Before: Livingston, Ch.J., Sack, C.J.* In this Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert D. Drain, Bankruptcy Judge) approved a settlement agreement among the trustee of the bankruptcy estate Mark S. Tulis (the “Trustee”), the debtor-in-bankruptcy Mark A. Nordlicht (“Nordlicht”), the non-bankrupt appellees, and Nordlicht’s mother Barbara Nordlicht (who is not a party to this case) (together, the “Settling Parties”). The settlement released claims that appellants Richard and Marisa Stadtmauer (the “Stadtmauers”) had originally asserted in a New York state court action. In that action, the Stadtmauers alleged an elaborate scheme by Mark Nordlicht and the non-bankrupt appellees to conceal Nordlicht’s assets to avoid paying his debts to his creditors. When Nordlicht filed for bankruptcy, the state court proceedings were automatically stayed, and the Trustee took possession of the Stadtmauers’ state court claims in the course of his administration of the bankruptcy estate. In exchange for the release of the Stadtmauers’ claims against all defendants in the state court action, Barbara Nordlicht obligated herself to (1) pay the estate $2.5 million to be distributed to Nordlicht’s creditors; (2) indemnify that $2.5 million payment in the event the Stadtmauers successfully established priority-creditor status; and (3) reimburse the estate for its legal fees arising from defending against the Stadtmauers’ continued prosecution of their state court claims. The Stadtmauers objected to the settlement and, after the bankruptcy court approved it, appealed the decision to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge). Key to their appeal, the Stadtmauers maintained that the state court had granted them valid liens on two of Nordlicht’s real estate holdings. These liens, they argued, gave them secured property rights to enforce if they prevailed on their fraudulent-conveyance claims in state court. Based on that theory, the Stadtmauers contended, inter alia, that (1) the Trustee lacked the authority to settle the Stadtmauers’ claims; (2) settling those claims over their objection violated both due process and basic bankruptcy principles of creditor priority as articulated in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451 (2017); and (3) the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in approving the settlement. The district court rejected all these arguments and affirmed the approval of the settlement agreement. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the district court, and therefore AFFIRM. ROBERT SACK, C.J. In this Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert D. Drain, Bankruptcy Judge) approved a settlement agreement among the trustee of the bankruptcy estate Mark S. Tulis (the “Trustee”), the debtor-in-bankruptcy Mark A. Nordlicht (“Nordlicht”), the non-bankrupt appellees, and Nordlicht’s mother Barbara Nordlicht (who is not a party to this case) (together, the “Settling Parties”). The settlement released claims that appellants Richard and Marisa Stadtmauer (the “Stadtmauers”) had originally asserted against Mark Nordlicht and the non-bankrupt appellees — various individuals and corporate entities affiliated with Nordlicht — in a New York state court action. In that action, the Stadtmauers brought claims for actual fraudulent conveyance, constructive fraudulent conveyance, and “reverse veil-piercing” by alleging that Nordlicht, his wife, and a web of shell companies had schemed to conceal Nordlicht’s assets from his creditors to avoid paying his debts. Central to this appeal, the Stadtmauers also requested and obtained attachment orders against two of Nordlicht’s real estate holdings in satisfaction of the amounts owed to them. When Nordlicht filed for bankruptcy, the state court proceedings were automatically stayed, and the Trustee took possession of the Stadtmauers’ claims in the course of his administration of the bankruptcy estate. In exchange for the release of the Stadtmauers’ claims against all named and prospective defendants in the state court action, Barbara Nordlicht obligated herself to (1) pay the estate $2.5 million to be distributed to Nordlicht’s creditors; (2) indemnify and hold harmless the estate to the extent that Barbara Nordlicht would pay an additional $2.5 million in the event that the Stadtmauers successfully established priority-creditor status; and (3) reimburse the estate for its legal fees arising from defending against the Stadtmauers’ continued pursuing their state court claims. The Stadtmauers objected to the settlement and, after the bankruptcy court approved it, appealed the decision to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge). Crucially, the Stadtmauers maintained that the state court’s grant of an attachment on two of Nordlicht’s real estate holdings had given the Stadtmauers valid judicial liens. These liens, they argued, gave them secured property rights to enforce if they prevailed on their fraudulent-conveyance claims in state court. Based on that theory, the Stadtmauers contended, inter alia, that (1) the Trustee lacked the authority to settle the Stadtmauers’ claims; (2) settling those claims over their objection deprived them of due process as well as violated basic bankruptcy principles of creditor priority as articulated in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451 (2017); and (3) the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion in approving the settlement. The district court rejected all these arguments and affirmed the approval of the settlement agreement. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the district court, and affirm its judgment. BACKGROUND I. The Original Dispute Appellee Mark A. Nordlicht (“Nordlicht”), the debtor in the underlying Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, founded and managed Platinum Management (NY) LLC, the general partner and investment advisor to a set of hedge funds named collectively, Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund LLP (“PPVA”). Appellants Richard and Marisa Stadtmauer (the “Stadtmauers”) were investors in PPVA. In early 2016, Richard Stadtmauer requested that PPVA pay out their interest in PPVA. Lacking sufficient liquidity at the time, PPVA instead issued the Stadtmauers two promissory notes on May 27, 2016, personally guaranteed by Nordlicht. PPVA defaulted on the notes, but Nordlicht refused to honor the guaranty. The Stadtmauers initiated an arbitral proceeding to enforce Nordlicht’s obligation, and on January 10, 2020, won a final award of $14,896,316.16. Four days later, the Stadtmauers filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cathy Seibel, Judge) seeking to confirm the arbitral award. See Stadtmauer et al. v. Nordlicht, 20 Civ. 347 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020). Nordlicht opposed the motion to confirm and cross-moved to vacate the award. II. The State Court Action On February 5, 2020, with the motion to confirm the arbitral award still pending, the Stadtmauers filed an action in New York state court (the “State Court Action”) to collect on the award and thus satisfy Nordlicht’s alleged debt to them. See, e.g., App’x at 48 (State Compl. 82) (alleging that “[p]laintiffs are entitled to a money judgment against defendant Mark Nordlicht” in light of their final arbitration award “in the amount of $14,896,316.16″). The case was assigned to the Honorable Linda S. Jamieson (Justice). Beyond Nordlicht’s approximately $15 million debt to the Stadtmauers, the complaint in the State Court Action (the “State Complaint”) alleged a sprawling scheme by which “Nordlicht and [his wife Dahlia] Kalter” had “transfer[red] tens of millions of dollars [in] assets to offshore trusts, LLCs, and other shell companies…, over which Mr. Nordlicht exercise[d] dominance and control but disclaims legal ownership.” App’x at 30 (State Compl. 4). These transfers, the Stadtmauers alleged, “were intended to make Mr. Nordlicht judgment[-]proof,” App’x at 35 (State Compl. 30) against not only the Stadtmauers, but against all his creditors, see, e.g., id. (alleging intent to make Nordlicht judgment proof and thereby “defraud Mr. Nordlicht’s creditors, including [the Stadtmauers].”). In accordance with their theory, the Stadtmauers pleaded four counts in state court under New York state law: (1) actual fraudulent conveyance, (2) constructive fraudulent conveyance, (3) “reverse veil piercing” against the business entities named as defendants, App’x at 47, and (4) as interim relief, requests for ex parte prejudgment orders of attachment1 against two pieces of real estate allegedly owned by Nordlicht, but held in the name of his wife Dahlia Kalter (together, the “State Causes of Action”). The two properties were an apartment unit located at 535 West End Avenue, New York, NY (the “535 W.E.A. property”), and a property located at 245 Trenor Drive, New Rochelle, NY (the “Trenor Drive property”) (together, the “Properties”). On February 5, 2020, the state court issued an order to show cause why the ex parte motion should not be granted. The Stadtmauers moved to confirm it on February 7, 2020. On February 14, 2020, the Stadtmauers filed a notice of attachment on real property as to the 535 W.E.A. property on the state court docket, and on February 18, 2020, an analogous notice of attachment on real property as to the Trenor Drive property. The parties dispute whether the Stadtmauers effected legally adequate service of those notices on Nordlicht. On May 22, 2020, the state court confirmed the attachment order against the Properties. On June 25, 2020, the Stadtmauers filed for leave to amend the State Complaint, seeking to add more named defendants to the alleged scheme. III. The Bankruptcy Proceedings A. Initial Stages Days later, on June 29, 2020, Nordlicht filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, the State Court Action was stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. §362(a).2 Notice of removal of the State Court Action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1452(a) was filed on July 29, 2020. On July 31, 2020, the State Court Action was referred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert D. Drain, Bankruptcy Judge), and designated as an adversary proceeding. On July 6, 2020, Mark S. Tulis was named as the interim trustee of the bankruptcy estate, and then became its permanent trustee (the “Trustee”) by operation of law. “A trustee has the statutory duty to protect and preserve property of the estate for the purpose of maximizing a distribution to creditors…. A trustee also owes a fiduciary duty to each creditor of the estate.” In re Ngan Gung Rest., 254 B.R. 566, 570 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985))). On October 23, 2020, the Stadtmauers filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court against the bankruptcy estate, claiming a “secured” interest in $14,896,316.16, the amount of their arbitral award against Nordlicht. Supp. App’x at 163.3 The Stadtmauers maintained that their interest was secured and perfected because a “[s]heriff’s levy pursuant to [an] order of attachment” in the State Court Action, id., had endowed them with “judicial liens” on the 535 W.E.A. and 245 Trenor Drive properties, e.g., App’x at 90-92. The validity of those purported liens would soon become a central issue to the bankruptcy litigation. Meanwhile, the Trustee, exercising his “‘strong arm’ power,” Cumberland Oil Corp. v. Thropp, 791 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d Cir. 1986), granted him by the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §544, negotiated with the defendants in the State Court Action, the additional defendants the Stadtmauers had sought to add, and non-party Barbara Nordlicht (the “Settling Parties”) to settle all claims that could be asserted on behalf of debtor Nordlicht’s bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. §105(a), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 9019. This included the Stadtmauers’ causes of action for actual and constructive fraudulent conveyance, alter ego liability, and any property rights possibly created by an order of attachment awarded to the Stadtmauers in the State Court Action.4 The Trustee and the Settling Parties initially agreed to settle all claims the estate could assert against the Settling Parties in exchange for a payment of $1.5 million to the estate. On November 6, 2020, the Trustee moved the bankruptcy court to approve the settlement on the ground that, in his business judgment, the settlement was “fair and equitable and in the best interest of the [bankruptcy] estate in accordance with Bankruptcy Code §105(a) and Bankruptcy Rules 2002(a)(3) and 9019(a).” App’x at 76 21. Bidding War Over the Stadtmauers’ Claims A bidding war ensued. On January 6, 2021, the Stadtmauers objected to the proposed $1.5 million settlement and counter-offered $2 million to the bankruptcy estate in exchange for ownership of the claims the Trustee could assert on behalf of the estate. In effect, the Stadtmauers sought to repurchase the right to litigate their State Causes of Action that the Trustee had taken over. In addition, the Stadtmauers offered not to assert the liens they claimed to hold against the Properties against the $2 million paid to the estate. The Trustee agreed that the Stadtmauers’ $2 million offer was superior because (1) it exceeded the initial $1.5 million to be distributed to the creditors by $500,000, and (2) unlike the prior offer from the Settling Parties, it relieved the bankruptcy estate of the cost and risk of having to defend against the Stadtmauers’ assertion of their purported liens against the estate’s settlement proceeds. The Trustee moved in the bankruptcy court to approve the Stadtmauers’ $2 million offer instead of the earlier $1.5 million offer, subject to yet better offers. The Settling Parties submitted their own objection and counteroffer on March 10, 2021. At a hearing held on March 11, 2021, the bankruptcy court found that the Stadtmauers’ “$2 million proposal[]…[was] clearly superior” to both “the original proposal” for $1.5 million and the Settling Parties’ March 10 counter-offer. Supp. App’x at 98:13-16. On March 30, 2021, the Trustee therefore filed a motion seeking approval of the Stadtmauers’ $2 million offer, again subject to better offers. The bankruptcy court scheduled, for April 23, 2021, a hearing pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable statutes and rules. Until that date, the Trustee would entertain competing offers, and at the hearing itself, the court would open the floor for bidding.5 B. The April 22 Offer and the April 23, 2021 Sale Hearing On April 22, 2021, the Settling Parties submitted a new offer (the “April 22 Offer”). Under its terms, Barbara Nordlicht — who was neither a named nor proposed defendant in the State Court Action — would (1) pay $2.5 million to the bankruptcy estate to be distributed to the estate’s creditors; (2) reimburse the estate for any costs arising from defending against the Stadtmauers’ claims related to their asserted liens; and (3) fully indemnify and hold harmless the estate to the extent that Barbara Nordlicht would pay an additional $2.5 million to the estate in the event that the Stadtmauers prevailed on their State Causes of Action and collected on any portion of the $2.5 million as higher-priority creditors. The next day, April 23, 2021, the bankruptcy court held its hearing pursuant to Sections 363(b) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Code to consider which of the existing offers to approve, and to entertain possible bids for yet better offers (the “Sale Hearing”). The Trustee represented to the bankruptcy court that, in his business judgment, the April 22 Offer was superior to all other existing offers and “in the best interest of the [bankruptcy] estate.” App’x at 261:20-21. After colloquies with the parties, Bankruptcy Judge Drain opened the floor for bidding, specifically asking the Stadtmauers’ counsel whether he was prepared to make a “higher and better [offer] than the April 22 proposal.” Id. at 268:7. The Stadtmauers’ counsel declined, responding that “the Stadtmauers rest on their current offer.” Id. at 268:10-11. Judge Drain emphasized that “[n]ow is the time to make, if one is prepared to make, a higher and better offer than the April 22 offer,” id. at 268:18-20, that absent bidding, “the only proposals to be considered [would be] the [Stadtmauers' $2 million offer] and the April 22 [Offer],” id. at 269:4-6, and that “there won’t be an opportunity for additional bidding,” id. at 269:7-8. The Stadtmauers’ counsel again stood by its existing $2 million offer. Instead, counsel opposed the approval of the April 22 Offer on the basis that the Trustee lacked the authority to reduce that offer to a settlement because it would dispose of the Stadtmauers’ perfected judicial liens on the 535 W.E.A. property and the Trenor Drive property — liens that were the Stadtmauers’ property, and thus beyond the reach of the Trustee’s strong-arm power. The bankruptcy court disagreed. It reasoned that the Stadtmauers’ purported judicial liens on the Properties were in “bona fide dispute,” which did authorize the Trustee to settle the Stadtmauers’ claims “free and clear of any interest” encumbering those claims pursuant to Section 363(f)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 303:14-19 (quoting and discussing 11 U.S.C. §363(f)(4)). Indeed, the Stadtmauers’ counsel admitted at the hearing that “[w]e all know the lien is in dispute.” Id. at 290:1-2. The bankruptcy court therefore agreed with the Trustee that the April 22 Offer was in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate, approved the offer, and directed the Trustee to file a proposed settlement order reflecting its terms. In reaching that conclusion, the bankruptcy court On June 2, 2021, the bankruptcy court entered an order (the “Sale Order”) approving a purchase and assignment agreement (the “Settlement”) that reflected the terms of the April 22 Offer. IV. The Stadtmauers’ Appeals to the District Court and this Court The Stadtmauers challenged the Settlement by appealing to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, raising five issues: (1) whether the bankruptcy court erroneously concluded that the Trustee had the authority to settle and sell the State Causes of Action (including the attachments); (2) whether the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Settlement effectively reduced the Stadtmauers’ claims, secured by their purported liens, to unsecured claims, and thus violated basic principles of creditor priority as articulated in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451 (2017); (3) whether the bankruptcy court, in approving the April 22 Offer, abused its discretion by failing to follow the proper procedure and the factors set forth in In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007); (4) whether the bankruptcy court had erred in finding the April 22 Offer to be superior to the Stadtmauers’ $2 million offer; and (5) whether the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Settlement deprived the Stadtmauers of their property rights in violation of their constitutional right to due process. On May 19, 2022, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s Sale Order, reasoning as follows: First, the Trustee had the authority to settle the Stadtmauers’ fraudulent-conveyance and alter-ego claims because those claims sought to recover assets from the debtor that were wrongfully taken from the estate by a scheme that injured all prospective creditors equally. Such claims were quintessentially property of the estate, and thus within the Trustee’s authority to settle. The attachments, too, were property of the estate because they were contingent on and