Recitation, as required by CLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion: Papers Numbered Plaintiff’s 1 Defendant 2 Plaintiff’s 3 Defendant 4 DECISION/ORDER This decision pertains solely to the framed issue hearing on whether the signatures of the alleged transfer of the deed from defendent Keith Boodoo (“Boodoo”) to Communicare, and the notary on the deed, are forged, thus voiding ab initio the original transfer of the deed and property from Boodoo to Communicare and all subsequent transfers, including that to plaintiffs’ Carlos McKenzie and Kara Barnabas (“plaintiffs” or “Barnabas”). The alleged forgery occurred in 1998. Plaintiffs initially brought an action to quiet title (under index number 2326/04) which laid dormant for several years for unexplained reasons. In 2014 plaintiffs brought this current action to quiet title by virtue of adverse possession and to cancel the City of N.Y.’s declaration alerting the public that the deed to transfer ownership from Boodoo to Communicare may be fraudulent. Zachary Boodoo, the issue of Keith Boodoo, was appointed Administrator of the estate and, after appeals to the Second Department, was substituted as the defendant.1 On August 25, 1980, Keith Richard Boodoo, now deceased, acquired title to 187 Lafayette Avenue, Brooklyn, New York by deed, which was recorded in the Kings County Clerk’s Office. By deed dated February 9, 1998, title to the premises was transferred from Keith Boodoo to Communicare Properties LLC (“Communicare”), which was recorded in the Kings County Registrar’s Office. The supposed signature of Keith Richard Boodoo was seemingly notarized by one Hilliary A. Gibson (“Gibson”). Title to the premises was then transferred on September 18, 1998, by Communicare to Viva Development Corp. (“Viva”) and Festive Homes, Inc., (“Festive”) and recorded in the Kings County Registrar’s Office. This deed shows Kevin Walker Sr. (“Walker”) as the Principal of Communicare. On June 24, 1999, title to the premises was transferred by Festive and Viva to the plaintiffs, and the deed was duly recorded with the Kings County Registrar’s Office. By Affidavit dated September 12, 2000, Devora Cohn, Associate Commissioner for Legal Affairs for the NYC Dept of Finance issued an affidavit alerting the public that the signature of the grantor (Boodoo) on a deed recorded by the City of New York, purporting to transfer ownership from Boodoo to Communicare may be forged, and that until the alleged fraudulent conveyance is nullified, “this affidavit shall serve as a notice to the public of a possible defect in the chain of title.” On October 18, 2000, a grand jury rendered a 30 count indictment for Grand Larceny in the 2d degree and other felonies against Walker for fraudulently transferring seven houses without their owner’s knowledge. Count Seventeen accuses Walker of the crime of Grand Larceny in the 2d degree by on or about February 19, 1998 stealing “certain property having an aggregate value of more than fifty thousand dollars, namely: a residence from Keith Boodoo” (Doc. 186.)2 On March 5, 2001 Walker entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Grand Larceny in the 2d degree “covering the entire indictment, the number being 7150 of 2000″ before the Hon. Jon Firetog (JSC) (Doc. 200) This court notes that indictment 7150 cover all 28 counts including Count Seventeen pertaining to Boodoo. However, the transcript of the plea allocution reveals the court only elicited an explicit confession of guilt for Count Two — Grand Larceny in the 2d degree for stealing the home of Emily Norlund. While Walker did not explicitly confess to fraudulently obtaining the instant deed (i.e. the deed to Keith Boodoo’s home), he did confess that he never owned any real property in Kings County (Dkt. 23, 2:20-3:4). Boodoo’s criminal defense counsel also stated during the allocutio that Boodoo had informed him that “he has not right, title of interest in any real property located or situated” in Kings County and that he holds no property in either fee simple or fee simple absolute in Kings County (Doc. 200 & 281). Furthermore, in an affidavit dated and notarized on December 8, 2017 Walker admitted that the purported deed running from Boodoo to Communicare dated February 9, 1998 for the premises at 187 Lafayette Ave was not legitimate. Walker indicated that he was the sole member and principal of Communicare and that he has direct knowledge that “the deed is a forgery as is the notary signature since I signed the names of Keith Boodoo and Hillary Gibson without their knowledge or consent.” Walker also admitted that Boodoo never transferred the premises to Communicare and that he never met or paid Boodoo for any consideration for the purported transfer. Walker specifically addressed his March 5, 2001 allocution where he pled guilty to Larceny in the 2d degree and acknowledged “stealing real property and to a scheme of alleging ownership to residences which I did not own” which included the subject property (“Boodoo property”) and his attorney’s statement that Walker had not interest in any property in Kings County. Plaintiffs’ counsel states that Boodoo’s actual plea was limited to one count of Grand Larceny in the 2d degree for stealing the home of Emily Norlund and tht he did not explicitly confess to fraudulently obtaining the Boodoo deed. However, in addition to the above admissions, Walker also admitted in his allocution that he had engaged in a scheme where he alleged to have ownership of residences when in fact he did not. Finally, defendants played on the record the video deposition they took of Walker in 2018 which transcript was also provided. Walker admitted that he forged both the signature of Keith Boodoo, the then owner of the property, and Hillary Gibson, the purported notary on the purported transfer of the deed on February 9, 1998 from Boodoo to Communicare by first reiterating what he said in his affidavit (Dep. 12). As memorialized in defendants’ supplemental brief Walker admitted that he was alone when he forged Boodoo’s and Gibson’s signatures on the deed which he recognized during the deposition The parties focused their initial legal arguments in large part upon the testimony of