Joseph Srour, Plaintiff-Appellee v. New York City, New York, and Edward A. Caban, in his Official Capacity as NYPD Police Commissioner, Defendants-Appellants Keechant Sewell,* Defendant In 2019, Joseph Srour was denied a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in his home in New York by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) License Division. Subsequently, he initiated this lawsuit seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, bringing a constitutional challenge to various provisions of the New York City Administrative Code and the Rules of the City of New York, which provide the legislative and administrative framework, respectively, for granting rifle and shotgun permits. Most relevant to this appeal is the requirement that an applicant have “good moral character” to be issued a rifle and shotgun permit. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §10-303(a)(2); 38 R.C.N.Y. §3-03. Srour moved for summary judgment, but prior to the district court’s decision, the NYPD updated the Rules of the City of New York to provide a definition of “good moral character,” which was previously undefined. The district court (Cronan, J.) granted Srour’s motion with regard to the New York City Administrative Code, enjoining the enforcement of the “good moral character” requirement and the separate “good cause” requirement, and declaring them unconstitutional. Srour v. New York City, 699 F. Supp. 3d 258, 285, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). The district court did not and has not yet decided the amount of damages. Id. at 289. Defendants-Appellants, New York City and New York City Police Commissioner Edward A. Caban (collectively, “the City”), filed this interlocutory appeal asking us to review the district court’s judgment enjoining enforcement of New York City Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2). In the meantime, Srour applied for a rifle and shotgun permit again, and immediately brought another suit against the City on the theory that he would surely be denied another permit. However, on March 21, 2024, Srour was granted his rifle and shotgun permit. The City now asks us to deem this appeal moot and to vacate the district court’s judgment enjoining enforcement of New York Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2) and declaring it unconstitutional. We now hold that because Srour has been granted the very relief he sought, the case before us is moot, and we lack jurisdiction to hear the merits. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013). Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment enjoining New York City Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2) and declaring it facially unconstitutional, DISMISS this appeal as moot, and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Srour’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief from New York City Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2) as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950). EUNICE LEE, C.J. In 2019, Joseph Srour was denied a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in his home in New York, by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) License Division. Subsequently, he initiated this lawsuit seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, bringing a constitutional challenge to various provisions of the New York City Administrative Code and the Rules of the City of New York, which provide the legislative and administrative framework, respectively, for granting rifle and shotgun permits. Most relevant to this appeal is the requirement that an applicant have “good m oral character” to be issued a rifle and shotgun permit. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §10-303(a)(2); 38 R.C.N.Y. §3-03. Srour moved for summary judgment, but prior to the district court’s decision, the NYPD updated the Rules of the City of New York to provide a definition of “good moral character,” which was previously undefined. The district court (Cronan, J.) granted Srour’s motion with regard to the New York City Administrative Code, enjoining the enforcement of the “good moral character” requirement and the separate “good cause” requirement and declaring them unconstitutional. Srour v. New York City, 699 F. Supp. 3d 258, 285, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). The district court did not and has not yet decided the amount of damages. Id. at 289. Defendants-Appellants, New York City and New York City Police Commissioner Edward A. Caban1 (collectively, “the City”), filed this interlocutory appeal asking us to review the district court’s judgment enjoining the enforcement of New York City Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2). In the meantime, Srour applied for a rifle and shotgun permit again, an d immediately brought another suit against the City on the theory that he would surely be denied another permit. However, on March 21, 2024, Srour was granted his rifle and shotgun permit. The City now asks us to deem this appeal moot and to vacate the district court’s judgment enjoining enforcement of New York Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2) and declaring it unconstitutional. We hold that because Srour has been granted the very relief he sought, the case before us is moot and we lack jurisdiction to hear the merits. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013). Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment enjoining New York City Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2) and declaring it facially unconstitutional, DISMISS this appeal as moot, and REMAND to the district court with instructions to dismiss Srour’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief from New York City Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2) as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950). BACKGROUND I. Rifle and Shotgun Licensing in New York City Prior to delving into the specific facts of Srour’s case, it is helpful to outline the licensing scheme for the ownership of shotguns and rifles in New York City. While state law governs handgun licensing for individuals, see generally N.Y. Penal Law §400.00, possession of rifles and shotguns is regulated by the City of New York through the New York City Administrative Code (the “Code”) section 10-303. The Code provides, among other things, that “[n]o person shall be denied a permit to purchase and possess a rifle or shotgun unless the applicant…is not of good moral character.