Magistrate Judge Andrew Krause1 DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff Nicole Molling brings this action against Defendants Liebenbrau LLC, Cochecton Pump House Holdings LLC, David Robert Lieber, and Jin Zhang (“Defendants”), asserting claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) based on, among other things, the alleged failure to pay all earned wages, including overtime wages, as well as a claim for pregnancy-based discrimination in violation of the New York Human Rights Law. ECF No. 10 (“First Amended Complaint” or “First Am. Compl.”). Before the Court is the parties’ application for approval of a proposed settlement agreement in accordance with Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015). ECF No. 33 (“Cheeks Application” or “Cheeks App.”). For the reasons that follow, the parties’ application for approval of the proposed settlement agreement is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. DISCUSSION In the Second Circuit, “parties cannot privately settle FLSA claims with a stipulated dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 absent the approval of the district court or the [United States] Department of Labor.” Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc., 948 F.3d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 2020). Thus, a district court in this Circuit must review a proposed FLSA settlement and determine whether it is fair and reasonable. See, e.g., Cronk v. Hudson Valley Roofing & Sheetmetal, Inc., No. 20-cv-7131 (KMK), 2021 WL 38264, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2021). When reviewing a proposed settlement agreement in an FLSA case, district courts consider the “totality of circumstances,” Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), to assess whether the agreement is fair and reasonable, including the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to which the settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated burdens and expenses in establishing their respective claims and defenses; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) whether the settlement agreement is the product of arm’s-length bargaining between experienced counsel; and (5) the possibility of fraud or collusion. Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600 (quoting Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335-36). In addition, the following factors “weigh against approving a settlement”: (1) the presence of other employees situated similarly to the claimant; (2) a likelihood that the claimant’s circumstance will recur; (3) a history of FLSA non-compliance by the same employer or others in the same industry or geographic region; and (4) the desirability of a mature record and a pointed determination of the governing factual or legal issue to further the development of the law either in general or in an industry or in a workplace. Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (quotation marks omitted). “[T]here is a strong presumption in favor of finding a settlement fair, as the Court is generally not in as good a position as the parties to determine the reasonableness of an FLSA settlement.” Xiao v. Grand Sichuan Int’l St. Marks, Inc., Nos. 14-cv-9063, 15-cv-6361 (RA), 2016 WL 4074444, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and considered the totality of the circumstances, the Court cannot approve the proposed settlement agreement at this time because (i) the parties have failed to provide sufficient information with respect to the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement amount; (ii) the release provisions are not sufficiently mutual; and (iii) the proposed settlement agreement contains a problematic non-disparagement provision. First, the proposed settlement agreement provides for a total settlement payment of $13,000.00, with $8,223.34 payable to Plaintiff and $4,776.66 payable to Plaintiff’s counsel as attorneys’ fees and costs. Cheeks App. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that she was paid for 40 hours of work per week, despite often working more than 70 hours; she alleges that she was never paid overtime compensation. Id. at 1-2; see First Am. Compl. 21. Plaintiff further alleges that she was terminated by Defendants due to pregnancy-based discrimination. Cheeks App. at 2; see First Am. Compl.