non-divorceable from the fraudulent-conveyance and alter-ego claims. Second, the Settlement did not violate Jevic because the bona fide dispute over validity of their judicial liens defeated the notion that their claims were in fact secured. Third, the district court saw no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court’s assessment of the Iridium factors, especially in light of the fact that a bankruptcy court ought merely “to canvass the issues and see whether the settlement ‘falls below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness.’” Spec. App’x at 35 (quoting In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983) (further citation omitted)). Fourth, the bankruptcy court had not committed any error of law or clear error of fact in finding that the April 22 Offer was better than the Stadtmauers’ previous $2 million offer, and that in any event any error leading to that conclusion was harmless because the April 22 Offer was in fact better. The district court therefore affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Settlement reflecting the terms of the April 22 Offer.6 The Stadtmauers appealed to this Court, raising the same issues as they did in the district court. For substantially similar reasons given by the district court, we affirm. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because “[b]ankruptcy court decisions are subject to appellate review in the first instance by the district court,…. we engage in plenary, or de novo, review of the district court decision.” In re Anderson, 884 F.3d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Credit One Bank, N.A. v. Anderson, 139 S. Ct. 144 (2018). “We thus apply the same standard of review that the [d]istrict [c]ourt employed, reviewing the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error[,]…its legal determinations de novo[,] [and its] discretionary rulings…for abuse of discretion.” In re Tingling, 990 F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when its decision “rest[s] on an error of law[,]…or a clearly erroneous factual finding,” or “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” In re Aquatic Dev. Grp., Inc., 352 F.3d 671, 678 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant here, we review for abuse of discretion a bankruptcy court’s approval of a sale of assets or claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363, see In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he bankruptcy court’s approval of the [section-363] Sale was no abuse of discretion.”), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010), and “the reasonableness of [the bankruptcy] court’s application of [Bankruptcy Rule 9019] in approving [a s]ettlement,” In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 461 n.13 (citation omitted). We review de novo the legal questions whether the Settlement comported with Jevic and due process. DISCUSSION I. The Trustee’s Authority to Settle the Stadtmauers’ Legal Claims at the Section 363 Sale Hearing We turn first to the Stadtmauers’ argument that the bankruptcy court erred in approving the Trustee’s sale and settlement of the Stadtmauers’ State Causes of Action in accordance with the April 22 Offer at the Sale Hearing held pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§363(b) and (f). A. Background Principles and Legal Framework “In [a] Chapter 7 [bankruptcy proceeding], a trustee liquidates the debtor’s assets and distributes them to creditors.” Jevic, 580 U.S. at 455. “A trustee is the legal representative and fiduciary of the [bankruptcy] estate,” and therefore “must represent all creditors without partiality.” In re AFI Holding, Inc., 355 B.R. 139, 147 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff’d and adopted, 530 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2008). The Bankruptcy Code grants a trustee certain “‘strong arm’ power[s]” to meet those obligations. Cumberland, 791 F.2d at 1042. Relevant here, section 363(b)(1) provides that “ [t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. §363(b)(1). As is apparent from the statute, the trustee can only “use, sell, or lease” what is indeed “property of the estate.” The parties disagree whether the “property of the estate” includes the causes of action pleaded by the Stadtmauers in the State Court Action (i.e. actual fraudulent conveyance, constructive fraudulent conveyance, “reverse veil-piercing,” and attachment of property to aid collection on those claims) and settled by the Trustee at the April 23, 2021 Sale Hearing held pursuant to section 363(b) and (f). A claim constitutes “property” of the bankruptcy estate if it falls within the scope of Bankruptcy Code §541(a). See Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp. (“Kalb”), 8 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1993). Section 541(a) provides that property of the bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case,” “wherever [the property is] located and by whomever [it is] held.” 