OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART POST-TRIAL MOTIONS Plaintiff Emily Penzo sued her former employer, Defendant Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., alleging that Defendant discriminated and retaliated against her based on her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), and that Defendant retaliated against her and interfered with her benefits in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Following a four-day trial at which nine witnesses testified and sixty-six exhibits were received in evidence, a jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on a single claim of retaliation in violation of the NYCHRL, and awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages in the form of back pay in the amount of $203,951.35. [ECF No. 173 ("Special Verdict Form")]. The jury found for Defendant on Plaintiff’s remaining seven claims. Special Verdict Form. Thereafter, the Court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of the jury’s award, plus pre-judgment interest in the amount of $31,078.83, pursuant to the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”), and post-judgment interest accruing from the date of judgment to payment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1961. [ECF No. 178 ("Judgment")]. Before the Court are post-trial motions of both parties. Plaintiff moves for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).1 [ECF Nos. 188, 189, 195 ("Pl. Mem.")]. Defendant opposed, and Plaintiff filed a reply. [ECF Nos. 207, 224 ("Pl. Reply")]. In further support of either her own motion or her opposition to Defendant’s motion, and without leave of Court, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply.2 [ECF No. 225 ("Pl. Sur-reply")]. Defendant renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) or, in the alternative, moves for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a). [ECF Nos. 191, 192 ("Def. Mem.")]. Plaintiff opposed, and Defendant filed a reply. [ECF Nos. 214, 215, 221 ("Def. Reply")]. The parties each request oral argument in connection with their motions and oppositions. [ECF Nos. 195, 213, 215, 222]. Defendant also moves, unopposed, for leave to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply and the excess pages of Plaintiff’s reply brief. [ECF No. 226 ("Def. Mot. Strike")]. Defendant also requests a pre-motion conference for leave to file a Rule 11 motion for sanctions against Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, which Plaintiff opposed. [ECF Nos. 223 ("Def. R. 11 Ltr."), 227]. The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background, procedural history, and trial transcript [ECF Nos. 179, 181, 183, 185 (together, "Tr.")] in this case. This Order sets forth only those facts necessary to contextualize the Court’s rulings on the present motions. For the reasons explained below, the parties’ motions are DENIED with the exception of Defendant’s request for leave to file a Rule 11 motion, which is GRANTED. LEGAL STANDARDS I. Post-Verdict Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Rule 50(a), “a party may move for judgment as a matter of law (‘JMOL’) during trial at any time prior to the submission of the case to the jury.” Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 286 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2)). A motion for JMOL “alert[s] the opposing party to the supposed deficiencies in his proof, thereby affording the nonmoving party ‘an opportunity to cure any deficiency in that party’s proof that may have been overlooked until called to the party’s attention by a late motion for judgment.’” Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 Advisory Committee Note (1991)). If the court denies a Rule 50(a) motion made at trial, the movant may renew its motion for JMOL under Rule 50(b) following an unfavorable verdict. See Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 286 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)). “The posttrial motion is limited to those grounds that were specifically raised in the prior motion for JMOL; the movant is not permitted to add new grounds after trial.” Id. (cleaned up); accord Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 153 (2d Cir. 2012). “In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may: (1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.”3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). “To warrant post-verdict judgment as a matter of law, the movant must show that the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the non-movant, was insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to have found in the non-movant’s favor.” Conte v. Emmons, 895 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2018). This standard imposes a high burden that is “met only in rare occasions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Cross v. New York City Transit Auth., 417 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A movant’s burden in securing Rule 50 relief is particularly heavy after the jury has deliberated in the case and actually returned its verdict.”). “The movant, generally, must be able to show a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict such that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture.” Conte, 895 F.3d at 171 (cleaned up). In resolving such a motion, “[t]he court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir.1988)). II. Motion for a New Trial A district court may, on a party’s motion, “grant a new trial on all or some of the issues — and to any party…after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). “Rule 59(a)…[imposes] a less stringent standard than Rule 50 in two significant respects: (1) a new trial under Rule 59(a) may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, and (2) a trial judge is free to weigh the evidence himself, and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.” Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[a]lthough the standard for granting a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 is less onerous than that for granting judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50, it is still high.” Tardif v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-4056 (KMW), 2023 WL 2495897, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2023). “A motion for a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.” Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1998)). III. