Cindy L. Moll, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., d/b/a Verizon Services Group, a/k/a Verizon New York Inc., Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee* Appeal from so much of a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, William M. Skretny, Judge, as dismissed plaintiff’s action against her former employer, principally alleging gender-based discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment, including hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer of her job site to a city some 160 miles away, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §290 et seq.; and alleging that plaintiff was paid less than her male co-workers for substantially similar work, in violation of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206 et seq. Following proceedings after a remand from this Court in Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., 760 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014), the district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, ruling principally that plaintiff failed to point to evidence sufficient to establish (a) an objectively hostile work environment, (b) an adverse employment action, or discriminatory or retaliatory intent, in the job site transfer, or (c) a clear causal connection between her gender or her protected activity and the termination of her employment; the court dismissed the claims of gender-based unequal pay on the ground that the pay differences were not based on gender. See Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., No. 04-CV-805, 2020 WL 5593845 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020). On appeal, plaintiff contends principally that the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that there was no adverse employment action or clear retaliatory motive in her job site transfer; and that the court’s conclusions that her proffered evidence was insufficient to show, inter alia, (A) an objectively hostile work environment, and (B) circumstances giving rise to an inference of (1) retaliation in the job site transfer, (2) discrimination or retaliation in the termination of her employment, and (3) unequal pay, failed to view the record in the light most favorable to her. We conclude that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff in connection with the motion for summary judgment against her, presents genuine issues of material fact to be tried as to the claims of hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment; and that such issues also exist with respect to plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act claim as to one of her identified comparators. We vacate the judgment to the extent that it dismissed these claims and remand for trial. Other aspects of the final judgment are affirmed or remain undisturbed. Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part. AMALYA KEARSE, C.J. Plaintiff Cindy L. Moll appeals from so much of a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, William M. Skretny, Judge, as dismissed her action against her former employer defendant Telesector Resources Group, Inc., d/b/a Verizon Services Group, an indirect subsidiary of Verizon Communications Inc. (collectively “Verizon” or “Verizon Business” or “the Company”), principally alleging gender-based discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment, hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer of her job site to a city some 160 miles away, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”); and alleging that she was paid less than several of her male co-workers for substantially similar work, in violation of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206 et seq. (or “EPA”). Following proceedings after a remand from this Court, see Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., 760 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Moll III”), the district court granted Verizon’s motion for summary judgment, ruling principally that Moll failed to point to evidence sufficient to establish (a) an objectively hostile work environment, (b) an adverse employment action, or discriminatory or retaliatory intent, in the job site transfer, or (c) a clear causal connection between her gender or her protected activity and the termination of her employment; the court dismissed the claims of gender-based unequal pay on the ground that the pay differences were not based on gender. On appeal, Moll contends principally that the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that there was no adverse employment action or clear retaliatory motive in her job site transfer; and that the court’s conclusions that her proffered evidence was insufficient to show, inter alia, (A) an objectively hostile work environment, and (B) circumstances giving rise to an inference of (1) retaliation in the job site transfer, (2) discrimination or retaliation in the termination of her employment, and (3) unequal pay, failed to view the record in the light most favorable to her. We conclude that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Moll in connection with the motion for summary judgment against her, presents genuine issues of material fact to be tried as to the claims of hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment; and that such issues also exist with respect to Moll’s Equal Pay Act claim as to one of her identified comparators. We thus vacate the judgment to the extent that it summarily dismissed these claims and remand for trial. Other aspects of the final judgment are affirmed or remain undisturbed. I. BACKGROUND Moll, who was employed by Verizon (or its predecessor or component entities) from 1990 until her termination in 2007, began, as a high school graduate, in the Company’s Buffalo, New York, office in a clerical position. She earned an Associate’s Degree in Business in 1999 and a Bachelor’s Degree in Business in 2006. In 1997, she had been promoted to a sales-related role in the Company’s enterprise solutions group, whose mission was to sell Verizon products and services to