MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER1 Presently before the Court is defendants Coeymans Recycling Center LLC and Coeymans Recycling Center II, LLC,’s (hereafter, collectively, “CRC”) Motion to Compel disclosure pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). See Dkt. No. 97. Plaintiff Riverkeeper (“plaintiff”) opposed. See Dkt. No. 107. CRC replied.2 See Dkt. No. 114. I. Legal Standard A. Motion to Compel Discovery Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) Rule 26(b)(1) states, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case…. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence in order to be discoverable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). “Under Rule 37, following a good-faith effort to meet and confer, upon to all parties notice,” “a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). “‘Motions to compel made pursuant to Rule 37 are ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.’” Harris v. Bronx Parent Hous. Network, Inc., No. 18-CV-11681, 2020 WL 763740, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 2000)). A district court has broad latitude to determine the scope of discovery and to manage the discovery process.’” Tromblee v. The State of New York, et al., No. 1:19-CV-638(BKS/CFH), 2022 WL 2818222, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2022) (quoting EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (additional citation omitted)). “Motions to compel made pursuant to Rule 37 are ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.’” Id. (quoting Harris v. Bronx Parent Hous. Network, Inc., No. 18-CV-11681, 2020 WL 763740, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020) (additional citation omitted)). B. Attorney-Client Privilege The attorney-client privilege “enable[s] attorneys to give informed legal advice to clients” and “protects communications between a client and its attorney that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential.” Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015). This Court has held that communications are deemed confidential if: (1)…legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his or her capacity as such, (3) the communication relates to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, and (6) are at his or her insistence permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by the client or the legal advisor, (8) except if the protection is waived. Trudeau v. New York State Consumer Protection Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325, 335-36 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing United States v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1997)) and (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132. The privilege protects the attorney’s advice to the client and the information communicated by the client that provides a basis for giving advice. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390, 101 S.Ct. 677; In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1992); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 293 F.R.D. 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “But since the privilege stands in derogation of the public’s right to every man’s evidence,…it ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000). The burden of proving the existence of the privilege rests with the party asserting the privilege. See Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 6, 2005, 256 F. App’x 379, 382 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order). Thus, “[t]he party asserting the privilege must establish the essential elements of the privilege.” United States v. Constr. Prod. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “Any ambiguities as to whether the essential elements have been met are construed against the party asserting the privilege.” Koumoulis v. Indep. Fin. Mktg. Grp., Inc., 295 F.R.D. 28, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 29 F. Supp. 3d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (additional citations omitted)). Farrell v. United States Olympic & Paralym[p]ic Comm., No. 1:20-CV-01178 (FJS/CFH), 2023 WL 4033290, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. June 15, 2023) (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 332 F.R.D. 420, 437 (N.D.N.Y. 2019)). “The attorney-client privilege is generally waived ‘by voluntary disclosure of the [privileged] communication to another party.’” Id. at *6 (quoting Loguidice v. McTiernan, No. 1:14-CV-1323 (TJM/CFH), 2018 WL 4011584, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2018)). “It is…well established that the party invoking a privilege bears the burden of establishing its applicability to the case at hand.” In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 19, 2002 & Aug. 2, 2002, 318 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2003). C. Attorney Work Product As this Court has set forth: The attorney work product doctrine “shields from disclosure materials prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation’ by a party, or the party’s representative, absent a showing of substantial need.” United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)); accord Bloomingburg Jewish Educ. Ctr. v. Vill. of Bloomingburg, 171 F. Supp. 3d 136, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Although a document “‘need not be prepared primarily or exclusively to assist at trial in order to be prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation…., more than a remote possibility of litigation must be shown.” United States ex rel. Rubar v. Hayner Hoyt Corp., No. 5:14-CV-830 (GLS/CFH), 2018 WL 5811427, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Farrell, 2023 WL 4033290, at *6. “In order ‘to assert privilege under the attorney work product doctrine, [a party] must be able to show that [a] document[ ][was] prepared (1) in anticipation of litigation (2) by a party or its representative and (3) not in the ordinary course of business.’” ICM Controls Corp. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 5:12-CV91766 (LEK/ATB), 2020 WL 1819658, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020) (quoting Carpenter v. Churchville Greene Homeowner’s Ass’n, No. 09-CV-6552T, 2011 WL 4711961, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) and citing U.S. v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d at 473) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “The attorney-client privilege and the work product rule serve different objectives.” Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 293 F.R.D. 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1200 n.4). “The work product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.” United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947)); see generally Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 380, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (1991) (“The prospect of litigation may be relevant to the subject of work product and trial preparation materials, but the attorney-client privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation. Legal advice is often sought, and rendered, precisely to avoid litigation, or facilitate compliance with the law, or simply to guide a client’s course of conduct.”) (internal citation omitted). Farrell, 2023 WL 4033290, at *7. “The party asserting the work-product privilege bears the ‘heavy burden of establishing its applicability.’” United States ex rel. Rubar, 2018 WL 5811427, at *2 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 6, 2005, 510 F. 3d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, “[o]nce a party establishes that its document is protected by the work-product privilege, the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery to prove that discovery is warranted.” NL Industries, Inc. v. ACF Indust. LLC, No. 10-CV-89W, 2015 WL 4066884, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015). “Even where the applicability of the work product doctrine has been established, factual material may be ordered produced ‘upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.’” Garnier v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., No. 04-CV-1825 (NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 1211201, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2006) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981)) (quoting In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., No. M-21-81, 2005 WL 818821, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2005)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190-191 (2d Cir. 2000) (“A party seeking discovery of attorney work-product must show “substantial need,” for fact work-product. As for work-product that shows ‘mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney,…at a minimum such material is to be protected unless a highly persuasive showing [of need] is made.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, “opinion work product” “enjoys ‘near absolute immunity.’” Foti v. City of Jamestown Bd. of Public Utilities, 10CV575A, 2014 WL 3842376, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014). “[T]he privilege derived from the work product doctrine is not absolute[,]…it may be waived.’ ” Foti, 2014 WL 384376, at *3 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39) (1975). “ Any ambiguities as to whether the essential elements have been met are construed against the party asserting the privilege.” Koumoulis v. Indep. Fin. Mktg. Grp., Inc., 295 F.R.D. 28, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 29 F. Supp.3d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (additional citations omitted)). United States ex rel. Rubar, 2018 WL 5811427, at *2. II. Arguments A. Background Plaintiff withholds, on the bases of attorney-client privilege, attorney-work product, and material prepared in anticipation of litigation, 75 documents/communications items. See Dkt. No. 97-5. Plaintiff also redacted portions of three e-mail communications involving Ms. Heinzen. See Dkt. No. 97-4. These communications were redacted on various grounds. The first e-mail3 was redacted on the basis of attorney-client privilege, the second on the bases of attorney-work product and “personal information (non-responsive),” and the third e-mail on the bases of attorney work product and “personal information (non-responsive).” Id. B. Defendants’ Arguments CRC argues4 that plaintiff is improperly asserting the attorney-client and attorney-work product privileges over communications and documents involving a nonparty, Barbara Heinzen. See Dkt. No. 97-13 at 6-14. CRC asserts that Ms. Heinzen is not a client of the Super Law Group — the firm representing plaintiff — or of plaintiff’s in-house counsel. See id. at 9. CRC further argues that she is not an employee, officer, or owner of Riverkeeper, and instead “identifies herself as being associated with the ‘Clean Air Coalition of Greater Ravena-Coeymans’, with Riverkeeper Inc. identifying itself as a separate and distinct entity in that matter.” Id. at 9, 11. CRC provides that Ms. Heinzen “does not appear to be a legal member of the Plaintiff under the New York State Not-For-Profit Corporation Law.” Id. at 11. CRC contends that Ms. Heinzen is a “member” of plaintiff Riverkeeper, but observes that plaintiff’s website states that anyone can become a “member” by making a financial donation, but there is no mention of any membership benefits that “remotely involve[] ownership or control over Plaintiff or its operations, and no unilateral decision-making authority for Plaintiff’s operations.” Id. at 13. CRC also observes that Ms. Heinzen signed correspondence with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation on behalf of the Clean Air Coalition, with someone else signing on behalf of Riverkeeper. See id. at 14. Because Ms. Heinzen “is clearly only a donor to Plaintiff,” as she was not identified as a client in the retainer agreement, nor was she ever identified as an officer, owner, director, or employee of plaintiff, CRC argues that the attorney-client and work-product privileges do not apply to Ms. Heinzen. Id. C. Plaintiff’s Arguments Plaintiff first argues that Ms. Heinzen is a client representative of Riverkeeper, and, thus, her communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Dkt. No. 107 at 13. Plaintiff contends that Ms. Heinzen is “a particularly important member” of Riverkeeper insofar as she is the representative of the Riverkeeper membership who provided an affidavit to establish her individual standing, in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and who is prepared to testify to her individuals standing at trial, so that Riverkeeper can establish associational standing to bring a suit in federal court on behalf of its members. Id. at 14. Plaintiff contends that only a member, like Ms. Heinzen, can be the client’s representative to Riverkeeper’s attorneys and to the Court in this Capacity.” Id. Plaintiff avers that Ms. Heinzen’s “participation as a representative of the membership and her agreement to communicate with Riverkeeper’s counsel on standing matters is foundational to this action.” Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Heinzen has provided counsel with “information needed by Riverkeeper’s attorneys to prosecute this action; has been an active participant in the development of Riverkeeper’s investigation and legal strategy; and has played a central role, along with Riverkeeper’s staff, in the organization’s decision making in this case.” Id. at 15. Plaintiff points to case law that it contends supports the idea that communications of “paid and unpaid organizational affiliates” with attorneys are protected “where communications involve non-employees that are intimately involved in litigation — especially where the non-employee possesses important information needed by the attorney to represent the organization effectively.” Dkt. No. 107 at 16. Plaintiff contends that Ms. Heinzen is a “key member of the litigation team at all stages of this matter and has been included on communications intended and kept confidential”; thus, she is “‘an insider’ for the purpose of the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 17. Plaintiff alternatively argues that Ms. Heinzen’s communications with counsel are otherwise protected by the common-interest rule because she and Riverkeeper “share[] a common legal goal[,]” and she “ worked with Riverkeeper to formulate a common legal strategy[.]” Dkt. No. 107 at 17. Plaintiff points to Ms. Heinzen’s “ active roles in the litigation as a standing witness, investigator, advisor, and local liaison for Riverkeeper.” Id. at 18. Next, plaintiff proposes that Ms. Heinzen is an agent or consultant of plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 107 at 18. Plaintiff contends that she is a “necessary party” in obtaining legal advice insofar as that she served a “specialized and indispensable purpose.” Id. at 19. Specifically, Ms. Heinzen “possesses a unique and detailed understanding of site specific facts and history that informs Riverkeeper’s understanding of the legal merits of this case”; possesses a necessary perspective, as a local resident and advocate for the Coeymans Creek-Hannacroix watershed, on the outcomes and impacts of potential remedies for Defendants’ pollution”; and plaintiff considers Ms. Heinzen’s views “to be an important input” when “formulating its legal strategy and settlement position.” Id. Plaintiff next asserts that “[m]ost of the communications involving Ms. Heinzen are also protected under the work product doctrine” as they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. Dkt. No. 107 at 19. First, plaintiff contends that Ms. Heinzen is a “fact investigator”; thus, her investigations, done “at the direction of counsel and in her capacity as a member of Riverkeeper,” are covered by the work product privilege. Id. at 21. Plaintiff contends that Ms. Heinzen also “recruited” a drone operator “to assist in a factual investigation that proved certain of Defendants’ representations made in settlement negotiations were false, and Super Law Group later retained that drone operator. See id. Plaintiff notes that Ms. Heinzen “recruited” Mr. Remillard to observe and report on salt transport at the industrial park after Super Law Group asked her to do this and she was unavailable. Id. Plaintiff again points out that Ms. Heinzen has agreed to testify as to associational standing. See id. Thus, plaintiff avers, that Ms. Heinzen’s communications are prepared in anticipation of litigation because “she has served as Riverkeeper’s representative in litigation and acted at the explicit direction of Riverkeeper’s counsel as part of Riverkeeper’s litigation team.” Id. Second, plaintiff urges the Court to follow “Montesa and similar cases” that apply work-product protections to “volunteer ‘consultants’ and ‘investigators’ relied upon in developing factual background for a case.” Id. at 22. Plaintiff also appears to argue, independently from the attorney-client