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code §10-303(a)(2).2 The Code also directs any application for a permit to be made to the police commissioner. Id. §10-303(b). The New York City Charter allows the police commissioner to “adopt rules necessary to carry out the powers and duties delegated to [the NYPD] by…local law.” N.Y.C. Charter §1043(a)(2). The Police Department’s regulations regarding the process for issuing permits for rifles and shotguns are codified in title 38, chapter 3 of the Rules of the City of New York (the “Rules”). Prior to December 2022, the Rules stated that “an application for a rifle/shotgun permit may be denied where it is determined that an applicant lacks good moral character [or that other good cause exists for denial].” New York City Police Department, Notice of Adoption of Final Rule 4 (Dec. 13, 2022), https://perma.cc/U626-ME6W. However, this section was amended on December 16, 2022, so that it now contains a definition of “good moral character” and no longer permits denial for “good cause.” See 38 R.C.N.Y. §3-03 (“For the purposes of this chapter, ‘good moral character’ means having the essential character, temperament and judgment necessary to be entrusted with a weapon and to use it only in a manner that does not endanger oneself or others.”). This definition in substance tracks the definition for “good moral character” used by New York State in its handgun licensing scheme. See N.Y. Penal Law §400.00(1)(b) (“[F]or the purposes of this article, [good moral character] shall mean having the essential character, temperament and judgement necessary to be entrusted with a weapon and to use it only in a manner that does not endanger oneself or others[.]“). II. Srour’s Rifle and Shotgun Permit Application In 2018, Srour, a resident of Brooklyn, New York, applied for a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in his home. His application was denied on June 13, 2019.3 The NYPD License Division issued a Notice of Application Disapproval, which explained that Srour’s prior arrests “show[i ng] poor moral judgment,” and his “derogatory driving record…, reflect negatively upon [Srour's] moral character and cast[] grave doubt upon [Srour's] fitness to possess a firearm.” App’x at 119. Srour administratively appealed the denial of his rifle and shotgun application. In November of 2019, the NYPD License Division denied his appeal through a Notice of Disapproval After Appeal. The Notice began by referencing New York State Penal Law section 400.00, which provides that “no license shall be issued except for an applicant…(b) of good moral character…and; (n) for whom no good cause exists for the denial of a license.” App’x at 124 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law §400.00(1)). It also referenced the Rules as “provid[ing] a list of factors to be considered in assessing moral character and ‘good cause.’” Id. The Notice explained that even though the prior criminal cases against Srour were dismissed, his previous arrests and their “violent nature” were “factors supporting denial of his applications.” Id. It also stressed that the failure to disclose his previous arrests on his initial application “demonstrate[d] a lack of candor and is a strong ground for disapproval of his applications.” Id. at 125. Finally, the Notice indicated that Srour’s many moving violations and license suspensions “demonstrate[] an inability to abide by laws and regulations.” Id. All of these factors, the Appeal Notice concluded, “portray a lack of good moral character and disregard for the law.” Id. at 125-26. III. Procedural History A. Srour’s Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment On January 2, 2022, Srour initiated a suit against the City of New York and then-Police Commissioner Sewell seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief for the denial of his firearms applications. In it, he claimed that the City’s “discretionary and permissive” licensing scheme for handguns, rifles, and shotguns “violate[s] the Second Amendment facially and as applied to Plaintiff.” App’x at 12. Specifically, Srour claimed that subsections 10-303(a)(2) and (a)(9) of the Code, authorizing the City to deny a rifle or shotgun permit based on good moral character and good cause, respectively, are improperly discretionary and permissive, and are therefore unconstitutional facially and as applied to him. Srour also challenged as unconstitutional specific sections of the Rules that the police department had promulgated to implement section 10-303 of the Code and section 10-310 of the Code (providing criminal penalties for violations of sections 10-301 through 10-309). He also argued that all of these rules and regulations are preempted by state law. On June 23, 2022, six months after Srour filed his complaint, the Supreme Court decided a challenge to New York State’s handgun licensing scheme in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), ruling against the State. In response, on July 1, the state legislature amended its handgun licensing regime. The district court had stayed Srour’s case in the interim, and after the Bruen decision, directed the parties to submit a joint letter on September 25, 2022, indicating their positions as to whether the issues in this case had changed. In said letter, Srour indicated that he wished to move for summary judgment pre-discovery. In response to the City’s position that discovery was necessary to decide Srour’s as-applied challenges, Srour withdrew his as-applied claims and his preemption claim and opted instead to proceed solely on a facial constitutional challenge to the City’s regulations. Srour moved for summary judgment on December 16, 2022. On the same