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment “A party who moves to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) must demonstrate that the Court overlooked ‘controlling law or factual matters’ that had been previously put before it.” Komatsu v. City of New York, No. 23-CV-5406 (LTS), 2024 WL 1905786, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2024) (quoting R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); see Metzler Inv. Gmbh v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2020). “A court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion only when the movant identifies an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Metzler, 970 F.3d at 142 (cleaned up). ANALYSIS I. Defendant’s Motion for Post-Verdict JMOL At the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for JMOL pursuant to Rule 50(a), arguing, as relevant here, that Plaintiff “failed to tie” her filing of an EEOC complaint to any subsequent action taken by Defendant, including Plaintiff’s ultimate discharge, thereby failing to meet her burden of proof as to her claim for retaliation under the NYCHRL. Tr. 378:11-19, 379:18-380:4. The Court denied JMOL on Plaintiff’s claims under the NYCHRL4, including her claim for retaliation, concluding that it could not find that a reasonable jury, crediting all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could not return a verdict for Plaintiff on her NYCHRL claims. Tr. 387:3-10. Defendant has renewed its motion for JMOL pursuant to Rule 50(b) and requests that the Court grant post-verdict JMOL in its favor as to the single claim on which Plaintiff prevailed at trial, retaliation under the NYCHRL.5 Def. Mem. 1. To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant knew about the plaintiff’s participation in the protected activity; (3) “the defendant took an employment action that disadvantaged the plaintiff in any manner”; and (4) “a causal connection existed between the [plaintiff's] protected activity and the [defendant's] negative employment action.” Fattoruso v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., LLC, 525 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2013); see Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 69-71, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep’t 2009). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, “the defendant must articulate legitimate non-[retaliatory] reasons for its actions, whereupon the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant’s explanations are pretext for the true [retaliatory] motive.”6 Ibok v. Sec. Indus. Automation Corp., 369 F. App’x 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Holt v. KMI-Cont’l, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1996)). Although these elements are similar to those required to prove a retaliation claim under the ADA and the NYSHRL, the Second Circuit has instructed that “the standard for claims under the NYCHRL is intended to be more liberal than the standard for [federal] and NYSHRL claims, and that ‘courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims.’” Baldwin v. Goddard Riverside Cmty. Ctr., 615 F. App’x 704, 705-06 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. America, Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013)). “Thus, even if the challenged conduct is not actionable under federal and state law, federal courts must consider separately whether it is actionable under the broader New York City standards.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 109. Specifically, as to the third element of a retaliation claim under the NYCHRL, the defendant’s conduct need not result in a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment, but rather need only be “reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in” protected activity. Id. at 112. As to the fourth, causal element of a retaliation claim under the NYCHRL, retaliation need only have been a “motivating factor” in the defendant’s decision to engage in the negative employment action, even if it was not the sole or “but-for” cause of the defendant’s action. Id. at 110 n.8, 116; accord Gordon-Mallett v. Mount Sinai Hosps. Grp., Inc., No. 22-CV-1159 (LJL), 2024 WL 1513910, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024). The Court’s instructions to the jury on Plaintiff’s NYCHRL retaliation claim — to which neither party objected — reflected these standards. See Tr. 775:9-778:1. Defendant has not met the “particularly heavy” burden of establishing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a reasonable juror to have found in Plaintiff’s favor on her NYCHRL retaliation claim. Cross, 417 F.3d at 248. First, the evidence at trial established that on June 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint against Defendant alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. Tr. 138:11-139:18. The filing of an EEOC complaint is a protected activity. See Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719-20 (2d Cir. 2002); Conway v. Healthfirst Inc., No. 21-CV-6512 (RA), 2022 WL 4813498, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022). Second, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s filing of the EEOC complaint: The parties stipulated that Defendant’s “law department received notice of the [EEOC] charge on June 19, 2018.” Tr. 139:17-18. “[A] plaintiff may rely on ‘general corporate knowledge’ of her protected activity to establish the knowledge prong” of a retaliation claim. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 2013). Further, Plaintiff testified that she attended a meeting with the EEOC and Defendant to discuss her claims. Tr. 189:12-24, 190:9-12. Third, the evidence established that, thereafter, Defendant took several actions that disadvantaged Plaintiff in the workplace and that were reasonably likely to deter Plaintiff from engaging in future protected activity. For example, Plaintiff testified that following her EEOC complaint, she faced heightened scrutiny and negative treatment from her manager, Elissa Seidman, including timing of Plaintiff’s bathroom breaks and withholding of resources and privileges from Plaintiff’s team. Tr. 130:5-131:9, 148:14-149:3, 180:18-181:15, 182:22-183:1. Plaintiff also testified that her desk was moved to “what was at the office considered a junk desk” without a proper computer hookup, and that she was disciplined for timeliness issues that had previously gone undisciplined. Tr. 146:9-21, 155:15-22. Finally, Plaintiff