institutional customers, including businesses, governmental entities, healthcare facilities, and schools. Moll’s position (called “Systems Analyst” until Verizon revised its titles in 1999) was “Sales Engineer” (or “SE”). The primary function of an SE was to assist a group’s sales representative, titled a “Corporate Account Manager” (or “CAM”), in selling Verizon products to clients; the enterprise solutions group (or “ESG”) also included “project managers,” positions that were coordinate with SEs. SEs and project managers reported to SE Managers. SEs were generally responsible for designing and pricing Verizon telecommunications systems, and for presenting design proposals. They were divided into four levels and given numerical designations of I, II, III, or IV, with SE I being the lowest and SE IV being the highest; the levels were intended to signify distinctions in technical expertise within certain assigned product specialties. However, each SE was expected to have expertise in a “bucket” of Verizon products. Moll was originally an SE I and was promoted in 2003 to SE II; her specialty was “traditional telephone” and voice products. Moll continued to report to Verizon’s Buffalo office, where she worked alongside three others: Anne Byrne, a Systems Analyst retitled an SE I, who was promoted to SE II in 2001 and to SE III in 2003; and Thomas Spencer and Daniel Irving, each a Senior Systems Analyst retitled an SE II. Byrne in early 2004 commenced a Title VII action that, to an extent, paralleled the present action. See, e.g., Byrne v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., 339 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2009). Spencer remained an SE II until he left the group in early 2004. Irving became an SE Manager in 2001. Moll commenced this action in October 2004, asserting claims principally of gender discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, including sexual harassment by Irving, a hostile work environment, denial of promotion by Irving after he became her supervisor, and retaliation for her complaints of such discrimination, all in violation of Title VII and state law; and asserting that she was denied compensation equal to that paid to Spencer and other male co-workers for substantially similar work, in violation of Title VII and the EPA. She filed an amended complaint in 2008, adding claims that she was subjected to new acts of discrimination and retaliation, first in 2004 by Verizon’s transferring her job site from Buffalo, where she and her family lived, to Syracuse, New York, some 160 miles away, and then in 2007 by Verizon’s termination of her employment, supposedly as part of a reduction in force. The details of Moll’s factual allegations and the path of this litigation are described in opinions of the district court and this Court, familiarity with which is assumed. See Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., No. 04-CV-805, 2005 WL 2405999, at *7, *12 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005) (“Moll I”) (granting in part Verizon’s motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Moll’s hostile-work-environment claims as time-barred), vacated by Moll III, 760 F.3d at 204; Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., No. 04-CV-805, 2012 WL 1935087, at *32 (W.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012, amended May 30, 2012) (“Moll II”) (granting in part Verizon’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all remaining claims (except one for discriminatory delay in promotion, which was thereafter settled)), vacated by Moll III, 760 F.3d at 206; see also id. at 204 (vacating district court’s denial of Moll’s motion to compel Verizon to produce certain documents). Following the remand by Moll III, Moll filed a second amended complaint, which differed from her amended complaint principally by alleging hostile work environment as separate claims rather than as aspects of her general gender discrimination claims. And following additional discovery, Verizon again moved for summary judgment dismissing Moll’s claims. The district court record described in Parts II.B. through II.E. below — as developed before and after Moll III — includes declarations and deposition testimony by Moll and two of Moll’s female co-workers who had also brought actions alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, sexual harassment, and retaliation, as well as declarations or deposition testimony of several Verizon managers and Buffalo-based Verizon employees. In a Decision and Order reported at Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., No. 04-CV-805, 2020 WL 5593845 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020) (“Moll IV”), the district court granted Verizon’s renewed summary judgment motion in its entirety. As described more fully in Part II.B. below, the court found that Moll had failed to present a prima facie case of hostile work environment, concluding that she had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of an environment that a reasonable person would have found to be hostile or abusive. The court found that Moll had also failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation in her job site transfer to Syracuse, principally because Verizon’s plan was to transfer men as well as women, and ruled that the relocation order was not an adverse employment action both because Moll was given the options, instead of accepting the transfer, of changing departments or accepting a severance package, and because she reported to Syracuse only infrequently and was on disability leave for part of the period in question. In addition, discounting contrary evidence given by Christopher Gaglione, the manager of Moll’s SE group at the time of the transfer order, the district court stated that there was no clear evidence that the transfer plan was devised or implemented with discriminatory or retaliatory intent. See Part II.C. below. The Moll IV court also concluded that Moll failed to present a prima facie case of gender discrimination or retaliation in the termination of her