The following papers numbered 1-3 were read and considered on Plaintiffs Notice of Motion (Motion #1) for an order (a) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212 granting summary judgment on liability in favor of Plaintiffs PATRICK PATTISON and DARRELL BRINTLINGER as against the Defendants BRIAN T. HICKS and THOMAS P. HICKS; (b) dismissing the Defendants’ affirmative defense(s) of and/or related to Plaintiffs’ culpable conduct; (c) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212(c) granting an immediate trial as to the amount and extent of the Plaintiffs’ damages; and (d) for such other, further, and different relief as this Court deems just and proper: PAPERS NUMBERS Notice of Motion (Motion #1)/Affirmation of Simon Kahng, Esq./Affidavit of Patrick Pattison/Affidavit of Darrell Brintlinger/Exhibits 1-3 1 Affirmation of Keri A. Wehrheim, Esq 2 Reply Affirmation of Simon Kahng, Esq 3 DECISION & ORDER This is an action in which the Plaintiffs seek compensation for personal injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on July 7, 2023, at the intersection of State Route 211E and Orange Plaza Lane, Orange County, New York. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs commenced the instant action with the filing of a Summons and Verified Complaint on October 13, 2023. Defendant THOMAS P. HICKS was served pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §308(1) by serving him on December 27, 2023, at 36 Rose Place, B171, Central Valley, New York. Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS was served pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §308(2) by serving Defendant THOMAS P. HICKS on December 27, 2023, at 36 Rose Place, B171, Central Valley, New York. Defendants joined issue by the filing of a Verified Answer raising ten (10) Affirmative Defenses on January 18, 2024. Defendants requested a preliminary conference on January 24, 2024, along with a Request for Judicial Intervention [hereinafter RJI]. The parties were directed by Court Notice to complete the Proposed Preliminary Conference Order by March 4, 2024, or appear for an in-person conference. The parties failed to submit a completed Preliminary Conference Order and were directed to appear before the undersigned on April 9, 2024. On April 9, 2024, the parties filed a completed Preliminary Conference Order. Plaintiffs filed the instant motion (Motion #1) on March 28, 2024, for summary judgment as to liability, dismissing Defendants’ affirmative defenses and placing the matter on the Court’s calendar for an immediate damages trial. FACTS The instant action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 7, 2023, at approximately 8:12 p.m. in the vicinity of the intersection of State Route 211E and Orange Plaza in the Town of Walkill, Orange County, New York. Plaintiffs assert they were stopped in the right most lane at a red light waiting to make a right hand turn when “suddenly and unexpectedly” Defendant Driver BRIAN T. HICKS, attempted to squeeze his motor vehicle in a space between the Plaintiff’s vehicle and the curb. The Plaintiffs state that since there was not enough space, Defendant Driver BRIAN T. HICKS struck Plaintiffs’ vehicle about the right rear and the right side of the vehicle. Further, Plaintiff states that Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS did not stop his vehicle after the collision and continued in a forward manner, crossing over the median and striking another vehicle that was also stopped at a red light. Plaintiffs state as a result of the accident they were severely injured. ARGUMENTS Plaintiffs Arguments Plaintiffs contend that it is indisputable that the accident was a rear end collision and a subsequent side swipe that occurred due to Defendants’ negligence. According to Plaintiffs it is well settled law that an operator of a motor vehicle is under a duty to operate his/her motor vehicle with reasonable care and be aware of the actual and potential hazards present from the road conditions and see what is to be seen. Further, Plaintiffs contend that a rear end collision with an automobile creates a prima facie liability as to the operator of the vehicle where the driver fails to maintain a safe distance pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law §§1142, 1172(a) and 1140(a) and constitutes negligence as a matter of law. The Plaintiffs also assert that here, the sole proximate cause of the accident is negligence, and the driver of the rear vehicle has a duty to provide a non-negligent explanation to excuse the collision. Additionally, Plaintiffs aver that whether the Plaintiffs are comparatively culpable for failure to reduce or mitigate the injuries is not dispositive of the resolution of the accident, in that a plaintiff is no longer is required to show freedom from comparative fault in establishing his/her prima facie case of negligence. Plaintiffs contend that applying the foregoing law, they are not liable for the subject accident and this court must find summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs against the Defendants. According to Plaintiffs the Defendants cannot produce any evidence to oppose the instant motion since he has never testified in an Examination Before Trial and should be precluded from doing so at this time. Defendants Arguments in Opposition Defendants contend that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is premature since no depositions have been conducted as of yet. Further, Defendants assert that Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS has a criminal action that is currently pending that arises from the underlying accident that is preventing him from offering testimony. According to Defendants they have not had a “sufficient opportunity to perform any discovery in this matter” which includes taking the depositions of the Plaintiffs. Defendants cite Rosa