Bruce Behrens, Kathleen Behrens, David Scheffert, Sherri Scheffert, and Richard Wakeford, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., U.S. Bank, N.A., Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc., the CME Group, Inc., and National Futures Association, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants Millennium Trust Co., a.k.a. Millennium Trust Co. LLC, Paul Thomas, Russell Wasendorf, Jr., and Perry Comeau, Defendants-Appellees Steve Brewer, a.k.a. Steven John Brewer, Garlon Maxwell, Amber Maxwell, Russell Wasendorf, and Does #1-40, Defendants*
Five former customers of Peregrine Financial Group, Inc., the defunct futures commission merchant, appeal the dismissal of their putative class action. In a summary order published simultaneously with this opinion, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of all federal claims as time barred and the dismissal of one of the Defendants. We publish this opinion to decide only the sole issue on the cross-appeal: whether a party may compel a district court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction on a theory of jurisdiction that the party has raised untimely. We hold that it may not and accordingly AFFIRM. DENNIS JACOBS, C.J. Five former customers (“Plaintiffs”) of Peregrine Financial Group, Inc. (“Peregrine”), the defunct futures commission merchant, appeal the dismissal of their putative class action by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Broderick, J.).1 In a summary order published simultaneously with this opinion, we affirm the dismissal of all federal claims as time barred (and the dismissal of one of the Defendants); this opinion decides only the issue raised on the cross-appeal. Several Defendants, well-satisfied with the dismissal with prejudice of the federal claims, untimely moved the district court to reconsider the dismissal without prejudice of the analogous state-law claims. Defendants’ motions argued for the first time that the district court was obligated to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §1332(d); the motions were denied. We publish this opinion to consider a question of first impression in this Circuit: whether the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction requires a district court to exercise it, even if it is invoked belatedly — on analogy to the rule that a party can object to the lack of such jurisdiction “at any time.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000). We hold that a party may forfeit subject-matter jurisdiction by failing to invoke it timely. We accordingly AFFIRM. I. A. We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true in reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. Muto v. CBS Corp., 668 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs — all natives of Oelwein, Iowa — have “invest[ed] in futures and options contracts since 2005.”2 A205-06 (SAC 110). In 2007, Plaintiffs transferred their assets to Peregrine, allegedly on the promise that it was a “winning strategy,” made by investment advisers at “a local steakhouse” in Oelwein. A222 (SAC
