Bacher v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms. Inc.

Defendants-Appellants appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) remanding these nine actions to state court. Defendants removed these actions from state court to federal court, arguing that a motion to consolidate filed in state court by Plaintiffs proposed a joint trial sufficient to confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act’s “mass action” provision. Plaintiffs disagree, asserting that their motion proposes consolidation only for pretrial purposes. We agree with the Plaintiffs, finding the text of their motion ambiguous in isolation but clear in context, and therefore AFFIRM. Judge Kearse dissents in a separate opinion. GUIDO CALABRESI, C.J. Defendants-Appellants appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) remanding these nine actions to state court. The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) is best-known as a landmark expansion of federal subject-matter jurisdiction over class actions. CAFA also conferred federal subject-matter jurisdiction over “mass actions,” or civil actions “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly.” 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(11)(B)(i). But CAFA is clear that actions consolidated “solely for pretrial purposes” are not considered “mass actions.” Id. §1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As a result, the federal statutes controlling our jurisdiction often allow plaintiffs to structure litigation strategically to evade federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, to avoid federal question jurisdiction, plaintiffs can choose not to bring a federal cause of action; or, to escape invocation of CAFA’s mass action provision, plaintiffs can structure their complaints to include 99 plaintiffs rather than 100. In this case, which involves nine virtually identical cases filed in Connecticut state court, Plaintiffs sought to do just this. They went to great lengths to evade various triggers of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Time and again, Plaintiffs walked the edge of one jurisdictional line or another, and each time they sought to avoid missteps that might allow the cases to be brought into federal court. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs made one such misstep — Plaintiffs filed a “motion to consolidate” — which Defendants allege triggered federal jurisdiction by proposing a joint trial, thereby fulfilling a requirement of CAFA’s mass action provision. Accordingly, Defendants removed the case to federal court. Plaintiffs sought remand. Conceding that they otherwise met the requirements of CAFA’s mass action provision, Plaintiffs argue that they proposed only pretrial consolidation and not a joint trial. They thus assert that they have not run afoul of CAFA’s jurisdictional grant. The district court agreed with the Plaintiffs and ordered remand of these nine actions. It held (a) that Plaintiffs’ motion cited authority that could be used to propose consolidation for either pretrial management or for a joint trial and (b) that, read in the context of Plaintiffs’ many attempts to avoid CAFA jurisdiction, the best reading of Plaintiffs’ motion was that it proposed only pretrial consolidation. Defendants timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in two ways: (1) in considering Plaintiffs intent when intent is not contemplated by the statute and, (2) if intent were to be considered, in its evaluation of the evidence of Plaintiffs’ intent. We hold: (1) that the district court correctly understood CAFA as requiring a determination of whether the Plaintiffs intended to seek a joint trial — that is, whether a reasonable observer would conclude that Plaintiffs acted with the intention of bringing about a joint trial and (2) that, analyzing the record, the district court correctly concluded that the Plaintiffs sought only pretrial consolidation. We therefore affirm. I. BACKGROUND A. Proceedings in State Court Between July and October 2022, nine lawsuits were filed in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Danbury. Each suit asserts virtually indistinguishable state-law personal injury claims stemming from usage of a gastrointestinal medication known as Zantac; each suit was brought by the same firm and against the same eight defendants, companies that have held the right to market over-the-counter Zantac; each suit named three defendants and one Plaintiff domiciled in Connecticut; and each suit contains just fewer than 100 plaintiffs, with seven suits containing 99 plaintiffs and the other two containing 80 plaintiffs. In total, these nine suits include claims filed on behalf of 853 Plaintiffs from thirty-six states. Each complaint further contained a clause indicating that every Plaintiff sought an individual judgment against Defendants, preserving the individual nature of their respective claims: “Wherefore, each Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an order or judgment against the Defendants.” J. App’x 106, 345, 605, 730, 862, 986, 1121, 1257 (emphasis added). And each complaint contained a lengthy, express disclaimer of federal jurisdiction.