OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. #141) of the Court’s Opinion and Order dated March 5, 2024 (Doc. #140 (the “Opinion”)), in which the Court denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, and denied in part and granted in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case is presumed. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard “To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the movant must demonstrate ‘an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Ent. Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983)).1 Such a motion should be granted only when the Court has overlooked facts or precedent that might have altered a conclusion reached in the earlier decision. Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Local Civil Rule 6.3. The movant’s burden is weighty to avoid “wasteful repetition of arguments already briefed, considered and decided.” Weissman v. Fruchtman, 124 F.R.D. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). II. Analysis In the Opinion, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action for a declaratory judgment because it is parallel and duplicative of his twelfth cause of action for unjust enrichment. Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action “seeks a declaratory judgment declaring null and void and invalidating the Purported Trust and Purported Stock Agreement.” (Doc. #13 (“Am Compl.”) 308). Alternatively, “if the Court finds that no Partnership agreement existed,” this claim seeks a declaration “that Plaintiff is entitled to the full value of SANO CORP. as of the date that Zur converted same for the purpose of the successor FBO with Myles.” (Id. 309). According to plaintiff, the Court overlooked that the declaratory judgment claim (i) “implicates the parties’ current legal rights and obligations,” and (ii) “involves much more expansive factual and legal issues” than those raised by plaintiff’s other claims. (Doc. #142 (“Reconsideration Motion”) at 1). Plaintiff also argues newly discovered evidence demonstrates defendant continued to breach her fiduciary duties to plaintiff through 2019. The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff has not identified any fact or controlling law the Court overlooked in dismissing the eleventh cause of action. Nevertheless, for the avoidance of any doubt, the Court addresses each of plaintiff’s arguments in detail below. A. Defendant’s Ongoing Fiduciary Obligations In the instant motion, plaintiff argues the “Vincenzo Oppedisano Trust” (the “Trust”), “remains valid today,” and defendant therefore owes plaintiff a fiduciary obligation as his trustee. (Reconsideration Motion at 4). This a remarkable about-face. In the amended complaint, plaintiff specifically alleges he never validly executed a trust document and never formed the Trust. (Am. Compl. 299). Indeed, had plaintiff believed otherwise, presumably he would not have sought a judgment “declaring null and void and invalidating the Purported Trust.” (Id. 308). To be sure, in seeking summary judgment on the eleventh and twelfth causes of action, plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to have it both ways — simultaneously arguing “the Purported Trust is a nullity” and defendant “owed Plaintiff an undivided duty of loyalty” as his trustee. (Doc. #121 at 2 n.3, 16). Plaintiff may have tried to minimize this inherent conflict by seeking summary judgment only as to the invalidity of the Purchase Agreement. But, as the Court noted, plaintiff’s argument ultimately was premised, at least in part, on the Trust being invalid. (See Opinion at 17 n.6). Put differently, to the extent the Opinion is not otherwise clear, plaintiff is bound by the allegations in his complaint, and he may not amend his pleadings through artfully misleading briefing. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998); Vuksanovich v. Airbus Ams., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d 92, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). Relatedly, plaintiff’s argument fails for the simple reason that he did not plead a claim against defendant for breach of a fiduciary duty as plaintiff’s trustee. A declaratory judgment is a procedural mechanism only; whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief turns on the nature of the underlying substantive claim. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 731 (2d Cir. 1993); Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] declaratory judgment relies on a valid legal predicate.”). Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action makes no mention of defendant’s supposed “ongoing” duties to plaintiff under the Trust, presumably because any such allegation would have been flatly inconsistent with plaintiff’s claim that the Trust was never formed. In short, plaintiff never pleaded an “ongoing business relationship” which “demands declaratory relief.” Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. AMCK Aviation Holdings Ir. Ltd., 676 F. Supp. 3d 233, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). B. Whether the Eleventh Cause of Action Is Parallel and Duplicative Plaintiff next makes several assertions as to why his claim for a declaratory judgment is not resolved by adjudication of his claim for unjust enrichment in the twelfth cause of action. None is availing. First, plaintiff again asserts his claim for a declaratory judgment “implicates…the parties’ rights as Trust beneficiary and trustee.” (Reconsideration Motion at 7). For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff cannot retroactively import these issues into his eleventh cause of action simply because it is now convenient to do so. Second, plaintiff inexplicably argues the eleventh and twelfth causes of action are not duplicative because the Court could determine defendant was unjustly enriched without needing to decide whether the “Purchase and Transfer of Stock Agreement” (the “Purchase Agreement”) (Doc. #110-6) is invalid. Again, plaintiff seems to confuse a remedy with a right to relief. The twelfth cause of action alleges defendant was unjustly enriched because she purported and appeared to acquire plaintiff’s shares of Sano Aviation Corporation (“SAC”), using the allegedly invalid Purchase Agreement. (Am. Compl.
