Judges Garcia, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur. Chief Judge Wilson concurs in result in an opinion. Judge Rivera dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion.
The narrow question before us on this appeal is whether amendments to the CPL imposing additional requirements that the People must fulfill before announcing their readiness for trial apply where the People declared ready for trial before the amendments’ effective date. Because the amendments did not vitiate the People’s prior readiness statement, we hold that they do not. Thus, we reverse the Appellate Division order. Defendant was charged with attempted second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and other charges, arising out of an incident where he threatened his children with a knife and stabbed his pregnant wife several times in her hands, feet, and chest. In 2019, defendant was indicted, and the People declared ready for trial with approximately one week remaining on their speedy trial clock. On January 1, 2020, amendments to New York’s discovery (CPL art 245) and statutory speedy trial (CPL 30.30) rules went into effect, and the old discovery rules (CPL former art 240) were repealed (see L 2019,§1, parts KKK, LLL; see generally People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200 [2023]). On January 27, the first day of trial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds, arguing that the People had become unready for trial when the amendments came into effect and had failed to file a certificate of compliance with the new discovery rules (COC) as required by the amendments and announce their readiness before their statutory speedy trial time expired. Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the amendments do not apply to cases arraigned before January 1, 2020. The jury acquitted defendant of attempted second-degree murder but convicted him of the remaining counts. As relevant here, the Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, reversed the judgment, granted defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, and dismissed the indictment (see 216 AD3d 1400 [4th Dept 2023]). The Court held that the People were placed in a state of unreadiness on January 1, 2020, and were required to file a COC to become ready thereafter (id. at 1405-1406). The majority relied on the general rule that newly enacted procedural statutes are applicable to future steps and stages of a litigation and concluded that its statutory interpretation did not give the amendments any retroactive effect (id. at 1406). Even assuming the People were entitled to certain exclusions of time, the Court determined that the People were chargeable with a total of 185 days—over the 181-day limit applicable to this case (id. at 1408). The dissent would have held that the majority’s interpretation of the law gave it retroactive effect, and that the legislature did not intend the new discovery laws to be applied in a retroactive manner (id. at 1408-1409 [Ogden, J., dissenting]). The dissenting Justice granted the People leave to appeal. Resolution of this appeal depends on whether any delay after January 1, 2020, is chargeable to the People. The answer to that question hinges on whether, in a case where the People had validly declared ready for trial prior to the effective date of the amendments, those amendments reverted the People to a state of unreadiness when they came into effect, requiring them to file a COC to regain their readiness status and stop the speedy trial clock. As this issue involves a question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the statutory text, which is “the clearest indicator of legislative intent” (Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]). Before 2020, “[n]othing in the speedy trial statute linked…discovery obligations to the People’s readiness for trial under CPL 30.30″ (Bay, 41 NY3d at 207). The amendments that became effective on January 1, 2020, constituted a sea change in speedy trial and discovery procedure. They “impose[d] new automatic disclosure requirements” (id. at 208; see CPL 245.20) and “tie[d] the[se] discovery obligations to trial readiness under CPL 30.30″ (Bay, 41 NY3d at 208). Though the amendments did not alter the basic concept that the People must declare ready—and actually be ready—for trial in order to stop the speedy trial clock, the amendments linked the People’s discovery and speedy trial obligations by requiring the filing of “a COC attesting to good faith compliance with CPL 245.20′s disclosure requirements” prior to stating ready for trial (id. at 210). To that effect, CPL 30.30 (5) provides that “[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a [COC],” and CPL 245.50 (3) similarly provides that “the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial…until it has filed a proper [COC].” There is no evidence, in the plain language of the amendments or the legislative history, that the legislature intended to—or did—revert the People to a state of unreadiness on January 1, 2020. Rather, the amendments specifically tie the COC requirement to the People’s ability to state ready and be deemed ready. Because the legislature established the COC requirement as a condition precedent to declaring ready for trial and did not indicate an intent to undo the People’s prior readiness statements, there is no basis to apply that requirement prospectively to a case such as the present one where the People were in a trial-ready posture when it went into effect. In other words, the People are not required to fulfill a prerequisite to declaring trial readiness when they have already validly declared ready for trial. Accordingly, the only way to apply the COC requirement to this case would be to wholesale invalidate the People’s pre-2020 readiness statement—not to render the People unready as of January 1, 2020. Because the language of the amendments does not “expressly or by necessary implication require” this plainly retroactive application, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended for the COC requirement to apply in this manner (Majewski, 91 NY2d at 584). Consequently, the People are not chargeable for any delay after January 1, 2020, and thus remained within the applicable 181-day statutory speedy trial limit (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]).* Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 denied, and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court.
