The following numbered papers were used on this motion: Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 15: Notice of motion NYSCEF Doc No. 16: Affirmation of Andrew Wiese in support of motion NYSCEF Doc No. 17: Exhibit A — Affidavit of Karl Henry NYSCEF Doc No. 18: Statement of material facts NYSCEF Doc No. 19: Statement of authorization for electronic filing Submitted by Defendants: NYSCEF Doc No. 31: Affirmation of Sean A. Gradowitz in opposition to motion Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 32: Affirmation of Andrew Wiese in reply DECISION AND ORDER Upon the foregoing papers and having heard oral argument on the record, the within motion is determined as follows. Introduction This is a motion by Plaintiff Karl Henry seeking on order pursuant to Rule 3212 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) granting him summary judgment against Defendants on the issue of liability and dismissing Defendants’ affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence, contributory negligence, and culpable conduct on his part. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if no triable issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]). The party moving for summary judgment must present a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of material issues of fact, and the failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Smalls v. AJI Industries, Inc., 10 NY3d 733 [2008]; Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324). Once a prima facie showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact that require a trial for resolution or tender an acceptable excuse for the failure to do so; mere expressions of hope are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact (see Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). If there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (see Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]). Background At approximately 9:15 p.m. on July 8, 2023, Plaintiff Henry was involved in a motor vehicle accident on the eastbound Belt Parkway near Pennsylvania Avenue, in the County of Kings, City and State of New York. More specifically, he was the seat-belted operator of a Mercedes bearing license plate number MCS1818 that he owned. The roads were dry and weather was clear. The Belt Parkway, at the location of the accident, had three lanes (left, middle and right). As he was travelling 10 mph eastbound in the middle lane, Plaintiff Henry observed that traffic ahead of him was coming to a complete stop. He brought his vehicle to a slow, gradual stop about one car length behind the vehicle in front of him which was also fully stopped. He was completely stopped in the middle lane for approximately 40 seconds, with his foot on the brake, when his vehicle was struck in the rear by the front of a Volkswagen bearing license plate number GNK6775, operated by Defendant Jaiden Neil Francis and owned by Defendant Natasha Murray. (See NYSCEF Doc No. 17, Henry aff.) Plaintiffs Position Plaintiff requests that summary judgement be granted to him on the issue of liability because there is no issue of material fact and no affidavit from Defendant Francis; also that affirmative defenses alleging at least part liability attributable to him should be stricken (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 16, Wiese aff 2; 32, Wiese reply aff
