DECISION AND SUPPLEMENTAL INTERIM ORDER REGARDING AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS This Court has issued interim orders with respect to Motion Sequences 1 and 2. On July 12, 2024, this Court issued an “Interim Order: Adjournment & Notice Regarding Amicus Curiae Briefs,” providing as follows: It is hereby ORDERED as follows: The within motions are further adjourned to Thursday, August 22, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 18.36, at the Kings County Supreme Court Courthouse, 320 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York. Notice Regarding Amicus Curiae Briefs New York State Supreme Court, Kings County, IAS Part 2, will accept amicus curiae briefs on the issue presented in Deblase v. Hill, Kings County Index No. 522689/2023. Motion Sequences 1 and 2, to wit, whether the mother of a dog owner possesses a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress resulting from witnessing the dog being struck by a vehicle as she walked it on a leash across the street in a crosswalk. The deadline for amicus curiae submissions is August 15, 2024. Currently filed documents in this case may be viewed on the New York State Courts Electronic Filing (NYSCEF) online platform. The Court now explicates its reasoning underlying such order and notice. Plaintiff Nan Deblase describes what transpired in a July 4, 2023 motor vehicle accident as follows: On July 4, 2023, I was a pedestrian and was walking my son’s dog when we were involved in an accident whereby my son’s dog was struck by a motor vehicle that I later learned was owned and operated by defendant MITCHELL HILL. The accident occurred at the intersection of East 64th Street and Strickland Avenue in Brooklyn, NY. Prior to the accident I was walking my son’s dog on the sidewalk along Strickland Avenue and was intending on crossing over East 64th Street. Strickland Avenue is a two-way roadway in that area and both directions are controlled by a stop sign. Prior to the accident I was on the sidewalk. Prior to crossing over East 64th Street, I looked both ways before stepping off of the sidewalk and there were no cars near the intersection or any cars turning. I proceeded to step off of the sidewalk with my son’s dog and we began to walk across East 64th Street and we were crossing within the cross-walk. I continued to check for any vehicles and there were none in the vicinity. When I had almost reached across to the other side, I observed a vehicle traveling on Strickland Avenue in the opposite direction. That vehicle did not have any directional signal on. I then observed that vehicle proceed though the stop sign without stopping, make a left turn from Strickland Avenue onto East 64th Street, and suddenly, and without any warning, strike my son’s dog. There was nothing that I could do to prevent my son’s dog from being struck. I have reviewed a video of this accident, and it is a fair and accurate portrayal of how this accident occurred. (NYSCEF Doc No. 11, Nan Deblase aff.) In the first cause of action of Plaintiffs’ complaint, Trevor Deblase seeks compensatory and exemplary damages (see NYSCEF Doc No. 9, complaint 18). The second cause of action is asserted by Nan Deblase. She claims that she was present in the zone of danger, observed the striking of the dog, and was herself in danger of being struck. She too seeks compensatory and exemplary damages (see id.
22, 25). Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, striking all affirmative defenses as to liability, and for other, just, and proper relief (see NYSCEF Doc No. 7, notice of motion). Defendants have cross-moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (see NYSCEF Doc No. 17, notice of cross-motion). Defendant asserts that the portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint “which seek mental, emotional and psychological damages due to the death of the dog must be dismissed as there is no cause of action for same in the State of New York” (NYSCEF Doc No. 18, Deborah C. Zachary aff 5). Defendant cites to Greene v. Esplanade Venture (36 NY3d 513 [2021]) for the proposition that the zone of danger doctrine in the law concerning infliction of emotional distress is limited to members of the plaintiff’s immediate family. In Greene, the Court of Appeals adopted a modification to the common law to include a grandparent who witnesses a grandchild being killed. (See id.