and others testified that Defendant investigated Plaintiff’s use of a colleague’s parking pass, conduct for which other employees were not disciplined. Tr. 190:3-192:5, 225:13-226:9, 465:23-467:25. That investigation led to Plaintiff’s termination. Tr. 224:4-225:12, 468:1-12. The thrust of Defendant’s motion for post-verdict JMOL concerns the fourth element of a prima facie NYCHRL retaliation case. Defendant argues that “Plaintiff fails to connect any alleged adverse action she experienced, including her termination, with her June 8, 2018 EEOC charge.” Def. Mem. 7. In essence, Defendant challenges the jury’s finding of causality — that a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to take actions against Plaintiff was retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing an EEOC complaint. Defendant argues that no evidence supports the jury’s finding of causality because: (1) Plaintiff’s managers were not aware that she had filed an EEOC complaint; (2) there is no causal connection between Plaintiff’s discipline for lateness and her EEOC complaint, as Plaintiff had previously been counseled for ongoing issues with timeliness; (3) Plaintiff’s desk was moved for reasons related to Plaintiff’s lateness, not her filing of an EEOC complaint; (4) Defendant’s rejection of Plaintiff’s request to attend an external training had no connection to her EEOC complaint; (5) Plaintiff’s testimony that she received heightened scrutiny following her EEOC complaint is undermined by the testimony of rebuttal witness Betty Griffin, who testified that she faced similar scrutiny; and (6) no evidence supports that Defendant’s investigation regarding Plaintiff’s use of a parking pass was motivated by retaliation for her EEOC complaint. See Def. Mem. 7-13. Finally, Defendant argues that it had a legitimate, non-retaliatory and non-pretextual reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment. See Def. Mem. 13-14. None of these arguments persuades the Court to disturb the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff testified that she informed her manager, Ms. Seidman, of her meeting with Defendant and the EEOC. Tr. 372:23-373:4. Although Defendant is correct that Ms. Seidman and others testified that they were not aware of Plaintiff’s filing an EEOC complaint, see Tr. 415:13-19, 592:17-20, 599:6-15, 638:12-15, it is for the jury — not the Court on a motion for post-verdict JMOL — to resolve conflicting evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 70.7 Defendant’s remaining arguments challenging the jury’s finding of causation fail for the simple reason that “[t]he causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action.” Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Cifra v. G.E. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001)); see Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying principle to NYCHRL retaliation claims). Here, Plaintiff testified that certain of Defendant’s actions against her, such as Plaintiff’s transfer to an undesirable desk, Ms. Seidman’s enhanced scrutiny of Plaintiff’s performance and timeliness, and the diminishment of Plaintiff’s support and resources, occurred close in time to Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint. See Tr. 148:8-149:11. And critically, although Defendant did not determine that it would fire Plaintiff until April 2019 and finally terminated Plaintiff in July 2020, the security investigation that precipitated Plaintiff’s termination began in the fall of 2018, only several months after Plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint and around the time of her meeting with the EEOC and Defendant.8 Tr. 190:6-192:5, 465:23-468:12. The jury could find that this investigation was part of the heightened scrutiny alleged by Plaintiff. See, e.g., Hill v. Airborne Freight Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 59, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (sustaining plaintiff’s verdict on NYCHRL retaliation claim where plaintiff “received a number of minor disciplinary actions for conduct which did not result in discipline for other [employees] and which [plaintiff] had engaged in without incident prior to the EEOC complaint”), aff’d, 93 F. App’x 260 (2d Cir. 2004). Defendant argues that Plaintiff faced reprimand for tardiness and discipline or counseling for poor performance prior to her EEOC complaint, severing any causal inference based on temporal proximity.that she began to receive See Def. Mem. 8-9; Def. Reply 1, 6-7. “While it is true that where timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise,” such an inference is permissible if “other instances of mistreatment” occur after the plaintiff’s protected activity. Colon v. Fashion Inst. of Tech. (State Univ. of New York), 983 F. Supp. 2d 277, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (cleaned up); see Welch v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 164, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that “this broad principle is inapplicable” where “certain significant events took place in the interim”). Here, evidence at trial established that some of Defendant’s actions, including the security investigation that led to Plaintiff’s termination, exclusively occurred after Plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint. Plaintiff also testified, for example, that it was only after she filed the EEOC complaint that she began to receive enhanced scrutiny10 and formal censure for untimeliness, which had previously gone undisciplined. See Hill, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 70. In fact, Defendant’s argument supports this finding by pointing to evidence that Plaintiff’s desk was moved because of her habitual lateness after her EEOC complaint. See Def. Mem. 9-10. A reasonable jury, crediting all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, could find that retaliation for Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint was a motivating factor, even if not the but-for factor, in Defendant’s decision to take actions that were reasonably likely to deter Plaintiff from engaging in protected activity. Defendant finally argues that even if Plaintiff did prove a prima facie case of retaliation under the NYCHRL, Defendant had a legitimate, non-retaliatory and non-pretextual reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment, citing to the conclusions of Defendant’s security investigation regarding Plaintiff’s use of a co-worker’s parking