privilege argument, that documents involving Ms. Heinzen can be properly withheld as prepared in anticipation of litigation. See id. at 19; Dkt. No. 97-5. Lastly, plaintiff contends that the motion should be rejected pursuant to the Local Rules because CRC failed to meet and confer, resulting in many factual errors and matters placed before the Court that could have been “narrow[ed] or eliminate[d].” Dkt. No. 107 at 25. Plaintiff avers that Riverkeeper failed to “fully explain the legal basis or their factual concerns underlying their objection.” Id. at 25-26. Plaintiff argues that CRC “made little to no effort” to “investigate” or “reach out” to Riverkeeper about their concerns about “the claims that Barbara Heinzen was a proper member of Riverkeeper, a witness, or an investigator.” Id. Plaintiff contends that its understanding of CRC’s objections to plaintiff’s claims of privilege with respect to Ms. Heinzen, prior to the filing of CRC’s instant motion, was “based only on the erroneous legal argument that attorney-client privilege applies only to individual clients and officers or employees of corporations[.]” Id. at 27. Plaintiff further argues that CRC “ did not provide a basis to dispute” plaintiff’s claim of attorney work product privilege over communications with Ms. Heinzen before filing this motion. Id. Plaintiff points out the following “errors” in CRC’s motion (1) that Ms. Heinzen is not a fact witness or legal member of Riverkeeper; (2) claiming that Riverkeeper is attempting to assert a privilege over Riverkeeper’s communications with all of its members, rather than just Ms. Heinzen. Id. at 27-29. Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees associated with opposing this motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(b), contending that it was not substantially justified because, as relevant here, plaintiff’s assertion of privilege is “wholly justified under the law,” whereas CRC “make no substantially justified argument otherwise” and “repeatedly mischaracterize Riverkeeper’s assertion of privilege in making their motion.” Dkt. No. 107 at 29-30. In reply, CRC reiterates its argument that neither plaintiff’s counsel in this litigation nor its in-house counsel “assert that Ms. Heinzen is an actual client of theirs and no one has produced any attorney-client retainer or agreement otherwise demonstrating that Ms. Heinzen is under an attorney-client relationship with any Plaintiff associated lawyer related to this matter.” Dkt. No. 114 at 7-9. CRC further denounces plaintiff’s failure to provide “factual information” to demonstrate that Ms. Heinzen has “any control or direction” over this action or over Riverkeeper, and, thus, is not a client or client representative. Id. at 7-8. As to plaintiff’s argument that Ms. Heinzen is an agent or consultant to Riverkeeper, CRC argues that plaintiff did not produce “documentation” to support Ms. Heinzen being “actually retained as a consultant nor that she possesses any formal education or experience in any particular field regarding the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Id. at 7, 12-13. CRC contends that plaintiff’s filings suggest her involvement is based upon her “alleged personal knowledge about CRC and its operations,” which CRC decries as “speculative.” Id. at 7. CRC also contends that, despite plaintiff asserting that Ms. Heinzen is a fact witness, (1) the complaint is “clearly based upon publicly available documents and CRC documents…, not factual testimony from Ms. Heinzen”; and (2) she “cannot be a fact witness to alleged storm water operations at the Park or alleged violations as she is not an office [sic] or employee of CRC and does not work at the Park nor has legal access to the Park to observe Park operations. Any information she may have is from reading documents or from observations from outside the Park. No affidavit is offered…from Ms. Heinzen to demonstrate what Park operations she has personal knowledge of or what her factual knowledge may be[.]” Id. at 19-20. To the extent plaintiff argues that Ms. Heinzen is a client representative of Riverkeeper, CRC argues that her status as a “donor member” or that she was relied upon to demonstrate standing in this case “ignore[s] controlling law as to the standards for creating an attorney-client relationship[.]” Dkt. No. 114 at 10. Addressing plaintiff’s argument that the common interest rule applies, CRC contends that plaintiff “ mischaracterizes” this rule, as it is “sophisticated enough,” “knowledgeable enough,” and “experienced enough to bring this Clean Water Act Citizen’s Suit and articulate its factual and legal claims without Ms. Heinzen.” Id. at 13, 14-15 (citing Bulgari v. Bulgari, 649 F. Supp. 3d 8, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)). CRC argues that Ms. Heinzen “is not shown to be providing any actual factual information to support Riverkeeper’s allegations in the Complaint,” rather, is “only a fact witness and used for standing purposes.” Id. at 15. Although, CRC argues, Ms. Heinzen may be “useful and convenient,” case law requires more. Id. As for attorney work product, CRC similarly contends that that this doctrine does not apply to material shared with Ms. Heinzen because there is no “document or evidence from Riverkeeper” to show Ms. Heinzen “actually entering into any formal agency agreement with Riverkeeper.” Dkt. No. 114 at 16. CRC also disputes plaintiff’s description of Ms. Heinzen as a “fact investigator,” because plaintiff states only that Ms. Heinzen “gave Riverkeeper names of a possible drone operator that was formally retained by The Super Law Group, LLC, and talked to another individual to obtain some information that was