People v. Trump

Decision and Order After Non-Jury Trial After presiding over a non-jury trial that began on October 2, 2023, and ended on December 13, 2023, with closing arguments on January 11, 2024, this Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and issues this Decision and Order: SUMMARY Donald Trump and entities he controls own many valuable properties, including office buildings, hotels, and golf courses. Acquiring and developing such properties required huge amounts of cash. Accordingly, the entities borrowed from banks and other lenders. The lenders required personal guarantees from Donald Trump, which were based on statements of financial condition compiled by accountants that Donald Trump engaged. The accountants created these “compilations” based on data submitted by the Trump entities. In order to borrow more and at lower rates, defendants submitted blatantly false financial data to the accountants, resulting in fraudulent financial statements. When confronted at trial with the statements, defendants’ fact and expert witnesses simply denied reality, and defendants failed to accept responsibility or to impose internal controls to prevent future recurrences. As detailed herein, this Court now finds defendants liable, continues the appointment of an Independent Monitor, orders the installation of an Independent Director of Compliance, and limits defendants’ right to conduct business in New York for a few years. INTRODUCTION In this civil action, plaintiff, the People of the State of New York, by Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, seeks monetary penalties and injunctive relief against Donald John Trump (“Donald Trump”) (the former president of the United States); Donald Trump, Jr. (“Donald Trump, Jr.” or “Trump, Jr.”) and Eric Trump (two of his sons); Allen Weisselberg and Jeffrey McConney (two former employees of defendant The Trump Organization, Inc.); and various real estate holding entities. Plaintiff essentially alleges (1) that the individual defendants violated New York Executive Law §63(12) by submitting false financial statements to banks and insurance companies to obtain better rates on loans and insurance coverage; and (2) that the holding entities are liable for the individual defendants’ misdeeds. Defendants (1) allege that the statements were completely or substantially correct; and (2) crow that the borrowers paid back all loans fully and on time. Common Law Fraud The instant action is not a garden-variety common law fraud case. Common law fraud (also known as “misrepresentation”) has five elements: (1) A material statement; (2) falsity; (3) knowledge of the falsity (“scienter”); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damages. See, e.g., Kerusa Co. LLC v. W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd. Partnership, 12 NY3d 236, 242 (2009) (“[T]he elements of common law fraud” are “a false representation…in relation to a material fact; scienter; reliance; and injury.”). Alleging the elements is easy; proving them is difficult. Is the statement one of fact or opinion? Material according to what standard? Knowledge demonstrated how? Justifiable subjectively or objectively? In mid-twentieth century New York, to judge by contemporary press reports and judicial opinions, fraudsters were having a field day. Executive Law Section 63(12) Along came Executive Law §63(12), which began life as Laws of 1956, Chapter 592, “An act to amend the executive law, in relation to cancellation of registration of doing business under an assumed name or as partners for repeated fraudulent or illegal acts.” Jacob Javits, then the Attorney General of the State of New York (the position that Attorney General James now occupies), pushed for the bill, as did the Better Business Bureau of New York City. See Senate Bill Jacket, February 21, 1956. State Comptroller Arthur Levitt asked, “Why not grant the Attorney General authority to enjoin anyone from continuing in a business activity if such person has been guilty of frequent fraudulent dealings.” The preponderance of the evidence standard, the one used in almost all civil cases would apply. Comptroller Levitt noted: “In a suit for an injunction, there is no need to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, as in a criminal case — a mere preponderance of evidence would be sufficient.” Id. In the subsequent six decades, the State has toughened the statute. In Laws of 1965, Chapter 666, the definitions of the words “fraud” and “fraudulent” were expanded to include “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretence [sic], false promise or unconscionable contractual provisions.” The statute casts a wide net. “The general grant of power to the Attorney General under section 63(12) has traditionally been his most potent.” 3 Fordham Urb. L. J. 491, 502 (1975). Executive Law §63(12) now reads as follows: Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply…for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages and, in an appropriate case, cancelling any certificate filed under and by virtue of the provisions of section four hundred forty of the former penal law or section one hundred thirty of the general business law, and the court may award the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper. The word “fraud” or “fraudulent” as used herein shall include any device, scheme or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, false pretense, false promise or unconscionable contractual provisions. The term “persistent fraud” or “illegality” as used herein shall include continuance or carrying on of any fraudulent or illegal act or conduct. The term “repeated” as used herein shall include repetition of any separate and distinct fraudulent or illegal act, or conduct which affects more than one person. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, all monies recovered or obtained under this subdivision by a state agency or state official or employee acting in their official capacity shall be subject to subdivision eleven of section four of the state finance law. The Financial Marketplace This Court takes judicial notice that New York State, particularly New York City, is the financial capital of the country and one of the financial capitals of the world. The City’s fabled Wall Street is synonymous with capital formation, investing, trading, lending, and borrowing. In a summary judgment Decision and Order dated September 26, 2023, NYSCEF Doc. 1531, the Court addressed the State’s judicially recognized interest in an honest marketplace: “In varying contexts, courts have held that a state has a quasisovereign interest in protecting the integrity of the marketplace.” People v. Grasso, 11 NY3d 64, 69 at n 4 (2008); People v. Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 (1st Dept 2008) (“the claim pursuant to Executive Law §63(12) constituted proper exercises of the State’s regulation of businesses within its borders in the interest of securing an honest marketplace”); People v. Amazon.com, Inc., 550 F Supp 3d 122, 130-131 (SDNY 2021) (“[T]he State’s statutory interest under §63(12) encompasses the prevention of either ‘fraudulent or illegal’ business activities. Misconduct that is illegal for reasons other than fraud still implicates the government’s interests in guaranteeing a marketplace that adheres to standards of fairness…”). Timely and total repayment of loans does not extinguish the harm that false statements inflict on the marketplace. Indeed, the common excuse that “everybody does it” is all the more reason to strive for honesty and transparency and to be vigilant in enforcing the rules. Here, despite the false financial statements, it is undisputed that defendants have made all required payments on time; the next group of lenders to receive bogus statements might not be so lucky. New York means business in combating business fraud. Procedural Background This action follows an extensive investigation conducted by plaintiff, the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York (“OAG”). In 2020, OAG commenced a special proceeding to enforce a series of subpoenas against various named defendants and other persons and entities. This Court presided over that proceeding and issued several orders compelling, in part, compliance with OAG’s subpoenas. See People v. The Trump Org., Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 541685/2020. OAG filed the instant complaint on September 21, 2022. On November 3, 2022, in response to a motion by OAG, this Court found preliminarily that defendants had a propensity to engage in persistent fraud by submitting false and misleading Statements of Financial Condition (“SFCs”) on behalf of Donald Trump. NYSCEF Doc. No. 183. Accordingly, the Court granted a preliminary injunction against any further fraud and appointed the Hon. Barbara S. Jones (ret.) as an independent monitor to oversee defendants’ financial statements and significant asset transfers. NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 193 and 194. To date, Judge Jones has delivered six reports to this Court, dated December 19, 2022, February 3, 2023, April 11, 2023, August 2, 2023, November 29, 2023, and January 26, 2024. NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 441, 489, 617, 647, 1641, 1681. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. In a Decision and Order dated January 6, 2023, this Court denied the motion. NYSCEF Doc. No. 453. Defendants appealed, resulting in a June 27, 2023 Order, wherein the Appellate Division, First Department modified this Court’s order to the extent of: (1) declaring that in this case the “continuing wrong doctrine does not delay or extend [the statute of limitations]“;¹ (2) finding that claims are timely against defendants subject to a tolling agreement² if they accrued after July 13, 2014, and timely against defendants not subject to the tolling agreement if they accrued after February 6, 2016; and (3) dismissing the complaint as against defendant Ivanka Trump on statute of limitations grounds, finding that she was not bound by the tolling agreement, as she was not an employee of the Trump Organization at the time Garten entered into the agreement. People v. Trump, 217 AD3d 609 (1st Dept 2023). The Complaint The Complaint asserts seven causes of action. The first cause of action is of a type known as a “stand-alone §63(12) claim.” Consistent with the wording of the statute, plaintiff need only prove that defendants used false statements in business. The second through seventh causes of action require plaintiff to prove that defendants intended to violate a provision of the Penal Law. The second cause of action, pursuant to New York Penal Law §175.10, requires plaintiff to prove that defendants intended to falsify business records. The third cause of action requires plaintiff to prove that defendants intended to conspire to falsify business records. The fourth cause of action, pursuant to New York Penal Law §175.45, requires plaintiff to prove that defendants intended to issue a false financial statement. The fifth cause of action requires plaintiff to prove that defendants intended to conspire to issue a false financial statement. The sixth cause of action, pursuant to New York Penal Law §176.05, requires plaintiff to prove that defendants intended to engage in insurance fraud. The seventh cause of action requires plaintiff to prove that defendants intended to conspire to engage in insurance fraud. Summary Judgment In a 35-page Decision and Order, dated September 26, 2023, this Court granted plaintiff summary judgment only on liability and only on the first cause of action. Simply put, the Court found that plaintiff had capacity and standing to sue; that non-party disclaimers and party “worthless clauses” do not insulate defendants’ material misrepresentations; that intent, scienter, and reliance are not elements of a stand-alone §63(12) claim; that disgorgement of profits is an available remedy; and that the subject financial statements materially misrepresented the value of the Trump Tower Triplex, The Seven Springs Estate, certain apartments in Trump Park Avenue, 40 Wall Street, Mar-a-Lago, and a golf course in Aberdeen, Scotland. NYSCEF Doc. 1531. This Court also held that the tolling agreement the parties entered into bound all defendants, such that the applicable statute of limitations allowed claims accruing on or after July 13, 2014. This Court also ordered the cancellation of defendants’ business certificates filed under and by virtue of GBL §130. The Appellate Division stayed the cancellation of the certificates pending the final disposition of defendants’ appeal of the summary judgment rulings. The Trial The eleven-week trial of this action addressed whether defendants are liable pursuant to the second through seventh causes of action and what monetary penalties and/or injunctive relief this Court should impose. Plaintiff is seeking “disgorgement” of “ill-gotten gains,” and to limit defendants’ abilities to conduct business in New York. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a jury trial, such as the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, apply only to cases “at common law,” so-called “legal” cases. The phrase “at common law” is used in contradistinction to cases that are “equitable” in nature. Whether a case is “legal” or “equitable” depends on the relief that plaintiff sought. Here, plaintiff seeks disgorgement and injunctions, each of which are forms of equitable relief. Thus, there was no right to a jury,³ and the case was “tried to the Court;” the Court being the sole factfinder and the sole “judge of credibility.” This Court listened carefully to every witness, every question, every answer. Witnesses testified from the witness stand, approximately a yard from the Court, who was thus able to observe expressions, demeanor, and body language. The Court has also considered the simple touchstones of self-interest and other motives, common sense, and overall veracity. FINDINGS OF FACT This Court heard testimony from 40 witnesses over 43 days⁴ and makes the following findings of fact: The Non-Party Witnesses Donald Bender Donald Bender is an accountant who worked for Mazars USA LLP (“Mazars”), an accounting firm, for approximately 41 years. From approximately 2011-2021, Bender spent approximately half of his time working on engagements for Donald Trump and the Trump Organization, and between 2-4 percent of his time working on Donald Trump’s SFCs. Trial Transcript (“TT”) 106-107. Donald Trump engaged Mazars to create SFC “compilations,” comprised of accounting data that defendants sent to Mazars; Mazars simply “compiled” that data into SFC format. “Audits” are the highest level of review of accounting data; “reviews” subject the data to medium-level scrutiny; “compilations” require the least scrutiny of the data. The accountant does not test or audit the raw numbers and thus cannot, and does not, assure the accuracy of the statement. TT 113. Mazars compiled Donald Trump’s SFCs from 2011 through 2020. Bender received all his information for the compilations from Jeffrey McConney or a member of his team, such as Patrick Birney. TT 114-116, 221-222, 387. Mazars would not have issued the SFCs if Allen Weisselberg had not represented that the information in the SFCs was in conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) or if Mazars had learned that any of the representations in the letter were not true. TT 199, 254-255, 263-269. Bender made absolutely clear that under the terms of the engagement for compilation services, the client was responsible for ensuring that assets were stated at their “estimated current values,” and that Weisselberg was responsible for determining which GAAP departures were identified and disclosed. TT 237-238, 319-320. The engagement letters, signed by a combination of Weisselberg, Donald Trump, and Donald Trump, Jr., confirmed this by unambiguously acknowledging that Donald Trump, through his trustees, was responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the personal financial information in accordance with GAAP. See, e.g., PX 741. Bender later learned that the Trump Organization had withheld records, such as appraisals, that Mazars had requested while preparing the compilations, leading Mazars to conclude that the Trump Organization had falsely represented that it had complied fully and truthfully with all inquiries from Mazars. Mazars subsequently terminated its relationship with the Trump Organization. TT 242-243; PX 2992, 2994. Bender stated that it was not until he was interviewed by the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, in spring 2021, that he learned that the Trump Organization had withheld appraisals from Mazars. TT 536-538. Bender made clear that Mazars would not have issued the SFCs if it had known that it had not been provided with all appraisals. TT 251. Camron Harris Camron Harris is an audit partner at Whitley Penn, an accounting firm that compiled Donald Trump’s SFC for 2021. TT 442. His testimony buttressed Donald Bender’s that compilers simply use the numbers provided by the client; they do not check them. TT 447-448; PX-1497. Harris’s contemporaneous notes, taken during or shortly after a meeting with Jeffrey McConney and Mark Hawthorn of the Trump Organization, state: Patrick [Birney] explained that he is the primary preparer of the valuations. Patrick obtained all of the necessary information for the valuations from external and internal sources. He worked with other team members to pull this information together, such as Ray Flores. Ray Flores performs the first review of Patrick’s spreadsheet and financial statements. Prior to issuance of the SOFC, an individual from upper management of the Trump Organization, and also one of the Trump family members, will read and review the financial statements. TT 450-451. Harris also indicated that the Trump Organization designated McConney as the “individual with suitable skills, knowledge and experience to oversee [Whitley Penn's] preparation of your financial statements,” as the Whitley Penn compilation engagement agreement required. TT 459-464; PX-2300. Harris stressed the “fundamental” importance of the client’s obligations, particularly during a compilation engagement, emphasizing that “[u]nder a compilation, we are not doing anything, you know, to verify the accuracy of that information, so that responsibility and accountability follows within the client to be doing those things so that the information is correct, because we didn’t do anything to verify that it is correct.” TT 464-465. Harris further made clear that Whitley Penn would not have issued the 2021 SFC without a signed representation letter from the client, indicating that it acknowledged its responsibility for providing a fair presentation of values in accordance with GAAP. TT 480-481. Nicholas Haigh Nicholas Haigh worked as a risk officer and managing director of Deutsche Bank’s Private Wealth Management Division from 2008 to 2018. TT 980. The Private Wealth Management Division serviced high net worth individuals and provided various products to them, including credit products. As the risk officer, Haigh’s job was to examine the client’s credit exposure and determine whether a client’s credit request fit within the bank’s desired risk profile. TT 982. When a client wanted a loan or other “credit facility” from the Private Wealth Management Division, a relationship manager would interface with the client and then speak with a lending officer at the bank. The lending officer would document the terms of a proposed loan in a credit memorandum that would be sent to Haigh and his team for final approval. TT 986-987. If the credit risk management team was comfortable with the terms and information contained in the credit memorandum, they would approve and sign off on the proposal. TT 989. Haigh was the most senior credit officer to sign off on the Deutsche Bank loans to the Trump Organization entities. TT 992. In 2011, the risk management team approved the terms of a credit facility to the “Trump Family”⁵ “based on the financial strength of the guarantor,” emphasizing that “[t]he financial profile of the guarantor includes on an adjusted basis, 135 million in encumbered liquidity, 2.4 billion in net worth and approximately 48 million in adjusted recurring net cash flow.” The risk management team noted that “[a]lthough facility is being extended to [a special purpose vehicle] for the purposes of financing the purchase of the resort, the credit exposure is being recommended primarily based on the financial profile of the guarantor,” further emphasizing the “[f]ull and unconditional guarantee of DJT which eliminates any shortfall associated with operating and liquidating Collateral.” PX 293; TT 1001. Haigh made clear that: The wealth management business at Deutsche Bank would not make loans secured just on collateral without a strong financial guarantee or personal guarantee from a financially strong person. Given that this was unusual collateral as a golf resort and spa, we would not really want to have to foreclose on that collateral and so we would most likely look to the guarantor to remedy any default — payment default on the loan. TT 1003-1004. In deciding to approve the credit facility, Haigh relied on Donald Trump’s 2011 SFC and assumed that the representations of value of the assets and liabilities were “broadly accurate.” TT 1009-1010; PX 330. The Deutsche Bank Credit Report’s “Financial Analysis” is based on numbers provided by the “family office” (here, the Trump Organization) and contains the same numbers represented in the SFC. PX 293; TT 1010-1013. Before approving the credit facility, the Private Wealth Management Division consulted Deutsche Bank’s Valuation Services Group about market conditions to arrive at a conservative estimate of the value of the commercial real estate should a need arise to liquidate during “bad market conditions.” TT 1013-1016. In so doing, the Valuation Services Group applied a 50 percent “haircut” to the valuations presented by the client, which Haigh affirmed was the “standardized number for commercial real assets.”