employment. As described in Part II.D. below, it found that the circumstances did not give rise to an inference of discrimination, chiefly because in Verizon’s reduction of force the ratio of terminated employees was two males to every female. The court further adopted Verizon’s contention that Moll’s claims of retaliatory termination were “belie[d]” by her manager’s assigning Verizon’s most lucrative client account to her. Finally, the court found that Moll had not adduced sufficient evidence to show a genuine issue of fact to be tried as to her Title VII claims of gender discrimination or retaliation in her treatment with regard to such other matters as client entertainment tickets, vacation privileges, credit for sales to Verizon clients, performance rankings, and discipline. It found that disparities in pay resulted from factors other than gender. See Part II.E. below. Having found that Verizon was entitled to summary judgment dismissing all of Moll’s Title VII claims, the court ruled that Moll’s claims of discrimination or retaliation under the NYSHRL, which were governed by the same principles, were dismissed for the same reasons as her claims under Title VII. Having disposed of Moll’s claims, and having dismissed counterclaims asserted by Verizon — a decision that Verizon has not appealed — the court entered final judgment. This appeal by Moll followed. In reviewing Moll IV’s grant of summary judgment, we are mindful that the court referred frequently to its findings and conclusions in Moll II, and generally found no reason to change the results it had reached in Moll II. Accordingly, we take both opinions into account as appropriate. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Moll’s challenges to the judgment address four categories of claims: (1) hostile work environment, (2) retaliatory job site transfer, (3) discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment, and (4) denial of equal pay. She contends principally that the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that there was no adverse employment action or clear retaliatory motive in her job site transfer; and that as to each of the above categories of claims the court’s conclusions that her proffered evidence was insufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact to be tried failed to view the record in the light most favorable to her. While Moll’s notice of appeal indicates that it encompasses all of Moll IV’s dismissals of her claims, her briefs on appeal present challenges only with respect to the above four categories. She has not argued for reinstatement of her claim that the job site transfer was discriminatory. And although her claim of denial of compensation equal to that of her male co-workers invokes both Title VII and the EPA, she has not argued that the court erred in rejecting her claims of discrimination in other facets of her employment, such as permission to work from home, discipline, performance evaluations, allocation of credit for sales, and access to customer networking opportunities such as tickets or invitations to sports events. Accordingly, we regard claims as to those other aspects as having been abandoned; the record as to those aspects will thus be considered only as they may be relevant to the above four claim categories that are argued in Moll’s brief. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that in light of the record in the district court, with all reasonable inferences drawn in Moll’s favor, summary judgment was inappropriately granted as to each of the first three categories and in part as to the fourth. A. Summary Judgment Principles We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standards that govern the district court’s consideration of the motion. “A motion for summary judgment may properly be granted — and the grant of summary judgment may properly be affirmed — only where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant the entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kaytor”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court’s role with respect to such a motion is not to resolve disputed questions of fact “but solely to determine whether, as to any material fact, there is a genuine issue to be tried.” Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 360 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Fitzgerald”), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Liberty Lobby”). In determining whether genuine issues of fact exist, “‘the district court may not properly consider the record in piecemeal fashion, trusting innocent explanations for individual strands of evidence.’” Davis-Garett v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 921 F.3d 30, 45 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Davis-Garett”) (quoting Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545). Rather, the court must “review the record ‘taken as a whole.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In so doing, it “‘must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,’…even though contrary inferences might reasonably be drawn.” Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (emphasis in Kaytor) (other internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the court “‘may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence,’” Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (emphasis in Kaytor)); “‘[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,’” Davis-Garett, 921 F.3d at 46 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150); see, e.g., Moll III, 760 F.3d at 206 (“because the assessment of a witness’s credibility is a function reserved for the jury,” the summary judgment court “may not discredit” deposition testimony that is favorable to the party opposing summary judgment (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court “‘must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.’” Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (intermediate quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in Kaytor)). To be sure, “reliance upon conclusory statements or mere allegations” will not suffice to defeat summary judgment. Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). Summary judgment as to a specific claim is proper when “after adequate time for discovery[,]…the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). But if “‘the admissible materials in the record make it arguable that the claim has merit,’” then “[s]ummary judgment dismissing a claim” cannot be granted. Davis-Garett, 921 F.3d at 45 (quoting Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545 (emphasis ours)). Finally, “an extra measure of caution is merited” before granting or affirming “summary judgment in a discrimination action because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). Thus, the court must scrutinize affidavits and depositions carefully for circumstantial evidence that, if credited by the factfinder, could reasonably be interpreted as showing discrimination. See, e.g., Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, LP, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). In sum, “summary judgment is proper only when, with all permissible inferences and credibility questions resolved in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought, ‘there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.’” Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 546 (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250). Where “there are genuine issues of material fact” that “‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,’” “[s]ummary judgment should be denied.” Davis-Garett, 921 F.3d at 45 (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250). B. The Hostile Work Environment Claims Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of,” inter alia, “such individual’s…sex.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). This “prohibition of sex discrimination extends to sexual harassment,” which encompasses “conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of…creating an intimidating[ or] hostile” work environment. Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Title VII “does not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace,” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (“Burlington Northern”) (internal quotation marks omitted); but “[w]hen [a] workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’…that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’…Title VII is violated,” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986) (emphasis ours)). To prove a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must establish both objective and subjective elements. The misconduct shown must have been “severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment,” that is, “an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. And the victim must have “subjectively perceive[d] the environment to be abusive.” Id. Whether a particular environment is objectively “‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Such “circumstances…may include” but are not limited to the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Id. “[N]o single factor is required.” Id. And “[t]here is neither a threshold magic number of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law, nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.” Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The assessment “is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. “Because the analysis of severity and pervasiveness looks to the totality of the circumstances, the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole….” Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 547 (emphasis in Kaytor (internal quotation marks omitted)). “ Sex-based hostile work environment claims may be supported by facially sex-neutral incidents and ‘sexually offensive’ acts may be facially sex-neutral. See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 2002).” Moll III, 760 F.3d at 200 (“The district court [in Moll I] erred when it refused to consider all allegations in the Complaint in their totality, including those that were not sexually offensive in nature.”). And “a plaintiff who herself experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support her claim.” Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 547 (emphasis in Kaytor (internal quotation marks omitted)); see generally Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (a “hostile environment is not limited to…sexual behavior targeted at the complainant,” “as long as there is evidence suggesting that the objectionable workplace behavior is based on the sex of the target” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Moll IV, the district court granted summary judgment dismissing Moll’s hostile work environment claims for failure to proffer enough evidence to establish a prima facie case. While ruling that Moll had sufficiently “raise[d] issues of fact as to her subjective belief that her work environment was hostile and that Verizon Business was responsible through imputation,” the court found that Moll “ha[d] not established the existence of material issue of fact of the objective basis for hostile work environment given the number and frequency of incidents [she] presented.” Moll IV, 2020 WL 5593845, at *16 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as to Moll’s hostile work environment claims, the only issue on this appeal is whether her proffered evidence sufficed to reveal a genuine issue to be tried as to whether a reasonable person in Moll’s position would have found her working environment hostile or abusive. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Moll, with all credibility questions and permissible inferences resolved in her favor, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate. 1. The District Court’s View of the Evidence In Moll IV, the district court discussed many of the instances, statements, and actions in the Verizon Business workplace in 1998-2003 that Moll viewed as harassing, abusive, and humiliating. In the Moll IV discussion, we count some 17 such descriptions by the court, see 2020 WL 5593845, at *14-*15, although some individual descriptions encompass and/or compress multiple statements or actions. We summarize them as follows. [1] In December 1998, “a male co-worker stated to another female co-worker that she was working from home because he heard ‘bedsprings creaking’”; [2] in 1999, Irving repeatedly called Moll while she was on a multiple-day training trip, asking that she come to his hotel room; [3] in January 2000, Moll “was denied [hockey tickets] by [SE Manager] Michael McGowan claiming that because [Moll] was pregnant…she was too tired”; in 2003, Irving acquired hockey tickets for entertaining clients, for which he could be reimbursed by Verizon, and he offered them only to male, not to female, SEs; [4] in 2001, project manager Michael Finnegan called Moll and another female co-worker “hottie[s]“; [5] Irving asked Moll whether she had an affair with another co-worker; [6] Moll was in conversations where male employees commented on the age and attractiveness of female employees; [7] a female co-worker told Moll that a “male coworker asked to come to her hotel room during a sales meeting (reminiscent of[)]” Irving’s request of Moll; [8] another male co-worker commented on the appearance of Moll’s co-worker Sara DeLena, analogizing her to a “Bond girl”; one of DeLena’s managers told her she should start exercising, implying that DeLena was overweight; [9] in April or May of 2001, Irving left a note on Moll’s desk saying that he thought about her while he was in the shower; [10] in June 2001, Irving began to require Moll to communicate with him only in person, not by other means, a requirement he did not impose on male SEs; [11] in January 2002, Irving asked Moll “to come back to work with him at night,” when they would be “alone in the office”; [12] in February or March 2002, when Moll was talking with a group of co-workers, Irving walked up to a female worker, looked at her breasts, and said “hooters”; [13] in May 2002, Irving denied Moll permission to work from home from then on, so that Irving could continue to see her; [14] in October 2002, Irving followed Moll to a business lunch, and when he was asked why (given that other employees were not accompanied on similar occasions), Irving stated that he wanted to “develop” Moll; [15] during a 2003 equal employment opportunity office training program on discrimination, retaliation, and harassment attended by Irving, Irving laughed and mocked the vignettes presented; Moll then complained of Irving’s behavior and itemized instances of harassment and discrimination; [16] in 2003, Finnegan and new father David Jager were heard discussing that Jager could not have sex with his wife; Finnegan was giving out his work and fax number as “25-PENIS”; [17] in 2005, Moll sought psychological treatment due to the discrimination and harassment she suffered. 2. Other Evidence or Details Not Mentioned in Moll IV In addition to the court’s description of the record as to Moll’s complaints about Irving and others at Verizon, her depositions and declaration — along with sworn statements from Moll’s co-worker SE Anne Byrne and from Sara DeLena, who had become a Corporate Account Manager in 1996, one year before Moll became an SE — provided further details as to the approximate timing, extent, and nature of some of the incidents referred to by the court in Moll IV, including: In or about 1998 “through 1999,” Irving made comments to Moll in the workplace, in which he said she “look[ed] and smell[ed] great today”; Moll was married, as Irving knew; and Irving too was married; Moll “was offended by these comments, which were humiliating and made [her] uncomfortable”; one of the several notes Irving left on Moll’s desk complained about “being interupted [sic] when we are talking,” and said “I know the 23rd was unplanned & I was definitely thinking about the possibilities!! You look & smell great today…Call me?” (emphasis in original); in the 1999 multi-day training trip mentioned in Moll IV, Irving called Moll in her hotel room multiple times between 9:30 and 11:30 p.m., asking her to come to his room; he had continued to call after she had refused and had asked him to stop calling; after more than five such calls, she took the telephone off the hook; Irving asked Moll “whether [she] had anything going [on] with Mr. McGowan [her then-SE Manager] or another male co-worker”; Irving “stated that [Moll] had the keys to Mr. McGowan’s house, suggesting that [she] must be having an affair with” McGowan; upon Moll’s return to work after maternity leave, Finnegan called Moll and CAM Sara DeLena “hottie[s],” and he thereafter repeatedly called Moll a “hottie” “when he would see [her] every month or two during the time [they] worked together, which was through 2003 or 2004″; although the district court noted Verizon’s contention that Irving’s sexual pursuit of Moll had ceased in the Fall of 1999 when Moll’s pregnant state became apparent, it was in 2001, after Moll returned from maternity leave, that Irving — who by then was Moll’s supervisor — left his note on her desk saying that he thought about her while he was in the shower; in 2003, when Finnegan and Jager discussed Jager’s inability to have sex with his wife for six weeks after the birth of the baby, they did so near the desks of Byrne and Moll, both of whom heard Finnegan say that “any guy who had to go that long without sex would be in an ‘upright and locked position’”; although Moll and Byrne complained to Verizon’s equal employment opportunity office (“HR”) about, inter alia, Irving’s laughing at and mocking the April 2003 HR training session on discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, in response Verizon did nothing; soon after that HR training session, Finnegan telephoned SE II Spencer at work, asking to receive a fax at his Verizon fax number, and stating that his number was 25-PENIS; Spencer, whose desk — like those of Moll and Byrne, was in a cubicle — announced Finnegan’s number to the people sitting nearby; he then immediately went to Moll’s desk and told her that Finnegan’s