given to Ms. Heinzen from looking at the Industrial Park from the road outside of the park.” Id. Absent proof that plaintiff “creat[ed] a legal relationship for an agency as to Heinzen,” CRC argues plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is an agent, and the protections do not apply. See id. Regarding material prepared in anticipation of litigation, CRC similarly contends that plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving privilege with respect to e-mails involving Ms. Heinzen. See dkt. no. 114 at 18. Finally, CRC rejects plaintiff’s contention that CRC did not meet-and-confer or fully explain their concerns and grounds for objecting to the privilege claims involving Ms. Heinzen. See Dkt. No. 114 at 18. CRC also contends that plaintiff cherry picks statements from its papers in contending that CRC’s motion is factually inaccurate. See id. at 19. CRC avers that plaintiff attempts to shift its burden to defendants. See id. Finally, it contends that Ms. Heinzen’s ability to “cast a ballot for board of directors on an annual basis” does not make plaintiff anything beyond a “donor-member,” as “one of likely thousands of donors” with such rights, and “has no other membership rights that would give her control or direction over Riverkeeper as a corporation for purposes of justifying any claim for attorney-client privilege.” Id. III. Discussion A. Client Representative As a threshold matter, insofar as plaintiff cites to case law about unincorporated associations, the Court agrees with CRC that such case law is irrelevant, as Riverkeeper does not contend that it is an unincorporated association nor explain how such rationale applies. See Dkt. No. 107 at 15; dkt. no. 114 at 11. Plaintiff argues that Ms. Heinzen, as “client representative,” should be covered by the attorney-client privilege. Dkt. No. 107 at 14-17. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff asserts that plaintiff is a “particularly important” member of Riverkeeper insofar as she provided an affidavit “to establish her individual standing” and is “prepared to testify” as to that matter at trial. Id. at 14. Plaintiff further points to Ms. Heinzen’s role in the litigation by being an “active participant in the development of Riverkeeper’s investigation and legal strategy,” and “played a central role, along with Riverkeeper’s staff, in the organization’s decision making in this case.” Id. Plaintiff contends that Ms. Heinzen has provided information needed by Riverkeeper’s attorneys to prosecute this action; has been an active participant in the development of Riverkeeper’s investigation and legal strategy; and has played a central role, along with Riverkeeper’s staff, in the organizations decision making in this case.” Id. at 15 (citing Leung Decl. [dkt. no. 107-5], Rotenberg Decl. [dkt. no. 107-3], Muench Decl. [dkt. no. 107-1]). The Court has closely reviewed these declarations. Mr. Rotenberg’s declaration contends that Riverkeeper “expressed its desire” that the Super Law Group “work closely with Ms. Heinzen, as she was a local community member and a Riverkeeper member knowledgeable about the environmental concerns surrounding development of the Port of Coeymans and Coeymans Industrial Park.” Dkt. No. 107-2 at 2 5. Mr. Rotenberg further declares that Ms. Heinzen “was the principal Riverkeeper contact on the ground” during her May 2019 “reconnaissance site visit of the area surrounding Coeymans Industrial Park.” Id. at 2 7. Mr. Rotenberg states that Ms. Heinzen was “included in all discussions, factual, legal, and strategic because her knowledge of the site was important for us to effectively represent Riverkeeper.” Id. Mr. Rotenberg further contends that the “first correspondence” between Riverkeeper and the Super Law Group “included information provided by Barbara Heinzen[.]” Dkt. No. 107-4 at 1 4. Mr. Rotenberg provides that Ms. Heinzen “has been treated as a member of Riverkeeper’s litigation team from the very first stages of the investigation,” insofar as she “completed tasks at the direction of the legal team varying from arranging the details of the initial reconnaissance visit, to providing up-to-date observations of the Park and surrounding area, to liaising with local witnesses on behalf of the legal team.” Id. at 2-3 8. Mr. Rotenberg states further that Ms. Heinzen has “attended periodic calls and acted as one of Riverkeeper’s representatives in connection with the litigation, providing input on factual issues in legal briefs and assisting Riverkeeper to formulate its litigation and settlement positions.” Id. at 3 9. Mr. Rotenberg next declares that Riverkeeper intends to have Ms. Heinzen testify on behalf of Riverkeeper on issues of standing and “to offer her personal observations of site history and current conditions.” Dkt. No. 107-4 at 2-3 8. Mr. Rotenberg contends that his law firm’s “representation of Riverkeeper includes preparing its witnesses for deposition and testimony, as well as defending those depositions and testimonies. Super Law Group will do that for Ms. Heinzen and any other Riverkeeper witness in this case.” Id. at 3 11. Further, he contends that Ms. Heinzen communicated with plaintiff’s counsel “in manner intended to create and maintain confidentiality.” Id.; see also dkt. no. 107-4 at 3 10. Ms. Leung, a Staff Attorney at Riverkeeper, Inc., and “lead in-house counsel” provides, that she is seeking to assert the attorney-client privilege over “communications between Riverkeeper’s legal team and…Barbara Heinzen, as well as over communications between Ms. Heinzen and people that she contacted under the direction of Riverkeeper’s legal team in order to advance the litigation.” Dkt. No. 107-5 at 1-2,