⁶ TT 1016, 1041. Haigh affirmed that the Private Wealth Management Division would not have done business with Donald Trump without a personal guarantee, and that the personal guarantee was the reason for favorable pricing on the loan and the large size of the loan itself. TT 1017, 1020-1021, 1032. The Doral loan was conditioned on certain continuing covenants. One such covenant required Donald Trump to maintain a minimum net worth of $2.5 billion, excluding any value related to his brand. PX 293; TT 1024. As the “ultimate signer” of the credit risk management team, Haigh determined the required amount of Donald Trump’s minimum net worth “in order to make sure that the bank would be fully protected under adverse market conditions.” TT 1025-1026. In the event of a default of any of the covenants, Haigh stated the bank would have “various remedies…which it can pursue like waiving the breach, which it might do for an inconsequential breach; negotiating some variation of the terms of the loan; or potentially accelerating the loan and ask for repayment.” TT 1028. The covenant obligated Donald Trump to provide an annual financial statement. Haigh stressed that the annual SFCs were required because “[t]he bank wants to be sure that the client’s financial strength is being maintained and also the bank wants to be able to test its covenants periodically,” and that “[t]he bank would use the financial information that [the client] provided to test itself to try and ensure that the client is in compliance with those covenants.” TT 1022-1023. In 2012, the Trump Organization, under the entity 401 North Wabash Venture LLC, sought another loan from Deutsche Bank’s private wealth division for a new project in Chicago (“Trump Chicago”). PX 291; TT 1028-1029. The credit memorandum indicates that the beneficial owner of the borrower was “Donald J. Trump.” PX 291. Like the previous credit facility, the Chicago facility was conditioned on a full and unconditional guarantee provided by Donald Trump; the Deutsche Bank risk team specifically noted “[a]lthough facilities are secured by the collateral, given its unique nature, the credit exposure is being recommended based on the financial profile of the guarantor.” PX 291; TT 1030-1033. Similar to the previous credit facility review, the risk management team utilized Deutsche Bank’s Valuation Services Group to estimate the value of the liquidation of the commercial assets in bad market conditions and applied a standard 50 percent haircut to the valuations represented by the client.⁷ TT 1033. While he was seeking the loan from the Private Wealth Management Division and waiting to see if it would be approved, Donald Trump was simultaneously exploring a loan from Deutsche Bank’s Commercial Investment Bank Division, which maintained a commercial real estate lending group. PX 470; TT 1036-1038. The dueling proposals resulted in an internal Deutsche Bank memo, as Haigh explained, reflecting that “[t]wo business divisions at Deutsche Bank were making proposals on the same potential loan and…we wanted to be sure that they made sense with regard to each other so the bank didn’t look foolish in front of the client with two completely different sets of term sheets that bore no relation to each other.” PX 470; TT 1036-1038. The memo indicated that for Trump Chicago, the Commercial Investment Bank Division would be willing to provide a loan on a non-recourse basis (i.e., no personal guarantee) at LIBOR plus 8 percent, and that the private wealth division would be willing to provide a loan on a full recourse basis (with an unconditional personal guarantee) at LIBOR plus 4 percent . PX 470; TT 1036-1038. In 2014, the Trump Organization sought several more approvals from Deutsche Bank: (1) a loan for the Washington, D.C. “Old Post Office” project; (2) the renewal of an existing Trump Endeavor 12, LLC credit facility for Doral; and (3) an increase in the Trump Chicago credit facility. PX 294; TT 1041-1045. The approval process for these three discrete items was the same as the previous approval processes, except that a higher level of authority was needed to approve the transactions within the credit risk management team. TT 1045. Like the previous credit facilities, approval required Donald Trump, as guarantor, to maintain a minimum net worth of $2.5 billion, as “[t]he bank wanted to be sure that in an adverse market scenario the client would always have enough financial resources to be able to pay off our loan.” TT 1048-1049. Like the previous credit facilities, the credit risk management team noted that “[a]lthough all three Facilities are secured by Collateral, given the unique nature of these credits, the credit exposure is being recommended based on the financial profile of the Guarantor.” PX 294; TT 1050. Haigh noted that the Private Wealth Management Division did not normally extend loans that involved substantial reconstruction on its collateral, here, the Old Post Office, so the loan was approved in reliance Donald Trump’s personal guarantee. TT 1050-1051. Once again, as a required covenant, Donald Trump was obligated to provide certifications and annual statements of financial condition so that the bank could test his required covenants at any time. TT 1049. Rosemary Vrablic Rosemary Vrablic worked at Deutsche Bank in the Private Wealth Management Division and was the chief relationship manager for the Trump Organization. TT 994, 5484-5486. Vrablic explained that her job was to be “an intermediary between the customer and/or prospect and the credit and lending parts of the bank.” TT 5486. Vrablic served as the client intermediary for the bank for all three of the loans that Deutsche Bank’s Private Wealth Management Division extended to Donald Trump. TT 5486-5487. Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump’s husband, introduced Vrablic to Donald Trump in 2011. TT 5486, 5498-5499, 5511-5512. Vrablic testified that one goal of her job was to initiate a broadbased relationship with Donald Trump. TT 5499. Ivanka Trump was Vrablic’s main liaison for the subject credit facilities. TT 5504. Vrablic was not a part of the credit risk analysis team, and she had no input or authority on whether credit was ultimately extended. TT 5578. She was not involved in the bank’s annual review of Donald Trump’s SFCs. TT 5554, 5578-5579. Vrablic confirmed, and emails corroborate, that when considering whether to extend the Doral loan, the head of the global asset management group wrote: “I support the transaction, but we need iron clad full recourse under all circumstances,” indicating that an iron-clad personal guarantee was a non-negotiable term of the loan. DX 313; TT 5519-5521, 5572-5573. Vrabalic further confirmed that each of the Trump family members she dealt with, including Donald Trump, Donald Trump, Jr., and Ivanka Trump, fully understood the recourse requirement to obtain a loan from the Private Wealth Management Division. TT 5574-5777; PX 1129. Vrablic expected Donald Trump to submit accurate financial information to the bank. TT 5579. Doug Larson Doug Larson is a valuation advisor and certified New York real estate appraiser who currently works at Newmark. Prior to working at Newmark, he worked at Cushman & Wakefield for almost 25 years. TT 1558-1559. In 2015, while at Cushman & Wakefield, Larson appraised 40 Wall Street for Ladder Capital as part of its due diligence. TT 1560-1570; PX 118. Larson testified clearly and credibly that although his name is cited as the source to justify a 2.940 capitalization (or “cap”) rate⁸ on Niketown, a property in which Donald Trump owned two long-term leases on 57th Street, Larson never had a specific conversation with Jeffrey McConney in which he advised him that such a cap rate would be appropriate; nor was he aware that he was listed as a source for such a cap rate. TT 1572-1575; See, e.g., PX 758. Larson further said that he would not have advised McConney to select that cap rate, as “it’s not how we would value [it] in our practice.” TT 1583. Larson stated that McConney was incorrect in stating that he consulted with Larson when valuing Trump Tower. TT 1581. Upon learning that his name had been repeatedly used to justify cap rates that he had not recommended, Larson said it was “inappropriate and inaccurate…I should have been told and, you know, an appraisal should have been ordered.” TT 1587. Larson further took issue with his name being used to justify a cap rate on the property controlled by a Vornado partnership interest. In 2012, Larson appraised the property at 1290 Avenue of the Americas at $2 billion with a cap rate of 4.5 percent. PX 1824; TT 1588-1589. Notwithstanding, in the following SFC’s supporting data, McConney cites Larson as the source for using a 3.12 percent cap rate, even though he never worked with McConney to pick a cap rate to value that property, and that he would not have, as valuing minority interests is a specialized area beyond his expertise. TT 1589-1595. In a 2015 appraisal of 40 Wall Street, Larson included the value of a Dean & Deluca lease that yielded annual rent of $1.4 million, and he applied a 4.25 percent cap rate, for a total valuation of $540 million. Notwithstanding, the 2015 SFC backup data double-counted the Dean & Deluca lease. McConney also chose a much lower cap rate than that on the appraisal and listed the total value of 40 Wall Street at over $735 million, citing Larson as the source. Larson repeatedly confirmed that he was not a source for that number, that the number was nearly $200 million more than his own appraisal, and that he did not work with McConney or anyone else at the Trump Organization to determine the cap rate used to generate the $735 million value.⁹ PX 118,729; TT 1601-1606. Jack Weisselberg Since 2008, Jack Weisselberg has worked at Ladder Capital as a “loan originator,” which includes finding new business and maintaining the client relationship throughout the life of a loan. TT 1770-1773; 1779. When originating a loan for the Trump Organization, Jack Weisselberg primarily communicated with Allen Weisselberg (his father), Jeffrey McConney, and Donna Kidder. TT 1790-1791. Jack Weisselberg understood that the Trump Organization had concerns about its financial information becoming public because of a potential Ladder Capital loan (stating in an email to his supervisor that Donald Trump is “nervous about Gucci’s rent becoming public knowledge, as he tends to embellish from time to time”). PX 650; TT 1811-1816. In spring 2015, Allen Weisselberg began inquiring about the possibility of refinancing a loan on 40 Wall Street that was serviced by Capital One Bank. In January 2015, Allen Weisselberg wrote to Capital One asking it to waive an upcoming required $5 million principal payment. After Capital One declined to waive the payment, Allen Weisselberg contacted Jack Weisselberg about Ladder Capital refinancing the loan. TT 1820-1826. In the application process, the Trump Organization provided Ladder Capital with a paper copy of the 2014 SFC, although later required that it be returned to the company. TT 1858-1861, 1873-1876. Ladder Capital relied on the SFC for information about Donald Trump’s net worth and liquidity, and Ladder Capital incorporated the information from the SFC into its risk memorandum when determining whether to approve the loan. TT 1878-1891. As a condition of the Ladder Capital loan on 40 Wall Street, and to avoid setting aside ongoing cash reserves as a condition of the loan, Donald Trump was required to guarantee unconditionally payment of certain obligations of 40 Wall Street LLC, including insurance, tenant improvements, leasing commissions, capital expenditures, and ground lease payments. PX 625, 645; TT 1884-1886. In 2017, the Trump Organization approached Ladder Capital about a short-term loan on its property on Central Park South, which was then unencumbered, for the purpose of funding a $25 million settlement arising out of litigation by OAG against Trump University. People v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, Docket No. 451463/2013, Doc. 1 (Sup Ct, NY County). Jack Weisselberg testified that he understood that the loan was necessary because “they had recourse obligations to another lender [Deutsche Bank] that limited the amount of cash they could access.” In approving the loan, Ladder Capital helped Donald Trump avoid triggering a default on his outstanding Deutsche Bank’s lending covenants. TT 1817-1820. David McArdle David McArdle was, and still is, the senior managing director of Cushman & Wakefield and a professional appraiser. TT 1909-1910. In summer 2013, attorney Sheri Dillon, on behalf of the Trump Organization, retained McArdle to appraise portions of the Trump National Golf Course in Westchester County, New York. Even though Sheri Dillon and her law firm retained Cushman & Wakefield, McArdle stated “[i]t was widely understood that [the] intended users of this document would also be the Trump Organization, Donald J. Trump, [and] Eric Trump.” TT 1919-1926; px 157. The engagement was focused on the valuation of 71 potential attached units within the confines of the Trump National Golf Club in Briarcliff (“Briarcliff”). TT 1926. McArdle was retained because the Trump Organization was “contemplating a donation, conservation easement donation, and they were looking for my input on valuation of this 71-unit project.” TT 1928. In performing this work, Eric Trump was McArdle’s primary point of contact at the Trump Organization. TT 1926-1939, 1952. In fall 2013, McArdle told Eric Trump and Sheri Dillon that the highest supportable value for a potential conservation easement of the 71-units was $45 million. PX 1465; TT 1944-1945. McArdle explained that although “Eric had certain ideas of value” that were “a little more lofty and above $45 million,” the “team of Sheri, Bob and myself clearly recognized that we were sort of at the end here and anything beyond $45 million would have put some people at risk,” and “[i]t would not have been credible.” TT 1944-1945. In response, Eric Trump told McArdle to “hold off” sending a written appraisal. PX 3201; TT 1946-1948. In February 2014, McArdle was again retained for a similar engagement; this time he was tasked with valuing the same 71-units and, also, determining if a potential conservation easement would have any effect on the adjacent 18-hole golf club known as Trump National Golf Club Westchester, which included an already-built town home owned by Eric Trump on the perimeter of the property. TT 1949-1950. In April 2014, McArdle provided a written appraisal to Sheri Dillon that valued the 71-unit plot at $43.3 million. PX 3194; TT 1958-1963. In June 2014, Eric Trump again retained McArdle to appraise the same plot of land and changed the scope of the engagement to consider more IRS tax guidelines. Despite the change in scope, McArdle once again valued the 71-unit plot at $43.3 million. PX 132, 3217; TT 1963-1972. In July 2014, Sheri Dillon, on behalf of the Trump Organization, engaged Cushman & Wakefield to appraise land on the Seven Springs property in Westchester, New York. PX 131; TT 1980-1982. Once again, Eric Trump served as the primary point of contact for McArdle, including providing him with proposed comparables. TT 1983-1986. McArdle understood this to be a verbal assignment (meaning the client did not want to receive a written appraisal), but McArdle was obligated to build a work file as he “certainly couldn’t keep everything in [his] head.” TT 1988-1989. McArdle concluded that the valuation ranged from $36-50 million before discounting to present value, and $29.5 million when discounting was applied. TT 1990-1994. McArdle communicated these results verbally to Eric Trump in August 2014, before closing out the engagement at Sheri Dillon’s request in October 2014. PX 3206, 911, 185; TT 1995-1997. In June 2015, Eric Trump once again retained Cushman & Wakefield to appraise Seven Springs. This time, McArdle was unavailable, so he referred the assignment to a colleague, Tim Barnes. PX 104; TT 2001-2002. McArdle, whom the Court found credible, stated that Eric Trump’s testimony that he was not involved in the appraisal work on the Seven Springs property did not conform to McArdle’s recollection of events. TT 2005. William Kelly William Kelly is the general counsel of Mazars, a role he assumed in 2018. TT 2111, 2115. Kelly participated in the decision to terminate Mazars’ relationship with the Trump Organization in spring 2021. TT 2115-2116. Kelly said that the decision to terminate the relationship was based upon what Mazars “had come to learn about Allen Weisselberg,” stating: Allen Weisselberg was the CFO of the Trump Organization. He was our main contact at the Trump Organization for the providing — for them providing us financial information. If his representations to us about the accuracy and truthfulness of the financial records that he’s providing to us as the outside accountants is compromised, if we can no longer rely on him as CFO, then we can no longer perform our engagements. The engagements we were preparing at the time were preparing tax returns for the corporate entities and Donald Trump individually, as well as doing the statements of financial condition. Both of those engagements require that we rely upon the representations of management, in this case, Allen Weisselberg, the CFO. If we are no longer allowed or no longer reasonably allowed to rely on his management, we can no longer do those engagements. TT 2116-2117; PX 2992. Kelly, on behalf of Mazars, followed up with a letter to the Trump Organization dated February 9, 2022, in which he stated, as here pertinent: We write to advise that the Statements of Financial Condition for Donald J. Trump for the years ending June 30, 2011-June 30, 2020, should no longer be relied upon and you should inform any recipients thereof who are currently relying upon one or more of those documents that those documents should not be relied upon. We have come to this conclusion based, in part, upon the filings made by the New York Attorney General on January 18, 2022, our own investigation, and information received from internal and external sources. While we have not concluded that the various financial statements, as a whole, contain material discrepancies, based upon the totality of the circumstances, we believe our advice to you to no longer rely upon those financial statements is appropriate. PX 2994; TT 2119-2128. Kelly further emphasized that when Mazars was issuing the SFCs for Donald Trump, Mazars was performing a compilation, which is the lowest level of scrutiny of financial statement preparation, and which relies on the representations and information provided by the client. TT 2128-2131, 2149. Michael Holl Michael Holl is an employee of HCC Global (“HCC”), an international specialty insurance group. From 2015-2018, Holl served as an underwriter. TT 2487-2490. In December 2016, Holl was contacted by a broker at AON NY on behalf of the Trump Organization, indicating that the company was seeking additional Director & Officer (“D&O”) coverage. TT 2491-2492. Holl confirmed that to underwrite the account he would need to look at the “financials for those companies to understand what their financial situation is,” as it is relevant to assessing the risk. TT 2494. Holl elaborated that “[i]t’s relevant because you’re trying to find out if they’re a successful company and if they’re profitable and if they are in debt that they can’t manage and what their overall financial health is,” and “[i]f they are a bankruptcy risk, there is significant increase in the likelihood of a D&O claim if a company goes bankrupt.” TT 2494-2495. On January 10, 2017, Holl attended a meeting at the Trump Organization with Allen Weisselberg and other Trump Organization employees for the purpose of reviewing the Trump Organization’s financials as part of the insurance company’s due diligence. PX 588; TT 2496-2498, 2516. On the way home from the meeting, Holl drafted an email to his supervisors memorializing the information he obtained. PX 2985; TT 2498-2499. Holl’s contemporaneous email reads: “Saw very few financials but did see the balance sheet for year ends 2015. They assured me that the one being put together is better. They have total assets of 6.6 BB. Cash of $192 mm. Total debt of $519 mm. No single debt larger than $160mm.” PX 2985. Holl testified that the $192 million in cash was a meaningful number for him, as it “was a measure of liquidity for the company.” TT 2500. Holl’s contemporaneous email also reads: “No material litigation or communication from anyone.” PX 2985. Holl understood this to be a representation from the Trump Organization that there was no pending litigation or notices or communication that could lead to litigation and implicate the D&O policy, which he viewed in a positive light. TT 2500-2502. Holl deemed these representations relevant when HCC ultimately decided to extend coverage. TT 2502. Sheri Dillon Sheri Dillon is a tax lawyer who provided business and legal advice to the Trump Organization from 2005 through 2020. TT 2527. Throughout her various engagements from 2011-2020, Dillon interfaced with Donald Trump, Donald Trump, Jr. Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, Patrick Birney, and Jill Martin. TT 2532-2534. Contrary to the representations made to Holl about no pending litigation or claims, as early as June 2016 Dillon was aware of claims made against the Trump Organization that could trigger liability, and she had discussed such claims with Donald Trump, Jeffrey McConney, and Allen Weisselberg. TT 2540-2555. Part of her work for the Trump Organization was advising it about potential conservation easements. TT 2531. Dillon explained that a conservation easement is essentially a “negative covenant” in which someone who owns property agrees, in a recorded deed that runs in perpetuity with the land, not to do something, in exchange for a tax deduction that is “equal to the value of the easement.” TT 4123-4126. Dillon recalls working on potential conservation easements at Trump National Golf Club LA (“TNGCLA”), Briarcliff, and Seven Springs. As part of her engagements, Dillon would retain appraisers from Cushman & Wakefield. She explained that obtaining a qualified appraisal to value the potential conservation easement is an essential part of the process, as only a qualified appraisal could determine the value of the tax deduction that could be taken. TT 4127-4128. She clarified that qualified appraisers were tasked with determining the “highest and best use” of a property if it were developed. TT 4141-4142. When working on a potential conservation easement for TNGCLA, Dillon retained Brian Curry, of Cushman & Wakefield, who valued the driving range on the property at between $27-28 million in 2014. PX 944; TT 2578-2580. On March 12, 2015, Cushman & Wakefield sent an appraisal of the TNGCLA driving range portion of the property that valued it at $25 million as of December 26, 2014; the appraisal also valued the entire TNGCLA property, before any potential conservation easement, at $107 million. PX 1464; TT 2598-2603. Although Dillon could not recall exactly with whom at the Trump Organization she shared this valuation, she knows it would have gone to McConney, as he “would have needed it.” TT 2608-2611. Further, email communications demonstrate ongoing discussions between Dillon, Weisselberg, and Trump, Jr. about the potential conservation easement on TNGCLA. PX 1412; TT 4142-4146. Notwithstanding, the 2015 supporting data and accompanying SFC valued TNGCLA at over $140 million. PX 731; TT 2611-2623. In 2013, Dillon engaged Cushman & Wakefield, on behalf of the Trump Organization, to explore the potential benefits of donating a conservation easement over parts of the Trump National Golf Club located in Briarcliff. PX 157; TT 2626-2628. In so doing, Cushman & Wakefield was tasked with determining the value of 71 hypothetical residential units that could be built on the property. TT 2628; PX 3261. On October 1, 2013, David McArdle emailed Dillon and her colleague, indicating that McArdle was ready to move forward with a written appraisal report on Briarcliff. PX 3197. On October 16, 2013, Dillon emailed McArdle, as here pertinent: I spoke to Eric and he is aware that the more supportable value at this point is around $45M…I further explained that we needed to reconcile the comp sales approach with the [discounted cash flow], and in so doing, you and your team arrived at a value of around $45M, which remains quite substantial. I also noted that in the event the claimed value was too far off as ultimately determined by the IRS or a Court, a taxpayer could be subject to [a] valuation misstatement penalty, and we wanted to ensure that there would be no argument that a valuation misstatement occurred. Eric was pleased with the number. PX 1465. Later that same day, Eric Trump emailed McArdle and Sheri Dillon, instructing McArdle to finish the appraisal “but hold off sending the appraisal until further notice.” PX 3201. In February 2014, Dillon’s firm once again engaged Cushman & Wakefield to appraise Briarcliff. PX 158. In April 2014, Cushman & Wakefield submitted a written appraisal to Dillon, valuing the hypothetical 71-unit development at Briarcliff at $43.3 million. PX 3194; TT 2687. Dillon confirmed that it would have been her practice to share the values with her client along the way. TT 2687. Notwithstanding, beginning in November 2015, Eric Trump instructed McConney to leave the value of the 71 units at just over $101 million. PX 742, 758, 843. TT 3378-3379. He continued to do this for the 2016, 2017, and 2018 SFCs. By at least June 2014, Dillon became aware that the Trump Organization’s rights to build units at Briarcliff had been reduced from 71 units to 31 units. PX 3261; TT 2701-2702. Notwithstanding, the supporting data for every SFC from 2015-2021 values Briarcliff as if it had the right to build 71 units, and, indeed, explicitly states: “Sale of 71 Mid-Rise units approved.” PX 731, 742, 758, 774, 843, 857, 1501. In October 2012, Dillon, on behalf of the Trump Organization, engaged appraiser Robert Heffernan “to provide a written appraisal…estimating the fair market value of a conservation easement placed on the Client’s property located in the town of New Castle, New York (the ‘Seven Springs Estate’) for federal income tax purposes.” PX 908; TT 2703-2704. Email correspondence from Heffernan to Dillon demonstrates that as of December 18, 2012, Dillon was aware that Heffernan valued the potential Seven Springs conservation easement over seven mansion lots at $775,000 per raw lot, an estimate that would have valued the entire sevenmansion development at approximately $5.5 million. PX 3296; TT 2707-2708. Notwithstanding, the SFC backup data for 2013 demonstrates that on August 20, 2013, Eric Trump advised McConney to value the seven-mansion undeveloped plots on the SFC at a staggering $161 million. PX 708. By September 8, 2014, McArdle completed another verbal estimate of the value of the seven-mansion development at Seven Springs, this time valuing it at $14 million. PX 169, 181. Notwithstanding, the SFC backup data for 2014 demonstrates that on September 12, 2014, Eric Trump again advised McConney to value the seven-mansion undeveloped plots on the SFC at $161 million. PX 719. In June 2015, Eric Trump re-engaged Cushman & Wakefield to perform yet another appraisal on the potential Seven Springs conservation easement, this time asking it to value not just the seven-mansion undeveloped lots, but the entire Seven Springs property encompassed by three towns. PX 104; TT 2723. PX 195; TT 2724-2725. On November 6, 2015, Timothy Barnes of Cushman & Wakefield emailed Dillon its appraisal, which valued the entire Seven Springs property at $56.6 million, and the 7-mansion undeveloped lots at $23.5 million. PX 195; TT 2725-2726. As was her customary practice, Dillon informed her client of the appraisal. TT 2727. David Cerron David Cerron is the assistant commissioner for business development and special events at the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (“NYC Parks”). TT 2786-2787. In February 2010, NYC Parks published a Request for Offers (“RFO”) for operation and maintenance of a golf course at Ferry Point Park in the Bronx (“Ferry Point”). PX 3290. Cerron confirmed that NYC Parks was seeking an “entity that ha[d] the financial wherewithal to ensure that the course is maintained at a high level and also any other capital work that would be necessary.” TT 2793-2794. Cerron explained that NYC Parks had already invested $120 million in Ferry Point and “wanted to be sure that whoever we had operating the course had the financial capability to deliver on their obligations including making sure the course was operating and working every day.” TT 2794-2796. The RFO further stated that all offers had to include “financial statements and other supporting documentation of the Responder’s financial worth.” PX 3290. In March 2010, the Trump Organization submitted an offer in response to the RFO; the offer included a letter from Mazars stating that according to Donald Trump’s 2009 SFC, which Mazars had compiled, Donald Trump represented that his net worth was in excess of $3 billion and that he had over $200 million in cash reserves. PX 1331; TT 2796-2797. NYC Parks received four offers in response to the RFO. TT 2796. NYC Parks ultimately awarded the contract to the Trump Organization. In doing so, it highlighted that “Trump has provided Parks with documentation from WeiserMazars LLP, Certified Public Accountants, stating that Donald J. Trump has a substantial net worth and cash position. As set forth in Exhibit v. to the concession agreement, there is also a personal guarantee from Donald J. Trump regarding payment obligations and the completion of capital improvements.” PX 3291; TT 2298-2800. The award further emphasized that “Trump will be subject to auditing by Parks, the NYC Comptroller and Parks-authorized auditors.” PX 3291. Cerron testified that NYC Parks relied on the representations of Trump’s net worth and liquidity and considered it important to “receive truthful, accurate and complete information from offerors.” TT 2801-2802. Donald Trump signed the license agreement with NYC Parks on February 21, 2012. DX 981. The agreement required him to submit a personal guarantee to NYC Parks for financial obligations arising out of the operation of Ferry Point. DX 981; PX 3283. The guarantee additionally obligated Trump to submit an annual letter from his accountant stating that there had been no material adverse change in his net worth from the financial statements shared with NYC Parks during the RFO process (the “No MAC letters”). PX 3283; TT 2804-2805. The Trump Organization submitted No MAC letters to NYC Parks in 2011, 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2021, and in each letter, Mazars relied on that year’s SFC for the representation that there had been no material, adverse change in Donald Trump’s net worth. PX 3282, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3280, 3281. Cerron confirmed that NYC Parks expected that the No MAC letters would be true, complete and accurate, and that the submission of false or fraudulent information in the No MAC letters would be a matter of concern for NYC Parks and could lead to a referral to the New York City Department of Investigations. TT 2805-2806, 2812-2816. In June 2023, the Trump Organization assigned the Ferry Point license to Bally’s Corporation. The Trump Organization received $60 million from the deal, and Bally’s agreed to pay an additional $115 million to the Trump Organization if Bally’s obtained a gaming license for the site. TT 2850; PX 3304, 3306. Claudia Markarian Claudia Markarian, previously Claudia Mouradian, was an underwriter at Zurich Insurance from 2010-2020. PX 3324 at 7-10. During the period from late 2017 through 2020, she worked on the Trump Organization account as an underwriter for the commercial surety program. PX 3324 at 8, 18. Markarian worked with the insurance brokerage firm AON during her time working on the Trump Organization account. PX 3324 at 18. Markarian recalled that when reviewing the Trump financials for her underwriting responsibilities, she was prohibited from retaining a copy of any financials, and she was only permitted to view them at Trump Tower with Allen Weisselberg or Jeffrey McConney, or both, in the room at all times. Markarian testified that this was a “rare requirement by a customer.” PX 3324 at 17-18, 24-25, 58-59. During these on-site reviews at the Trump Organization, which occurred in late 2018 and early 2020, Markarian was shown the 2018 and 2019 SFCs, respectively, which listed as assets real estate holdings with valuations that Allen Weisselberg represented to Markarian had been determined each year by an outside professional appraisal firm. PX 1561, 1552, 3324 at 25-32. Markarian considered Weisselberg’s representation, which she recorded in her contemporaneous notes, to be favorable and an indication that the valuations were reliable. PX 1561, 1552, 3324 at 51-75. Notwithstanding Weisselberg’s explicit representation to Markarian, the Trump Organization never retained a professional appraisal firm to prepare any of the property valuations for the 2018 and 2019 SFCs. TT 952-955. Markarian’s contemporaneous memorandum for each on-site review reflected the amount of cash on hand, which she considered to have “great bearing” on her analysis because it indicated Donald Trump’s liquidity and represented the funds available to repay Zurich for a loss. PX 1561, 1552, 3324 at 30, 51-52. Markarian testified that she “relied on what [Weisselberg] said” about the valuations being determined by professional appraisers when she made her recommendation that the surety program be renewed in 2019 and 2020. PX 3324 at 32-34. She further relied on Weisselberg’s representation that the Trump Organization real estate assets do not fluctuate much in value regardless of economic cycles,¹⁰ and on the values in the 2018 and 2019 SFCs when making her recommendation to renew the programs. PX 3324 at 33-52. Markarian testified that at the time, she had no reason to doubt that Weisselberg was being truthful and honest in his representations and that she accepted at face value his representations about the values contained in the SFCs. PX 3324 at 28-53. When presented with Weisselberg’s testimony that confirmed that the Trump Organization did not engage any professional appraisers to perform valuations of the properties in the SFCs, Markarian testified that Weisselberg’s misrepresentations would have been “material” to her analysis, as “without the third party it — it means that there’s — it could possibly be less reliance on the numbers that are presented to me.” PX 3324 at 52-54. Markarian further testified that Weisselberg’s misrepresentations about the cash on hand, and specifically misrepresenting Donald Trump’s partnership interest in Vornado as cash available to him, would also have been “material” in her analysis to approve the renewals. PX 3324 at 54-56. Markarian stated that because the Trump Organization is a private company, not a publicly traded company, there is very little that underwriters can do to learn about its financial condition, other than to rely on the financial documents that the client provides to them. PX 3324 at 57. She explained that because of that, “it’s important to know that our customers are being truthful to us. If they’re not giving us true information or accurate information, that greatly impacts our underwriting decisions.” PX 3324 at 56-57 (further testifying that “if we find out that there’s — that they’re being untruthful, it will impact our underwriting of the account”). David Williams David Williams has worked at Deutsche Bank for the past 17 years. TT 5324. He is currently a senior lender and team leader in the Private Wealth Management Division. TT 5324. Williams testified that, generally, a payment default is more material than a covenant default, as it “speaks definitively to the repayment of the loan.” TT 5337. Williams stated that he was not aware of any payment defaults on any of Donald Trump’s loans with Deutsche Bank. TT 5339. Williams corroborated the testimony of Nicholas Haigh that Deutsche Bank would apply a standard 50 percent haircut to the values of assets supplied by a client on an SFC, testifying that “it is — it is after we have made what I would say are generally our standard adjustments that we apply to really any given high-net-worth individual or ultra-high-net-worth individual’s provided financial statements.” TT 5374-5375, 5382-5384. Williams confirmed that the numbers to which Deutsche Bank applied its standard haircut in evaluating the credit risk of the Trump loans came from Donald Trump’s SFCs. PX 498; TT 5400-5403. Williams testified that Donald Trump agreed to continue a guarantee requirement “in order to keep a more favorable pricing on the loans.” TT 5406-5407, 5417-5419; PX 498. In summer 2019, Deutsche Bank sent three different letters to Donald Trump, indicating that he was not in compliance with his Debt Service Coverage Ratio covenants under the Trump Chicago, Doral, and Old Post Office loans. PX 520, 521, 522. Williams confirmed that these notices were sent to Donald Trump because the covenant breaches could implicate the personal guarantee. TT 5410-5415. Williams testified that there were two more breaches of the Old Post Office and Trump Chicago loans in 2020. TT 5419-5420. Williams went on to detail that all three loans breached their debt service coverage requirements in 2021, resulting in Deutsche Bank commissioning appraisals on all three properties. TT 5424-5425; PX 561. Williams confirmed that in July 2021, Deutsche Bank determined to “exit” the client relationship with Donald Trump, stating “we would be opting not to renew or extend that credit facility, and we would advise the client with some advance notice of that.” TT 5425-5427; PX 561. Williams further corroborated that as a lending officer, he would expect a client to provide truthful and accurate information to the bank, and that Donald Trump’s net worth and personal guarantee were significant factors in Deutsche Bank’s determining whether to underwrite a loan. TT 5427-5428. Williams additionally confirmed his previous deposition testimony, in which he stated that had he determined that Donald Trump’s net worth fell below $2.5 billion at any time, he would have recommended that the private wealth division declare an “event of default.” TT 5429-5430. Emily Pereless Emily Pereless, formerly Emily Schroder, worked at Deutsche Bank from 2007 through 2015. TT 5448-5449. For a time, she worked as an analyst in the lending group of the Private Wealth Management Division. TT 5449-5451. Pereless confirmed that, at the request of the client, she went to Trump Tower to review Donald Trump’s financial statements. TT 5454-5455. She testified that in preparing a credit risk memorandum for a potential credit facility, the credit risk team would consult with Deutsche Bank’s Valuation Services Group about market conditions. TT 5455-5456. Pereless confirmed that her responsibility as a lender was to analyze the information provided and compile a report. TT 5459, 5463-5464, 5467. The Individual Defendant Witnesses Jeffrey McConney Jeffrey McConney was Controller of the Trump Organization from the early 2000s until February 25, 2023. TT 581-582; PX 3041 at 736. At the time of his testimony, McConney was still awaiting receipt of $125,000 of the $500,000 severance package the Trump Organization promised him. TT 582. McConney reported directly to Allen Weisselberg, the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), and to Donald Trump. TT 4910-4911. McConney took over responsibility for preparing the valuations for Donald Trump’s SFCs sometime in the 1990s and had primary responsibility for preparing the valuations and supporting data between 2011 and 2017. TT 583. Beginning in 2016, McConney began receiving assistance from Patrick Birney, who took over primary responsibility for preparing the valuations used in the SFCs after 2017. TT 583-584. McConney created and maintained annual spreadsheets referred to as “Jeff’s Supporting Data” (or “supporting data” or “supporting spreadsheets”) that contained the itemized valuations that became the aggregate numbers reported on the SFCs. Each annual version of Jeff’s Supporting Data¹¹ contained two years’ worth of information — the current year and the prior year — and included the valuation methodology and valuations for each of the assets used in the SFCs. TT 588. When McConney had primary responsibility for maintaining Jeff’s Supporting Data, all decisions about valuation would be made by him, in consultation with Allen Weisselberg. When Patrick Birney first came on board, decisions were made by McConney, Weisselberg, and Birney. Once Birney took over primary responsibility for maintaining Jeff’s Supporting Data, Birney and Weisselberg made the initial valuation decisions. TT 589. McConney understood that it was Donald Trump’s or his trustees’ responsibility to make sure that all financial records and related information were provided to Mazars. TT 590-591. McConney further understood that Donald Trump had engaged Mazars to perform a compilation, which differs significantly from a review or an audit. McConney acknowledged that the preparation of the compilation does not contemplate that the accountants would inquire, perform analytical procedures, assess fraud risk, or test accounting records. TT 592-594. He confirmed that Donald Trump would get final review for each financial statement after McConney and his team prepared it and Weisselberg approved it. TT 596-597, 5047. McConney’s emails and contemporaneous notes indicate that Eric Trump and Donald Trump, Jr. had final review of the SFCs after Donald Trump assumed the presidency of the United States, TT 5079-5084; PX 1361. McConney testified that he never hid any information from Donald Bender. TT 4915. However, this is belied by the documentary evidence and the testimony of Bender, which conclusively establish that Mazars did, in fact, inquire about appraisals, and that McConney falsely told them that there were none. TT 242-247, 4915, 4930; NYSCEF Doc. No. 1262 at 243. McConney testified that nearly all the disclaimer and valuation disclosure language that appeared in the SFCs was written by Mazars. However, he was then confronted with his handwritten notes to the draft SFC language that demonstrated that he, himself, marked-up and made changes to the majority of the language and forwarded those changes to Mazars to incorporate. TT 4928-4937, 5055-5059; PX 729, 3054. When confronted with this evidence, McConney conceded that “[m]y memory was incorrect” on direct examination and that he “frequently made changes.” TT 5059-5071. McConney was aware that Donald Trump had no right to withdraw funds from his interest in Vornado Partnerships, and yet he listed the interest on the SFCs from 2013 to 2021 as if it were cash immediately available to Donald Trump. TT 617-626, 5019. McConney knew that the SFCs had to be GAAP compliant. TT 629-630. He admitted pre-trial that it was “undisputed” that GAAP defines “estimated current value” as “the amount at which the item could be exchanged between a buyer and seller, each of whom is well informed and willing, and neither of whom is compelled to buy or sell.” PX 3041 at 31. After some equivocation, and baseless objections by counsel,¹² McConney confirmed this at trial. TT 627-631. During the period of 2012-2016, the Trump Organization hired Cushman & Wakefield to appraise 40 Wall Street, as required under the terms of another lending agreement. Doug Larson, of Cushman & Wakefield, was the primary contact on this project, and McConney was the Trump Organization’s conduit for all 40 Wall Street appraisals. TT 668-669. As part of these appraisals, Larson included cap rate calculations that he viewed as appropriate for the specifics of the property. On the valuations for the SFCs for the corresponding subject years, McConney selected cap rates that were lower than those that Doug Larson selected.