day, the NYPD amended the regulations for implementing the rifle and shotgun permitting regime by providing a definition for “good moral character” and removing the “good cause” exception. See Part I, supra. Subsections 10-303(a)(2) and (a)(9) of the Code remained unchanged. B. District Court Decision On October 24, 2023, the district court issued an opinion and order granting in part, and denying in part, Srour’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, it found that subsections 10-303(a)(2) and (a)(9) of the Code, i.e., the “good moral character” and “good cause” provisions, respectively, were facially unconstitutional. As a result, the district court granted declaratory relief as to these subsections of the Code and enjoined enforcement of both of them.4 In finding subsection 10-303(a)(2) of the Code unconstitutional, the district court analyzed it on its face, and did not consider the revised version of section 3-03 of title 38 of the Rules — defining “good moral character” — as a part of the law. In doing so, the district court found that the City had “not identified any historical analogue for investing officials with the broad discretion to restrict someone’s Second Amendment right based on determining the person to lack good moral character.” Srour, 699 F. Supp. 3d at 279 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court also determined that the pre-December 16, 2022 versions of sections 3-03 and 5-10 of title 38 of the Rules, the versions under which Srour was denied his permits, were facially unconstitutional. Because these versions of the Rules were no longer in effect at the time of the district court’s decision, and the current versions were not before the district court, it held that declaratory and injunctive relief as to the Rules was not necessary or appropriate. The district court denied Srour’s motion with regard to section 10-310 of the Code, which provides criminal penalties for conduct which violates sections 10-301 through 10-309 — conduct which includes, for example, possessing a shotgun without a license or defacing a serial number on a firearm. It reasoned that Srour had not shown that all the conduct covered in those sections was protected by the Second Amendment, and therefore he “failed to establish that section 10-310 is facially unconstitutional.” Id. at 285. Lastly, the district court noted that it had already bifurcated the issues of liability and damages. Therefore, with regard to Srour’s retrospective claims seeking money damages for the City’s denial of his permits, the district court directed the parties to file a joint letter proposing a discovery plan. C. Post-Summary Judgment Developments On October 25, 2023, the City filed a notice of interlocutory appeal and moved for a stay of the injunction of subsections 10-303(a)(2) and (a)(9) of the Code pending appeal. The district court denied the full stay, but granted a temporary stay of the injunction to afford the City a short time to seek a stay pending appeal before this Court. Before this Court, the City asked for a stay of the injunction only on subsection 10-303(a)(2) — the “good moral character” provision — and on February 21, 2024, this Court granted the stay. As this case was working its way to this Court, Srour filed a new application for a permit to possess rifles and shotguns and immediately filed a separate complaint against the City on October 29, 2023. See Complaint, Srour v. City of New York, No. 23-CV-9489 (JPC) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2023) (“Srour II”). In Srour II, he sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that the post-December 2022 versions of the Rules of the City of New York, which include the amended definition of “good moral character,” are unconstitutional. Id. at 1-2. Even though his new applications had yet to be denied, Srour asserted that he had standing because “his applications are futile” as “[t]he denial of [his] applications is certain.” Id. at 7, 9. However, nothing in life is certain. On March 21, 2024, after the opening and response briefs were submitted in the case before this Court, Srour’s rifle and shotgun and handgun applications were granted. Srour was issued his rifle and shotgun permit on March 25. In its reply brief submitted on April 10, 2024, the City argued that this case was moot, as Srour’s applications had been granted, and that this Court should dismiss the appeal and vacate the judgment of the district court. After oral argument on June 10, 2024, the City filed a Post-Argument Letter Brief reiterating its mootness argument, and Srour submitted a Post-Argument Letter Brief, arguing that the case was not in fact moot. DISCUSSION The parties disagree as to two issues relevant to this appeal: (1) whether Srour’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against subsection 10-303(a)(2) are moot; and (2) the extent to which we possess pendent appellate jurisdiction over his retrospective claims. Under Article III, we are required to first address whether Srour’s claims for prospective relief are moot before considering if exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction over other issues is appropriate. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (“The requirement that [Article III] jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Mootness is a jurisdictional matter relating to the Article III requirement that federal courts hear only cases or controversies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the following reasons, we conclude that Srour’s claims for prospective relief are moot. Therefore, we decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over any of Srour’s claims for retrospective relief, which are not yet final. I. Mootness The City argues that because Srour was granted a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in March of 2024, “he no longer has any interest in the prospective relief at issue in this appeal.” City Reply Br. at 4. Therefore, the City argues, Srour’s claims requesting prospective relief from subsection 10-303(a)(2) of the Code are moot.5 There is a “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). However, we have a similarly s trong obligation to decide only actual cases and controversies. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it….”). This is because “federal judges are not counselors or academics; they are not free to take up hypothetical questions that pique a party’s curiosity or their own.” FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024). Our responsibility to ensure we limit our review to live cases and controversies does not cease at the time a complaint is filed, but rather extends through the entire life of a case. See Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1991) (“A case in federal court must be alive at all stages of judicial proceedings, not only at the point at which a suit was originally filed.”). This is not an optional responsibility we carry, as “[u]nder Article III of the U.S. Constitution, when a case becomes moot, the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action.” Doyle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 722 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether or not the original denial of Srour’s permit application was unlawful, this “case is moot if the dispute is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about [Srour's] particular legal rights.” Already, 568 U.S. at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Srour’s case, his injury of being denied a permit to possess rifles and shotguns — which gave him Article III standing to bring this suit against the enforcement of subsection 10-303(a)(2) — has been remedied. Srour was granted a permit to possess rifles and shotguns, and it is therefore “impossible for a court to grant [him] any effectual [prospective] relief.” Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). For this reason, his claim before us — barring any applicable exception — is moot. The exceptions to the mootness doctrine include “voluntary cessation cases and cases capable of repetition but evading review.” Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 2016). Srour argues that this case falls under the “voluntary cessation” exception because “[t]he City voluntarily (and temporarily) complied with the district court’s Order by issuing Srour a rifle/shotgun license,” and therefore the case and controversy is no longer live because of the City’s own actions, which should not be permitted to render the case moot. Srour Post-Argument Letter Br. at 3, ECF No. 60.6 We disagree. An alleged wrongdoer’s voluntary cessation of a disputed action will still render a case moot if the wrongdoer can show that (1) there is no “reasonable expectation” the action will recur, and (2) “interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Granite State Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Town of Orange, 303 F.3d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 706 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (explaining that “a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear” there is no reasonable expectation its behavior will recur). The City has met that “formidable burden.” We begin with the easy question — whether the relief has “eradicated” the effects of the City denying Srour a rifle and shotgun permit. It has. Srour has obtained a permit to possess rifles and shotguns, and thus his situation is “sufficiently altered so as to present a substantially different controversy from the one that existed when this suit was filed.” Lamar Advert. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trickier question is whether the City has met its “stringent and…formidable burden” in demonstrating that there is no reasonable expectation its conduct will recur, i.e., that Srour’s rifle and shotgun permit will not be revoked for allegedly unconstitutional reasons. Mhany, 819 F.3d at 604 (citation omitted). We hold that it has. The City argues that “[t]here is no nonspeculative basis to conclude that Srour will be subject to the character requirement for rifle/shotgun permitting again in the future.” City Reply Br. at 4 n.2. This is because the permit is subject to automatic renewal every three years, and is subject to investigation only if “the police commissioner has reason to believe that the status of the applicant has changed.” N.Y.C. Amin. Code §10-303(f). At oral argument, the City reaffirmed that “[Srour's] character…is not reassessed. So unless he is rearrested…[or] decides to violate laws,” he will not be subject to a character assessment pursuant to subsection 10-303(a)(2). Oral Argument at 35:34-42. These “representations are entitled to some deference.” Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 815 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2016) (giving weight to a government agency’s representations at oral argument that a challenged regulation would not be applied to the plaintiff). We agree with the City that there is no reasonable likelihood Srour again will be subject to the allegedly unconstitutional character requirement. Though Srour argues that his license will be “subject to suspension and revocation at the will of the License Division,” Srour Post-Argument Letter Br. at 4, ECF No. 60, there is no evidence to support the contention that his license will not in fact be subject to automatic renewal, as is required by section 10-303(f) of the Code. Nor is there evidence, as Srour contends, that his application was granted “specifically to seek vacatur of the permanent injunction.” Id. Srour’s October 2023 application was reviewed under the new implementing regulations which defined “good moral character,” see 38 R.C.N.Y. 3-03, suggesting this application was granted when the previous one was denied due to a change in policy. We have previously held that a policy change from the government and a representation that, under the current circumstances, the government will not resume the challenged conduct, strongly support that the behavior is not reasonably expected to recur. See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 815 F.3d at 110 (holding the government met its burden when, among