¹ After these nine actions were filed as separate suits in Connecticut state court, Plaintiffs’ counsel corresponded with Defense counsel over the Plaintiffs’ desire to file motions consolidating these actions and transferring them to the Connecticut Superior Court’s specialized Complex Litigation Docket (“CLD”). Following a phone call between counsel, Defense counsel wrote the following email to Plaintiffs’ counsel: Before I start making my calls, I want to make sure my notes are accurate. Plaintiffs want all cases consolidated in the same court and as far as CLD designation, would like to designate: 1) Hartford, 2) Stamford. If I have that right, I will start making calls today and hopefully get back to you early next week. Id. at 143. Five days later, Plaintiff’s counsel followed up on the “consolidation motions/CLD application” and asked if there had been “[a]ny progress on your end?” Id. Defense counsel expressed that the Defendants consented to CLD transfer and were comfortable with Plaintiffs’ recommended CLD venues. Id. at 142. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that they would “prepare the consolidation motion and CLD application.” Id. After Defense counsel consented to the CLD transfer, Plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate the nine actions. Plaintiffs’ motion requested consolidation “[p]ursuant to Conn. Prac. Book §9-5.” Id. at 117. The motion cited no other authority but did contain a few statements “support[ing]” consolidation: Specifically, the motion stated that “ [c]onsolidating these actions will allow for the court to manage all of them in an orderly and efficient manner” and that “[i]t is likely that issues raised in any one of the cases could impact the other cases.” Id. at 118 (emphasis added). B. Proceedings in Federal Court Before the state court could act on Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate, the Defendants filed notices of removal for all nine actions, asserting federal subject9 matter jurisdiction under the mass action provision of CAFA. That provision confers on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over “any civil action…in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the consolidated actions include the claims of 100 or more persons; nor do they dispute that the instant actions are civil actions for monetary relief. Instead, the sole disputed question is whether Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate “proposed” a joint trial. Defendants argued that the plain text of Plaintiffs’ motion proposed a joint trial because of its citation to Section 9-5. That section provides in relevant part: “Whenever there are two or more separate actions which should be tried together, the judicial authority may, upon the motion of any party or upon its own motion, order that the actions be consolidated for trial.” Conn. Prac. Book §9-5(a). Eight days after Defendants removed these actions, Plaintiffs sought remand. They contended that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because their motion proposed consolidation only for pretrial management, and CAFA is clear that actions consolidated “solely for pretrial proceedings” are not “mass actions.” 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV). Plaintiffs argued that Section 9-5 has been used by Connecticut courts to effectuate transfer both for pretrial management and for trial, and that, as a result, their citation to Section 9-5 did not necessarily propose a joint trial. Further, Plaintiffs claimed that the context of their motion clearly indicated that the purpose of consolidation was pretrial management in order to avoid paying a transfer fee for each individual action. The district court agreed with the Plaintiffs. It found that Plaintiffs’ citation to Section 9-5 was ambiguous and that the record did not show that Plaintiffs proposed a joint trial: The most natural interpretation of their motion and the context in which it was filed is that they sought consolidation only for purposes of pre-trial case management.…[T]he plaintiffs sought consolidation as no more than an expedient for an easier and less costly transfer of the cases to the [CLD] for superior case management. Bacher v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. 3:22-CV-01432 (JAM), 2023 WL 196053, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 17, 2023). Accordingly, the district court remanded all nine cases to Connecticut state court. The Defendants timely appealed. II. Standard of Review The district court had jurisdiction because “a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” LeChase Constr. Servs., LLC v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). We also have jurisdiction. Usually, an order remanding a removed case to state court is not reviewable on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §1447(d). CAFA provides an exception to that rule. CAFA authorizes the courts of appeals to review an appeal from a district court’s order deciding a motion to remand pursuant to CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions. 28 U.S.C. §1453(c)(1). The Defendants timely filed an application to appeal, and we therefore have jurisdiction to consider the order of remand. On appeal from the grant or denial of a motion to remand for lack of CAFA-conferred jurisdiction, “we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2004)). CAFA, moreover, is no exception to the well-known rule that the party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (“[T]he court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.”); c.f. Blockbuster, Inc., 472 F.3d at 59.