Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 19-cv-3461, Nelson S. Román, Judge. Citizens United To Protect Our Neighborhoods (“CUPON”) and Hilda Kogut, Robert Asselbergs, and Carole Goodman (the “Individual Plaintiffs” and, together with CUPON, “Plaintiffs”) appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint, which alleged that the Village of Chestnut Ridge violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by enacting a new zoning law relating to places of worship in 2019. Specifically, the district court (Román, J.) found that none of the Plaintiffs had constitutional standing to pursue the claim, as (1) the Individual Plaintiffs lacked municipal-taxpayer, direct-harm, or denial-of-benefits standing and (2) CUPON lacked associational or organizational standing. Because we agree that neither the Individual Plaintiffs nor CUPON had any form of standing, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. AFFIRMED. RICHARD SULLIVAN, C.J. Citizens United To Protect Our Neighborhoods (“CUPON”) and Hilda Kogut, Robert Asselbergs, and Carole Goodman (the “Individual Plaintiffs” and, together with CUPON, “Plaintiffs”) appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint, which alleged that the Village of Chestnut Ridge (the “Village”) violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by enacting a new zoning law relating to places of worship in 2019. Specifically, the district court (Román, J.) found that none of the Plaintiffs had constitutional standing to pursue the claim, as (1) the Individual Plaintiffs lacked municipal-taxpayer, direct-harm, or denial-of-benefits standing and (2) CUPON lacked associational or organizational standing. Because we agree that neither the Individual Plaintiffs nor CUPON had any form of standing, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. I. BACKGROUND The Village is a municipal corporation, located within the Town of Ramapo in Rockland County, New York, and zoned primarily for single-family residences.1 Between the date of the Village’s incorporation in 1986 and 2019, the Village operated under one set of zoning laws. Under that original regime, all places of worship were required to obtain a special permit for religious use and receive site planning approval from the Village’s Planning Board. In 2017, at the urging of the Orthodox Jewish Coalition of Chestnut Ridge (the “OJC”), the Village began the process of amending its zoning laws so that places of worship could more easily be built in Village neighborhoods, accommodating the need of Orthodox Jewish observers “to pray within walking distance of their homes.” J. App’x at 38 (Compl. 104). After the OJC provided a draft of proposed amendments to the Village in August 2017, the OJC, the Village, and an outside firm hired by the Village worked in concert to refine the OJC’s proposal. In February 2018, the proposed amendments to the Village’s zoning laws were publicly disclosed at a Village Board meeting. The Planning Board then issued a memorandum in May 2018 regarding the proposed amendments, critiquing certain provisions and the “negative[]” impact they could have on the Village. Id. at 30 (Compl. 64). In the wake of that memorandum, a series of contentious public meetings were held. Ultimately, the Village Board passed revised amendments in February 2019 (the “New Zoning Law”). According to Plaintiffs, the New Zoning Law established three categories of use: “residential gathering place[s], neighborhood places of worship, and community places of worship.” Id. at 36 (Compl. 93); see also id. (Compl. 94) (defining “residential gathering place” as a dedicated portion of a one-family detached residence used for large gatherings of between fifteen and forty-nine people more than twelve times a year); id. (Compl 96) (defining “neighborhood place of worship” as “a structure [used] for regular organized religious assembly with a total floor area up to 10,000 square feet”); id. at 37 (Compl. 97) (defining “community place of worship” as “a structure [used] for regular organized religious assembly with a total floor area of more than 10,000 square feet”). For residential gathering places and neighborhood places of worship, the New Zoning Law provided “automatic blanket variance[s] for maximum development coverage of [ten] percent more than for other, nonreligious uses.” Id. at 36-37 (Compl.
