MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Before the Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted. The plaintiff claims that Jeffrey Epstein repeatedly sexually assaulted and eventually raped her when she was a minor. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants collectively owned the building where the assaults occurred, and that the defendants allowed the abuse to continue by supporting Epstein social and financially, allowing him to live and work in the building, and allowing him to use the defendants’ employees for his own purposes. The plaintiff previously brought claims against Epstein’s estate in New York state court, premised on the same underlying facts as this case, which were dismissed with prejudice. She alleges now that the defendants in this action employed the defendants whom the plaintiff sued in the prior state action. BACKGROUND I. Factual Background The plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2001, Jeffrey Epstein1 repeatedly sexually assaulted and eventually raped her when she was a minor, at Nine East 71st Street, New York, New York (“the Property”). (ECF No. 36
5-7.)2 She further alleges that the defendant Leslie Wexner owned the Property “where[,] despite having notice of Epstein’s behavior, he permitted Epstein to live and run his companies and nonprofit organizations,” and that Epstein was “enabled…to perpetuate these sexual crimes against her” “with the help of Leslie and Abigail Wexner, and a network of charities, companies, [] trusts, and their employees.” (Id.) II. Prior State Court Action In 2019, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York and made similar claims arising out of the same set of facts against multiple defendants, including Jeffrey Epstein’s estate and its executors and Ghislaine Maxwell. (ECF No. 40-3 (State Action First Amended Complaint).) None of the defendants in that lawsuit are parties to this suit. In the state court lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged that the Nine East 71st Street Corporation owned and operated the Property. (Id.) In November 2020, the plaintiff entered a stipulation of discontinuance in which she agreed to dismiss the state court action with prejudice. (ECF No. 40-4 (State Action Stipulation of Discontinuance).) III. Federal Action Procedural Background On August 14, 2021, the plaintiff, then pro se, brought this action in state court against six defendants: The New Albany Company, LLC, the YLK Charitable Fund, the Wexner Family Charitable Fund, the Wexner Foundation, and Leslie Wexner and Abigail Wexner (collectively “the defendants”). (ECF No. 1.) The defendants removed this action to federal court on January 7, 2022, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Id.) At the time of removal, the plaintiff had filed only a notice with summons; she had not filed a complaint. (Id.) At Magistrate Judge Robert Levy’s direction, the plaintiff filed a complaint on June 29, 2022 in this Court. (ECF No. 22.)3 The plaintiff filed an amended complaint — the operative pleading for resolution of this motion — on January 6, 2023. (ECF No. 36.) The plaintiff asserts seven causes of action: (1) a declaratory judgment claim regarding ownership of the property; (2) a negligence claim for premises liability against Leslie Wexner; (3) a negligence claim against all of the defendants; (4) a negligent retention claim against the Wexner Family Charitable Fund, the Wexner Foundation, Leslie Wexner, and the New Albany Company for hiring employees who caused the sexual abuse of the plaintiff; (5) a fraudulent conveyance claim against Leslie Wexner, Abigail Wexner, YLK Charitable Trust, the Wexner Family Charitable Fund, and the Wexner Foundation; (6) an aiding and abetting claim against Leslie Wexner, the Wexner Family Charitable Fund, the Wexner Foundation, and the New Albany Company; (7) a conspiracy claim against Leslie Wexner, the Wexner Family Charitable Fund, the Wexner Foundation, and the New Albany Company; and (8) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the Wexner Family Charitable Fund, the Wexner Foundation, Leslie H. Wexner and the New Albany Company, LLC. (ECF No. 36.)4 The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint in its entirety on April 17, 2023. (ECF No. 40.) The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata because the plaintiff already litigated her claims, which arise from the same facts, and the claims were dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 18-23.) The defendants cite various other pleading deficiencies: (1) the plaintiff did not allege facts that would allow personal jurisdiction over any defendant; (2) the plaintiff has no standing to assert a claim of declaratory relief; (3) the plaintiff engaged in impermissible group pleading; (4) the complaint fails to state a claim against the defendant New Albany Company, LLC; (5) the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law; (6) the plaintiff’s fraudulent conveyance claim is untimely and fails on the merits; and (7) the plaintiff did not state a claim against the defendants for negligent retention. (ECF No. 40.) LEGAL STANDARD To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). DISCUSSION The defendants raise multiple arguments for dismissal. The Court first addresses the defendants’ res judicata argument — that the dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiff’s state action bars this action. The Court concludes that it does. “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, dictates that ‘a final judgment on the merits in one action bars subsequent relitigation of the same claim by the same parties.’” Toth v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 21-CV-4245, 2023 WL 121733, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2023) (quoting Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1992)); Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, holds that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” (internal quotations omitted)).5 The party raising the res judicata defense — here, the defendants — must show that “(1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the [parties] or those in privity with them; [and] (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.” Monahan, 214 F.3d at 285.6 I. Adjudication on the Merits With respect to the first element, “it has long been settled that a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits.” Toth, 2023 WL 121733, at *4 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The stipulation of discontinuance the plaintiff entered in the state court action, dismissing the action with prejudice (ECF No. 40-4), thus satisfies the first element of res judicata as an adjudication on the merits. II. Involving the Parties or Their Privies The second element is also met, as the previous state action involved the same parties or their privies. Both New York and federal courts have rejected a “formalistic approach” to privity, considering instead whether the new defendants share an interest with those named in the first action. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 1995); Sweeper v. Tavera, No. 08-CV-6372, 2009 WL 2999702, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2009) (“[I]t is well-settled in this Circuit that literal privity is not a requirement for res judicata to apply.…[A] privity analysis for res judicata purposes is broader than a traditional privity analysis.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). “[A]n employer-employee or agent-[principal] relationship will provide the necessary privity for claim preclusion with respect to matters within the scope of the relationship, no matter which party is first sued.” Quattrone v. Erie 2 Chautauqua-Cattaraugus Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., No. 19-CV-1329, 2021 WL 4295418, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bayer v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 897, 897-99 (2d Dep’t 2014) (“Although [certain parties] were not named in the [prior] action, since they are employees of the Department whose conduct formed the basis of the plaintiff’s allegations in the [prior] action, they are entitled to rely upon the beneficial disposition of the [prior] action against the City and the Department.” (citation omitted)). In the state court action, the plaintiff sued defendants who are not parties in this action; however, the allegations in the federal complaint, if true, establish that each defendant the plaintiff now sues is in privity with at least one of the defendants in the prior state action. In general, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants in this action employed some of the defendants in the state action and that the defendants’ alleged liability in this action stems from this employer-employee relationship — a privity relationship sufficient for purposes of res judicata. More specifically, the complaint alleges a privity relationship for each defendant in this action with at least one defendant in the earlier state action: The New Albany Company, LLC: The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “[u]pon information and belief, New Albany [] employed Epstein and the Employees that materially aided Epstein in his crimes and cover ups.” (ECF No. 36 43.) Epstein’s estate was a defendant in the prior state action. (See ECF No. 40-3.) The Wexner Family Charitable Fund: The plaintiff alleges that the Wexner Family Charitable Fund “also employed Epstein and the Employees that materially aided Epstein in his crimes and cover ups.” (ECF No. 36 48.) The YLK Charitable Fund: The plaintiff alleges “[u]pon information and belief[,] the YLK Charitable Fund also employed Epstein and the Employees that materially aided Epstein in his crimes and cover ups.” (Id. 45.) Abigail Wexner: The plaintiff alleges that Ms. Wexner was the president and director of the YLK Charitable fund (id. 12), the director of the Wexner Family Charitable Fund and the Wexner Foundation (id.), and that her and her husband Leslie Wexner’s “employees directly and materially aided Jeffrey Epstein in perpetrating crimes of sexual abuse, sexual assault, and rape against Ms. Araoz” (id. 9). The Wexner Foundation: The plaintiff alleges that “[u]pon information and belief the Wexner Foundation also employed Employees that materially aided Epstein in his crimes and cover ups.” (Id. 51.) In another part of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that the Foundation, along with some of the other defendants in this action, employed an individual referred to as “the Recruiter.” (Id. 101.) “The Recruiter” appears to refer to the defendant named as Jane Doe 1 in the prior state action. (Compare id.