² III. Discussion At every turn, Plaintiffs have gone to great lengths to avoid federal jurisdiction. This is obvious from the structure of their complaints. Each includes one plaintiff from Connecticut, ensuring that complete diversity between the parties does not exist. Each falls just shy of the 100-plaintiff federal removal threshold, with seven just a single plaintiff shy, indicating a particularized intent to avoid CAFA’s mass action provision. Each contains a lengthy express disclaimer of federal jurisdiction, and each indicated that the individual plaintiff’s claims remained separate. It is, therefore, clear that Plaintiffs originally sought to keep these actions in state court. Consistent with that desire, there is nonetheless an obvious reason why Plaintiffs might seek consolidation for pretrial management: avoidance of a costly fee. “Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 52-259, there is a $335.00 fee for each case requested” to be transferred to the CLD. State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Facts About the Connecticut Judicial Branch Complex Litigation Docket, https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/FACTS_082123.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB9V-QHV6] (last accessed July 21, 2024).³ Consolidation before transfer, thus, would presumably have saved Plaintiffs thousands of dollars in filing fees by allowing them to pay one fee rather than nine. Notably, in discussions with Defense counsel, Plaintiffs’ counsel always discussed the two motions — consolidation and transfer to the CLD — in tandem. And when it came time to file motions to consolidate and for transfer, Plaintiffs first filed the motions for consolidation. Plaintiffs’ actions are thereby consistent with a desire to consolidate to facilitate the economical transfer of these actions to the CLD. Defendants nevertheless make two broad arguments for reversal. A. First, Defendants argue that courts seeking to determine whether a joint trial has been proposed can examine only the plain text of a contested proposal and cannot “look[] beyond the words of Plaintiffs’ consolidation request.” Appellant’s Br. 16. Defendants argue that to require courts to look to Plaintiffs’ intent would require an unwieldy inquiry. Id. at 15. We disagree and hold that CAFA permits a consideration of Plaintiffs’ “intent.” The common usage of the word “propose[],” 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(11)(B)(i), indicates as much. As the Eleventh Circuit, considering the same argument, explained: “[W]e would hardly say that a mouse ‘proposes’ to be eaten by a cat when it makes the mistake of being seen by the cat, recognizes the danger, and then quickly scurries away.” Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 884 (11th Cir. 2013). Instead, our common understanding is that for one to “propose,” that person must intend to make an offer or request. Two other circuits considering whether CAFA requires courts determining if a joint trial has been “proposed” have adopted Scimone’s reasoning that the “natural reading of the provision is that the plaintiffs must actually want…what they are proposing.” Ramirez v. Vintage Pharms., LLC, 852 F.3d 324, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Scimone, 720 F.3d at 884); see also Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 888 (10th Cir. 2014) (same). One circuit has held otherwise. Adams v. 3M Co., 65 F.4th 802 (6th Cir. 2023). In Adams, the Sixth Circuit refused to consider an intent-based argument and held that “[r]equiring district courts to divine counsels’ unexpressed intentions” would run afoul of the usual maxim that jurisdictional rules be “simple.” Id. at 805 (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010)). Adams thus conducted its inquiry into whether a joint trial was “proposed” without considering plaintiffs’ intent. Adams instead relied on the definition of “proposal” provided in Black’s Law Dictionary: “Something offered for consideration or acceptance.” Id. at 804 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 854, 1255 (8th ed. 2004)). Defendants here urge us to adopt Adams’s logic. See Appellant’s Br. 15-16. We decline to do so. Setting aside that Adams ignores common usage (and, as we explain below, legislative history), its logic is flawed on its own terms. We are unpersuaded by its assumption that a test that is restricted to the text of a document itself is “simpler” than one that reads that text in context. In this case, for example, we find that looking beyond the face of the Plaintiffs’ motion readily clarifies the meaning of the motion, and thus presents us with a “simpler” resolution of the matter at hand. Second, Adams’s reliance on Black’s Law Dictionary to avoid considering intent is misguided. In consulting dictionaries, we should avoid “an uncritical approach,” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 Green Bag 2d 419, 420 (2013), and should “use more than one…check[ing] editions from the date of enactment as well as current,” id. at 422 n.14 (quoting Michael B.W. Sinclair, Guide to Statutory Interpretation 137 (2000)). Adams cites Black’s definition of the noun “proposal,” presumably because Black’s offers no definition for the verb “propose” or any variation thereof. But we should not assume that similar words used as different parts of speech have identical meanings. Cf. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 402-03 (2011) (noting that different parts of speech sharing a root word “may have meanings as disparate as any two unrelated words”). Moreover, though Black’s definition of the word “proposal” does not mention “intent,” it does contemplate an action with an intended result: “Something offered for consideration or acceptance.” Other dictionaries that do provide definitions of “propose” similarly describe an action with an intended result, usually consideration of a plan, and thereby make the intent element explicit. Parson and Scimone turn to Merriam-Webster publications with just such definitions. Parson cites Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, as in effect in March 2014, for its definition of “propose” as “to suggest (something, such as a plan or theory) to a person or group of people to consider” or “to plan or intend to do (something).” Parson, 749 F.3d at 888 (citing Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). Scimone cites Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) for a similar definition of “propose.” Scimone, 720 F.3d at 881.⁴ We are therefore satisfied that, to the extent dictionaries are helpful, they in fact further confirm that to “propose” something requires an intent to do so. CAFA’s legislative history corroborates our analysis. The Senate Report accompanying CAFA describes the mass action provision as covering “any civil action in which 100 or more named parties seek to try their claims for monetary relief together.” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 44 (2005) (emphasis added). This is significant evidence that CAFA’s authors did not intend CAFA’s jurisdictional grant to spring into swift operation when triggered by the use of a magic word or citation. It indicates that CAFA’s authors meant to confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction only when a court determines that plaintiffs acted with the intention of seeking a joint trial. Legislative history, common usage, and the dictionaries hence all row together. Each affirms our conclusion that courts evaluating whether a plaintiff proposed a joint trial must center their analysis on whether it was the plaintiffs’ intention to request such a trial. B. Second, Defendants forcefully argue that, even if Plaintiffs’ intent is relevant, the plain text of Plaintiffs’ motion itself evinces the intent to consolidate for trial, and that evidence from outside the motion cannot overcome the text of the motion itself. They contend that Plaintiffs’ citation to Section 9-5 constitutes an “express proposal” for a joint trial because a party’s citation to Section 9-5 can only mean that they seek a joint trial. Appellant’s Br. 12. We disagree and find the text of the motion, read in context, consistent with Plaintiffs’ desire to consolidate for pretrial purposes only. Defendants’ argument relies on the text of Section 9-5 itself, which twice refers to trials: “Whenever there are two or more separate actions which should be tried together, the judicial authority may, upon the motion of any party or upon its own motion, order that the actions be consolidated for trial.” Conn. Prac. Book §9-5(a). Plaintiffs, however, contend that local Connecticut practice regarding Section 9-5 does not in fact rely on the trial component. They argue that Connecticut courts have used Section 9-5 to effectuate consolidation for pretrial purposes, trial purposes, or both, and thus that their citation to Section 9-5 does not clearly propose a joint trial. Plaintiffs point to several cases as examples of Connecticut’s practice of using Section 9-5 for pretrial consolidation. The most significant of these is DiBella v. Town of Greenwich, No. X08-CV-09-5012500-S, 2012 WL 2899242 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 22, 2012). In DiBella, a case that had already been transferred to the CLD, the court consolidated two cases for pretrial management. Id. at *2. In so doing, it stated that “[a] motion to consolidate is governed by Practice Book §9-5(a).” Id. at *1. Two sentences later, however, the court describes itself as retaining “inherent power to consolidate different causes…when the circumstances authorize such course.” Id. (quoting Rode v. Adley Express Co., Inc., 33 A.2d 329, 331 (Conn. 1943)). Because DiBella asserts that the court possesses consolidation authority both pursuant to Section 9-5 and its “inherent power” to consolidate, it is not clear which authority the court relied upon. Alternatively, the court may have referred to its “inherent power” merely as support for the preceding statement that “[t]he question of whether two actions ought to be consolidated is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. In any event, DiBella cannot clearly be read either, as Defendants contend, to rely on “inherent power” to the exclusion of Section 9-5; or, as Plaintiffs contend, to rely on Section 9-5 to the exclusion of the “inherent power.”