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(1). We have interpreted this definition broadly. “[E]very conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative, and derivative, is within the reach of §541,” and is therefore property of the estate. Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A creditor’s legal claim asserted against the debtor or a third party to the bankruptcy, too, is property of the estate if “[the claim's] outcome might have any ‘conceivable effect’ on the bankruptcy estate.” In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC, 740 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A “central purpose…of extending bankruptcy jurisdiction to actions against certain third parties[ and] suits against debtors themselves[] is to protect the assets of the estate [and] to ensure a fair distribution of those assets at a later point in time.” In re Quigley Co., 676 F.3d 45, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations adopted, internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Cumberland, 791 F.2d at 1042 (“Making the pursuit of certain causes of action the sole responsibility of the trustee in bankruptcy furthers the fundamental bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution among creditors. It allows the trustee to exercise the ‘strong arm’ power and recover corporate assets for the benefit of all creditors of the corporation.” (internal citation omitted)). However, not all claims asserted by a creditor are “property of the estate.” Only “general” claims are; “personal” claims are not. General claims “arise[] from [the] harm done to the estate,” In re Tronox Inc., 855 F.3d 84, 100 (2d Cir. 2017) (first alteration in original), and thus “could be brought by any creditor,” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc. (“St. Paul”), 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989).7 General claims are “property of the estate,” id. at 701, because they “inure[] to the benefit of all creditors” by enlarging the estate, In re Emoral, Inc., 740 F.3d 875, 879 (3d Cir. 2014), thereby making “the trustee…the proper person to assert the claim,” St. Paul, 884 F.2d at 701. “[T]he creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee’s action.” Id. Personal claims, on the other hand, are ” claim[s] for injury that [are] particular[]” to the creditor, In re Tronox, 855 F.3d at 99, and in which “ other creditors generally have no interest,” In re Emoral, 740 F.3d at 879 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters Loc. 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 2002)).8 Personal claims therefore are in the “legal or equitable interest only of the creditor.” Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters Loc. 863, 296 F.3d at 170. Creditors “are exclusively entitled to pursue [personal] claim[s], and the bankruptcy trustee is precluded from doing so.” Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995). “The distinction between general and personal claims promotes the orderly distribution of assets in bankruptcy by funneling all asset-recovery litigation through a single plaintiff: the trustee.” In re Wilton Armetale, Inc., 968 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In distinguishing [general] claims from [personal] claims…, labels are not conclusive, since plaintiffs often try, but are not permitted, to plead around a bankruptcy.” In re Tronox, 855 F.3d at 100 (citation omitted). Instead, “we inquire into the factual origins of the injury and, more importantly, into the nature of the legal claims asserted.” Id. (internal quotation m arks and citation omitted). For this analysis, we look to the state law applicable to each claim. Kalb, 8 F.3d at 132. B. Actual and Constructive Fraudulent-Conveyance Claims With this framework in place, we must now consider whether the Trustee had the authority to settle the actual and constructive fraudulent-conveyance claims asserted by the Stadtmauers against the defendants in the State Court Action (including debtor-in-bankruptcy Nordlicht). We conclude that the Trustee did have that authority. “Fraudulent[ t]ransfer [claims] are easy: they are the paradigmatic example of claims general to all creditors,” In re Tronox, 855 F.3d at 106, because “[e]very creditor has a similar claim for the diversion of assets of the debtor’s estate,” id. at 103. This general observation is borne out by the Stadtmauers’ allegations in the State Court Action. The actual and constructive fraudulent-conveyance claims, evaluated under New York state law, see Kalb, 8 F.3d at 132, are not based on any allegations of a harm, injury, or theory of liability that is unique to the Stadtmauers. Instead, the State Complaint alleges a sophisticated “scheme to defraud Mr. Nordlicht’s creditors, including Plaintiffs [i.e., the Stadtmauers],” App’x at 35 (Compl. 