pass. See Def. Mem. 13-15. Although “temporal proximity alone is not enough to establish pretext in [the Second] Circuit,” Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2014), and “the mere fact that an employee disagrees with an employer’s evaluation of that employee’s misconduct or deficient performance…does not necessarily demonstrate, by itself, that the employer’s proffered reasons are a pretext for termination,” Renaud v. Fed. Exp. Corp., No. 10 CV 4261 LB, 2012 WL 34089, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), a finding of pretext in this case is supported by other evidence presented at trial. For example, a manager specifically documented Plaintiff’s inquiry as to how to obtain permission to use a colleague’s parking pass prior to any alleged wrongdoing by Plaintiff, see Tr. 550:13-551:16, testimony established that Defendant’s system for the assignment and sharing of parking passes was informal and inconsistently maintained, see, e.g., Tr. 556:23-557:5, 560:10-561:10, 569:2-572:2, 587:4-588:18, and other employees were not subject to investigation or discipline for using parking passes without permission, Tr. 568:2-13. See Bogdan v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 02 CIV. 09587 (GEL), 2005 WL 1161812, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2005) (“a jury [may] find that the inconsistent application of disciplinary policy [is] sufficient for a finding of pretext (citing Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1998)). “[A]pplying the liberal standards of the NYCHRL to the basic McDonnell Douglas [burden shifting] framework” in this case, Torre, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 284 n.1, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s proffered reason for Plaintiff’s termination was pretextual. In consideration of the trial record, the Court cannot say that there is “a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict such that the jury’s findings” for Plaintiff on her NYCHRL retaliation claim “could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture.” Conte, 895 F.3d at 171 (cleaned up). Accordingly, Defendant’s renewed motion for JMOL or, in the alternative, a new trial, is DENIED. II. Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial Plaintiff makes three arguments in support of her motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a): (1) that Defendant’s counsel tampered with and intimidated Plaintiff’s rebuttal witness, Ms. Griffin; (2) that the jury’s verdict is inconsistent; and (3) that the Court erred in excluding Plaintiff’s medical-record evidence. Pl. Mem. 1-3, 12-14. For the reasons explained below, none of these arguments convinces the Court that “the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.” Amato, 170 F.3d at 314 (quoting Atkins, 143 F.3d at 102). A. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to a New Trial for Alleged Witness Tampering Plaintiff’s first argument concerns an incident of alleged intimidation by one of Defendant’s counsel11 of Plaintiff’s rebuttal witness, Ms. Griffin, an employee of Defendant and former co-worker of Plaintiff. Although presented within the context of Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), this argument is more appropriately raised under Rule 60(b)(3), which provides that a party may seek relief from a final judgment for “fraud…, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); see, e.g., Schiel v. Stop & Shop Co., No. CIV. 3:96CV1742 WWE, 2006 WL 2792885, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2006) (“Fraud by an adverse party, including opposing counsel, properly falls under Rule 60(b)(3)…. Motions for relief from judgment filed under Rule 60(b)(3) may include allegations of witness tampering….” (citing Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003))); see also Schlafman v. State Univ. of New York, Farmingdale, 541 F. App’x 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(3) motion based in part on alleged witness intimidation by defense counsel). “To prevail on a motion for a new trial pursuant to [Rule] 60(b)(3), the movant must show that (1) the adverse party engaged in fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by clear and convincing evidence and that (2) such misconduct substantially interfered with the movant’s ability to fully and fairly present its case.” Thomas v. City of New York, 293 F.R.D. 498, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Ent. Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)), aff’d sub nom. Thomas v. McAullife, 691 F. App’x 671 (2d Cir. 2017); accord Deng v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, No. 1:13-cv-6801 (ALC) (SDA), 2018 WL 11176016, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2018) (citing Catskill, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 312), aff’d sub nom. Ren Yuan Deng v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, 783 F. App’x 72 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Smart v. City of Miami Beach, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Plaintiff’s cited authority, see Pl. Mem. 4, applying the clear and convincing evidence standard), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 820 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendant’s misconduct are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. A party meets the clear and convincing evidence standard “only if the material it offer[s] instantly tilt[s] the evidentiary scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence [its adversary] offer[s] in opposition.” Geo-Grp. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chopra, No. 15 CIV. 1756 (KPF), 2023 WL 6235160, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023) (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)). Plaintiff’s sole evidence of purported witness tampering is the affidavit of Ms. Griffin. [ECF No. 189-1 ("Griffin Aff.")]. Ms. Griffin states that upon arriving at the courthouse pursuant to her trial subpoena, she was confronted by Defendant’s Associate, who asked “in a hostile manner” who Ms. Griffin was and why she was present. Griffin Aff.
3, 5-6. Ms. Griffin further states that Defendant’s Associate “forcibly grabbed the [trial] subpoena” from her, “told [her] the subpoena [wa]s no good” and that she “would not be seeing the judge,” asked questions about who Ms. Griffin’s manager was and when she was subpoenaed, and told Ms. Griffin to leave the building. Griffin Aff.
