DECISION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Michael Hill (“Hill”), who was a pretrial detainee at the Niagara County Jail (the “Jail”) at the time of the events at issue in this action, and plaintiff Karen Pittman (“Pittman”), Hill’s fiancée (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Dkt. 1). After the Court screened the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, Plaintiffs were permitted to proceed to service on six claims against six defendants (see Dkt. 22), but subsequently voluntarily dismissed their claims except against Thomas Loughren (“Defendant”) (see Dkt. 172). The only claim that proceeded to service against Defendant was for denial of permission to marry. (Dkt. 22 at 24). Currently pending before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs’ objections (Dkt. 191) to United States Magistrate Judge Marian W. Payson’s Decision and Order dated March 3, 2023 (Dkt. 159); and (2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 197). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ objections are denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS I. Standard of Review “When a party submits objections to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order, the district court must review the objections and ‘modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.’” Advanced Analytics, Inc. v. Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 47, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)). A magistrate judge’s order is “clearly erroneous” if “‘on the entire evidence,’ the [district court] is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The clearly erroneous standard is “highly deferential, and magistrate judges are afforded broad discretion in resolving nondispositive disputes and reversal is appropriate only if their discretion is abused.” E.E.O.C. v. Teamsters Loc. 804, No. 04 CIV. 2409 (LTS), 2006 WL 44023, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2006) (quotation and alterations omitted). II. Plaintiffs’ Objections are Untimely and Judge Payson’s Determination was not Clearly Erroneous or Contrary to Law In her March 3, 2023 Decision and Order, Judge Payson, in relevant part, denied Plaintiffs’ motions for appointment of an expert and a special master, denied Plaintiffs’ premature motions in limine, denied Plaintiffs’ various requests for sanctions, and denied in part and granted in part Plaintiffs’ motions to compel. (Dkt. 159; see Dkt. 126; Dkt. 141; Dkt. 143; Dkt. 152). For purposes of its discussion below, the Court assumes familiarity with Judge Payson’s Decision and Order and with the parties’ briefing on the underlying motions. Plaintiffs’ objections make the following arguments: (1) Judge Payson erred in basing her decision on Plaintiffs’ motions to compel in part on her conclusion that there was no conditions of confinement claim pending in this action; (2) Judge Payson erred in finding that Request No. 5 of Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Discovery Demands was not relevant insofar as it sought information after Hill’s cell extraction; and (3) Judge Payson erred in not appointing a special master or issuing sanctions, because Plaintiffs have “substantial evidence that the defendants are blatantly lying to this court about documents in their possession and/or not in their possession.” (Dkt. 191). As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs’ objections are untimely. Judge Payson entered her Decision and Order on March 3, 2023. (Dkt. 159). Plaintiffs did not file their objections until July 26, 2023, over four months later. (Dkt. 191).1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that “[a] party may serve and file objections to” a magistrate judge’s nondispositive order “within 14 days after being served with a copy,” and “[a] party may not assign as error a defect in the order not timely objected to.” “[T]he Second Circuit and courts within this Circuit have routinely held that failure to file objections to a magistrate judge’s order in a timely manner operates as a waiver of such objections.” David v. Weinstein Co. LLC, No. 18-CV-5414 (RA), 2020 WL 4042773, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2020) (collecting cases). This is a sufficient basis, standing alone, for the Court to deny Plaintiffs’ objections. Even had Plaintiffs’ objections been timely, they fail on the merits. As to Plaintiffs’ first argument, in its Decision and Order permitting certain of Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed to service, the Court did not construe the second amended complaint as setting forth a conditions of confinement claim, nor did it permit any such claim to proceed to service. Plaintiffs did not, at that time, file with the Court a motion seeking reconsideration or any other document indicating that the Court had wrongly failed to recognize such a claim. The Court’s Decision and Order is the law of the case, and it was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law for Judge Payson to abide by it.2 Turning to Plaintiff’s second argument, the Court finds no error in Judge Payson’s relevancy determination. Moreover, Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed the claims to which the discovery request at issue related, thus rendering the issue moot. Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Judge Payson erred in denying their requests for a special master and for sanctions. While they claim to have “substantial evidence” of wrongdoing by the defendants, they have submitted no such evidence in connection with their objections. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ objections (Dkt. 191) in their entirety. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. Factual Background Defendant served as a Commissioner of the New York State Commission of Correction (“SCOC”) from June 17, 2013, to June 25, 2013. (Dkt. 197-4 at 2). The SCOC has “three deliberative members” who are “appointed by the Governor to statutory terms with the advice and consent of the New York State Senate.” (Id. at 7). The deliberative members of the SCOC fill three separate roles: (1) Chair and Chief Executive Officer, (2) Chair of the Medical Review Board (“MRB”), and (3) Chair of the Citizen’s Policy and Complaint Review Council (“CPCRC”). (Id. at 8). The CPCRC serves as the SCOC’s grievance oversight committee, and consists of nine members appointed by the Governor. (Id. at 9). The CPCRC “is responsible for rendering determinations of grievances appealed from any local correctional facility to include the treatment of incarcerated individuals in the local correctional facilities.” (Id. at 10). To initiate the grievance process, an incarcerated person must file a grievance form with the local correctional facility’s grievance coordinator. (Id. at 11). After the grievance coordinator makes a determination, the incarcerated person can appeal to the chief administrative officer of the local correctional facility. (Id.). If the incarcerated person is unsatisfied with the chief administrative officer’s determination, he or she can appeal to the CPCRC. (Id.). An SCOC correctional facility specialist reviews the relevant information and makes a recommendation to the CPCRC as to whether the local correctional facility was in compliance with SCOC’s regulations. (Id.). The CPCRC then reviews the grievance, the supporting documentation, and the recommendation, and votes whether to accept or deny the grievance. (Id. at 12). The CPCRC issues a written determination. (Id.). In 2013, Defendant was designated to serve as chair of the CPCRC. (Id. at 16). In that role, he reviewed and voted on grievances brought before the CPCRC, but did not review complaint letters received by the Commission. (Id.). On May 14, 2018, Defendant was designated by the Governor to chair the MRB, and his voting rights on the CPCRC ended. (Id. at 17). However, he continued to sign letters issued by the CPCRC, as no new chair had been designated. (Id. at 18). Hill’s incarceration in the Jail began on or around October 6, 2017. (Dkt. 197-10 at 58). He testified at his deposition that he and Pittman began making a plan to get married around October 11, 2017. (Id. at 60). Hill spoke to the lieutenants and the captains at the Jail, who told him “that there [was] no such thing as anybody getting married in the jail.” (Id.). Hill further testified that he spoke to “the chief of the jail,” who “went through the computer” and said, “oh you got a constitutional right to get married, file a grievance.” (Id. at 60-61). Hill testified that he had several conversations with staff at the Jail in which they told him that he could not marry Pittman unless Defendant’s office approved the request. (Dkt. 197-10 at 86-88). When asked whether he believed that Defendant had prevented him from getting married to Pittman, Hill stated that he did, and that this belief was based on Defendant having denied numerous grievances that Hill submitted while incarcerated at the Jail. (Id. at 103-06). However, Hill acknowledged that Defendant “never wrote [him] back” or said anything to him personally. (Id. at 106). Instead, he testified that he communicated directly with people at the Jail who would convey to him what Defendant’s decision was. (Id. at 106-08). Hill further acknowledged that he was not present for any communications between Defendant and Jail staff and that he had no personal knowledge of the communications between them. (Id. at 108-15). The record before the Court contains a grievance filed by Hill on December 18, 2017, to the SCOC. In this grievance, Hill states that he “has submitted several grievances for appeal. And, new ones to be decided which not been returned to him. Especially his grievance about marrying his financee, and having it posted not take stapples out of legal documents and shuffle papers.” (Dkt. 197-7 at 3 (spelling as in original)). This grievance was returned to the Jail on February 3, 2018, with a cover letter signed by Terrence Moran, SCOC’s Director of Operations. (Id. at 2). Defendant has submitted a sworn declaration indicating that this grievance was not reviewed by the CPCRC and that he has no recollection of ever seeing, working on, or being personally involved in any manner with this grievance. (Dkt. 197-4 at
24-25). The record further contains a complaint letter dated January 17, 2018, purportedly from Pittman to Defendant. (Dkt. 197-8 at 3-4).3 In this letter, Pittman states that on November 13, 2017, she requested permission from Chief Jail Administrator Kevin Payne (“Payne”) to marry Hill. (Id. at 3). The letter further states that Jail staff told Pittman that Payne would not allow her and Hill to marry. (Id.). Pittman reports that after Hill filed grievances related to the refusal of her request to marry Hill, her telephone communication with Hill was interfered with. (Id. at 3-4). She asks Defendant to “step in and correct the problem.” (Id. at 4). On February 15, 2018, the SCOC’s Field Operations Bureau sent a copy of this letter to Payne, asking him to “offer any assistance to” Pittman that he deemed appropriate. (Id. at 2). In his sworn declaration, Defendant states that he does not recall ever seeing this letter or being personally involved in any manner in responding to this complaint. (Dkt. 197-4 at 27). Defendant further notes that the complaint was reviewed and responded to by someone with the initials “C.M.,” which are not his initials. (Id.). The record also contains a complaint letter from Hill dated January 21, 2018, and addressed “Dear Commissioner.” (Dkt. 197-9 at 2-3). In this letter, Hill complains — among other things — about not being permitted to marry Pittman, and requests the recipient’s “attention and immediate action.” (Id. at 3). This complaint was also reviewed by an individual with the initials “C.M.” (Id. at 2). On January 30, 2018, SCOC’s Field Operations Bureau sent a response letter to Hill indicating that his grievances were being processed by the CPCRC board. (Id. at 4). Defendant states in his declaration that he does not recall ever seeing or being personally involved in any manner with this complaint. (Dkt. 197-4 at 28). Defendant states in his declaration that he was not involved in the determination of any CPCRC grievance appeal made by either of Plaintiffs regarding their request to get married. (Id. at 20). He denies having spoken to Jail staff about Hill’s right to marry while incarcerated, and states that “at no time did [he] make any decision, or have any authority to make any decision, to grant or deny Plaintiff Hill’s request to get married while in Niagara County Jail.” (Id. at