¹³ The supporting spreadsheets for the same time period credit Doug Larson as the source for the chosen cap rates, notwithstanding that the rates were much lower than those that appeared in Larson’s appraisals. When questioned about the difference, McConney admitted that when choosing the lower cap rate, he relied on a generic marketing report that Cushman & Wakefield emailed a large customer base that was derived from data not specific, or even closely related, to 40 Wall Street. TT 660-681, 4995, 5101-5102. McConney further admitted that he made no attempt to adjust the numbers to reflect more accurately the value of 40 Wall Street when he was selecting cap rates. TT 681-682. When questioned about his working relationship with Doug Larson and his knowledge of these appraisals, McConney’s credibility was severely impaired, as he obfuscated and equivocated at length before finally conceding that between 2012 and 2016, when he was preparing the valuations for the SFCs, he was simultaneously acting as the conduit for Doug Larson for information needed for formal appraisals of 40 Wall Street. TT 668-674. He further admitted that despite his knowledge of these Cushman & Wakefield appraisals, he never sought to use any of these values for 40 Wall Street in the SFCs. TT 674-675. When valuing Trump Park Avenue on the SFCs, McConney knowingly valued rent-regulated apartments using an anticipated selling price that assumed not only that the apartments were unrestricted, but that they had already been renovated, thus failing to discount future value to present value. TT 4946-4953, 5097-5099. Although he testified that he knew “very little” about conservation easements, McConney said that he would select a value for the conservation easement based on “an appraisal done specifically for the conservation easement that had a before donation and after donation value.” TT 5000-5001. However, the SFCs from 2012-2014 demonstrate that McConney ignored several Seven Springs appraisals commissioned by the Trump Organization that valued the potential seven-mansion development at between $5.5 million and $21 million and instead valued the seven-mansion development at $161 million, citing Eric Trump as the source. PX 1075. McConney testified that for every SFC, Donald Trump valued Mar-a-Lago as if it were a private residence and not a social club, despite knowing that “Mar-a-Lago is a social club.” When asked the reason for his doing so, he testified: “I don’t remember off the top of my head.” TT 5018-5022. McConney’s credibility was further compromised when he was questioned about his testimony in the recent criminal trial of the Trump Organization brought by the District Attorney of New York. Initially, when questioned by OAG, McConney denied that Allen Weisselberg ever asked him to commit fraud on behalf of the Trump Organization. However, when confronted with his sworn testimony from the criminal trial, McConney admitted that Weisselberg did, on more than one occasion, ask McConney to assist him in committing tax fraud. TT 776-778. He further conceded, after initially denying, that even though he knew these activities were illegal at the time he was performing them, he continued to assist Weisselberg in committing fraud, as he was afraid that if he refused Weisselberg’s requests he would lose his job. TT 776-778. Plaintiff questioned McConney about his “Separation Agreement” with the Trump Organization, pursuant to which was to receive $500,000, to be paid in installments, the last of which remains outstanding. TT 5075. Plaintiff questioned him as to whether his agreement includes the same covenant found in Weisselberg’s separation agreement that prohibits voluntary cooperation with governmental investigations or any entity “adverse” to the Trump Organization. TT 5075-5076. McConney testified that he could not recall if his agreement contained that covenant, further straining his credibility, as it seems implausible that McConney would not remember such a requirement, given the many investigations in which the Trump Organization has been engaged since McConney signed the agreement. When asked how he feels today about the work he did on Donald Trump’s SFCs, McConney replied: “I feel great. I have no problems with the work I did on this.” TT 5041. Allen Weisselberg Allen Weisselberg was the CFO of the Trump Organization from 2002 until he was placed on leave in October 2022, after pleading guilty to 15 criminal counts of tax fraud and falsification of business records at the Trump Organization. TT 790; PX 1751, 3041. In that same vein, his testimony in this trial was intentionally evasive, with large gaps of “I don’t remember.” He conceded that his Separation Agreement, on which he is still apparently awaiting four payments, prohibits him from voluntarily cooperating with any entity “adverse” to the Trump Organization or its former or current employees. PX 1751. That alone renders his testimony highly unreliable. The Trump Organization keeps Weisselberg on a short leash, and it shows. As CFO, Weisselberg oversaw the Trump Organization’s accounting department, although he was not a certified public accountant (“CPA”) and did not know any components of GAAP. TT 788-790, 864. Before Donald Trump assumed public office in 2017, Weisselberg reported directly to him. TT 790. McConney reported directly to Weisselberg from the time McConney was hired until the time Weisselberg left the Trump Organization. TT 791. After Donald Trump assumed the presidency, Weisselberg’s reporting structure was “more informal”; he dealt “mostly with Eric Trump,” and “periodically” with Donald Trump, Jr. TT 790. From January 2017 through 2021, Weisselberg and Donald Trump, Jr. were the trustees of the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust and were responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of its SFCs. TT 794-795, 961-963; PX 756, 769, 1016. From 2011 until at least 2020, Weisselberg had a primary role in preparing the valuations for the SFCs, supervising McConney from 2011 until late 2016, and Birney and McConney from late 2015 until at least 2020. TT 1228-1231, 3561; PX 3041 at 714. Each year from 2011 to 2020, Weisselberg signed SFC engagement and management representation letters (the “Management Representation Letters”) as an executive officer of the Trump Organization (and for the 2016-2020 SFCs, also as a trustee of the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust). PX 3041 at 716-735, PX 753, PX 786. The Management Representation Letters to Mazars stated, as here pertinent, that the Trump Organization and Donald Trump undertook the following responsibilities: (a) the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements in accordance with the accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. (b) designing, implementing, and maintaining internal controls relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements. (c) preventing and detecting fraud. (d) identifying and ensuring that the company complies with the laws and regulations applicable to its activities. (e) the selection and application of accounting principles. (f) making all financial records and related information available to [Mazars] and for the accuracy and completeness of that information. See, e.g., PX-791. When Weisselberg signed the Management Representation Letters, he understood their contents, that Mazars was relying on those representations, and that Mazars would not have issued the SFCs without having secured those representations. TT 835-837, 969. Weisselberg further admitted that he was obligated to advise Mazars of the existence of any information in the Trump Organization’s possession that would contradict or be inconsistent with the values represented in the SFCs. TT 846-847. Notwithstanding his lack of knowledge of GAAP and his not knowing what the term “estimated current value” means, each year, Weisselberg represented to Mazars that the SFCs were presented in conformity with GAAP and that assets in the SFCs were stated at their estimated current value. TT 839-842. 940; see, e.g., PX 706. Weisselberg provided dozens of certifications to lending institutions affirming the truth and accuracy of the SFCs, knowing that if he failed to do so, Donald Trump would be in breach of his various loan covenants. TT 923-935. Between 2011 and when Donald Trump became president, before finalizing each SFC and its valuations, Weisselberg would give them to Donald Trump for final review and changes. TT 898. Weisselberg would not have permitted a final draft of the SFC to be issued to Mazars unless Trump had reviewed and was satisfied with it. PX 3041 at 676; TT 900. Once Donald Trump assumed the presidency, Weisselberg would give the SFCs to Eric Trump or Donald Trump, Jr. for final review. TT 899. Weisselberg testified that “I certainly am not one to value a property. I have no idea what properties are worth.” TT 896. Yet, Weisselberg also testified that he knew that the selling price, not the asking or offering price, is the relevant number in selecting comparable properties. TT 887-888. Weisselberg had final approval over the 40 Wall Street budgets and was, thus, aware that in 2011, the Trump Organization had a negative cash flow from 40 Wall Street. TT 1499, 1520-1521. He nonetheless directed Donna Kidder, a Trump employee who worked in accounting, to prepare a document containing a series of implausible assumptions to generate a $26.2 million net operating income.¹⁴ Weisselberg concealed from Kidder that these assumptions would be used for the SFC’s valuations. TT 1523-1526, 1529. Weisselberg confirmed that insurance company representatives could only review financial information at Trump Tower and were not permitted to make copies or take anything with them. TT 1187. On January 9, 2023, Weisselberg entered into a “Separation Agreement and General Release” with the Trump Organization wherein the Trump Organization promised him a total of $2 million dollars in installment payments as long as he performed his obligations under the agreement. Section 3(d) of the separation agreement provided that: [E]xcept for acts or testimony directly compelled by subpoena or other lawful process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, he will not: (1) communicate with, provide information to, or otherwise cooperate in any way with any other person or entity, including his counsel or other agents, having or claiming to have any adverse claims against the Company or any person or entity released by this Agreement, with regard to the adverse claim; or (2) take any action to induce encourage, instigate, aid, abet or otherwise cause any other person or entity to bring or file a complaint, charge, lawsuit or other proceeding of any kind against the Company or any person or entity released by this Agreement.15 PX 1751; TT 796-798. Weisselberg affirmed that he understood that under the terms of the separation agreement, he was not permitted to cooperate voluntarily with any law enforcement agency adverse to the Trump Organization, including the Attorney General’s Office. TT 1193-1195. Donald Trump, Jr. Donald Trump, Jr. started his employment at the Trump Organization in 2001. TT 3160, 3976. Early in his tenure, he worked as a project manager at Trump Park Avenue, where he did a “[l]ittle bit of everything; design, construction, overseeing some of the banking relationships we had, anything and everything.” TT 3161-3162. Trump, Jr. affirmed that, at the time, he knew about the impact of rent stabilization laws on development at Trump Park Avenue, and he was aware of the limitations imposed by that law. TT 3162. Trump, Jr. also served as project manager for Trump Chicago, working on “everything from design, architecture, sales and marketing, finance, construction…[y]ou name it.” TT 3162-3163. Since at least 2011, Trump, Jr. has served as an executive vice-president of the Trump Organization, reporting to his father, until Donald Trump assumed the presidency in January 2017. TT 3164, 3167. After that, Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump served as co-chief executive officers of the Trump Organization and, collectively, with Allen Weisselberg, had “ultimate authority over decisions made at the Trump Organization.” TT 3164-3170. TT 3286-3288. In addition to their role as co-CEOs of the Trump Organization, beginning in January 2017, Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump were also presidents, directors, executive vice presidents, and/or chairmen of various Trump Organization entities. PX 1329 at 13-25. Also in January 2017, Trump, Jr. and Weisselberg became trustees of the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, which Trump, Jr. understood to be “the trust that governed all of my father’s assets[,] especially while he was president.” TT 3170, 3179, PX 769. When examined about his knowledge of Allen Weisselberg’s departure from the Trump Organization, Trump, Jr. testified that Weisselberg was terminated from his role as trustee because of his criminal indictment, but that he was not terminated from his employment at the helm of the Trump Organization for that reason. TT 3170-3172. Trump, Jr. then testified that he does not know the details of how or why Weisselberg ended his employment relationship with the Trump Organization, which this Court finds entirely unbelievable. TT 3172-3173. On January 20, 2021, Donald Trump re-appointed himself as a trustee of the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust and removed Trump, Jr., while leaving Weisselberg as a “business trustee.” PX 1016; TT 3185-3186. After Weisselberg was terminated from his role as trustee in June of 2021, Trump, Jr. was re-appointed trustee on July 7, 2021. Apparently,¹⁶ Trump, Jr. remains the sole trustee of the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust. TT 3181-3185, 3190-3191; PX 1015, 1016. In early 2016, at the request of “one of the three children” (referring to Donald Trump’s three adult children), Patrick Birney created and distributed to Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, and Trump, Jr. a “Trump Organization Operating Financial Summary 2015″ to keep them informed of the performance of the business, in anticipation of taking over. PX 1293; TT 1181-1186. Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump were continuously kept apprised of the operating financials by Weisselberg. TT 3270-3273; PX 1454. In January 2017, Trump, Jr., along with Eric Trump, took over responsibility for running the Trump Organization. TT 3982-3983. In March 2017, Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump were given power of attorney over certain of their father’s real estate and banking relationships. PX 1330; TT 3174-3177. The power of attorney explicitly states “[t]he authority granted hereunder is solely with respect to the execution and delivery of certifications and similar documentation (including, without limitation, compliance certificates) in connection with existing financings in which Donald J. Trump is guarantor.” PX 1330; TT 3177-3178, 3433-3434. Trump, Jr. stated that his father had no role in decision-making at the Trump Organization between January 20, 2017 and January 20, 2021, but that he resumed “some” decision-making after January 20, 2021, choosing certain activities in which to get involved. TT 3173-3174, 3984. From January 2017 through 2021, Trump, Jr. and Weisselberg, as trustees of the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, were responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the SFCs. See, e.g., PX 756; TT 961-963. Trump, Jr. acknowledged that as a trustee, he was subject to fiduciary responsibilities. In his capacity as trustee, Trump, Jr. certified that he was “responsible for the accompanying statement of financial condition…and the related notes to the financial statement in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.” See, e.g., PX 756. He did this every year from 2017 to 2021 despite having no knowledge of the requirements of GAAP, never having been employed in a position that required him to apply GAAP, and never having received any training on applying GAAP. TT 3155-3156. In his capacity as trustee, Trump, Jr. also certified that the values of assets contained in the SFCs were “estimated current values.” See, e.g., PX 756. On March 3, 2017, Alan Garten, chief legal officer for the Trump Organization, forwarded Trump, Jr. an email from Forbes that, inter alia, questioned the claimed size of Donald Trump’s Trump Tower Triplex and cited that property records indicated it was only 10,996 square feet. PX 1344. Trump, Jr. acknowledged receiving the email, and he responded that same day with: “Insane amount of stuff there.” PX 1344. Notwithstanding, four days later, on March 10, 2017, Trump, Jr., along with Weisselberg, signed a Management Representation Letter to Mazars in which they represented the value of the Triplex based on the false assumption that it was 30,000 square feet. PX 741; TT 3231-3234. Trump, Jr. testified that he could not recall if he did any fact checking or “anything” in response to the Forbes inquiry, despite specifically affirming the following representations in the Management Representation Letter: (2) We have made available to you all financial records and related data, and any additional information you requested from us for the purpose of the compilation. We have not knowingly withheld from you any financial records or related data that in our judgment would be relevant to your compilation. … (4) We acknowledge and have fulfilled our responsibility for designing, implementing, and maintaining internal control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of the personal financial statement that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. (5) We acknowledge our responsibility for designing, implementing, and maintaining internal control to prevent and detect fraud. (6) We have no knowledge of any allegations of fraud, or suspected fraud, affecting us that could have a material effect on the personal financial statement. PX 741; TT 3231-3234. When asked on whom he relied to assure himself that making the representations in the Management Representation Letter was appropriate, Trump, Jr. testified: “I don’t recall who I relied on.” TT 3236. Yet, when he signed the certifications, Trump, Jr. “intended for the bank to rely upon [them].” TT 3241, 3250. Trump, Jr. signed