their respective handwriting experts. This court finds that neither of the expert’s testimony is determinative of this case, especially since neither discussed the difference or similarity between Walker’s forged signature in the Norland deed and the alleged forged signature on the deed from Boodoo to Communicare. As such, this court subsequently informed the parties that the crux of the framed issue rested upon what happened in criminal court, as referred to above.3 The court also duly notes plaintiff’s contention that a certification of acknowledgment attached to a deed raises a presumption that the deed was duly executed, which can be rebutted only after being weighed against evidence adduced to show that the subject instrument was not duly executed. However, as set forth, defendants have met their burden of rebutting the presumption. The below resolution of this matter is governed both the evidence of forgery described above and by Justice Knipel’s decision in Stevens v. Communicare Prop. LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op. 33645U, 2013 NY Misc. LEXIS 6654 (Sup Ct., Kings Co. 2013) affd in part 111 A.D. 3d 614 (2d Dept. 2013). The Stevens case is based upon the same fact pattern alleged herein: that one Kevin Walker forged the signatures of the original owner of the property and then fraudulently transferred the deed to his company Communicare, which then transferred the property to other entities until it was transferred to defendant Uddin in the Stevens case and to plaintiffs Carlos McKenzie and Karla Barnabas in the instant matter. The plaintiff, Ira Stevens, acquired title to the property located at 466 Franklin Avenue, Brooklyn, by deed date January 15, 1980. On February 13, 1998 466 Franklin was transferred by deed from Ira Stevens to Communicare Properties LLC (“Communicare”). Subsequently, Walker transferred the deed to Hillcrest Homes, who then transferred the deed to Rosalind Wright and Tonya Holland. By referee’s deed dated November 18, 2003 the title to 466 Franklin was transferred to the defendant in Stevens, Nabir Uddin. Justice Knipel noted, just as this court takes legal notice of the fact that Walker was arrested in August 2000, and charged with the theft of 11 properties by filing false deeds to the properties and selling them or using them to secure mortgage loans. As in the instant matter, the Associate Commissioner for Legal Affairs for the New York City Department of Finance averred that the City has been advised that the signature of the grantor on the deed which “purports to transfer ownership from Ira Stevens to Communicare Properties, LLC” may be forged, and that until such time that the alleged fraudulent conveyance is nullified, “this affidavit shall serve as a notice to the public of a possible defect in the chain or title.” Justice Knipel noted that on March 5, 2001, Kevin L. Walker withdrew his plea of not guilty to Indictment 7150/2000 (involving the Norland property and not those originally owned by either Stevens or Boodoo) in Supreme Court, Kings County, and entered a guilty plea, admitting that he did not own any real property in Kings County. Justice Knipel concluded that the deed dated February 13, 1998, which transferred the deed for 466 Franklin from Ira Stevens to Communicare was void, and that the only way for the defendant, Nabir Uddin, to show possession of 466 Franklin would be through adverse possession. The court held that “Once a property has been obtained by way of forged deed, any subsequent purchaser will not be protected, and such transfer is a nullity…This is not unfair, it is urged, since title insurance exists for this very situation.” The court’s opinion also cited to the holding in JPMorgan Chase Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Kalpakis, stating that the law is well settled that “if a document purportedly conveying or encumbering property is void, the conveyance or encumbrance is a nullity and neither the grantee nor those subsequent in the chain of title or encumbrances, including bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers for value gain anything of value from the void transaction.” Based upon this court’s review of Stevens and all the criminal records surrounding the indictment of Walker on 30 felony counts, Count Seventeen — which accused Walker of stealing the property of Keith Boodoo, Walker’s allocution, Walker’s 2017 affidavit, and his deposition in the instant matter, this court declares that the transfer of the deed in 1998 from Keith Boodoo to Communicare, as well as all subsequent transactions and mortgages based therein, to be void ab initio. This court follows the predicate for Justice Knipel’s decision that even though Walker only pled guilty to Count Two — the Norland Property — the rest of the evidence and Walker’s admission that he owned no property in Kings County mandated a finding that the deed in question was fraudulent. Justice Knipel also ruled that Uddin had no standing to raise the statute of limitations defense with respect to the forged deed. “Uddin’s defense is, in reality, a claim to title based upon adverse possession. However, he cannot satisfy the ten-year limitations period. The mere recording of a deed — albeit a void one — is not sufficient to put plaintiff on notice of the hostile possession of another; rather, the adverse possession of another is measured from the time an owner should have known he was out of possession.” The parties are to clarify the record as to when Boodoo was put on notice of the hostile possession by either Communicare or the McKenzies. Please address whether the date upon which notice of hostile possession runs is from September 12, 2000, the date of Cohn’s affidavit alerting the public of a possible fraudulent deed transfer, or some other date. The court still is not clear as to why the initial 2004 case laid dormant for years, and why plaintiffs waited until 2014 to bring the adverse possession action. As the hearings focused almost exclusively on whether the deed was forged, a conference will be held concerning how to address the adverse possession portion of the motion. This constitutes the decision and order of the court. SO ORDERED: Dated: May 2024
