DECISION AND ORDER Chandiana Jean stands charged, inter alia, with Manslaughter in the Second Degree, Reckless Driving, Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle, and has moved to controvert the search warrant issued on June 6, 2023, by the Honorable Jane C. Tully, A.J.S.C. This search warrant authorized, inter alia, the seizure and search of the vehicle’s crash data recorder (commonly known as a “black box”) and any other digital devices found in a white 2003 Chevy Impala, purportedly operated by Jean at the time of the accident at issue. The People oppose the motion in its entirety and have submitted the search warrant application and the sworn testimony of Detective Curt Cunningham for this Court’s review. The foregoing material demonstrates that on May 28, 2023, Jean approached the intersection of New Lots Avenue and Essex Street, at roughly 8:30 PM, in a white 2003 Chevy Impala. Det. Cunningham attested that he observed Jean, via surveillance video, closely following a 2021 Toyota Sienna minivan. Although the Toyota Sienna stopped at the stop sign at New Lots Avenue and Essex Street, Jean’s Chevy Impala did not. The Chevy Impala collided into the rear of the Toyota Sienna with such force that the Toyota Sienna was thrust into the intersection, whereupon the Toyota Sienna collided into a passing 2006 Ford SUV. After this chain-reaction accident, Jean’s white Chevy Impala proceeded to pass the stop sign at New Lots and Essex and collided again into a bus operated by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”). Jean’s vehicle, along with the MTA bus and the Toyota Sienna, were all carrying numerous passengers. Jean’s vehicle was immediately impounded by the NYPD and she was placed under arrest. When reviewing the issuance of the search warrant, “a presumption of validity attache[s] to the warrant given that a Magistrate had already reviewed the purported basis for the search and determined it to be valid[.]” People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578, 585 (1992). Here, Justice Tully reviewed the search warrant application and found the detective’s sworn statements reliable in accordance with CPL §690.40(1). See also People v. Taylor, 73 N.Y.2d 683 (1989). Upon reviewing the record before this Court and considering the strong policy considerations favoring the use of search warrants, the Court finds that the search warrant was based on probable cause. See Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d at 578. Jean argues that the warrant was not supported by sufficient factual allegations to establish probable cause that evidence of the specified offense would be found. “To establish probable cause, a search warrant application must provide sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place.” People v. German, 251 A.D.2d 900, 901 (App. Div. 3d Dept 1998). The Court of Appeals has held that “as long as the evidence creates substantial probability that the seizable property will be on the premises when searched, the warrant should be sustained.” People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 259 (1972). Here, the search warrant application and Justice Tully both indicate that the “black box” and other items contained within the subject vehicle (such as any registration or licensing paperwork) are evidence relevant to the charges of Reckless Driving and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle. Not only would these items demonstrate operation of the motor vehicle, which is relevant to both offenses, but they are also reasonably expected to be found inside of a vehicle. Jean also argues that the warrant lacked particularity and that it was necessary for the warrant to include various “protocols.” “Sufficiently particularized warrants (a) identify the specific offenses for which the police have established probable cause, (b) describe the places to be searched, and (c) specify the items to be seized by their relation to the designated crimes.” People v. Gaynor, 82 Misc.3d 422, 426 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2023) (Hecht, J.). The search warrant at issue was sufficiently particularized insofar as it identified the offense for which the People had probable cause (Reckless Driving and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle), the places to be searched (the white 2003 Chevy Impala), and the items to be seized in relation to the crime (the “black box” or any documents pertaining to ownership or registration inside of the impounded vehicle). Each element is plainly and clearly identified in the search warrant application as being necessary and relevant to the ongoing investigation into the collisions. Next, Jean also argues that the court did not have the requisite authority to issue the search warrant as an Acting Supreme Court Justice. However, a search warrant may be issued by “a local criminal court,” which includes a “supreme court justice sitting as a local criminal court.” CPL §§690.05(1), 10.10(3)(f). The Court of Appeals has held that a supreme court justice is authorized to issue a search warrant when “exercising preliminary — not trial — jurisdiction of the local criminal court.” People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 569 (1985), rev’d on other grounds 475 U.S. 868 (1986). See also People v. Carson, 216 A.D.2d 965, 965 (4th Dept. 1995) (“Local criminal courts have preliminary jurisdiction of all offenses [CPL §10.30(2)]. The issuance of a search warrant involves the exercise of preliminary jurisdiction.”). The fact that the warrant was signed by Justice Tully as an Acting Supreme Court Justice is irrelevant; Justice Tully was authorized to issue the search warrant regardless of whether she was sitting as a Criminal Court Judge or as a Supreme Court Justice, because she “was exercising the preliminary jurisdiction of the local criminal court.” People v. Mayhew, 192 A.D.3d 1391, 1392 (3d Dept. 2021). See also People v. Schoenwandt, 12 Misc. 3d 105 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2006) (acting supreme court justice retained status as a criminal court judge with jurisdiction to preside over criminal court matters). Finally, Jean’s contention that the search warrant was improperly executed more than ten days after its issuance appears to be inaccurate. See CPL §690.30(1). The search warrant was issued on June 6, 2023, and the search and extraction of the crash data recorder occurred six days later was on June 12, 2023. Accordingly, the motion to controvert the search warrant is denied. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: June 17, 2024