certifications verifying the accuracy of the SFCs submitted to Deutsche Bank in 2017, 2018 and 2019. See, e.g., PX 1386, 393; TT 3238-3239. While disclaiming responsibility for the SFCs contents, Trump, Jr. testified that he “would have sat with the relevant parties,” which he identified as Weisselberg, McConney, and Bender, to discuss the SFCs. TT 3238-3241. Trump, Jr. also certified to Mazars that there were no significant changes in Donald Trump’s net worth in 2017 and 2018, upon which Mazars relied in issuing the No MAC letters to NYC Parks to fulfill Donald Trump’s obligations under the Ferry Point contract. PX 3280, 3285. In 2023, Trump, Jr. approved the sale and assignment of the Ferry Point contract to Bally’s for $60 million, with an additional $115 million to be paid to the Trump Organization should Bally’s obtain a gaming license for the site. PX 3304, 3305, 3306; TT 3261-3268. Despite disclaiming responsibility for or knowledge of the SFCs contents, Trump, Jr. still insisted that the SFCs were “materially accurate.” TT 3275-3276. Trump, Jr. mistakenly testified that Mark Hawthorn is the current chief financial officer (“CFO”) of the Trump Organization, claiming that he replaced Allen Weisselberg. TT 3282-3283, 3987. However, the CFO position has remained unfilled since Allen Weisselberg departed the Trump Organization. TT 5245-5248. Eric Trump Eric Trump joined the Trump Organization right after college in 2006. TT 3285. From the time he became an executive vice president in 2014, until Donald Trump assumed the presidency in January 2017, the hierarchy of the Trump Organization was like a pyramid, with Donald Trump at the top. TT 3286. During this period, Eric Trump reported directly to his father. TT 3287. In early 2016, at the request of “one of the three children”¹⁷ (referring to Donald Trump’s three adult children), Patrick Birney created and distributed to Eric Trump, Ivanka Trump, and Donald Trump, Jr. a “Trump Organization Operating Financial Summary 2015″ to keep them informed of the performance of the business. PX 1293; TT 1181-1186. Allen Weisselberg affirmed that he was directed to advise Eric, Ivanka, and Trump, Jr. of the performance of the business “as Mr. Trump had now become president,” “[t]hey wanted to be knowledgeable about the running of the business…[s]o [in] 2016, he was in the process of running for president and they wanted to get up to speed on how the business was operating.” TT 1185-1186. Beginning in January 2017, Eric Trump, Trump, Jr. and Weisselberg ran the day-to-day operations of the Trump Organization. TT 3288. Eric Trump confirmed that beginning in January 2017, he did not report to anyone, although he confirmed that post-presidency, he resumed following his father’s directives. TT 3289. Eric Trump became involved in the Seven Springs project in 2012. TT 3289-3290. He testified that “I never had anything to do with the Statement of Financial Condition.” TT 3292. However, McConney’s supporting spreadsheets from 2012-2014 indicate that he relied on Eric Trump for the valuations of Seven Springs, which were inflated to $161 million for the undeveloped seven mansions, far more than the $21 million appraised value, of which Eric Trump was aware. PX 793, 708, 719. Eric Trump’s credibility was severely damaged when he repeatedly denied knowing that his father ever even compiled an SFC that valued his assets and showed his net worth “until this case came into fruition.” Upon being confronted with copious documentary evidence conclusively demonstrating otherwise, he finally conceded that, at least as early as August 20, 2013, he knew about his father’s SFCs (begrudgingly acknowledging: “It appears that way, yes”). TT 3292-3294, 3300-3304, 3307-3316, 3319-3336; PX 1071, 1079, 1112, 1113, 1075, 3333, 1091, 1265, 3332. Moreover, emails indicate that contrary to Eric Trump’s testimony, McConney relied on Eric Trump for the $161 million valuation of the undeveloped seven-mansion plot at Seven Springs, from 2012-2014. PX 1075. In particular, an August 20, 2013 email from Jeff McConney to Eric Trump, with the subject “Seven Springs,” reads: “Hi Eric, I’m working on your Dads [sic] annual financial statement. I need to value Seven Springs. Attached please find how we valued it last year. Can you let me know when you have time to talk about this year’s valuation? Thanks Jeff.” PX 1075. When the documentary evidence against him became overwhelming, Eric Trump reversed his previous testimony: Q. It is correct that when you received this e-mail in August of 2013, you understood that your father had an annual financial statement and you understood that Mr. McConney was asking you for information specifically to assist him in working on the notes to the annual financial statement; isn’t that correct? A. Yes. TT 3325, 3339. Although Eric Trump advised McConney in August 2013 to continue to use the $161 million value for the proposed seven-mansion development at Seven Springs, emails demonstrate that Eric Trump was aware of a valuation by a professional appraiser, engaged by the Trump Organization, who valued the hypothetical development at approximately $5.5 million. PX 908, 3296; TT 3342-3349. By September 8, 2014, a mere four days before Eric Trump advised McConney to continue using $161 million as the value for the seven-mansion development in the 2014 SFC, David McArdle of Cushman & Wakefield had completed an appraisal for the property and delivered a verbal estimate to Eric Trump of $14 million. PX 169, 181, 3331; TT 3349-3354. Eric Trump’s testimony that he had very limited involvement in the appraisal work that McArdle performed on Seven Springs and Briarcliff was shown to be false when he was confronted with the ample contemporaneous documentary evidence demonstrating otherwise. PX 133, 1074, 3206, 3327, 3207, 3189, 3190, 3328, 3195, 3196, 3204, 3202, 3201; TT 3360-3364, 3367-3381, 3383-3385, 3427-3432. He unconvincingly tried to distance himself from this evidence, asserting that he was not focused on it because, “I am a construction guy.” TT 3385. Despite retaining McArdle in August 2013 to value the proposed 71-units at Briarcliff, and receiving a professional appraised value of $45 million, Eric Trump directed McConney to value the proposed units at over $101 million in the 2014-2018 SFCs. PX 719, 742, 758, 843; TT 3378-3379. In 2020, Eric Trump, as attorney-in-fact for his father, signed three certifications based on the SFCs and sent to Deutsche Bank to satisfy obligations for the Trump Chicago, Doral, and Old Post Office loans. PX 518. TT 3434-3438. In 2021, again as attorney-in-fact for his father, Eric Trump signed two certifications based on that year’s SFC, and sent them to Deutsche Bank to satisfy obligations under the Doral and Old Post Office loans. PX 517; TT 3438-3442. When questioned about his knowledge and involvement in valuing Mar-a-Lago, Eric Trump adamantly maintained that it was appropriate to value Mar-a-Lago as a private residence, even though it was being taxed as a commercial club and the deed prohibited, in perpetuity, use of it as anything other than a social club. TT 3445-3451; PX 1013. When confronted with Patrick Birney’s testimony that Eric Trump and Trump, Jr. participated in a video conference call in fall 2021 to discuss the preparation of the 2021 SFC, Eric Trump acknowledged that he would have “no reason to doubt Pat.” TT 3385-3391. Eric Trump, on behalf of the Trump Organization, signed Allen Weisselberg’s separation agreement, in which, in exchange for $2 million in installment payments, Allen Weisselberg agreed, inter alia, not to disparage or criticize the Trump Organization or its current or former employees, and not to cooperate voluntarily with law enforcement or anyone with adverse legal claims to the Trump Organization unless compelled to by a court. PX 1751; TT 3451-3457. Eric Trump took responsibility for negotiating the terms of the separation agreement. TT 3457. Donald Trump Donald Trump is the beneficial owner of the collection of companies branded as “the Trump Organization.” TT 3472. From May 1, 1981 through January 19, 2017, he was its Director, President, and Chairman. TT 3472. He is also the sole beneficiary of the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, under which all Trump Organization assets are held. TT 3472. After he assumed the presidency in 2017, Donald Trump appointed Donald Trump, Jr. and Allen Weisselberg as the trustees of the trust. TT 3474. When he left the White House in 2021, Donald Trump re-appointed himself as the sole trustee of the trust, stating that “I figured that I would be back in the business world for a little while…So, I figured that I would be back in business, I might as well be the Trustee.” TT 3475. However, on July 7, 2021, Donald Trump once again removed himself as trustee, stating that “I think we were at a position where I was gaining more and more confidence in my family in terms of business.” PX 1720; TT 3475-3476. He re-appointed Trump, Jr. and Weisselberg as trustees. TT 3476-3477. Donald Trump testified that Weisselberg and McConney were responsible for maintaining complete and accurate books and records of the Trump Organization. TT 3617. Donald Trump confirmed that Weisselberg and McConney prepared the supporting data on which the SFCs were based before coming to him for final review. TT 3491. Donald Trump acknowledged that he reviewed the SFCs each year from 2011 to 2017 before they became final, further adding that “I would see them. And I would maybe, on occasion, have some suggestions.” TT 3478, 3513. He recalled that on specific occasions Weisselberg and McConney asked his opinion about the valuations of 40 Wall Street, Seven Springs, and his limited partnership with Vornado. TT 3495-3496; 3519-3522; PX 3344. Donald Trump also acknowledged that, as he certified to Mazars in the Management Representation Letters, he was responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of financial statements. PX 730; TT 3481-3482, 3564-3568. He understood that Deutsche Bank would rely on his certifications to determine if he was complying with his loan covenants. TT 3620-3623, 3630. Donald Trump insisted that the values within the SFCs were not only not fraudulently inflated, as this Court has already found, but that, if anything, they were deflated, as the following exchange with OAG demonstrates: Q. In light of your expertise in real estate, do you recall ever thinking that the values were off in your Statements of Financial Condition? A. Yeah, on occasion. Q. What were some of those occasions? A. Both high and low; both high and low. Q. Which occasions do you recall? A. I thought that Mar-a-Lago was very underestimated, but I didn’t do anything about it. I just left it be. It didn’t matter, I didn’t care, because the numbers you are talking about here is, you know, they are very big numbers, very, very big. Far bigger — the values are far bigger than what is on the financial statement. I thought Mar-a-Lago was underestimated. I thought 40 Wall Street was very underestimated because that building has tremendous value. I thought that there were numerous other things. I thought Doral was very underestimated. I thought it was considerably more valuable. Not necessarily [its] golf courses, but it is right in the middle of Miami, right next to the airport. I would say you could build thousands of units and hotels on the site. So you don’t look at it as a golf course. It is a great golf course, very successful, four of them, four courses. One was sold. It was five. One was sold that was a little disconnected, and [I] sold it. But I thought Doral was very underestimated. … Q. [I]f anything, do you think the statement undervalued your assets; is that correct? A. Yes, by a lot. The financial statements. TT 3487-3488, 3495. When asked about his limited partnership interest in Vornado, and specifically, whether he had control over the assets, Donald Trump equivocated several times, extolling the virtues of his limited partnership, before ultimately conceding: “In the true sense, no.” TT 3518-3519. When examined about the valuation of Mar-a-Lago, Donald Trump did not recall having any specific conversations with Weisselberg or McConney about valuing it as a private residence, although he conceded that it was valued on the SFCs as if it could be sold as a private residence. TT 3527-3530. When confronted with the 2002 deed¹⁸ in which he signed away, in perpetuity, the right to use or develop Mar-a-Lago as anything other than as a social club, in exchange for a conservation easement tax benefit, he offered that “when you say, ‘intend,’ intend doesn’t mean we will do it.” PX 1730; TT 3533-3535. Nonetheless, Donald Trump insisted that he believed Mar-a-Lago is worth “between a billion and a billion five” today, which would require not only valuing it as a private residence, which the deed prohibits,¹⁹ but as more than the most expensive private residence listed in the country by approximately 400 percent.²⁰ TT 3530. When questioned about Aberdeen, and whether he was aware that the SFCs for 2014-2018 valued the property as if the Trump Organization could build 2500 year-round private residences (when in fact, they had received permission to build only 500), Donald Trump testified: “I don’t know, but it could very well be. It’s sort of like a painting. You could do pretty much what you want to do. The land is there. You could do what you want to do. So you could do either one of them, actually.” TT 3539-3547. When confronted with evidence that, in 2014, the Trump Organization had submitted a statement to UK regulators stating that the Trump Organization did not intend to develop the Aberdeen property any further because of Donald Trump’s opposition to wind farms, Trump testified: “At some point that will be developed into a magnificent job. I just don’t want to do it now.” TT 3547-3549. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 2014-2018 SFCs valued Aberdeen not only as if Donald Trump had permission to develop 2500 private year-round residences, which he did not, but also as if those residences had already been built, and the SFCs and supporting data failed to account for any development costs associated with making the hypothetical residences a reality. PX 719, 731, 742, 758, 774. When questioned about whether he had ever inflated the value of 40 Wall Street, Donald Trump was confronted with a Forbes article, including a published audio recording, dated September 21, 2022, that reported that Trump had told Forbes in 2015 that 40 Wall Street was 72 stories tall, when in fact, it is only 63, resulting in an overvaluation of $50 million. The article also reported that Donald Trump told Forbes that 40 Wall Street had a net operating income of $64 million in 2015, when in fact, the building ran a deficit²¹ of more than $8.7 million for the 12-month period ending on March 31, 2015. TT 3568-3576; PX 652, 636. When asked if he was misquoted in the Forbes article, Donald Trump replied “I don’t know. I don’t know what I said.” TT 3571. When asked if he still approved of the work that McConney and Weisselberg did in preparing the SFCs from 2011-2017, Donald Trump testified: “As far as I know I do. You haven’t shown me anything that would change my mind.” TT 3551. Donald Trump stated he was not involved in the preparation of the 2021 SFC, and that it would have been prepared by Weisselberg, McConney, Trump, Jr., and Eric Trump. TT 3523. Donald Trump was aware that receiving loans from the Deutsche Bank Private Wealth Management Division required him: to provide a personal guarantee; to maintain a minimum net worth of $2.5 billion; to maintain unencumbered liquidity of $50 million at all times; and to submit annual SFCs to Deutsche Bank, so that Deutsche Bank could test his compliance with the loan covenants. TT 3586-3601, 3604-3614; PX 426, 312, 307, 1844, 309, 394, 503. When Donald Trump sold the Old Post Office hotel, he paid off the Deutsche Bank loan, and the following profits were distributed: $126,828,600 to Donald Trump; $4,013,024 to Eric Trump; $4,013,024 to Donald Trump, Jr., and $4,013,024 to Ivanka Trump. PX 1373, TT 3624-3626. When questioned about Weisselberg’s guilty plea to tax fraud in connection with his employment at the Trump Organization, Donald Trump challenged that Weisselberg had committed any wrongdoing (to which Weisselberg admitted), saying “I mean is there something wrong…I mean IBM executives get apartments that are compensated by IBM. And lots of other companies do. But people that work for me can’t be so compensated? I don’t know, I don’t think that’s a big thing. Is it?”²² TT 3632-3634. Overall, Donald Trump rarely responded to the questions asked, and he frequently interjected long, irrelevant speeches on issues far beyond the scope of the trial. His refusal to answer the questions directly, or in some cases, at all, severely compromised his credibility. The Party Witnesses Donna Kidder Donna Kidder joined the Trump Organization in 2007 as a senior accountant and currently serves as Assistant Controller. TT 1491-1492. Since at least 2008, she has overseen preparing spreadsheets illustrating the cash positions of each Trump Organization entity for the purpose of enabling Allen Weisselberg to provide Donald Trump with weekly updates.²³ TT 1513-1515. From 2011-2021, Kidder also prepared, in consultation with Weisselberg and Matthew Calamari (another Trump Organization employee), budget projections for 40 Wall Street and Trump Tower that were then incorporated into financial statements sent to third parties. TT 1520-1524; 1529-1533. Weisselberg directed Kidder to assume certain things when preparing the budget projections, such as presupposing that any vacant space remaining in a property would be fully leased by the end of the year and omitting management fees from affiliated entities (falsely claiming that “payment[s] to an affiliated company” did not have to be included in costs). TT 1524-1525, 1536-1539. Weisselberg reviewed and approved any financial document that went to an outside party. TT 1530-1533. Jeffrey McConney tasked Kidder with preparing an annual report that projected the amount of fees that Donald Trump would receive through licensing deals. TT 1550-1551; PX 3169. Kidder’s projections were then provided to Mazars and incorporated into the SFCs. TT 1551-1556. However, Kidder’s projections, as directed by McConney and Weisselberg, contained undiscounted figures, as it assumed that all revenue would be received within one year regardless of how many deals were finalized or the pace at which offers were being received. TT 1550-1556; PX 774, PX 3168. Patrick Birney Patrick Birney is a current employee of the Trump Organization. He started there in 2015 as a senior financial analyst, and in the eight years since, he has held the titles of Associate, Assistant Vice President of Financial Operations, and Vice President of Financial Operations, the title he currently holds. TT 1198-1199. Patrick Birney is neither a CPA nor a licensed appraiser, and he has received no training in applying GAAP or Accounting Standards Codification 274 (“ASC-274″). TT 1199; 1211. Before joining the Trump Organization, Birney worked at AON, an insurance broker, in claim management, where he serviced the Trump Organization insurance accounts. TT 1199-1201. While at AON, he liaised with who people referred to as the “Team of Four” that was comprised of Allen Weisselberg, Ron Lieberman, Matthew Calamari, and Michael Cohen, who were responsible for overseeing the Trump Organization’s insurance program. TT 1200-1201. From in or around November 2016 through 2021, Birney prepared the initial valuations for Donald Trump’s SFCs. TT 1207-1208, 5305. Birney maintained Jeff’s Supporting Data, which referred to the spreadsheets that supported the numbers on Donald Trump’s SFCs. He also maintained the “backup,” which referred to “anything that was used to” support the information on Jeff’s Supporting Data. TT 1204, 1207-1209. When Birney took over for Jeffrey McConney in preparing and maintaining Jeff’s Supporting Data, he would show his draft to and ask questions of Weisselberg, and Weisselberg would review them, answer the questions, and adjust whatever he deemed appropriate. TT 1212, 1213; 1220-1228. When Birney took over primary responsibility for preparing and maintaining the SFCs’ supporting data, McConney still selected cap rates, appropriate comparables, and valuation methods. TT 1220-1228. When valuing Trump Tower for the 2018 and 2019 SFCs, Weisselberg instructed Birney to remove the management fees from the net operating expenses, even though they were an expense, and to apply a 2.67 cap rate, despite Birney’s raising concerns with Weisselberg that he might not be able to support such a low cap rate. TT 1310-1318, 1332-1342. Birney confirmed that the only reason the Trump Tower Triplex’s square footage on the supporting spreadsheets was updated to reflect accurately the size was in response to the Forbes article. TT 5592-5593. To maintain an inflated value for the Triplex despite correcting the square footage, Weisselberg told Birney to use the “most expensive” and “record shattering” penthouse