⁵ There are, however, cases in which Connecticut state courts do cite Section 9-5 as allowing for consolidation “only…for purposes of trial.” Feinstein v. Keenan, No. FSTCV106007235S, 2012 WL 2548274, at *2 n.3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 6, 2012); see also Chieffalo v. Hoffman-Olson, No. FSTCV085007415S, 2010 WL 1052270, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010). On the other hand, one recent decision by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut noted that two Connecticut state court cases “indicate that some Connecticut trial courts have interpreted [Section] 9-5 to allow consolidation for some or even all pre-trial purposes.” Caprio v. Gorawara, 2019 WL 13222943, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. 2019), adhered to in relevant part on reconsideration, 2019 WL 6463684 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 2019) (citing Post v. Brennan, 2008 WL 2967094, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 16, 2008), and Groth v. Redmond, 194 A.2d 531, 532 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962)). Defendants assert that Caprio mistakenly interpreted Post and Groth. They also argue that Caprio is not an authoritative source for interpreting Connecticut law because it is unpublished. But ultimately the question is not what the correct understanding of Connecticut law is. Rather, it is what, given these cases, we can understand Plaintiffs’ citation to Section 9-5 to mean. Accordingly, even if reading Section 9-5 and its surrounding caselaw as allowing the provision’s usage for pretrial consolidation is not the best reading of the provision — indeed, even if it is ultimately a mistaken reading⁶ — given the convoluted history of Section 9-5′s application, we cannot say that a party’s citation to Section 9-5 provides clear evidence of that party’s intent to propose a joint trial.⁷ In the final analysis, we cannot agree that the text of Plaintiffs’ motion constitutes a plain declaration of their intent to seek a joint trial. To the contrary, when Plaintiffs’ citation to Section 9-5 is read alongside their explanation in the motion that “[c]onsolidating these actions will allow for the court to manage all of them in an orderly and efficient manner,” J. App’x 118 (emphasis added), and their consistent desire to avoid federal jurisdiction, it seems clear to us that Plaintiffs’ motion sought to propose only pretrial consolidation. CONCLUSION Defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate that federal jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. KEARSE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s post-removal remand of this class action to state court on the basis that plaintiffs “did not propose consolidation for a joint trial of their claims but only that their actions be consolidated for purposes of pre-trial case management proceedings” (SpA.5). I have seen nothing in the state-court record showing that plaintiffs stated, prior to or in making their motion for consolidation, that they sought consolidation of these cases only for pretrial proceedings. Rather, when plaintiffs sought consolidation of the nine cases, they repeatedly referred to the “actions,” not to any limited stage of the actions. And they moved for consolidation under the Connecticut provision that states that [w]henever there are two or more separate actions which should be tried together, the judicial authority may, upon the motion of any party or upon its own motion, order that the actions be consolidated for trial.” Connecticut Practice Book §9-5(a) (emphases added). Plaintiffs maintain that they had made clear their desire to have the cases consolidated preparatory to seeking the consolidation action’s placement on the “Connecticut’s Complex Litigation Docket (‘CLD’)” (Bacher brief on appeal at 1). But while §23-13 of the Connecticut Practice Book states that a case may be placed on the CLD and assigned “to a single judge for pretrial, trial, or both,” plaintiffs did not refer to this section; and I do not see that plaintiffs’ references to the CLD contained any suggestion that they desired CLD placement only for pretrial proceedings. Nor does it appear that such fragmentation of a case on the CLD would be the norm. The very first section of the State’s official description as to how the CLD works states that when a case is placed on the CLD, [a]n individual calendar method of case management will be employed; that is, an individual judge will preside over all aspects of the litigation, including trial. State of Connecticut, Facts About the Judicial Branch Complex Litigation Docket at 1 (emphases added). In sum, without stating that they sought consolidated proceedings only for the pretrial stage, plaintiffs moved for consolidation under a section that refers only to consolidation “for trial”; and they did so avowedly in order to seek the consolidation action’s placement on the CLD, in which an individual judge presides over “all aspects of the litigation, including trial.” In my view, the district court clearly erred in finding that plaintiffs proposed consolidation only for pretrial proceedings and “did not propose consolidation for a joint trial.”