v. Colonial Tr., 276 AD2d 781 (2d Dept 2000) stating the Second Department, Appellate Division “denied a rear-end driver’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability, holding that ‘an award of Summary Judgment would be inappropriate in this case since the plaintiff has not appeared for Court-Ordered Examinations Before Trial, thereby depriving the defendants of an opportunity to obtain evidence pertinent to the cause of the accident.”1 See Rosa v. Colonial Tr., 276 AD2d 781 (2d Dept 2000). Defendants contend that a party must be given a reasonable opportunity for disclosure prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment. Further, the Defendants argue that in a situation in which “it appears that facts supporting the position of a party opposing Summary Judgment may exist, but cannot yet be stated due to outstanding discovery, the Court should deny the Motion, or else order a continuance to allow for full disclosure.” See Affirmation, p. 3 7. Another argument raised by Defendants is that the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is premature in light of the criminal charges Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS is facing arising from the subject accident. Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS’ counsel states that they have been in contact with their client, but they cannot offer an affidavit as to “the happening of this accident” until the criminal charges are resolved. Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS states that he “must refrain from submitting an affidavit in order to protect him constitutional privilege against self incrimination.” According to Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS he will suffer a “severe prejudice” in regard to defend himself on the issue of liability on this matter. In support of this assertion Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS cites Mook v. Homesafe Am., Inc., 144 AD3d 1116 (2d Dept 2016) asserting that in a “similar situation” a Court stayed a trial of a civil matter because the defendant was also facing criminal charges arising from the same incident. Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS also notes that he has criminal charges pending against him regarding the subject accident and has not been proven guilty and the charges alone unproven cannot establish Defendants liability for the subject accident. Defendants also assert that the Plaintiffs have failed to submit admissible evidence in admissible form and therefore they have not established their prima facie burden. Specifically, Defendants contend that the police report annexed to Plaintiff’s motion is uncertified and therefore is inadmissible. As a result, Defendants seek that this Court not consider the annexed police report as it is inadmissible hearsay for which no exception has been provided. The Defendants also assert that if the court determines Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to Defendants’ liability, the summary judgment motion should still be denied as Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate his lack of comparative liability (Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 NY2d 312 (2018)). Defendants argue that when a plaintiff is seeking a determination that they are not liable or that a matter should proceed directly to a damages trial or that a defendant’s affirmative defense of comparative negligence should be stricken, then that plaintiff is required to prove his/her freedom from comparative negligence. The Defendants contend that based upon the arguments raised by Plaintiffs in their motion and the prevailing caselaw, Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate the lack of comparative negligence. Turning to Plaintiff PATRICK PATTINON’s Affidavit, Defendants contend that the affidavit is insufficient to demonstrate that PATTINSON was free from fault in regard to the subject accident. Citing the Affidavit, the Defendants state that the statement as to how the subject accident occurred leaves questions as to whether Plaintiff PATTINSON was free from fault. Specifically, Defendants state that the Court cannot make a determination on liability without knowing whether the Plaintiffs saw Defendants’ vehicle at any time before the impact, if the vehicle was seen whether any evasive measures were taken to avoid the accident, where the Plaintiff was looking at the time of the impact, when the Plaintiff last looked in the rear view mirror or side mirrors, did the Plaintiff hear any honking of horns prior to the impact and whether the Plaintiff was distracted by conversation with a passenger or on a cellular telephone before the impact. According to Defendants the answer to any of these questions could raise an issue of fact regarding Plaintiff PATTINSON’s comparative negligence. Plaintiffs Arguments in Reply In reply, Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants have failed to provide evidentiary proof in opposition to the instant summary judgment motion in admissible form such that a triable issue of fact exists. The Plaintiffs assert that Defendants opposition fails to contain a sworn statement by the Defendant driver or any witnesses that rebut or contradict the allegations made by Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the sole basis of Defendants opposition is the affirmation of counsel, which is “wholly insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that affirmation of counsel is not predicated on any personal knowledge of the facts and therefore has no probative value in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. In reply to Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is premature, the Plaintiffs argue that they have produced an affidavit that establishes that all of the liability for the accident is on the Defendants. As a result, the Plaintiffs assert that conducting discovery in this matter will have no other effect than delaying the prosecution of the matter and ultimately delay the “real issue” of damages. According to Plaintiffs the purpose of summary judgment motions is to expedite civil matters and to resolve matters that can be properly resolved as a matter of law before the necessity of placing them on a court’s trial calendar. In regard to the argument that discovery is necessary in this matter, the Plaintiffs contend that mere hope and speculation of the existence of evidence to defeat a summary judgment motion is insufficient to deny a motion. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have the burden of producing evidentiary proof in admissible form that is sufficient to raise material questions of fact and require a jury to determine. However, Plaintiffs aver that here the Defendants have merely provided unsubstantiated allegations and assertions that there may be questions regarding how the Plaintiffs reacted prior to the accident which are insufficient to defeat their motion for summary judgment. The last argument in Plaintiffs’ reply is in response to Defendants’ assertion of the necessity for Plaintiffs to demonstrate the lack of comparative negligence pursuant to Rodriguez v. City of New York. See 31 NY3d 312. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have improperly stated the holding in Rodriguez. According to Plaintiffs, based upon the Court of Appeals holding in Rodriguez is that comparative negligence on the part of a plaintiff is not a defense to a summary judgment motion in regard to the issue of liability and instead is grounds for possible diminishment as to the amount of damages. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs have argued that they are entitled to summary judgment based upon the documentary evidence including the police report, the affidavit of Plaintiff PATRICK PATTINSON and the affidavit of DARRELL BRINTLINGER all of which indicate that the accident was caused by the Defendant when he was alleged to be intoxicated and attempted to pass Plaintiffs’ car on the right side, struck Plaintiffs’ vehicle, continued traveling over a median and struck a third vehicle stopped at a red light in the intersection. The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, by tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case and to warrant a court to direct judgment in its favor, as a matter of law. See Civil Practice Law and Rules 3212(b); Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., et al, 100 NY2d 72 (2003), citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 (1986); Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 (1980). Failure to make such showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers. See Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center, 64 N.Y. 2d 851 (1985). Summary judgment will be granted only if there is no triable issue of fact and issue finding, rather than issue determination, is the key to summary judgment, and the papers on the motion should be scrutinized carefully in the light most favorable to the party opposing the relief. See Judice v. DeAngelo, 272 AD2d 583 (2nd Dept., 2000). Turning to the issue of liability of a rear end collision, a plaintiff is no longer required to demonstrate a freedom from comparative fault to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. See Rodriguez v. New York, 31 NY3d 312; See also Poon v. Nisanov, 162 AD3d 804, 807 (2d Dept 2018). “A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle.” Nsiah-Ababio v. Hunter, 78 AD3d 672, 672 (2d Dept 2010). Further, “[i]t is well settled that a ‘rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle.” Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 726, 727-728 quoting Stalikas v. United Materials, 306 AD2d 810, 810 (4th Dept 2003). Additionally. “[A] violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence as a matter of law.” Marks v. Rieckhoff, 172 AD3d 847, 848 (2d Dept 2019). Upon review of the submission the Court has determined that Plaintiffs have demonstrated prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting their own affidavits in which they both stated that their vehicle was at a red light waiting to turn when the Defendants’ vehicle driven by Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS squeezed in the space alongside the right of Plaintiffs’ vehicle striking the vehicle. The Plaintiffs’ affidavits also indicate that after striking their vehicle Defendants vehicle continued into the intersection and struck another vehicle. The Plaintiffs have also submitted an uncertified police report which contains a narrative of the events based upon the responding officers’ interview with Plaintiffs and witnesses. The Court finds the instant police report is inadmissible evidence as it is uncertified and contains double hearsay as to the witnesses with no asserted exception. See Yassin v. Blackman, 188 AD3d 62, 65 (2d Dept 2020). Plaintiffs have not proffered affidavits or any statements from any of the named witnesses and therefore the Court cannot rely upon the statements of the witnesses within the report. Further the Court cannot rely upon the statements made by the Plaintiffs to the responding officer even though those statements are consistent with and corroborated by each of the Plaintiffs’ affidavits because the proper foundation for admissibility of the uncertified police report has not been laid. See Yassin v. Blackman, 188 AD3d at 66. Nevertheless, even though this Court must disregard the uncertified police report in its entirety the Plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden of submitting admissible evidence through the Plaintiffs affidavits in support of the instant motion which delineate their observations of the subject accident, that Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS was not sober at the time of the accident (a violation of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law) and that the Plaintiffs suffered injuries due to the accident caused solely by Defendants. Further, the Plaintiffs’ affidavits have established, prima facie, that Plaintiffs’ actions did not contribute to the happening of the accident. See Jung Geun Lee v. Mason, 139 AD3d 807 (2d Dept 2016); See also Joaquino v. Franco, 116 AD3d 1009 (2d Dept 2014); Napolitano v. Sanderson, 167 AD3d 1024 (2d Dept 2018); Lanicci v. Hansen, 153 AD3d 687 (2d Dept 2017); Bentick v. Gatchalian, 147 AD3d 890 (2d Dept 2017). In opposition, the Defendants have raised an argument that the instant motion is premature on two bases. The first argument by Defendants is that the Plaintiffs’ motion is premature based upon outstanding discovery. “A party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment.” Harrinarain v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 205 AD3d 893, 894 (2d Dept 2022) quoting Martinez v. 305 W. 52 Condominium, 128 AD3d 912, 914 (2d Dept 2015). Further, “[a] party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated.” Harrinarain v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 205 AD3d at 894 quoting Salameh v. Yarkovski, 156 AD3d 659, 660 (2d Dept 2017); See also Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212(f). The Defendants cite several cases in support of their argument that the instant motion for summary judgment is premature due to the lack of discovery. Most notably, the defendants cite to a Second Department decision, Rosa v. Colonial Transit, Inc., 276 AD2d 781 (2000). In Rosa v. Colonial Transit, Inc., the Second Department affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendants/appellants summary judgment conceding that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle but found there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the driver of the stopped bus contributed to the accident when he made a sudden stop. The Court also noted the denial of the summary judgment motion was appropriate because the defendant/appellant who had made the motion for summary judgment, had not appeared for court ordered examinations which deprived the plaintiff and codefendants of an opportunity to obtain evidence that was pertinent as to the cause of the accident. Defendants’ reliance of Rosa v. Colonial Transit, Inc., in support of their assertion that the instant motion by Plaintiffs is premature due to a failure to conduct the moving parties’ depositions is misplaced. The Plaintiffs, who are the moving party in this motion, are not required to seek Defendants’ deposition before trial to prove Defendants’ liability and Defendants’ here do not assert that they or each of the co-Defendants here has been deprived of an opportunity to obtain evidence pertinent to the accident in depositions. Further, nothing within the cases cited by Defendants, including Rosa v. Colonial Transit, Inc., requires that prior to a party moving for summary judgment they must conduct depositions (of either party) or engage in discovery. Rather, Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212(f) qualifies that a party who opposes a motion for summary judgment, such as the Defendants in this matter, are entitled to discovery when it appears facts supporting the opposing party’s position cannot be stated based upon the lack of discovery. Defendants argument that they have not been given a reasonable opportunity to engage in discovery prior to the Plaintiffs filing the instant motion for summary judgment and therefore the instant motion is premature pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212(f) is unavailing. In support of this argument the Defendants have failed to demonstrate what facts they believed supporting their position in opposition to the instant motion exist and from where. Rather, Defendants make sweeping conclusory statements that Plaintiffs’ depositions and discovery have not occurred without providing the Court any idea what evidence or discovery they need to oppose the instant motion and whom is in possession of that evidence. Further, by denying Plaintiffs’ motion based upon Defendants’ conclusory assertion of prematurity this Court will allow continued delay by the Defendants, since the Defendants have admitted Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS cannot testify in an examination before trial due to the implications that testimony may have on his criminal matter arising from the same accident. Turning to the second argument made by Defendants that the motion should be denied as premature “to prevent Hicks from suffering ‘severe prejudice” in regard to his ability to effectively defend himself on the issue of liability” and citing Mook v. Homesafe Am., Inc., 144 AD3d 1116 (2d Dept 2016). See Affirmation p.4, 9. Defendants’ reliance on Mook is also misguided. In Mook, the Court had before it the defendant’s motion to stay the pending civil matter pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §2201 pending the resolution of a related criminal action. See Mook v. Homesafe Am., Inc., 144 AD3d 1116 (2d Dept 2016). The defendant in Mook had been indicted on federal criminal charges of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in relation to the underlying claims in the civil action and as a result indicated to the court that he intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the civil action. See Id. As a result of that representation, the defendant sought a stay of the civil action. In granting the stay the Court in Mook indicated that “[a] compelling factor is a situation where a defendant will invoke his or her constitutional right against self incrimination” and cited extensively from the seminal case of Brit v. International Bus Servs. Mook v. Homesafe Am., Inc., 144 AD3d at 1117 