Verizon fax number was 25-PENIS; Spencer testified that he viewed Finnegan’s fax number as “minor compared to other things that were always said every day”; he testified, “like I said, the office atmosphere, that one statement…was nothing compared to what went on” (emphasis added). In addition to these details, the district court in Moll IV largely ignored ESG’s workplace conditions for women as a whole, as it made scant mention of the sexual harassment described by Sara DeLena (who, like Moll and Byrne, had filed her own Title VII action). From 1995 to 2002, DeLena’s manager was McGowan, and DeLena complained to him frequently. The evidence as to DeLena — who is usually the female “co-worker” referred to by the district court in Moll IV — reveals a working environment repeatedly punctuated with sexual comments, innuendo, and statements or treatment demeaning to women, including the following: CAM Timothy Mitten, at a charity event for which Verizon had purchased a table at which Verizon clients were sitting, referred to CAM DeLena as “his secretary”; beginning in or about 1997, Finnegan who was first a CAM and later a project manager in the group, “regularly” made sexually offensive comments, and comments about DeLena’s appearance; in a work meeting in or about 1997, attended by DeLena, Finnegan, McGowan, and another, Finnegan described a certain individual as so stupid that he could “‘screw up a wet dream’”; in the same meeting, in a discussion about hiring a female, Finnegan stated that her hiring would depend on what she looked like; after that meeting DeLena complained to McGowan and asked him to get Finnegan to “clean up his act”; in a 1998 conference call, with numerous CAMs participating, Finnegan asked DeLena whether she was at home, stating that he could “hear the bedsprings creaking”; DeLena thereafter complained to McGowan and asked if he had spoken to Finnegan; McGowan said he had and that he would do so again; in 2000, DeLena went to a meeting in McGowan’s office; when she entered, Finnegan was there and told DeLena she looked good; McGowan asked if her dress was new, because it even smelled new; and Finnegan told her, “come sit on my lap”; DeLena promptly turned and walked out; she later complained again to McGowan, who said he had spoken to Finnegan in the past and would do so again; thereafter, Finnegan’s comments did not cease but rather “accelerated”; he referred to DeLena as a “hottie” two or three times a week; she asked him to stop, but he just laughed and persisted, and he continued to comment on her appearance, her dress, and her hair; DeLena again complained to McGowan, who said he would talk to Finnegan; in or around 2000, when Finnegan and McGowan were discussing the new President of Verizon’s Sales Division — a woman — Finnegan commented that she was not “too bad looking”; McGowan responded that she “had a lot of miles on her”; when a female co-worker who was present asked what that was supposed to mean, Finnegan or McGowan replied by saying the woman was old; in November 2000, DeLena was stuck in the office because of a severe snow storm; later that week Finnegan told her he was only sorry that she was in the office alone without him; in December 2000, at the Company Christmas party, DeLena was in the buffet line next to Finnegan and McGowan, and Finnegan told DeLena that he had asked the restaurant to keep the whipped cream for her to take home so she could have a “hot time with” her husband; DeLena promptly turned and looked at McGowan, but he remained silent; around Christmas in 2000, Moll was in a van with members of the Buffalo office enterprise solutions group for an outing to a casino, and when DeLena entered, Finnegan said “now we have two old bags in the van”; in or about January 2001, when DeLena was to depart for a sales kickoff meeting at a resort, Finnegan came to her office and asked if she had a room alone at the resort; when she said she did, he told her he was going to come knocking at her door in the middle of the night; DeLena promptly walked out of her office; in addition, prior to that meeting, Finnegan had said, “how are we going to get Sara in the hot tub? Hopefully without a suit”; during the return trip from that meeting, Finnegan said to DeLena, “I hope you understand what I mean when I make comments about how you look, your body is so…”; DeLena interrupted him and told him to stop making comments about her body, her looks, and her appearance; she later complained again to McGowan, who told her he would take care of it; McGowan himself regularly made comments about women’s appearances; he also said women would be more appealing if they smelled like bacon and eggs, or vanilla; McGowan regularly asked DeLena about the appearance of certain of her friends; as to one, he asked “why does she make herself so unattractive”; on another occasion he asked “why older women would have plastic surgery when it obviously wouldn’t make a difference in their attractiveness”; McGowan also regularly claimed to have a cousin who was really his sister, stating that his parents had given her away because they didn’t want to have any girls; David Winley, who joined the enterprise solutions group as a Technical Support Specialist in April 2002, regularly made comments with respect to DeLena’s appearance, referring to her as a “Bond woman”; Winley also regularly referred to DeLena’s perfume and said “oh, Opium, don’t do that to me,” and once said “I can’t sit next to you, I don’t want to get in trouble”; in May 2001, DeLena began treating with a psychiatrist because of the continual and severe emotional stress she was experiencing at work; in May 2002, she was placed on disability leave, which lasted more than a month; in 2002, when DeLena was meeting with a client and Kevin Dean, a recently hired SE, the client asked whether Dean worked for DeLena; Dean responded, “I don’t work for her, and she’ll be working for me before I work for her.” (See Affidavit of Sara DeLena dated November 22, 2005,
72, 86, 104-127; see also Affidavit of Anne M. Byrne dated June 12, 2006 (“Byrne Aff.”),
