court’s discretion to approve proposed class action settlements. See Kelen v. World Fin. Network Nat’l Bank, 302 F.R.D. 56, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). “The compromise of complex litigation is encouraged by the courts and favored by public policy.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newburg on Class Actions §11:53, at 167 (4th ed. 2002)). The parties and their counsel are in a unique position to assess the potential risks of litigation, and thus district courts in exercising their discretion often give weight to the fact that the parties have chosen to settle. See Yuzary v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-cv-3693, 2013 WL 1832181, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2013). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires judicial approval of any class action settlement. Review of a proposed settlement generally involves preliminary approval followed by a fairness hearing. See Silver v. 31 Great Jones Rest., No. 11-cv-7442, 2013 WL 208918, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2013). “[C]ourts often grant preliminary settlement approval without requiring a hearing or a court appearance.” Lizondro-Garcia v. Kefi LLC, 300 F.R.D. 169, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). However, “[e]ven at the preliminary approval stage, the Court’s role in reviewing the proposed settlement ‘is demanding because the adversariness of litigation is often lost after the agreement to settle.’” In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d 686, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Zink v. First Niagara Bank, N.A., 155 F. Supp. 3d 297, 308 (W.D.N.Y. 2016)). Thus, a district court must consider whether the court “will likely be able to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal.” In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 330 F.R.D. 11, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)); see also In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d at 692 (same). Courts conducting this analysis “must make a preliminary evaluation as to whether the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 01-md-1409, M-21-95, 2006 WL 3247396, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, courts consider the (1) adequacy of representation, (2) existence of arm’s-length negotiations, (3) adequacy of relief, and (4) equitableness of treatment of class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (A)-(D). In addition to these four factors, courts in this Circuit also consider whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate based on the nine factors1 established in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974),2 which partially overlap with the factors in Rule 23(e)(2)(C)-(D). B. Conditional Settlement Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel Conditional settlement class certification and the appointment of class counsel have several practical purposes “including avoiding the costs of litigating class status while facilitating a global settlement, ensuring notification of all class members of the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, and setting the date and time of the final approval hearing.” Almonte v. Marina Ice Cream Corp., No. 16-cv-00660, 2016 WL 7217258, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016). A proposed settlement class must meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). Under Rule 23(a), class certification is appropriate if “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims…of the representative parties are typical of the claims…of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)(4). “The party seeking class certification bears the burden of establishing each of these elements by a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’” Lizondro-Garcia, 300 F.R.D. at 174 (quoting Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008)). Once each of these four threshold requirements are met, “class certification is appropriate if the action also satisfies one of the three alternative criteria set forth in Rule 23(b).” Id. To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), as the parties seek to do here, a court must also find “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). III. Discussion A. Preliminary Approval of the Class Settlement Based one Reyes’s submissions, including her memorandum of law, (Doc. 26), the declarations of Seth R. Lesser, (Doc. 25), and Andrew B. Kratenstein, (Doc. 28), the Settlement Agreement, and other supporting materials, I find that the Settlement merits preliminary approval. 1. Adequacy of Representation “Determination of adequacy typically entails inquiry as to whether: (1) plaintiff’s interests are antagonistic to the interest of other members of the class and (2) plaintiff’s attorneys are qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation.” Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reyes’s interests are aligned with those of the class given that she suffered the same purported harms as the other class members. She was allegedly improperly charged for an “office visit” after she received a COVID test, and then repeatedly harassed as Summit Health attempted to collect on that erroneous charge. (Doc. 1
