DECISION AND ORDER On May 14, 2024, the People filed a motion to consolidate the above-titled indictments. On May 28, 2024, Anna Quiacain, named on indictment 70480-24, filed her opposition to the People’s motion. On May 30, 2024, Letty Ujpan, who is jointly named on the same indictment as Ms. Quiacain, filed her opposition to the People’s motion. Then, on June 4, 2024, Lucas Quiacain, who is the sole individual named on indictment 70479-24, filed his opposition to the People’s motion. The People move to consolidate these indictments contending that they are comprised of a group of acts so closely related that they constitute integral parts of a single criminal venture. The People further claim that the consolidation of these indictments would serve the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, and that consolidation would not prejudice any of the accused. Anna Quiacain and Letty Ujpan oppose the People’s motion, both arguing that: 1) the People have failed to meet the statutory requirements of consolidation pursuant to CPL §200.40; 2) consolidation would prejudice them at trial; and 3) trying all three individuals together would violate their right to confrontation pursuant to Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Lucas Quiacain also opposes the People’s motion, contending that the motion to consolidate is improperly predicated upon hearsay in violation of CPL §690.35(c) and that, as a result, there is an irreconcilable conflict of facts between all three defendants. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS According to the People, on January 1, 2024, at approximately 3:00 AM, Leonardo Culum, Fatima Culum, Lucas Quiacain, Ana Quiacain, and Letty Ujpan were inside of their shared apartment, located at 5918 Fort Hamilton Parkway, drinking to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Leonardo Culum and Fatima Culum are siblings, as are Lucas Quiacain and Ana Quiacain. At the time of the incident, Fatima Culum and Lucas Quiacain were in an intimate relationship. After a verbal altercation of unknown substance, Lucas is alleged to have retrieved a knife and stabbed Leonardo Culum in the face. His sister, Fatima Culum, is alleged to have attempted to record the incident on her phone and to provide aid to Leonardo; however, the People contend that Ana Quiacain took possession of the phone in order to impede Fatima Culum from calling 911. Then, Ana Quiacain is alleged to have given Fatima Culum’s cell phone to Letty Ujpan, who further impeded Fatima Culum from calling for aid. In the exchange, Fatima Culum allegedly took Letty Ujpan’s phone from a table and threatened to break it if her phone was not returned. Eventually, Fatima Culum and Letty Ujpan are alleged to have exchanged phones and a 911 call was placed, though who placed that call is unclear. EMTs thereafter responded to the scene and transported Leonardo Culum to Maimonides Medical Center, where he was intubated and went into cardiac arrest. After five minutes of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”), Leonardo Culum was stabilized. For the alleged stabbing of Leonardo Culum, Lucas Quiacain was indicted for, inter alia, Assault in the First Degree, PL §120.10. Due to their alleged interference with Fatima Culum’s ability to call 911 for Leonardo Culum, Ana Quiacain and Letty Ujpan were jointly indicted for a single count of Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree, PL §145.00(4). DISCUSSION The decision on whether to grant consolidation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174 (1989). In deciding such a motion, the Court must weigh the public policy favoring joinder, “because it expedites the judicial process, reduces court congestion, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses,” against a claim of undue prejudice to a defendant. Id. at 183. A court should ordinarily grant consolidation unless it “appear[s] that a joint trial necessarily will…result in unfair prejudice [to the defendant] and substantially impair his defense.” Id. at 184 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “where the proof against the defendants is supplied by the same evidence, only the most cogent reasons warrant a severance.” Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d at 183 (citing People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 87 (1973). Indictments for multiple defendants, as here, may be joined for trial when based upon the same act or criminal transaction. See CPL §200.40(1)(c) and (2). Pursuant to CPL §40.10(2)(a), a “criminal transaction” is defined as “conduct which establishes at least one offense and which is comprised of two or more group acts…so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal incident.” Such incidents, which are “so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstances of commission as to constitute a single criminal incident” are properly joinable. People v. Castillo, 178 A.D.2d 113, 115 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1991); see CPL §200.40(1)(c). Here, the offenses listed on both indictments occurred on the same date, at the same location, and at one time. Moreover, the facts of both cases are inextricably linked. But for Lucas Quiacain’s purported assault on Leonardo Culum, Ana Quiacain and Letty Ujpan’s alleged attempts at concealing the act would never have occurred. Further, based upon the facts presented by the People, a trial of Lucas Quiacain would necessitate the eliciting of testimony and other evidence that would be essentially duplicated during a trial for Ana Quiacain and Letty Ujpan. Accordingly, the Court finds that the People have made out that these cases arose from a single criminal incident and that they are properly joinable pursuant to CPL §200.40 The Court also rejects the notion that the consolidation of both indictments unfairly prejudices the accused in this case. Although Lucas Quiacain faces more serious charges than Ana Quiacain and Letty Ujpan, the trial court will mitigate prejudice by instructing a jury that it must consider the charges separately as to each individual, and “a jury is assumed to follow the instructions of the court.” People v. Stone, 29 N.Y.3d 166 (2017); see also People v. Manuel Griffin, 135 A.D.2d 730, 730-31 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1987) (“[O]nce the trial court made the decision to join the indictments, it took every precaution to avoid prejudice to the defendant by specifically instructing the jury on several occasions that the subsequent jewelry robbery did not involve the defendant Griffin”). The Court does, however, note valid concerns from both Ana Quiacain and Letty Ujpan about possible confrontation clause issues given the unique posture of this case. The People have filed the instant motion to consolidate prior to serving all discovery and a Certificate of Compliance, and the Notice and Disclosure Form only refers defense counsels to review body-worn camera for the contents of any statements made by either Ana or Letty to be used at trial. Accordingly, the specific content of either individual’s statements is not presently available to this Court and a possible Bruton issue is entirely prospective. “Customarily, when a court is presented with a Bruton problem because of inculpatory out-of-court statements by one or both codefendants, it has the option of (1) deleting references to the codefendant in the statement, (2) seeking the consent of the People to a joint trial without the evidence or (3) ordering separate trials.” See People v. Ricardo B.,73 N.Y.2d 228, 234 (1989). Where a statement cannot be effectively redacted and the use of the only other option, a joint trial without the statement or separate trials, would result in serious prejudice to the People, the use of multiple juries, which at their root is a modified form of severance, is an option. Id. at 233-235; see also People v. Singh, 266 A.D.2d 569, 569 (App. Div. 2d Dept 1999). In this case, Ana Quiacain and Letty Ujpan have failed to demonstrate how their defenses conflict with each other’s or Lucas Quiacain’s. Moreover, mere differences in trial strategies are not, standing alone, sufficient cause to deny consolidation where, as here, the provisions of CPL §200.40 would have originally permitted joinder of a single indictment. See People v. Vernace, 2002 WL 39475 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty.). Upon the full service of discovery, however, if it is determined that incriminating statements by one defendant against the other were made, the use of multiple juries is appropriate to address the Bruton issue the defendant raised. See People v. Brockway, 255 A.D.2d 988 (App. Div. 4th Dept 1998) (due to the large volume of evidence common to all defendants, the court properly ordered multiple juries after granting defendant’s motion to sever based upon a potential Bruton problem). Finally, Lucas Quiacain’s contention that the People’s motion violates CPL §690.35(c) is without merit. Pursuant to that section, “allegations of fact may be based upon personal knowledge of the applicant or upon information and belief, provided that in the latter event the sources of such information and the grounds of such belief are stated.” The prosecutor’s affirmation includes a statement that, in his role as the assigned prosecutor, he has knowledge of the facts alleged in the application. This Court will require no more. Accordingly, the motion for consolidation of both indictments is granted. Should it be established that one defendant’s statement implicates another defendant upon the full service of discovery, and the statements cannot be redacted to comport with Bruton, the Court orders the use of multiple juries. Dated: July 18, 2024
