MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION On November 15, 2022, pro se Plaintiffs Bishme Smith and Paris Smith (“Plaintiffs”) commenced this action alleging that Defendants Holley Davis, Teresa Johnson, Julie Richardson, Stephanie Albert, Cold Black River L.P. (“Cold Black River”), and Preservation Management Inc. (“Preservation”) (collectively “Defendants”), who own and manage the apartment complex in which Plaintiffs live, have subjected them to discrimination, retaliation, hostile housing environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs also named Kelly Cannon (“Ms. Cannon”), who was a co-resident of the apartment complex, as a defendant. See id. Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on November 15, 2022. See Dkt. Nos. 2, 3. On March 28, 2023, Magistrate Judge Lovric granted Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed IFP and issued a Report-Recommendation and Order recommending that the Court accept Plaintiffs’ complaint in part for filing, dismiss in part with leave to replead, and dismiss in part without leave to replead. See Dkt. No. 8. Neither party objected to the Report-Recommendation and Order. On July 5, 2023, the Court issued an order adopting the Report-Recommendation and Order in its entirety and directing the Clerk to terminate Ms. Cannon from the action. See Dkt. No. 9. On October 16, 2023, Defendants Albert, Davis, Johnson, Richardson, and Preservation filed an answer. See Dkt. No. 21. On December 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 42. The allegations set forth in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint are generally the same as those included in the original complaint, except that Ms. Cannon, who has since died, is no longer a party to the action. See generally Dkt. No. 42. On April 4, 2024, Magistrate Judge Lovric issued a Report-Recommendation and Order recommending that the Court accept for filing and require an answer to Plaintiffs’ amended cocmplaint to the extent it asserts (1) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981 against Defendants; (2) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1982 against Defendants; (3) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000d against Defendants Preservation and Cold Black River; (4) a claim pursuant to the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) alleging discrimination against Defendants; (5) a claim pursuant to the FHA alleging retaliation against Defendants; (6) claims alleging discrimination and retaliation pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law §§296(5-7) against Defendants; (7) a claim pursuant to N.Y. Real Prop. Law §223-b against Defendants; (8) a claim pursuant to N.Y. Real Prop. Law §235-b against Defendants; and (9) a claim of breach of contract pursuant to New York common law against Defendants. See Dkt. No. 55. The Report-Recommendation and Order further recommended that the Court dismiss without leave to replead Plaintiffs’ complaint to the extent that it asserts (1) a claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §794 against Defendants; (2) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000d against Defendants Davis, Johnson, Richardson, and Albert; (3) a claim pursuant to the FHA against Defendants alleging a hostile living environment; and (4) a claim pursuant to New York common law alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants. See id. Plaintiffs did not file any objections to the April Report-Recommendation and Order. Currently before the Court is Magistrate Judge Lovric’s Report-Recommendation and Order. As set forth below, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly determined that the amended complaint should be accepted in part for filing and dismissed in part without leave to replead. II. BACKGROUND For a complete recitation of the relevant factual background, the parties are referred to the March 28, 2023, and the April 4, 2024, Report-Recommendation and Orders. See Dkt. No. 8 at 2- 6, Dkt. No. 55 at 3-4. III. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review When a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that…the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). “Although the court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se litigants,…there is a responsibility on the court to determine that a claim has some arguable basis in law before permitting a plaintiff to proceed with an action in forma pauperis.” Moreman v. Douglas, 848 F. Supp. 332, 333-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal citations omitted). When a party declines to file an objection, the court reviews a recommendation for clear error. See O’Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011 WL 933846, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (citations and footnote omitted); see also McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). After the appropriate review, “the court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Since Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court must review their pleadings under a “more lenient standard than that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (other citations omitted). The Second Circuit has stated that courts are obligated to “‘make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants’” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely “‘because of their lack of legal training.’” Govan, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F. 2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, a “document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’…and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). B. Analysis As to Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1982, Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly determined that the Court should accept for filing and require an answer to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants treated Ms. Cannon and her son, both of whom are Caucasian, more leniently than Defendants treated Plaintiff Bishme, who is Black. See Dkt. No. 42 at 16, 21. Defendant Albert told Plaintiffs that their lease would not be renewed because of criminal charges against Plaintiff Bishme, which resulted from an altercation with Ms. Cannon, and which had been dropped. See id. at 26-27. By contrast, Defendants renewed Ms. Cannon’s lease despite her committing lease violations, having active warrants, and being arrested. See id. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly found that Plaintiffs allege facts plausibly suggesting Defendants acted with racially discriminatory intent necessary to establish a claim of discrimination. See Dkt. No. 55 at 8. As to Plaintiffs’ claim for discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794, Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly found that the claim against Defendants Davis, Johnson, Richardson, and Albert should be dismissed with prejudice because “there is no individual liability at all under…the Rehabilitation Act.” Sears-Barnett v. Syracuse Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 3d 522, 535 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Thomas v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 938 F. Supp. 2d 334, 354-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (other citations omitted)). With respect to Plaintiffs’ Section 504 claim against Defendants Preservation and Cold Black River, Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly found that the claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. To satisfy the constitutional standing requirements, Plaintiffs must show that they have “‘sustained or [are] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 (1983) (citations omitted). Because “injunctive relief is the only relief available for nonintentional violations of” the Rehabilitation Act, Forziano v. Independent Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 613 Fed. Appx. 15, 18-19 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Powell v. Nat’l Bd. Of Med. Examiners, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2004)), the fact that Plaintiffs no longer live at Black River Apartments, in addition to the fact that Ms. Cannon, who they sought to move away from, has since died, precludes them from having an immediate injury as required for standing. See Dkt. No. 42 at
11, 69. Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly found that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Davis, Johnson, Richardson, and Albert pursuant to Section 601 of the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be dismissed with prejudice because “Title VI does not provide for individual liability.” Verdi v. City of New York, 306 F. Supp. 3d 532, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citations omitted). With respect to Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim against Defendants Cold Black River and Preservation, Plaintiffs allege that, based on an arrest, Defendants Cold Black River and Preservation terminated Plaintiffs’ lease and did not renew it, and subjected Plaintiffs to exclusion from participation in and benefits of low-income housing. See Dkt. No. 42 at
