MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER Having resolved the principal issue in this Fair Labor Standards Action (“FLSA”) action, to wit: whether plaintiff, a building superintendent, was entitled to round-the-clock compensation for being on-call for emergency situations that might arise outside of his normal workday, see Lindow v. Metro. Realty Grp., LLC, No. CV 19-2021 (GRB)(RML), 2023 WL 4827252 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2023) (“Lindow I”), defendants now move for summary judgment concerning the remaining issues in the case. Familiarity with Lindow I, incorporated herein by reference, is assumed. For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. This motion for summary judgment is decided under the oft-repeated and well-understood standard for review for these matters, as discussed in Bartels v. Inc. Vill. of Lloyd Harbor, 97 F. Supp. 3d 198, 211-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 643 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2016), which discussion is incorporated by reference herein. In sum, the question before the Court is whether, based upon the undisputed or improperly disputed facts, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. On this motion, few facts are in dispute: of the 233 paragraphs in defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement, plaintiff admits all but 22 of them. As to the remainder, questions arise as to whether plaintiff properly disputed these contentions. Plainly, counsel was aware of the requisites here, as the Court set forth the standards in Lindow I: [T]o oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party is required by the Court’s Local Rules to submit a Statement of Material Facts upon which it contends there “exists a genuine issue to be tried” and “each statement controverting any statement of material fact…must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible, set forth as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” L. Civ. R. 56(d); Tuccio v. FJC Sec. Servs., Inc., No. CV 12-5506(JFB)(GRB), 2014 WL 4438084, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014), adopted by, 2014 WL 4438469 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2014), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2015). A party may not rest on a mere denial without citing supporting admissible evidence. “Merely denying certain statements in the moving party’s statement of undisputed material facts without stating the factual basis for such denial and without disclosing where in the record is the evidence relied upon in making such denial does not constitute a ‘separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried’ — as is required to controvert the moving party’s statement of undisputed material facts.” Covelli v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 2001 WL 1823584, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2001) (citing Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001)), aff’d, Covelli v. Nat’l Gas Distrib. Corp., 49 F. App’x 356 (2d Cir. 2002). Upon the failure to properly controvert a movant’s statement of material fact, such statement “will be deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion.” L. Civ. R. 56.1(c); D.N. ex rel. D.N. v. Bd. of Educ. of Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 14-99(GRB), 2015 WL 5822226, at *3 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015); see also Edmonds v. Seavey, No. 08 CIV. 5646 (HB), 2009 WL 2949757, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009), aff’d, 379 F. App’x 62 (2d Cir. 2010); AFL Fresh & Frozen Fruits & Vegetables, Inc. v. De-Mar Food Servs. Inc., No. 06 Civ. 2142(GEL), 2007 WL 4302514, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007). Again, district courts have “broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a party’s failure to comply with local court rules,” Holtz, 258 F.3d at 73, and the Court may not rely solely upon the failure to controvert assertions made in a Rule 56.1 statement if those assertions are not supported in the record. See Giannullo, 322 F.3d at 140 (“[E]ven though plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 counter-statement failed to specifically controvert these assertions, the unsupported assertions must nonetheless be disregarded and the record independently reviewed.”); but see Jackson v. Fed. Express, 766 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 2014) (distinguishing Giannullo and upholding default where “each statement of proposed undisputed facts was supported by a citation to the record sufficient to prove each such fact”). Lindow I, 2023 WL 4827252, at *1 (quoting Davis v. Town of Hempstead, No. 14-CV-903 (JMA)(GRB), 2019 WL 235644, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2019)). In several instances, plaintiff flatly fails to comply with these requisites. See, e.g., Docket Entry (“DE”) 58
146-47 (attempting to categorize assertions as “legal argument”); 206 (counsel “leave[s] it to the Court to reach their [sic] determination as how to best interpret Defendant’s time records”);