sales when calculating price per square foot. TT 1241-1247; PX 767, 2530. Between 2017 and 2019, Weisselberg told Birney that Donald Trump wanted to see his net worth on his SFCs increase. TT 1409-1410. Birney stated that the process of preparing the 2020 supporting data for the SFC was different than it had been for the years 2016-2019 in that “there was more input from more people,” specifically identifying Ray Flores, Adam Rosen, and Alan Garten. TT 1229-1231. The process for preparing the 2021 SFC was similar to that of 2020, with the exception that Weisselberg was not involved and McConney was “barely involved.” TT 1233. Mark Hawthorn In 2016, the Trump Organization hired Mark Hawthorn, a CPA, as the Chief Accounting Officer for Trump Hotels. Currently, he is the Chief Operating Officer of Trump Hotels. TT 1414-1416, 1421. The role of Chief Executive Officer of Trump Hotels has remained vacant since its last CEO departed in May 2022. TT 1417. Hawthorn currently reports directly to Eric Trump, who has overseen the hotel division since at least 2016, and whom Hawthorn understood to be the chief decision-maker at the company. TT 1417-1421, 5128-5129. Hawthorn oversees accounting and finance for the hotels’ properties, and he frequently interacted with Allen Weisselberg, Jeffrey McConney, Donna Kidder, and Patrick Birney, who collectively oversaw the separate corporate accounting group. TT 1419-1421. Hawthorn conceded that including the Vornado partnership interest in the cash asset category of Donald Trumps’ SFCs was inaccurate. TT 1414-1454. Hawthorn affirmed that the requirements of GAAP must still be followed when performing a compilation. TT 5279. Although Hawthorn was the only CPA with knowledge of GAAP in the Trump Organization senior management, and, thus, the only one qualified to calculate correctly the present value of future cash flows to estimated current values, neither Weisselberg, nor McConney, nor Birney ever once asked for Hawthorn’s assistance in preparing the SFCs. TT 1487-1489, 5139. When Weisselberg left the Trump Organization, Hawthorn took over part of his responsibilities in the corporate accounting department, although he never participated in preparing the supporting data for any of Donald Trump’s SFCs. TT 5244-5245. On September 8, 2022, the Trump Organization, by Adam Rosen, requested that Deutsche Bank forego the requirement that Donald Trump submit his annual SFC on his outstanding loan, and, instead, accept a “one-page spreadsheet that shows his material assets and liabilities but does not show any valuations of real estate.” PX 563; TT 5259-5265. On September 23, 2022, Deutsche Bank rejected that request, making it clear that, “[th]e modified financial reporting you have proposed is not acceptable to Deutsche Bank,” and further quoting the covenant of the loan that requires submission of an SFC. PX 563. Hawthorn testified that, notwithstanding this correspondence, it was the Trump Organization’s position that Deutsche Bank did not require the submission of further SFCs, notwithstanding that the Trump Organization continued to seek an extension from Deutsche Bank of Donald Trump’s time to submit an SFC. TT 5263-5270; PX 562. Hawthorn ultimately conceded that he was not suggesting “that there was ever a point in the life of this loan where the guarantor ceased to have an obligation to submit a compliance certificate attaching Mr. Trump’s Statement of Financial Condition.” TT 5272. Hawthorn confirmed that “the company no longer prepares a Statement of Financial Condition,” again insisting it is not required by any lenders. TT 5282-5284. Raymond Flores Raymond Flores joined the Trump Organization in 2012 as an analyst on the acquisitions and development team. In 2014 he was promoted to associate, and in 2016 he was promoted to vice-president, where he began negotiating financial agreements and managing properties. TT 2038-2039. From 2016 until he left the Trump Organization in March 2022, he reported to Donald Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump. TT 2040-2041. While vice president, Flores interacted weekly with Allen Weisselberg, explaining that Weisselberg would reach out to him for information about certain properties that Flores had a role in managing and overseeing, including the Old Post Office in Washington D.C., the Doral golf resort, and the Chicago hotel. TT 2042. During that time, McConney would also ask for information about the properties that Flores oversaw. TT 2042-2043. Beginning in 2020, and at the direction of Alan Garten, chief legal officer, Flores helped prepare the supporting valuations and data for the SFCs. Garten also asked him to review the statements and the underlying assumptions that went into the valuations. TT 2043-2046. In preparing the 2020 supporting data, Flores worked with Garten, Adam Rosen, Weisselberg, McConney, and Patrick Birney. TT 2046. When asked about specific actions, meetings, discussions, phone calls, methodologies, and valuations that went into preparing the supporting data, Flores consistently and repeatedly testified that he “did not recall.” TT 2060-2063; 2075-2082, 2085-2089, 2750-2751. What Flores did not recall is memorialized in emails and voicemails. Flores repeatedly denied any recollection of performing a cash flow analysis of Niketown in 2020 and denied any recollection of McConney asking him to come up with additional reasoning to justify using a four percent cap rate on Niketown in the 2020 valuations. He was then confronted with a voicemail message that McConney left for him on Christmas Eve of 2020, asking Flores to come up with additional reasoning to justify using the four percent cap rate on Niketown. When presented with the voicemail, Flores still claimed not to remember any such events. TT 2748-2756. Similarly, he denied recalling having worked on the 2021 SFC supporting data. He was then confronted with a voicemail message that he left for Patrick Birney on August 2, 2021, stating that Eric Trump had asked Flores to reach out to Birney about preparing the 2021 SFC data. TT 2756-2759. Again, Flores claimed this voicemail did not refresh his recollection on whether he was involved in preparing the 2021 SFC. TT 2759. Flores was also a conduit with a firm, Marvin F. Poer & Company (“Poer”), that handled property tax assessment appeals in Florida for the Trump Organization. TT 2762; PX 3211. In 2020, the property appraiser determined the market value of Doral to be $78 million, a fact of which, emails reveal, Flores was acutely aware. PX 3209, PX 3211. Notwithstanding, the supporting data for the 2020 and 2021 SFCs value Doral at $345 million and $297 million, respectively. PX 857, 1501. Flores denied any recollection of this, despite the emails that demonstrate his active participation. TT 2772-2773. In 2020, the Trump Organization hired Poer to file an appeal of the 2020 tax assessment of Mara-Lago, claiming that the assessed, taxed value of $26.6 million was too high. PX 3170, 3214, 3041 at 199. As part of the appeal, the Trump Organization explicitly stated that the property was commercial, and not residential. PX 3170. Two months after filing the appeal, the Trump Organization withdrew it, stating that it agreed with the $26.6 million determination of value. PX 3170. 3214; TT 2774-2777. Flores conceded that that “determination was based on Mar-a-Lago being categorized as a commercial property.” TT 2776-2777. When presented with additional emails and documents found in Flores’ possession that unquestionably reveal that he absolutely understood that Mar-a-Lago was exclusively a commercial, not residential, property, Flores continued to deny any recollection, stating “[t]hat’s what the email says. I don’t recall.” TT 2777-2781; PX 1382. Notwithstanding, every SFC from 2011-2021 valued Mar-a-Lago not only as if it could be sold as a private residence, but also as if there were no deed restrictions burdening it; the SFCs’ values for that decade range from $405 million to $739 million. PX 788, 793, 708, 719, 731, 742, 758, 774, 843, 857, 1501. Overall, Flores was not a credible witness, and the Court finds it highly unlikely that none of the documentary evidence with which Flores was confronted revived his recollection as to his participation in any of the aforementioned activities. Michael Cohen Michael Cohen joined the Trump Organization in 2007 as executive vice president and special counsel to Donald Trump.²⁴ TT 2191, 2195-2197. During his entire tenure at the Trump Organization, Cohen reported directly to Donald Trump. TT 2197. In 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty, in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York, to several counts of tax evasion, one count of misrepresentation to a financial institution, two counts of violating campaign finance laws, and one count of misrepresentation to Congress. Cohen cooperated with the government and was sentenced to 36 months of incarceration. TT 2184-2188. Beginning in 2012, Donald Trump asked Cohen to assist in preparing the SFCs and their supporting valuations. TT 2208-2209, 2213. Specifically, Cohen affirmed: “I was tasked by Mr. Trump to increase the total assets based upon a number that he arbitrarily selected[,] and my responsibility[,] along with Allen Weisselberg predominantly[,] was to reverse engineer²⁵ the various different asset classes, increase those assets in order to achieve the number that Mr. Trump had tasked us.” TT 2210-2211. The “reverse engineering” conversations took place in meetings amongst Donald Trump, Weisselberg, and Cohen. Cohen testified that Donald Trump would intentionally give indirect instructions (i.e., “He would look at the total assets and he would say, ‘I’m actually not worth four and a half billion dollars. I’m really worth more, like, six.”), which Cohen and Weisselberg understood as a directive to inflate the assets until the desired value was achieved. TT 2215-2287, 2460-2461.²⁶ As part of this reverse engineering scheme, Cohen said they would look at numbers being achieved elsewhere, find the highest price per square foot achieved in New York City, and apply that price per square foot to Trump assets, even though the Trump properties were neither comparable nor similar. TT 2216-2217. Cohen described the process of arbitrarily adding values to the asset categories on the SFC categories as follows: I would sit down with Allen [Weisselberg] and we would make the changes. That document would then be photocopied that had all of the changes at which point in time Allen and I would return to Mr. Trump to demonstrate that we achieved or [were] close to the number that he was seeking and I had no use for that document any longer. TT 2218-2219. Cohen said that each reverse engineering process would take several days, and that Weisselberg relied on McConney to assist him in adding value to the numbers on the supporting data for the SFCs. TT 2220-2221, 2230. Cohen further made clear that Donald Trump had to approve the final numbers before they went to Mazars to be used in the compilations. TT 2220. Cohen specifically recalled working to reverse engineer the values of Trump Tower, Trump Park Avenue, Trump World Tower United Nations, 100 Central Park South, Seven Springs, and the Miss Universe Pageant. TT 2226-2227, 2340-2341. Cohen was also a member of the “Team of Four” that was tasked with acquiring insurance on behalf of the Trump Organization. TT 2234-2239; PX 3119. When meeting with insurance representatives or brokers for the purpose of acquiring coverage, Weisselberg would permit the representatives only to view the SFCs at Trump Tower; they were not permitted to make copies or to keep the original. TT 2240. Cohen also described Donald Trump’s participation in the meetings with the insurance representatives, detailing an orchestrated routine wherein Donald Trump would intentionally come into the meetings three quarters of the way through to boast that he is richer than the insurance companies and should consider going self-insured, in an attempt to garner a lower premium from the insurance representatives. TT 2245, 2248-2249; PX 3166. Michael Cohen was an important witness on behalf of the plaintiff, although hardly the linchpin that defendants have attempted to portray him to be. His testimony was significantly compromised by his having pleaded guilty to perjury and by some seeming contradictions in what he said at trial. However, carefully parsed, he testified that although Donald Trump did not expressly direct him to reverse engineer financial statements, he ordered him to do so indirectly, in his “mob voice.” Although the animosity between the witness and the defendant is palpable, providing Cohen with an incentive to lie, the Court found his testimony credible, based on the relaxed manner in which he testified, the general plausibility of his statements, and, most importantly, the way his testimony was corroborated by other trial evidence. A less-forgiving factfinder might have concluded differently, might not have believed a single word of a convicted perjurer. This factfinder does not believe that pleading guilty to perjury means that you can never tell the truth. Michael Cohen told the truth. David Orowitz David Orowitz joined the Trump Organization in 2008 as a vice president of acquisition and development and worked his way up to senior vice-president of acquisition and development before leaving the Trump Organization in 2016. He was hired by Donald Trump, Jr. and promoted by “the Trump kids,” referring to Eric Trump, Donald Trump, Jr, and Ivanka Trump. TT 2941-2942. Throughout his tenure at the Trump Organization, he reported to Eric Trump, Trump, Jr., and Ivanka Trump. TT 2942. Allen Weisselberg directed Orowitz to provide valuation information to Forbes, with the objective of “persuad[ing] Forbes that some of the assets were worth more than what [Forbes] originally were [sic] discussing valuing them at,” so that Donald Trump would be “represented higher on the listing” of the world’s richest people. TT 2944-2945. Emails to the Trump Organization (Weisselberg, Ivanka Trump, and Orowitz) and Orowitz’s testimony confirm that the Trump Organization sought financing for Doral, Trump Chicago, and the Old Post Office from multiple lenders besides Deutsche Bank’s Private Wealth Management Division, and in each instance the terms offered by the commercial real estate arm of the banks were less favorable than the terms offered by Deutsche Bank Private Wealth Management, which required a personal guarantee from Donald Trump. PX 3232, 3233, 3235, 3239, 3241, 3243; TT 2976-2981, 2984-3005. For example, the Trump Organization understood that rates on Doral could be as high as the “low teens” without Donald Trump’s personal guarantee. TT 2954-2955, 3672-3681. Ivanka Trump Ivanka Trump began working for the Trump Organization in 2006 and continued working there until 2017, when she left to work in her father’s presidential administration. TT 3662. She testified that she has not performed work for the Trump Organization since 2017, although she received payments from TTT Consulting after 2017, and she received a share of the profits upon the sale of the Old Post Office in 2022. TT 3666; PX 1373. In 2011, Ivanka Trump was seeking financing for the Trump Organization to fund the Doral project. TT 3670-3692; PX 1266, 3232, 3243, 3247, 1289, 1433, 1067. Her husband, Jared Kushner, introduced her to Rosemary Vrablic, who worked in the Private Wealth Management Division of Deutsche Bank. TT 3670; PX 315. Following an introductory meeting in fall 2011, in December, Vrablic emailed Ivanka Trump a proposed “Summary of Terms” for the Doral loan. PX 319, 315, 1129. Vrablic’s proposal made clear that any lending from the Private Wealth Management Division would require a personal guarantee. PX 319. The initial summary of terms proposed that Donald Trump maintain a minimum net worth of $3.0 billion; this was subsequently negotiated down to $2.5 billion in the final loan agreement. PX 319, 320. Despite being presented with ample emails and other documentary evidence demonstrating the critical role she played in the negotiation, Ms. Trump professed to have no memory of any of the events of the loan negotiation or the agreed upon terms.²⁷ TT 3694-3707, 3710-3711; PX 3226, 332, 320. In February 2016, Ivanka Trump contacted Vrablic about an additional unsecured loan on behalf of Donald Trump. PX 355, 352. Vrablic responded that, having run the request by the credit risk management team, an unsecured loan would not be possible, explaining “we do not have any large unsecured amounts such as this request in the entire [private banking] portfolio.” PX 355. Ivanka Trump, on behalf of the Trump Organization, implored Vrablic to have Deutsche Bank make an exception, to which Vrablic responded in April of 2016: “we are disappointed that the bank couldn’t make an exception in this case.” PX 558. Ivanka Trump again denied any recollection of these events, although she conceded she had no reason to believe that she did not send or receive the emails with which she was confronted. TT 3712-3717. Ivanka Trump was presented with emails that demonstrated that in 2012 she actively participated in trying to secure a loan for the Chicago project. PX 3236, 3239, 477, 365, 3242. When confronted with these emails, Ms. Trump denied any recollection of their contents. TT 3724-3734. Emails exchanged between Deutsche Bank and the Trump Organization demonstrate that in 2012, Deutsche Bank offered dueling proposals to refinance an existing loan on the property: (1) a non-recourse loan from the commercial real estate group, secured only by the real estate, priced at LIBOR + 8 points; and (2) a recourse loan from the Private Wealth Management Division, with a full personal guarantee from Donald Trump, priced at LIBOR + 4 points. PX 470. Emails and other documentary evidence similarly show Ivanka Trump’s active involvement in securing the bid for the Old Post Office and negotiating the terms thereof. PX 1288, 1429, 1431, 1302, 327, 1333. She consistently denied recalling the contents of documentary evidence that confirmed that she actively participated in events, even after she was confronted with the evidence. TT 3734-3738, 3747-3760, 3777-3782. In 2022, Ms. Trump received a profit payout of $4,013,024 from the sale of the Old Post Office. PX 1373; TT 3790-1391. On direct examination by plaintiff, Ivanka Trump had no recollection of any of the events that gave rise to this action; no number of emails or documents with her signature served to refresh her recollection. Notably, on cross-examination by defendants’ counsel, Ms. Trump suddenly and vividly recalled details of the projects and her interactions with Vrablic. TT 3801-3810. For example, after testifying on direct examination that she could not recall any of the details of her father’s personal guarantee of the Old Post Office loan, on cross-examination, she suddenly recalled: “There was a step down of the guarant[ee], if I recall, once the property was operational.” TT 3761-3763, 3777-3782, 3810-3811. Ivanka Trump was a thoughtful, articulate, and poised witness, but the Court found her inconsistent recall, depending on whether she was questioned by OAG or the defense, suspect. In any event, what Ms. Trump cannot recall is memorialized in contemporaneous emails and documents; in the absence of her memory, the documents speak for themselves. Kevin Sneddon Trump International Realty employed Kevin Sneddon from 2011-2012 as the managing director of its brokerage office. TT 6602. He recalled Allen Weisselberg asking him to assess the value of Donald Trump’s Triplex apartment. PX 1052; TT 6619-6620. In response to the request, Sneddon asked Weisselberg if he could see the Triplex, to which Weisselberg responded that that was “not possible.” TT 6620. Sneddon then asked if Weisselberg could send him a floorplan or specs of the Triplex to evaluate, to which Weisselberg also said “no.” TT 6620. Sneddon then asked Weisselberg what size the Triplex was, to which Weisselberg responded “around 30,000 square feet.” TT 6620. Sneddon then used the 30,000 square foot number in ascertaining a value for the Triplex. TT 6620-6623. The Expert Witnesses Michiel McCarty Michiel McCarty testified as an expert witness for plaintiff on banking and capital markets.