other reasons, its regulations were amended and it represented it would not apply the challenged regulation to the plaintiff); Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that while the possibility may exist that a child could be subject to removal from a school, the defendant’s concession that the child will not be removed and their actions in helping the child thrive at the current school lead the court “to conclude that a proposal to transfer [the child]…is [not] reasonably likely to recur”); Lamar, 356 F.3d at 377 (finding that when defendant city amended its regulations, mooting a plaintiff’s claim, the voluntary cessation exception did not apply, as there was “nothing [in the] record that would lead us to believe that [defendant] intends to return to the questionable state of affairs that existed before [plaintiff] filed suit”). Srour also argues that the City’s statement that he may be subject to the “good moral character” requirement again if he violates any laws or is rearrested is “confirm[ation] that [the City] will continue to resume the challenged conduct.” Srour Post-Argument Letter Br. at 4, ECF No. 60. This line of argument is of no help to Srour. The Supreme Court has “consistently refused to conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by the possibility that a party will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws. [It has] instead assumed that litigants will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 391 (2018) (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Lastly, Srour relies heavily on the recent Supreme Court case Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre in arguing that the City’s issuance of the permit did not moot the case. However, Srour’s situation is different from Fikre’s, and Fikre does not control our reasoning here. In that case, Fikre challenged his addition to the No Fly List and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that “the government had placed him on the list for constitutionally impermissible reasons.” Fikre, 601 U.S. at 239. After filing the lawsuit, Fikre was removed from the No Fly list but “[n]o explanation accompanied the decision.” Id. Because he was removed from the No Fly List, the government argued that the case was moot, and even provided a declaration representing that “Mr. Fikre will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information.” Id. at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court rejected the government’s mootness argument, finding that it did not “satisf[y] [its] formidable standard” of demonstrating it would not again place Fikre on the No Fly List. Id. at 243. It found that the government’s “sparse declaration,” id. at 242, as well as the contention that Fikre had not been placed back on the list since 2016, were “insufficient to warrant dismissal,” id. at 243. Importantly, the Supreme Court also noted that “it appears no statute or publicly promulgated regulation describes the standards the government employs when adding individuals to, or removing them from, the list.” Id. at 237. The fact that the defendant ceased and declared it would not restart its challenged behavior are where the similarities between Fikre and this case begin and end. In Fikre, the government unilaterally took Fikre off the No Fly List. Id. at 239. Here, Srour actively applied for a rifle and shotgun permit again. Once Srour re-applied for a permit, the City had legal obligations to him beyond his role as a litigant in this suit. It was required to process his application. And it was required to do so under the new regulations defining “good moral character” promulgated by the NYPD. See 38 R.C.N.Y. 3-03; see also Hassoun v. Searls, 976 F.3d 121, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that the government did not impermissibly unilaterally moot a case when the action mooting the case was a part of a separate legal obligation). Srour, not the City, initiated review of his new application, which was eventually granted in March of 2024.7 Additionally, in Fikre, when faced with a policy governed by no public rules or regulations, the Supreme Court could not rely on the government’s “sparse declaration” that Fikre would not be subject to impermissible placement on the No Fly List in the future. Fikre, 601 U.S. at 242. Here, we have a robust set of rules and regulations governing the granting and renewal of licenses. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §10-303; 38 R.C.N.Y. §3-03. We know quite a bit, including the exact standards that changed between the denial of Srour’s first application and the granting of his second, the fact that his renewal will generally be automatic, and the criteria under which his renewal would not be automatic. Moreover, unlike in Fikre, if Srour’s renewal were to be denied in the future, he would be provided with the exact reasons as to the denial. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §10-303(e)(1) (“[T]he commissioner shall issue the permit or shall notify the applicant of the denial of the application and the reason or reasons therefor.”). Thus, unlike the Supreme Court in Fikre, we are satisfied in Srour’s case that the City has met its burden of demonstrating that the challenged “behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190. Because Srour has been granted his rifle and shotgun permit, he “lack[s] a legally cognizable interest in the outcome” of his challenge requesting injunctive and declaratory relief from section 10-303(a)(2) of the Code, and the appeal before us is moot. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). II. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Because we conclude that Srour’s claims for prospective relief are moot, we decline to exercise appellate jurisdiction over his nonfinal retrospective claims. A federal appellate court’s jurisdiction is defined by statute, and under 28 U.S.C. §1291, it is generally limited to appeals from final orders of a district court. While the district court entered an injunction and declaratory relief, it did not, and has still not, calculated the damages available to Srour for the allegedly unconstitutional denial of his firearms permits. Therefore, the district court’s order is not a “final order.” See In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1992) (“An order granting summary judgment on the issue of liability, but requiring a calculation of damages, is not an appealable final order.”). “However, where a district court grants permanent injunctive relief but reserves decision on damages, we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to §1292(a)(1).” Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1175 (2d Cir. 1995). Because the district court entered an injunction of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(9) of the Code, that injunction is an interlocutory order that we possess appellate jurisdiction over pursuant to §1292(a)(1). However, “the Supreme Court has…directed the Courts of Appeals not to take ‘pendent appellate jurisdiction’ on interlocutory appeals of issues not themselves immediately appealable.” Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 756 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995)). As there is generally a “bar to interlocutory appeals of all issues not independently warranting immediate review,” id. at 757, to review the portion of the district court’s judgment concerning retrospective relief would require this Court to assume pendent jurisdiction on issues over which 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) does not independently grant us jurisdiction, which is permitted only in limited circumstances.8 “We have held that issues usually will not be considered inextricably intertwined where review of the unappealable issue is not necessary for review of the issue over which we have appellate jurisdiction.” Lamar Advert. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as explained supra, Srour’s prospective claims based on the district court’s order granting injunctive and declaratory relief are now moot. As we lack jurisdiction to review these claims, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to review the nonfinal retrospective claims. We therefore decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over any of Srour’s claims for retrospective relief. III. Vacatur When a case becomes moot on appeal, we must consider “what to do with the lower court’s judgment.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 14 (2023) (Jackson, J., concurring). We have the authority to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court…as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. §2106. It is the case that “[w]hen a civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudication, ‘the established practice in the federal system is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.’” Arizonans for Off. English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997) (alterations omitted) (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39). This general practice makes sense — otherwise losing parties who wish to challenge a ruling may find themselves saddled with an adverse but unappealable judgment if the underlying district court decision is not vacated. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994) (“A party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.”); see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 713 (2011) (“When happenstance prevents…review from occurring, the normal rule should apply: Vacatur then rightly strips the decision below of its binding effect, and clears the path for future relitigation.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Vacatur is not warranted, though, when an appellant acts in bad faith to purposefully moot a case. In such a case, “[a]n appellant’s actions constitute forfeiture of the benefit of vacatur” because it “voluntarily act[ed] with an intent that the appeal become moot.” Hassoun, 976 F.3d at 131 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). But “conduct that is voluntary in the sense of being non-accidental, but which is entirely unrelated to the lawsuit, should not preclude our vacating the decision below.” Russman v. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2001). There is no indication that the City granted Srour’s rifle and shotgun permit to intentionally moot this case, or even that its action was related to this lawsuit. It is true that the City’s action in granting Srour a rifle and shotgun permit was the final action in a chain of actions that ultimately mooted this appeal. However, as explained supra, the first action in that chain was precipitated by Srour himself — he re-applied for a rifle and shotgun permit on October 26, 2023, after the district court granted summary judgment in his favor and the City filed a notice of interlocutory appeal in this action. In deciding if vacatur is the correct path, “[t]he appellant’s fault in causing mootness is…the touchstone of our analysis.” F.D.I.C. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 271 F.3d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2001). The City was required to timely process the new application that Srour submitted, and there is no indication that his permit was granted for the purpose of mooting this appeal. Thus, we find that the standard practice of vacating the district court’s judgment is appropriate in this case. See Hassoun, 976 F.3d at 132-33 (explaining that while it was the government’s actions in deporting the plaintiff that caused the case to be moot, this action was a result of “the government’s ongoing effort to comply with” its statutory obligations, “independent of the pending lawsuit,” and therefore vacatur was appropriate). CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the district court’s judgment enjoining subsection 10-303(a)(2) of the New York City Administrative Code and its declaration that it is facially unconstitutional, DISMISS this appeal as moot, and REMAND to the district court with instructions to dismiss Srour’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief from New York City Administrative Code subsection 10-303(a)(2) as moot.
