MEMORANDUM & ORDER A grand jury indicted Defendant Elvis Dan Atomei on February 21, 2024, charging him with access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1029(a)(1), (4); aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1028A(a)(1); and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1349. (See Indictment, Docket Entry No. 1.) On February 29, 2024, the Court arraigned Atomei and ordered him detained.1 (Min. Entry dated Feb. 29, 2024, Docket Entry No. 19; Order of Detention.) On March 14, 2024, Atomei presented a bail application and moved for pretrial release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3142(c), which the government opposed. (Mot. for Release from Custody on Proposed Bail Conditions (“Def.’s Mot.”), Docket Entry No. 56; Gov’t's Opp’n to Def.’s Mot (“Gov’t's Opp’n”), Docket Entry No. 61.) On March 27, 2024, the Court held a bail hearing and reserved decision on Atomei’s motion. (See Min. Entry dated Mar. 27, 2024.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Atomei’s motion. I. Discussion a. Standard of review The Bail Reform Act requires a court to order the pretrial detention of a defendant if, after a hearing, the judge “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” United States v. Mattis, 963 F.3d 285, 290 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3142(e)(1)). In making its determination, the court must consider the following factors set forth in section 3142(g): (1) the nature and the circumstances of the offense charged…; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including [his] character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and… (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release. 18 U.S.C. §3142(g); United States v. Kelly, No. 20-1720, 2020 WL 7019289, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2020) (same) (quoting Mattis, 963 F.3d at 291); see also United States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2022) (explaining that the court shall consider these four factors in determining whether there are conditions that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance). “[T]he weight given to each factor will inevitably vary from case to case, and might even vary depending on whether the inquiry relates to a defendant’s danger or to his risk of flight.” Zhang, 55 F.4th at 149-50. A finding that the defendant presents a flight risk must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007), and a finding that the defendant is dangerous must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, United States v. Artis, 607 F. App’x 95, 96 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1995). Upon finding that the defendant presents a flight risk or a danger to the community, the court must then determine whether there are conditions of release that will assure the appearance of the person and the safety of those in the community. Zhang, 55 F.4th at 151 (considering whether the bail package held sufficient “moral suasion” over the defendant and mitigated the risk of flight and danger). In the pretrial context, the government bears the burden of showing that the defendant should be detained, United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001), and it “may proceed by proffer,” Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542; see also United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 321 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004). A bail hearing “may be reopened…at any time before trial if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2)(B); see also United States v. Blanco, 570 F. App’x 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Schwamborn, 249 F. App’x 906, 907 (2d Cir. 2007). “A court may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent authority, even where the circumstances do not match [this] statutory text.” United States v. Maxwell, 510 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (first citing United States v. Rowe, No. 02-CR-756, 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003); and then citing United States v. Petrov, No. 15-CR-66, 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015)). b. The Court denies Atomei’s motion Atomei argues that he should be released on bail, to be secured by the property owned by Atomei and his wife, because he poses neither a risk of flight nor a danger to the community.2 (Def.’s Mot. 1-2.) Regarding his risk of flight, Atomei notes that he “returned to [c]ourt in all three instances of [his] past criminal conduct,” and that he “did not flee from any jurisdiction” despite facing the prospect of, and actually serving, carceral sentences. (Id. at 2; see also Tr. of Bail Hr’g (“Hr’g Tr.”) 8:15-23 (contrasting Atomei’s position with that of a hypothetical defendant who fled from multiple jurisdictions after being convicted).) In addition, Atomei argues that he has “significant family here in the United States,” including his wife and threeyear-old son, both of whom are United States citizens, and that he has lived with his family in the residence he owns in Woodside, Queens since 2021. (Hr’g Tr. 13:14-20; see also Def.’s Mot. 1.) Finally, Atomei disputes the government’s characterization of his actions at the time of his arrest. (Hr’g Tr. 13:25-14:23). He argues that the government’s assertion that he tried to flee is mere “conjecture,” (id. at 14:1), and that instead, “when [Atomei] heard that they were police, he got back in bed with his three-year-old son and started hugging his son,” which is where he was apprehended, (id. at 14:10-12; see also Def.’s Mot. 2). Regarding danger to the community, Atomei argues that the government has not met its burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is a danger to the community. (Hr’g Tr. 4:22-25, 6:6-7.) Atomei argues that, with respect to the nature and circumstances of the offense, “it would be bad precedent to treat a nonviolent crime like [the charged offenses]” as requiring pretrial detention alongside “ other defendants…[who] are dangers to the community.” (Id. at 11:5-16.) Atomei also disputes the strength of the government’s evidence. (Id. at 23:22-24:15.) In addition, Atomei notes that “this is his first arrest in the United States,” (id. at 22:24), and argues that conditions of release, such as “monitor[ing] his activities to ensure that he [does] not engage in any” criminal activity, would mitigate the risk of harm to the community, (id. at 23:1-8). The government argues that Atomei “poses both a flight risk and risk to the community’s safety from his criminal activity if released on bail.” (Gov’t's Opp’n 1.) Regarding risk of flight, the government first argues that Atomei’s “conduct [on] the day of his arrest demonstrates that he did not hesitate to attempt to flee from law enforcement,” because he was “seen climbing out of [a second floor] window and standing on top of the rear roof of [his] residence” until an agent drew a weapon and ordered Atomei not to move. (Id. at 1-2.) Second, the government argues that Atomei’s “multiple convictions in different countries shows that he…[has] international ties,” and further notes that “he is not a citizen of this county and [that] he does not have immigration status in this country.” (Hr’g Tr. 18:8-11; see also Gov’t's Opp’n 1 (“Atomei does not dispute that he has significant ties to foreign countries, to which he could readily flee from prosecution.”).) Third, the government argues that Atomei has significant resources to flee because “law enforcement agents recovered over $40,000 in cash” during the search of his residence. (Hr’g Tr. 18:18-22.) Finally, the government contends that the “evidence of the crimes is…very strong,” that Atomei was “captured on camera committing these crimes, both in still images as well as video surveillance,” and that skimming devices and $40,000 in cash were found in his residence on the day of his arrest. (Id. at 18:20-22, 19:3-14; Gov’t's Opp’n 2.) Regarding danger to the community, the government argues that Atomei has demonstrated a “lack of respect for the law” through “continued criminal activity for over [seventeen] years.” (Hr’g Tr. 17:8-9.) The government also alleges that Atomei continued engaging in criminal activity “up until early 2024,” even though “the charged crimes…are alleged to have occurred in 2022,” (id. at 17:10-14), and that he “does not appear to be willing to stop,” (id. at 18:4-5). In addition, the government argues that the charged conduct “is not a lowlevel crime…[and] involved the theft of…multiple identities and multiple victims’ bank accounts.” (Id. at 17:19-23.) i. Atomei poses a risk of flight After evaluating the section 3142(g) factors, the Court finds that Atomei poses a risk of flight. First, the offenses with which Atomei has been charged — access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, (see Indictment