²⁸ He is the chairman and CEO of an investment bank called MM Dillon & Company, where he works on debt, convertible, and equity transactions, and mergers and acquisitions. TT 3031-3032. He has worked in the banking industry since 1975, holds an MBA from the Wharton School with a concentration in capital markets, and has worked on financing engagements and underwriting projects for Fannie Mae, the Marriot Corporation, AT&T, and the late Queen Elizabeth II. TT 3032-3040. He has been qualified as an expert witness more than a dozen times in adequacy of equity and terms and conditions of debt, structure of debt, knowledge of participants who bought debt, and generally in capital markets. TT 3037-3039. In performing his expert review, McCarty conducted an analysis of the risk differentials of the various loans and loan proposals at issue in this action. In so doing, he “looked at the internal documents by Deutsche Bank of analyzing first the credit level of the guarantor versus the credit level of the collateral, then the project itself without a guarantee” for the Doral, Old Post Office, and Trump Chicago loans. TT 3051-3054. In calculating the interest rate differentials for the perceived credit risks with and without a personal guarantee on the Doral loan, McCarty took the competing loan proposal terms that Deutsche Bank’s commercial real estate group had offered (which was LIBOR + 8 percent with a floor of LIBOR + 2 percent, or 10 percent) and compared them to the terms extended by Deutsche Bank’s Private Wealth Management Division that were contingent upon a personal guarantee from Donald Trump (which was between 1.8 percent and 4.1 percent, depending on whether it was pre-or post-renovation). PX 1780; TT 3066-3067, 3132-3136. He also analyzed the Old Post Office and Trump Chicago Loan using the same method, comparing the terms offered by the Private Wealth Management Division, which were contingent on a personal guarantee and relied on his SFCs, with those offered by the commercial real estate group for a non-recourse loan. PX 1786, 1780, 3302; TT 3068-3074. McCarty further testified that defendants profited by paying a lower interest rate on the 40 Wall Street Ladder Capital loan based on a fraudulent SFC than the interest rate with a non-recourse loan, and he compared the terms of the then-existing Capital One non-recourse loan that 40 Wall Street was subject to before refinancing, with the terms extended by Ladder Capital. McCarty’s calculations determined that Donald Trump improperly saved the following amounts on interest as a result of the banks relying on Donald Trump’s fraudulent SFCs and personal guarantee: (1) $72,908,308 from 2014-2022 on the Doral loan; (2) $53,423,209 from 2015-2022 on the Old Post Office loan; (3) $17,443,359 from 2014-2022 on the Chicago loan; and (4) $24,265,291 from 2015-2022 on the 40 Wall Street loan. PX 3302. McCarty thoughtfully and logically explained why, contrary to defendants’ assertions, using the default penalty rate would have been inappropriate, and, in any event, McCarty calculated the differential using the default penalty rate and determined it would be larger than the numbers he calculated in his report. PX 3077-3078. In fact, McCarty used conservative measures; by way of example, even though interest rates were rising in 2017, 2018, and 2019, McCarty used a standard flat 10 percent interest rate, resulting in significantly lower interest rate differentials than had he calculated using the floating market interest rate. TT 3057-3058. He similarly conservatively calculated his numbers using simple, not compound interest, which does not consider the time value of money. TT 3082. The method McCarty used to determine the amount of money defendants saved by borrowing with full recourse, such as from Deutsche Bank’s Private Wealth Management Division, as opposed to borrowing non-recourse, such as from Deutsche Bank’s Commercial Real Estate Division, is simple in theory, although a little tricky in application. This Court reviewed McCarty’s numbers and performed calculations to confirm his method and accuracy: four examples should suffice: (1) In 2020 the Doral loan was $125,000,000. Applying the non-recourse rate of 10 percent (or .01) results in an interest payment of $12,500,000. Applying the recourse rate of 1.9348 percent (or .019348) results in an interest payment of $2,418,500. Subtracting the latter from the former yields a saving of $10,081,500, as seen on PX3302, page 4. (2) Also in 2020, the Old Post Office loan was $170,000,000. Applying the nonrecourse rate of 8 percent (or .08) results in an interest payment of $13,600,000. Applying the recourse rate of 1.9348 percent (or .019348) results in an interest payment of $3,289,160. Subtracting the latter from the former yields a saving of $10,310,840, as seen on PX3302, page 4. (3) In 2019 the Trump Chicago loan was $45,000,000. Applying the nonrecourse rate of 7.5 percent (or .07500) results in an interest payment of $3,375,000. Applying the recourse rate of 4.4116 percent (or .044116) results in an interest payment of $1,985,220. Subtracting the latter from the former yields a saving of $1,389,780, which is $13 more than the amount McCarty used, $1,389,767, presumably because of a rounding differential, and in any event de minimis. (4) In 2018 the Trump Chicago loan was $45,000,000. Applying the nonrecourse rate of 7.5 percent (.07500) again results in an interest payment of $3,375,000. Applying the recourse rate of 4.0464 percent (or .040464) results in an interest payment $1,820,880. Subtracting the latter from the former yields a saving of $1,554,110, which is $19 less than the amount McCarty used, $1,554,129, presumably because of a rounding differential, in any event de minimis, and largely cancelled out by the $13 lower amount McCarty used for Chicago, 2019. McCarty calculated that defendants saved $72,908,308 on the Doral loan, $53,423,209 on the Old Post Office loan, $17,443,359 on the Trump Chicago loan, and $24,265,291 on the 40 Wall Street loan, for a grand total of $168,040,167, one dollar less than McCarty’s $168,040,168, presumably because of a rounding differential (or user error by a non-accountant, and in any case de minimis). Defendants do not accept McCarty’s methodology, which this Court finds to be air-tight, but they do not challenge his calculations, which this Court finds to be correct. The expert defendants called to the stand to challenge McCarty’s methodology, Robert Unell, left McCarty unscathed. Steven Witkoff Steven Witkoff was offered by defendants as an expert in the field of real estate development.²⁹ TT 4189. Witkoff has been a “good friend” of Donald Trump’s for more than 20 years. TT 4191. Witkoff conceded that he is neither an appraiser nor an accounting expert, nor is he familiar with what “estimated current value” is under GAAP. He did not review any of Donald Trump’s SFCs, which are the primary subjects of this case, nor did he review any of the operative legal documents for the properties upon which he attempted to opine. Accordingly, his testimony was irrelevant to the issues before the Court. TT 4196-4197, 4228-4233. Jason Flemmons Defendants offered Jason Flemmons, a CPA, as an expert in the field of accounting.³⁰ TT 4238, 4252. He testified that ASC-274 is the accounting standard that governs the preparation of SFCs, and that the measure of value for an asset or liability under ASC-274 is “estimated current value.” TT 4254-4255. Flemmons spent considerable time detailing the “methods” of valuation that ASC-274 permits. TT 4257-4264. The crux of Flemmons’s testimony was that so long as defendants selected one of the permissible methods under ASC-274, then any numbers may be inputted into such methodology, regardless of their accuracy or relationship to reality.³¹ TT 4264-4268, 4273-4277. The Court examined Flemmons on this issue, resulting in the following exchange: Q. You were asked 20 or 30 times, was the method used for determining the estimated current value of the project at issue consistent with the requirements of ASC-274. I think your answers were always yes. My question is: Were you saying that the method listed on the statement was one of the methods that ASC 274 allows? Or were you saying that the actual computations using that method were correct? A. Your Honor, I am not opining as to the ultimate valuation itself. I am not a valuation expert. But I am an expert on the methods permitted by ASC-274. So my testimony is really limited to, again, its methods that are clear from the documents that were being used, and not necessarily to the numbers that were attached to them. Q. Right. And so if the statement says we are using the capitalization rate method or the fixed asset method, your answers are just meaning that, yes, that’s one of the methods you can use, correct? A. That’s correct. TT 4364-4365. Accordingly, Flemmons’s testimony is of no evidentiary value, as the plaintiff has not alleged that defendants used an impermissible method, but that they have inputted and used patently false data with a permissible method. Mr. Flemmons also, inexplicably, acknowledged that future income had to be discounted to present value on a financial statement, and that not to do so would be a “red flag,” while at the same time stating that there were no GAAP departures, even though defendants failed to discount future income to present value. TT 4371-4373, 4375, 4434-4436, 4441-4443. Although he opined that Mazars should have followed up on items in the SFCs, he adamantly stated that asking for any appraisals when creating a compilation would have been highly unusual.”³² TT 4291-4292, 4303-4307, 4325-4328, 4376, 4377, 4381-4382, 4408, 4476-4481. Flemmons was reluctant to acknowledge that an asset controlled by a third party cannot be considered “cash,” while also acknowledging that it was a “red flag,” before ultimately conceding: “I think the fundamental recording or reporting of partnership cash would not be consistent with GAAP.” TT 4373-4374, 4385-4392, 4446-4452. Steven Collins Defendants offered Steven Collins as an expert witness in “contract procurement.”³³ TT 4539-4542. Collins testified, essentially, that he reviewed the documents used in the Trump Organization’s bid and award of the Old Post Office, and he opined that no one factor was determinative in the General Services Administration’s selection of the Trump Organization. TT 4548-4569. Steven Laposa Defendants offered Steven Laposa as an expert witness in “real estate research.”³⁴ TT 4596-4599. Laposa formed no opinion as to whether any of the valuations at issue in this case were accurate, and, prior to this assignment, he had no experience preparing or reviewing personal financial statements. TT 4600, 4633, 4684-4685. He further conceded that he had no knowledge of the types of valuations or methods that Donald Trump used to value the assets on his SFCs. TT 4709-4712. His testimony was limited to general methods by which one can appraise property, and that different appraisers might disagree about the value of the same property. TT 4603-4625. He opined that lenders generally prefer a more conservative approach to an appraisal than developers do. TT 4611-4613. Gary Giulietti Defendants offered Gary Giulietti as an expert in “surety underwriting and surety brokering.”³⁵ He has an ongoing personal and professional relationship with Donald Trump. TT 4723. Having met him in the late 90s, Giulietti plays golf and lunches with Donald Trump and is a member of “a bunch of his clubs.” TT 4723. Additionally, sometime between 2017-2018, Giulietti became the Trump Organization’s insurance broker, and he remains its broker to this day. TT 4723-4724. In its over 20 years on the bench, this Court has never encountered an expert witness who not only was a close personal friend of a party, but also had a personal financial interest in the outcome of the case for which he is being offered as an expert.³⁶ Giulietti opined that an insurance company like Zurich would pay no credence to an SFC compilation provided by a client, and that the main element that an insurance company would weigh is the client’s liquidity. TT 4738-4741. Giulietti also opined that, in his experience, any insurance company would have offered Donald Trump an “accommodation,” which he explained would “provide a product with minimal [to] no underwriting,” describing Zurich’s underwriting program as based on “airballs and witchcraft.” TT 4743-4744, 4768-4770. However, Giulietti’s testimony not only is belied by the testimony and contemporaneous notes of the Zurich underwriter, Claudia Markarian, it is also completely inconsistent with the expert report of another defense expert, David Miller, who opined that “Zurich made a competent business decision to underwrite the Trump Organization’s business as an exception to their normal guidelines based on reasonable risk factors, such as the sufficient liquidity of the Trump Organization to indemnify Zurich should a loss take place.” NYSCEF Doc. No. 1434; TT 4770-4772; PX 1561, 1552. Giulietti also testified that the Trump Organization had filed very few claims, despite being presented with evidence demonstrating that the Trump Organization tendered numerous claims. TT 4775-4778; PX 603. David Miller David Miller was offered by the defense as an expert in “commerce insurance and surety underwriting.”³⁷ TT 4806. Miller opined that, based on his review of the Zurich underwriting memoranda, he did not believe Zurich would have been concerned with Donald Trump’s assets. TT 4807-4810. He further testified: “My perception was there was not a lot of technical underwriting that took place, um, because it was done as what I would perceive — what I would call a business decision. They wanted to write the business to keep the relationship between Aon and Zurich in place.” TT 4815. He opined that “accommodations” are “probably too common” in the insurance industry, and that “very often surety is written as an accommodation to other lines of business.” TT 4817-4818. He further explained: “An accommodation generally means that you’ve already made the decision to write it, or you are going to write it, because of the situation that you are being asked to do. So, in general, it probably loosens or eliminates the underwriting standards, because you already know you are going to do it, so you just do it.” TT 4821. When asked if there was anything that required an insurer to make an accommodation, Miller stated “[p]ressure from the broker” to try and develop more business. TT 4821. However, on cross-examination, Miller was confronted with his previous deposition testimony, in which he affirmed that based on his review of the credit memoranda, Zurich employed “normal underwriting guidelines that included sufficient liquidity as a reasonable risk factor,” and Miller confirmed that he believed that that was still the case. TT 4872-4873. Moreover, on cross-examination, Miller conceded that in forming his expert opinion, he did not consider any of the information Zurich underwriter Claudia Markarian recorded in her contemporaneous notes of her meetings at the Trump Organization in 2018 and 2019, which are the basis of plaintiff’s causes of action for insurance fraud. TT 4865-4867, 4874-4880. He further conceded that he had no reason not to accept Markarian’s testimony as true. TT 4881-4884; PX 3224. Robert Unell Defendants offered Robert Unell as a witness in “commercial real estate finance and banking.”³⁸ TT 5627-5629. To prepare for his testimony, Unell reviewed the Deutsche Bank loans on Trump Chicago, the Old Post Office and Doral, as well as the Ladder Capital loan on 40 Wall Street. TT 5629. Unell did not perform any valuation work on any of the assets found in the SFCs. TT 5820. Unell opined that Deutsche Bank and Ladder Capital would have conducted their own analysis into Donald Trump’s assets and liabilities based on the contents of the SFCs. TT 5635-5639. Unell opined that any misstatements in Donald Trump’s SFCs were immaterial, and even stated that the inflation of the Triplex (which resulted in an overvaluation of approximately $200 million) was immaterial and did not cause the SFCs to be unfairly or inaccurately presented, a statement which severely diminished his credibility before the Court. TT 5672-5673, 5819. Unell opined that, based on his review of the Deutsche Bank credit risk memoranda, the covenants that required Donald Trump to maintain a minimum net worth and level of liquidity were not significant for the bank. However, he then conceded that the bank “relied upon — their knowledge and their information to set the net worth covenant…[and] the net worth covenant was determined by the guarantor submitted statements,” seemingly contradicting his initial opinion of non-reliance. TT 5673-5676. Unell also opined that a breach of a covenant would not “really raise the eyebrows of the lending institution.” TT 5678-5679. Unell disagreed with the mathematical calculations McCarty used to determine the interest rate differential between the Private Wealth Management Division loan and the commercial real estate group loan terms. McCarty used, as an assumption for the commercial real estate group interest rate, a term sheet Deutsche Bank’s commercial real estate group offered to Donald Trump at the same time at which he secured the loan from the Private Wealth Management Division. Notwithstanding, Unell said there was no support for McCarty’s use of that number, disregarding entirely the term sheet that the commercial real estate group offered Donald Trump for a non-recourse loan. TT 5682-5684. Unell further contradicted himself by stating: It is nearly impossible to place an exact interest rate on this looking back in time, because none of us have worked for Deutsche Bank. And the best indication as to what this rate would be, would be Deutsche Bank, because Deutsche Bank is the evaluator of risk. They are the evaluator of materiality. And they are the ultimate user and the one where this matters. And it is their sole determination, based on this analysis, as to how they want to price the loan. TT 5686-5687. Unell appears to be opining that the term sheets that Deutsche Bank’s commercial real estate group offered Donald Trump would be the best indicator of how the loan would have been priced without a personal guarantee, contradicting Unell’s prior opinion that McCarty’s utilization of the Deutsche Bank term sheets in his analysis was improper. Unell additionally opined that the interest rates McCarty used to calculate the rate differential for a non-recourse loan with Ladder Capital were not commensurate with what the market was at that time. TT 5712-5713. However, he offered absolutely no evidentiary basis for that opinion, and he offered no independent assessment for what the market rate would have been for a nonrecourse commercial real estate loan on the subject property at that time. TT 5758-5761. Notwithstanding this lack of foundation for his opinion, Unell offered up his own calculations of the interest rate differentials on the subject properties and opined that Donald Trump received the following savings: (1) $2,458,048 on the Doral loan; (2) $2,567,000 on the Old Post Office loan; (3) $1,015,632 on the Chicago loan;³⁹ and (4) $2,966,000 on the 40 Wall Street Loan. TT 5743-5748. However, on cross-examination, Unell clarified that his “hypothetical lost interest” rate differentials did not actually calculate the difference between a fully guaranteed loan and a nonrecourse loan, he merely assumed a 25 basis point reduction as the guarantee may have been reduced over the course of the loan, and he assumed, without evidentiary support, that the “guarant[ee] was worth 25 basis points.” TT 5758-5761. When further examined about this opinion, Unell stated, in a conclusory fashion, that the “guarant[ee] to them was valuable for 25 basis points for the engagement of a warm body of a billionaire to stand behind the loan in his equity infusion and capital there.” TT 5761. However, this statement is belied by the documentary evidence originating from Deutsche Bank, as well as the testimony of former and current Deutsche Bank employees. Unell testified that he did not form a view “as to what the market interest rate would be for a commercial real estate loan on these four properties with no guarant[ee] at the time they were originated,” stating again that the “only person…that is able to do that is Deutsche Bank.” TT 5762-5763 5775, 5812, 5815. Unell additionally offered: “The only group that can speculate or actually state what the interest rate would be is Deutsche Bank, because they are the ones that were the users of the documents, the ones that entered into the loan agreement and the ones that offered the terms to the defendants.” TT 5763. This statement once again contradicts Unell’s prior opinion that it was inappropriate for McCarty to rely on the term sheets Deutsche Bank’s commercial real estate group offered to Donald Trump for non-recourse loans on the subject properties. By Unell’s own admission, the term sheet (or “offered terms”) are the best evidence of what interest rate Deutsche Bank would have offered for a non-recourse loan. PX 369, 3232, 3243. Unell then undercut his own calculations in the following exchange with the Court: Q. Let me jump in. Are you testifying that with your experience, your expertise, your knowledge of the facts in this case, you could not possibly estimate what Deutsche Bank would have charged as an interest rate in any particular situation, because it is all up to them? A. Yes. I can give you a range and give historical [sic] as to what has been out there and show illustrative examples of it, but at the end of the day as referenced in the Deutsche Bank documents, all of their risk rating, all of the pricing is proprietary. None of us have that information. None of us have that ability. None of us understand the total relationship value. We can try to do our best to understand it based off of the testimony that has been provided, as well as the documents. But the only person that has the ability to determine the risk and the interest rate and the overall relationship value, is the lender. …. Q. So let me clarify one thing. Well, let me ask then, so are you saying that actually the commercial real estate loan, no guarant[ee], issued by the Commercial Real Estate group at Deutsche Bank or some other Commercial Real Estate division, would have priced even closer to the private wealth loans than your hypothetical here with the 25 basis points added? A. That’s not correct. Q. So what are you saying? I don’t understand what you are saying. A. What I am trying to say is that 10 percent is unfounded. Q. And you said, I think it would be closer to the numbers reflected here, even more than the 25 basis points? A. Absolutely. And that’s reflected in the loan documents. Q. So, sir, do you have an opinion, one way or the other, as to what the market rate would be for a commercial real estate loan with no personal guarant[ee] for these four properties? A. It would be in the range of where I have it here. Q. So close to the private wealth amounts? A. Yes. As illustrated in the loan documents. TT 5763-5766. Unell’s testimony is not only inconsistent, but the Deutsche Bank documents, testimony from former and current employees, and Trump Organization emails conclusively demonstrate that Donald Trump, in fact, did seek non-recourse loans from the Private Wealth Management Division and was told, adamantly, that no exceptions could be made for him and a full “iron clad” personal guarantee was required for him to receive the preferential terms of the Private Wealth Management group. TT 1003-1004, 1035, 1039, 5331-5332, 5572-5577, 5770-5773; PX 1251, 369, 3232, 3243. Unell testified that it was inappropriate for McCarty to rely on the Deutsche Bank term sheets because they were non-binding and Deutsche Bank’s commercial real estate group did not yet have a detailed understanding of the properties. However, on cross-examination he was confronted with emails between Deutsche Bank and the Trump Organization indicating that Deutsche Bank had, in fact, conducted due diligence on the properties⁴⁰ and considered itself to be “very familiar” with them. PX 3111, TT 5804-5806. On the whole, the Court was unable to ascribe any reliability to Unell’s “expert” opinions, finding them unresearched, unsupported, inconsistent, and contradicted by ample other documentary and testimonial evidence. Frederick Chin Frederick Chin is a certified appraiser and was offered by defendants as an expert in “real estate valuations,” “real estate market analysis,” and “real estate operations.”