citing Brit v. International Bus Servs., 255 AD2d at 144 (1st Dept. 1998). In Brit the Appellate Division, First Department reversed the lower court’s denial of an application for a stay by the defendant in the civil action related to a bus accident in which the defendant was indicted in New Jersey. The Court in Brit indicated that defense counsel had informed the court that the defendant would invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at trial and that the defendant’s testimony at trial would be critical and necessary testimony to ensure the defendant can assert a competent defense. Based upon the assertion that the defendant’s testimony would be critical to the civil matter and that the criminal matter was pending and would not conclude before the commencement of the civil trial, the Court stayed the civil action pending the outcome of the New Jersey criminal matter as the defendant would have been prejudiced by not being able to mount a defense in his civil trial without testifying. In Brit the Court also noted that the application for the stay occurred after discovery had been completed in the civil matter, which would usually “mitigate against granting a stay” but nothing in the record demonstrated the defendant had testified at an Examination Before Trial and the prejudice to the defendant to testify at trial was greater than the prejudice of the delay to the plaintiff. In essence discovery had been completed in the civil action and the defendant had not been deposed due to invoking his right of self-incrimination. Here, counsel for Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS has not sought a stay of the instant action despite referencing their inability to obtain an affidavit from the Defendant in an effort to protect the Defendant’s Fifth Amendment right. Rather, Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS’ counsel has indicated they are “unable to offer an affidavit from him at this time as to the happening of this accident, until the criminal charges arising from the subject incident have been resolved” and that “[s]ince the criminal matter and the subject civil action arise from the same set of facts, Mr. Hicks must refrain from submitting an affidavit in order to protect him [sic] constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” See Wehrheim Affirmation, p. 4, 8 and 9. Counsel asserts that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is premature due to their inability to have Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS testify at a deposition before trial, among the other arguments made regarding the exchange of discovery and non-existent depositions of the Plaintiffs. The standard for the determination of whether a motion for summary judgment is premature due to outstanding discovery pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212(f) is completely different than that of an application of a stay pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §2201. The Defendants’ opposition asserts that the motion is premature based upon a lack of discovery. Nonetheless, Defendants appear to be seeking a stay of the instant action without making a proper application. However, based upon the opposition as set forth by Defendants, that the motion is premature, the Court is bound by the analysis pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212(f). Considering whether the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiffs’ motion is premature, the Court must consider the relationship of the Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS’ criminal matter arising from the subject accident remains and his desire to invoke his right against self-incrimination in light of the factors pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212(f). First, “[t]hat the witness may invoke the privilege against self incrimination is not a basis for precluding civil discovery and a blanket refusal to answer cannot, absent unique circumstances…be sustained.” Dancy v. Panos, 46 Misc3d 1209(A) *3 (Supreme Ct, Dutchess Cty November 5, 2014) citing State of New York v. Carey Resources, Inc., 97 AD2d 508, 509 (2d Dept 1983). This Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is not premature based upon the existence of Defendant’s criminal proceeding. Specifically, the instant action is not stayed pending Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS’ criminal proceeding, nor has there been an examination before trial of BRIAN T. HICKS in which he would need to invoke his Fifth Amendment right. Further, the Defendants have not informed the Court of the stage of the criminal proceeding or whether Defendant BRIAN T. HICKS’s deposition has not been sought by Plaintiffs. Additionally, the Defendants have failed to demonstrate any other evidence necessary that they would be provided in discovery that is essential to Defendants defense of the instant matter. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden entitling them to judgment as a matter of law as to liability in the instant rear end collision. Further, Plaintiffs’ motion dismissing all affirmative defenses of Defendants alleging culpable conduct of Plaintiffs is granted. In arriving at this decision, the Court has reviewed, evaluated, and considered all the issues framed by these motion papers and the failure of the Court to specifically mention any particular issue in this Decision and Order does not mean that it has not been considered by the Court in light of the appropriate legal authority. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion #1) is granted as to liability and dismissing the affirmative defenses of Defendants as to culpable conduct of Plaintiffs; and it is further ORDERED that the parties are to appear for an in-person Conference on July 24, 2024 at 11:00am to schedule a date for a trial as to damages only. Dated: May 30, 2024