30) (emphasis added), by transferring Nordlicht’s assets to “shell companies” created to obscure that Nordlicht was the true owner of those assets. The State Complaint further alleges that “the Shell Companies have been used to defraud Mr. Nordlicht’s creditors, including Plaintiffs,” id. at 36 (Compl. 34) (emphasis added); that “Nordlicht caused the Shell Companies to make [certain conveyances] with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiffs and other creditors,” id. at 45 (Compl. 62) (emphasis added); and that Nordlicht “knew or should have known that these conveyances would hinder creditors such as Plaintiffs,” id. (Compl. 62) (emphasis added).9 The “factual origins of th[is] injury,” In re Tronox, 855 F.3d at 100 (citation omitted), are, by their “nature,” id., general to all creditors. If proven, this fraudulent-conveyance scheme wronged every creditor, as Nordlicht’s alienation of his assets into a web of independent shell companies necessarily removed recoverable assets for every creditor. See In re Wilton Armetale, 968 F.3d at 282 (“Claims alleging that third parties wrongfully depleted the debtor’s assets are general…because every creditor has a similar claim for the diversion of assets of the debtor’s estate.” (alterations adopted, internal q uotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the Stadtmauers’ claims of actual and constructive fraudulent conveyance are general claims, and therefore were “property of the estate” and within the Trustee’s authority to settle. C. Alter Ego (“Reverse Veil-Piercing”) Theory of Liability We next consider whether the Stadtmauers’ alter ego, or “reverse veil-piercing,” claim is general or personal.10 We again conclude that it is general, and therefore within the Trustee’s authority to settle. We also consider the Stadtmauers’ contention that alter-ego theories of liability are not claims under New York state law at all (and therefore beyond the Trustee’s authority to settle because he can only settle general claims), but remedies. We reject that notion as baseless. 1. New York law and the Stadtmauers’ relevant allegations. Looking to New York state law, see Kalb, 8 F.3d at 132, we see that it recognizes “reverse” veil-piercing theories,11 which “entail[] an effort to hold a corporation liable for the debts of its owners,” State v. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (emphasis in original); see also Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro v. Kane, 773 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the owner exercised “complete domination” over the corporate entity with respect to the transactions at issue; and (2) “such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong” that injured the party seeking to pierce the veil. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 908.12 To satisfy that standard, the Stadtmauers alleged that Nordlicht “strategically placed substantially all of his assets under the names of his wife [Dahlia Kalter], various LLCs, trusts, overseas entities and other shell entities, which allow[s] him to continue exercising de facto control and ownership over those assets while claiming that they are beyond the reach of his creditors.” App’x at 29 (Compl. 1). “Nordlicht dominated each of the Shell Companies,” the complaint continues, either by virtue of being “the sole corporate officer,” or by exercising “effective control over the corporate officers.” Id. at 47 (Compl. 77). Moreover, “the Shell Companies failed to observe corporate formalities and were established to conceal a nd protect Mr. Nordlicht’s assets from his creditors.” Id. (Compl. 76).13 2. The Stadtmauers’ reverse veil-piercing claim is general. The Stadtmauers’ reverse veil-piercing claim is a general claim under New York law. As we observed in Tronox, “claims based on allegations…[of] a general failure to adhere to corporate formalities and abuse of the corporate form,” 855 F.3d at 106 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), “qualify as ‘general’ claims,” id. at 104, if they are “capable of increasing the basket of assets that could be used to satisfy any and all liabilities owed by the…debtor[],”id. at 106 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is the case here. The State Complaint repeatedly alleges that Nordlicht’s web of shell companies defrauded not just the Stadtmauers, but all of his creditors and business partners. For example, the Complaint states that “[t]hough the [shell companies] were typically ‘owned’ in the name of Mr. Nordlicht’s wife, [Nordlicht] was deeply involved in managing and controlling them,” and used those companies to “operate as a fraud against his creditors and others doing business with him by positioning him as a de facto owner of assets for which he would disclaim control whenever it suited him.” App’x at 36 (Compl. 32) (emphasis added). The Complaint reiterates that “[t]he Shell Companies…. do not observe corporate formalities.…[and] have been used to defraud Mr. Nordlicht’s creditors, including Plaintiffs.” Id. (Compl.
