OPINION AND ORDER In this civil enforcement action, familiarity with which is assumed, the State of New York presses claims against nine companies that allegedly manufacture and sell “ghost guns” — that is, unfinished frames and receivers that can be converted into fully functional firearms by drilling a few holes or filing excess plastic — “directly to consumers without following any of the federal or state laws and regulations that apply to the sale of guns.” See ECF No. 157 (“SAC”),
19, 27.1 On February 23, 2024, this Court issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss the State’s claims. See New York v. Arm or Ally, LLC, No. 22-CV-6124 (JMF), 2024 WL 756474 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024) (ECF No. 245) (“MTD Op.”). As relevant here, the Court rejected Defendants’ arguments that (1) they did not commit certain federal law violations that underlie the State’s claims under New York Executive Law Section 63(12) and New York General Business Law Sections 349 and 350 because unfinished frames and receivers were not “firearms” as defined in 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(3) between June 2016 and July 2022 (the “Relevant Time Period”) and (2) most of the State’s claims are preempted by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), 15 U.S.C. §7901 et seq. See MTD Op., 2024 WL 756474, at *5-13. On March 22, 2024, Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal from the Court’s PLCAA ruling, invoking the Second Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. See ECF No. 260. They now move, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), for certification of an interlocutory appeal, focusing on the Court’s rulings rejecting their arguments about the meaning of the term “firearm” under federal law and about immunity under the PLCAA. See ECF No. 266. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. LEGAL STANDARDS Section 1292(b) represents a “rare exception” to the “basic tenet of federal law” that appellate review should be delayed “until a final judgment has been entered.” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996). A district court has discretion to certify an order for interlocutory appeal if the moving party shows that the order “(1) involves a controlling question of law”; (2) “there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”; and (3) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. §1292(b); see Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, No. 12-CV-8852 (JMF), 2014 WL 1881075, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014). When an order “satisfies these criteria and ‘involves a new legal question or is of special consequence,’ then the district court ‘should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal.’” Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 111 (2009)). But this is not an easy bar to clear. Because interlocutory appeals “derail the orderly conduct of lawsuits and result in piecemeal and duplicative litigation,” S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 336, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), they are to be certified only in “exceptional circumstances,” In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., No. 14-MD-2589 (JMF), 2019 WL 3202745, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (quoting In re Flor, 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also German ex rel. German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1385, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that certification of interlocutory appeals is “not intended as a vehicle to provide early review of difficult rulings in hard cases”). To satisfy the first prong of the test, the question at issue must be “a pure question of law that the reviewing court could decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.” Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the question must be “controlling,” meaning that “reversal of the district court’s opinion could result in dismissal of the action; reversal of the district court’s opinion, even though not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the conduct of the action; or, the certified issue has precedential value for a large number of cases.” In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-2656 (AJN), 2015 WL 876456, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., No. 11-CV-6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 5405696, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013)). Courts in this Circuit have found the second prong — whether there is substantial ground for difference of opinion — met where “(1) there is conflicting authority on the issue, or (2) the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit.” In re Enron Corp., No. 06-CV-7828 (SAS), 2007 WL 2780394, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007). “A mere claim that a district court’s decision was incorrect,” id., or “the mere presence of a disputed issue that is a question of first impression, standing alone,” In re Flor, 79 F.3d at 284, is insufficient. A district court must “analyze the strength of the arguments in opposition to the challenged ruling when deciding whether the issue for appeal is truly one on which there is substantial ground for dispute.” Id. Finally, courts “place particular weight” on the third prong of the test: “whether immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 358 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-CV-7257 (JMF), 2015 WL 14072740, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015) (describing the third prong as the “most important”). This requirement, which is “closely connected” to the first prong in practice, is met when an intermediate appeal “promises to advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.” Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Transp. Workers Union, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 350)). In evaluating this factor, “courts must consider the institutional efficiency of both the district court and the appellate court.” Wells Fargo, 2015 WL 14072740, at *1 (quoting Tocco v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc., No. 14-CV-810 (WHP), 2015 WL 5086390, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2015)). DISCUSSION Although the question is close, the Court concludes that certification is warranted with respect to whether unfinished frames and receivers qualified as “firearms” under federal law during the Relevant Time Period. Because “the statutory procedure specifies appeal of the order, rather than certification of the questions,” that is enough to grant Defendants’ motion and the Court could in theory avoid reaching whether the PLCAA question independently warrants immediate appellate review. United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit, however, has observed that it is “helpful for a district court to frame the controlling questions of law that the order involves.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will briefly discuss the PLCAA question as well. A. Whether Defendants’ Products Were “Firearms” Under Federal Law The question of whether Defendants’ products were, during the Relevant Time Period, “firearms” under federal law is a controlling question of law and, thus, satisfies the first prong of the test. As the State argues, and true to the posture of the case, the Court’s interpretation of the statute was intertwined with its “review of the [Second Amended Complaint]‘s factual allegations as to whether Defendants’ products satisfy the federal definition.” ECF No. 267 (“State’s Opp’n”), at 6 (emphasis added); see MTD Op., 2024 WL 756474, at *5-9. But because “a court must assume the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations and avoid resolving factual disputes” at the motion-to-dismiss stage, Oakley v. Dolan, 980 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2020), the principal question presented by Defendants’ motion to dismiss was whether the State’s factual allegations, taken as true, described “firearms” within the meaning of federal law, see, e.g., ECF No. 175, at 11 (Brownells arguing in its opening motion-to-dismiss brief that Defendants’ products were not “firearms” under federal law because, “[a]s the [Second Amended Complaint] itself acknowledges, converting an unfinished frame into something that will expel a projectile requires additional parts, specialized tools to drill holes and mill parts, the knowledge of how to perform those precise actions, and time to complete the necessary steps”); ECF No. 205, at 26-28 (the State citing to the same factual allegations to show that it had sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ products were “firearms” under federal law). In other words, the Court’s interpretation of Section 921(a)(3) and its assessment of the State’s factual allegations were both integral to the analysis, but they were distinct from one other. Accordingly, the question of whether Defendants’ products were “firearms” under Section 921(a)(3) is a question of law. The question is also controlling. It is true, as the State argues, that reversal of this Court’s answer to the “firearms” question would not “terminate this action.” In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 876456, at *3. After all, only four of the State’s seven causes of action are premised on Defendants’ alleged violations of federal law. See SAC