⁴¹ TT 5905-5906. Chin did not render any opinions of value as to the assets contained in the SFCs. TT 6041. Chin opined on the difference between “as is” and “as if” values, explaining: “‘As is’ generally connotates to [sic] a condition that exists at the time, a specific date, generally often times referred to as market value. ‘As if’ is a condition that will be expected to be — expected to be completed or expected to be received either kind of a hypothetical condition that might exist in the future.” TT 5912. Chin opined that the many of the valuations that appeared in Donald Trump’s SFCs contained “as if” valuations. TT 5913. He further opined that professional appraisers generally use “as is” valuations, while developers are generally focused on future performance and use “as if” valuations. TT 5914. Chin also stated that he “occasionally” would come across a request for a professional “as if” appraisal, but that in those instances, the governing standards mandate that the appraisal be clearly identified and labeled as “as if.” TT 5917-5919. Chin affirmed that “as if” appraisals must still make accurate assumptions; in particular, he affirmed that land use restrictions that encumber a property, or any sort of restriction that limited possible uses, would negatively affect the value of the property. TT 5949-5050. He conceded that any assumptions incorporated into “highest and best use” must be legally permissible and physically possible, and that a developer’s “as if” value cannot be based on something that is legally impermissible or physically impossible. TT 6001-6002. He also agreed that there needs to “be a reasonable, factual basis for the developer’s perspective of value that he puts in a Statement of Financial Condition.” TT 6006. When examined about his experience with rent-restricted apartments in New York City, Chin affirmed that the owner of a rent-stabilized unit wanting to value the unit as if it could be sold on the open market “would need to include in the value calculation the cost to remove the legal restriction,” which could include expensive “buy-outs” to the rent-stabilized tenants, and potential profit-sharing losses. TT 6007-6011. Chin further conceded that it would be a “significant omission” in an SFC if the owner of 20 apartments in a New York City building, of which 10 are rent-regulated, valued the apartments as if they were all free market without disclosing that half of them were subject to rent regulation. TT 6012. When cross-examined about Donald Trump’s 2013 SFC, Chin admitted that the SFC failed to disclose that any of the units at Trump Park Avenue were rent stabilized, notwithstanding that they were being valued at their offering plan prices, which itself is erroneous. TT 6015-6016; PX 707 Chin opined that the identity of the property owner would not affect either “as is” or “as if” appraisal values. TT 5966. Chin identified different types of appraisals, such as “market value” and “liquidation value” and clarified that the “intended purpose of an appraisal can affect the outcome.” TT 5945-5946. He testified that lender-ordered appraisers generally calculate “market value.” TT 5946. However, Chin is not an expert in accounting and stated that he would “rely on the experts and people designated in [his] firm that dealt with accounting matters.” TT 5902-5905, 5971. The SFCs represent that they are providing assets and liabilities at their “estimated current value,” not their future “as if” value. See, e.g., PX 756. Chin even conceded that, when reviewing the SFCs in preparation for this case, he understood that the SFCs were representing to the reader that the assets contained in the statement were being presented at their estimated current value. TT 5978. Moreover, Chin testified that Donald Trump “clearly” used “as if” values in his SFCs from 2011-2014 that “presumed a situation that didn’t exist.” TT 5966-5967. He further stated that he did not believe that the valuation method employed by McConney in valuing Seven Springs on the SFCs was reasonable. TT 5992-5993. Chin further opined: “Interest rates have a large bearing on several aspects that effect an owner or developer. It is a cost of capital. Certainly, when cost or capital are higher, interest rates increase. The obligations increase. And it may make a development less feasible.” TT 5929. John Shubin John Shubin is a lawyer called by the defense as an expert in “land use planning, entitlement, and zoning.”⁴² TT 6043, 6048. On direct examination, Shubin attempted to offer a host of legal conclusions about the deed restrictions that encumber Mar-a-Lago, plaintiff’s objections to which this Court sustained, as it is exclusively the Court’s province to interpret and apply the law. TT 6051-6075, 6084-6085. Accordingly, there was no evidentiary value to Mr. Shubin’s testimony. Lawrence Moens Lawrence Moens is a licensed real estate broker and was offered by the defense as a witness in “residential real estate in Palm Beach.”⁴³ TT 6092, 6099-6106. The Court had already questioned the credibility of Moens based on the affidavit he submitted with defendants’ motion for summary judgment, in which he opined, that “[i]f Mar-a-Lago was available for sale, I am confident that in short order, I would be in a position to produce a ready, willing and able buyer who would have interest in securing the property for their personal use as a residence, or even, their own club.” NYSCEF Doc. No. 1435 at 29. As this Court noted in its September 26, 2023 Decision and Order, Moens failed to identify at what price he is “confident” he could find a buyer (although he opines separately, without relying on any objective evidence, that he believes that as of 2023 the property was worth $1.51 billion). At trial, Moens testified that he met Donald Trump in the late 1980s, they have remained cordial, and Moens has been a member of Mar-a-Lago since 1995. TT 6108-6109, 6160-6161. Moens opined about the values he believed he could sell Mar-a-Lago for from the years 2011-2021. TT 6115-6126. When asked about his method for generating those values, he testified that he did not use any specific equations, that his method was not “re-creatable,” and that the only way to understand his valuation method was to “go inside [his] head.” TT 6157-6158. However, to be admissible, expert testimony must have some objective basis and must be subject to objective scrutiny. Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 28 Misc 3d 425, 427 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2010) (“New York courts permit expert testimony if it is based on…principles, procedures or theory only after the principles, procedures or theories have gained general acceptance in the relevant…field, proffered by a qualified expert and on a topic beyond the ken of the average [fact-finder]“). Moreover, Moens affirmed that each of these valuations was premised upon the assumption that Mar-a-Lago could be sold as a private residence, although he conceded that he was aware that Mar-a-Lago was being taxed as a private club. TT 6160. Eli Bartov Eli Bartov is a tenured professor at New York University, whom defendants offered as an expert in “financial accounting, credit analysis, and valuation.”⁴⁴ TT 6181, 6206-6215. Professor Bartov did not assess the valuations of any of the assets on Donald Trump’s SFCs. TT 6445. Yet, as this Court previously noted when denying defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, Bartov’s overarching point was that the subject statements of financial condition were accurate in every respect and that they were “100 percent consistent with GAAP.” TT 6537. As this Court discussed in excruciating detail in its September 26, 2023 Decision and Order, the SFCs contained numerous significant errors. By doggedly attempting to justify every misstatement, Professor Bartov lost all credibility in the eyes of the Court.⁴⁵ Indeed, Bartov insisted that the misrepresentation of the Triplex, resulting in a $200 million overvaluation, was not intentional⁴⁶ or material (leading the Court to wonder in what universe is $200 million immaterial). TT 6348-6356. Bartov opined that “GAAP is not designed to give you the true economic value of an asset.” TT 6240. However, it is undisputed that the SFCs required, and Donald Trump represented, that the assets be presented at their estimated current value and be GAAP compliant, so Bartov’s statement is of no consequence. Bartov further attempted to opine on the disclaimer and “worthless clauses,” previously rejected as a defense by this Court in several decisions and orders (subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division), repeatedly referring to the clauses as “[j]ust like when you have the Surgeon General warning on the box of cigarettes, this warnings [sic] is not Phillip Morris. This warning is for the smokers.” TT 6252-6256, 6259-6262, 6265-6267. Eric Lewis Eric Lewis, a professor at Cornell University, was called by the plaintiff as a rebuttal expert witness in the field of accounting.⁴⁷ TT 6637, 6668-6671. Professor Lewis disputed the testimony of Jason Flemmons, stating that, contrary to what Flemmons opined, it is not sufficient under GAAP merely to select a permissible method of valuation under ASC-274 if the assumptions and numbers used to arrive at a value are false, notwithstanding the propriety of the method. TT 6695-6697. He further testified that Flemmons was incorrect in stating that the responsibility for ensuring that the methods of valuation are GAAP compliant lies with the accountants performing the compilation, citing industry standards that clearly demonstrate that the ultimate responsibility for determining GAAP compliant methods and estimated current values, as the SFC requires and represents, lies with the issuer of the statement, here, Donald Trump. TT 6697-6706. He testified that under industry standards, accountants performing a compilation engagement are not responsible for finding GAAP departures, as compilations offer the lowest level of scrutiny and assurance. TT 6709-6710. He convincingly demonstrated that, according to the operative standards, an accountant creating a compilation will not verify the accuracy of the supporting information. TT 6715-6716. Lewis further corroborated that each of the permissible methods of valuation in ASC-274 requires that the valuation be discounted to present value, and failure to do so would be a GAAP departure for which the issuer would be responsible. TT 6711. Lewis further identified several valuations in the SFCs that had not been discounted to present value and for which there was no disclosure of the failure to do so in the SFCs. TT 6711-6714, 6719-6725, 6727-6728. Specific Assets on the SFCs The Triplex On October 1, 1994, Donald Trump consented to the “First Amendment to the Declaration of Trump Tower Condominium” (“First Amendment”) which documented that the Triplex at Trump Tower, in which Donald Trump resided for decades, was 10,996 square feet. PX 633. Since at least 2012, copies of the First Amendment showing the square footage of the Triplex were in Allen Weisselberg’s email inbox (multiple times over) and in the physical filing cabinet immediately outside his office. PX 633; TT 805-809. Since at least as early as 2012, Jeffrey McConney was valuing Donald Trump’s Triplex apartment, in which he resided, as if it were 30,000 square feet, not 10,996 square feet, resulting in an annual overvaluation of between $114-207 million dollars. PX 1052; NYSCEF Doc. No. 1531 at 21. In 2012, Weisselberg asked Trump International Realty employee Kevin Sneddon to value the Triplex. Sneddon asked to inspect the apartment or review the floorplan, and Weisselberg told him that both requests were “not possible” and advised Sneddon that the Triplex was 30,000 square feet. TT 6618-6621. Sneddon thereafter provided McConney a valuation using the incorrect 30,000 number from Weisselberg. PX 1052. On February 22, 2017, Dan Alexander from Forbes emailed Weisselberg and McConney with data indicating that Forbes believed the Triplex to be 10,996 square feet. PX 1324. On March 3, 2017, Noack Kirsch from Forbes emailed Alan Garten with many questions about Donald Trump’s assets, one of which reads: “President Trump has told Forbes in the past that his penthouse occupies 33,000 square feet, comprising the entirety of 66-68 of Trump Tower. Property records (notably the latest amended condo declaration, dated October 11, 1994) [sic]. Is the 1994 declaration accurate and up-to-date? It shows President Trump’s apartment is 10,996.39 square feet.” PX 1345. Alan Garten then forwarded the email chain to Weisselberg, Eric Trump, Donald Trump, Jr., and Amanda Miller (who was responsible for press relations). PX 1344. This resulted in a conversation between Miller and Weisselberg and culminated in Miller sending an email to Garten on March 6, 2017, stating that “I spoke to Allen W. re: [Trump World Tower] + [Trump Tower] — we are going to leave these alone.” PX 1345; TT 821-823. Notwithstanding the size of the Triplex being brought to his attention, on March 10, 2017, a mere four days after telling Miller to “leave it alone,” Weisselberg certified to Mazars the accuracy and truthfulness of the 2016 SFC, which included valuing the Triplex as if it were 30,000 square feet. PX 741. Indeed, Weisselberg “[was] comfortable certifying that nothing occurred subsequent to the date of the statement that would require adjustment.” TT 831. Despite this email, Weisselberg declined to review the First Amendment or take any other steps to confirm the actual size of the Triplex. TT 819. When examined about how this violated the Trump Organization’s responsibilities under the Management Representation Letters to Mazars, Weisselberg said he was not obligated to adjust the SFCs to reflect that change because he didn’t think it was “material.” TT 854-859. It was not until Forbes made the issue public, by publishing an article in May of 2017 indicating that Donald Trump had been misrepresenting the size of his Triplex,⁴⁸ that the Trump Organization “began to do our investigation, as to, you know, what the number really was at that point.” TT 833-834. Weisselberg admitted that “it was only after this article was published and the information became public that the Trump Organization corrected the square footage for Mr. Trump’s triplex.” TT 834. When asked about his understanding of the events that led to the change in the square footage used in the 2017 SFC, Birney stated that he was never informed about the actual square footage of the Triplex before issuing the 2016 SFC, and that it was not until Forbes published the article revealing the true square footage that they adjusted the 30,000 square foot basis upon which they had been relying since at least 2012. TT 1234-1238. In an effort to cover up the decrease in the reported value of the Triplex, Allen Weisselberg instructed Birney to draft a version of the SFC that added a 35 percent “ex-president premium” to the value of the Triplex, although the idea was ultimately scrapped.⁴⁹ TT 1288-1290; 1298-1299. To maintain an inflated value for the Triplex despite correcting the square footage, Weisselberg told Birney to use the “most expensive” and “record shattering” penthouse sales when calculating price per square foot. TT 1241-1247; PX 767, 2530. Donald Trump testified that he personally determined that the Triplex’s reported value was too high and directed Weisselberg and McConney to correct it. TT 3524. In reality, the Triplex’s reported size was not corrected until 2017, months after Trump was inaugurated as president and ceased having any involvement in the preparation of the SFCs. 40 Wall Street From 2011-2016, Jeffrey McConney and Allen Weisselberg valued 40 Wall Street based on dividing net operating income by a capitalization rate. During this same time, when valuing 40 Wall Street, McConney would “cherry-pick” cap rates from a generic marketing report Cushman & Wakefield emailed to its large customer base that was based on data not specific, or even closely related, to 40 Wall Street, and wholly ignored the appraisals of 40 Wall Street that Doug Larson had prepared. TT 660-681, 4995, 5101-5102; PX 3046, 3047, 3048. McConney did not adjust the cap rates from the generic marketing email to more accurately reflect the specifications of 40 Wall Street. TT 681-682. When valuing 40 Wall Street for the 2015 SFC, McConney forwarded an excerpt of Larson’s 2015 appraisal to Donald Bender, but intentionally omitted the pages of the appraisal that show that Larson selected a cap rate of 4.25 percent, which resulted in an appraised value that was $227 million lower than using McConney’s selected cap rate of 3.04 percent . PX 118, 868; TT 676-681. In 2015, McConney began incorporating Larson’s appraisal of 40 Wall Street in his SFC valuations. However, he manipulated the data — increasing the appraised value to account for income from a Dean & Deluca lease, even though the original appraisal had already explicitly incorporated the Dean & Deluca lease into its valuation, resulting in an overvaluation of $120 million. PX 3004, 868; TT 690-701. McConney also omitted the pages of Larson’s appraisal that valued the Dean & Deluca lease when sending excerpts of it to Donald Bender at Mazars. PX 118; TT 695-701. Weisselberg had final approval over 40 Wall Street budgets, and was, thus, aware that the Trump Organization had budgeted a negative cash flow for 40 Wall Street for 2011. TT 1499, 1520-1521. Notwithstanding, he directed Donna Kidder to prepare a document containing a series of implausible assumptions to generate a $26.2 million net operating income to be used for the SFCs. TT 1523-1526, 1529. However, 40 Wall Street never reached a net operating income of $26.2 million; instead, it ran a deficit as high as -$20.9 million through 2015. PX 636, 652. Donald Trump was aware of this, but he misrepresented to Forbes that the building was going to net $64 million in 2015.⁵⁰ TT 3571-3579. Weisselberg also directed Kidder to prepare cash flow data for 40 Wall Street that stated false amounts of management fees when submitting that data to Ladder Capital. TT 1506-1507, 1536-1539. Prior to 2015, 40 Wall Street was subject to a $160 million mortgage with Capital One Bank. PX 3041 at 575. In January of 2015, Weisselberg wrote to Capital One asking it to waive a required upcoming $5 million principal payment. PX 3041 at

576-577. After Capital One declined to do so, Allen Weisselberg contacted his son, Jack Weisselberg, and inquired about Ladder Capital refinancing the loan. TT 1820-1826; PX 647, 3041 at