94, 96). Additionally, the New Zoning Law allowed the owners of residential gathering places “to use off-site parking facilities on private property, including residential driveways in different ownership, or parking on public streets[,] within 1,500 feet of the lot…for up to [fifty] percent of [their] required parking.” Id. at 36 (Compl. 95). As a result of these changes, Plaintiffs feared that the New Zoning Law would “radically transmogrif[y] the character of the Village.” Id. at 22 (Compl. 27). In April 2019, the Individual Plaintiffs (all residents of the Village) and CUPON — a civic membership organization to which the Individual Plaintiffs belong — filed the instant action against the Village. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the Village’s enactment and enforcement of the New Zoning Law violates the Establishment Clause and seeks injunctive relief and a declaration that the law is unconstitutional. See, e.g., id. at 17 (Compl. 2) (“In enacting the [New Zoning Law], the Village affirmatively acted to give religious uses a preferred status” and thus “[t]he enactment and enforcement of the [New Zoning Law] violates the Establishment Clause.”); id. at 40 (Compl. 116) (“[The Village's] practices of favoring religious uses through the implementation of blanket variances in the [New Zoning Law] constitutes the promotion and endorsement of religious uses over secular uses in violation of the Establishment Clause.”). In response, the Village moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and the OJC (among other entities) moved to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1), concluding that each Plaintiff lacked constitutional standing. Having so held, the district court denied the OJC’s motion to intervene as moot. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION A district court properly dismisses an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) “if the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it, such as when the plaintiff[s] lack[] constitutional standing to bring the action.” Conn. Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal de novo, determining whether the plaintiffs “allege[d] facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest” that they had standing to sue, construing the complaint in their favor and accepting as true all material factual allegations contained therein. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (“[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”). Applying that standard, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing. A. Municipal-Taxpayer Standing To establish constitutional standing under Article III, a plaintiff generally must establish (1) an injury in fact, defined as an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Nevertheless, because the harm associated with the unconstitutional promotion of religion is “often inherently generalized,” “[o]ur jurisprudence has developed three distinct theories of standing entitling an individual to pursue a claim that the Establishment Clause has been violated.” Montesa v. Schwartz, 836 F.3d 176, 195-96 (2d Cir. 2016). One of these doctrines is municipal-taxpayer standing, under which courts presume that “[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). We have held that a municipal taxpayer has standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim if he can show “a measurable appropriation or loss of revenue attributable to the challenged activit[y].” Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 74 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Bd. of Educ. of the Mt. Sinai Union Free Sch. Dist. v. N.Y. State Tchrs. Ret. Sys., 60 F.3d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. City of New York, 972 F.2d 464, 466, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1992). We have also made clear, however, that a plaintiff must show that the defendant made the appropriation “solely for the activities that [the] plaintiff[]” challenges. Altman, 245 F.3d at 74. On that basis, we have rejected attempts to assert taxpayer standing merely because a municipality’s “ paid employees” spent time on the challenged activities. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[t]o confer taxpayer standing on such a basis would allow any municipal taxpayer to challenge virtually any governmental action at any time,” since “[n]early all governmental activities are conducted or overseen by employees whose salaries are funded by tax dollars.” Id. Like the district court, we conclude that none of the Individual Plaintiffs have suffered an injury sufficient to confer municipal taxpayer standing. Although the complaint specifies that the Individual Plaintiffs each pay municipal taxes, it alleges no facts plausibly suggesting that there is any “measurable appropriation or loss of revenue attributable to” the Village’s challenged activities — i.e., the enactment and enforcement of the New Zoning Law. Id. Although Plaintiffs suggest that the Village is losing revenue under the New Zoning Law because religious organizations no longer need to pay fees associated with variances, we do not find that to be a reasonable inference based on the facts alleged in the complaint, which do not reference variance fees. If anything, the complaint alleges facts that undermine any inference that the Village was generating meaningful revenue from variance applications under the old zoning regime, since the Village confirmed “that no applications for permits or variances were being made” before the New Zoning Law was adopted. J. App’x at 33 (Compl. 78). Similarly, we reject Plaintiffs’ contention that municipal-taxpayer standing is satisfied because the Village dispersed funds in order to pass the New Zoning Law. See id. at 25-26, 40 (Compl.
