The following papers numbered 1 to 11 were read on this motion by defendants for an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211: PAPERS NUMBERED Notice of Motion / Affirmation (Spolzino) / Exhibit A / Affirmation (Teague) / Exhibit B / Memorandum of Law 1-6 Memorandum of Law in Opposition / Affirmation (Fraietta) / Exhibits 1 — 2 7-10 Reply Memorandum 11 DECISION AND ORDER Upon the foregoing papers, the motion is denied. Plaintiffs in this putative class action challenge the imposition by defendants (the City) of a $15.00 “public safety fee” and a $1.99 “convenience fee” in connection with the City’s red-light camera program, enacted pursuant to VTL §1111-b. Plaintiffs’ vehicles each were captured by cameras at intersections in the City running red lights, after which plaintiffs each were mailed a Notice of Liability indicating they were responsible for payment of a “civil penalty fine” of $50.001 and a “public safety fee” of $15.00. The complaint further alleges that plaintiffs each elected to pay their fines online, for which they each were assessed an additional $1.99 “convenience fee.” Plaintiffs allege that the public safety fee and the convenience fee, when coupled with the $50.00 fine imposed on vehicle owners liable for a red light camera violation, exceeds the statutory liability cap in VTL §1111-b. Plaintiffs thus seek, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the local law pertaining to the red light camera program, Yonkers City Code §109-45, is preempted, unconstitutional or void as a matter of law. The complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) declaratory and injunctive relief, together with disgorgement of all unlawful fees; (2) fraud; (3) unjust enrichment; and (4) negligent misrepresentation. By Notice of Motion filed on March 29, 2024, the City seeks an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211. The City contends that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine, as plaintiffs failed to contest the fees at the time they paid their fines. The City additionally argues that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue these claims, as they have already paid the public safety fee and the convenience fee and thus no longer have any interest in these proceedings different in kind from motorists generally. The City further contends that that, in any event, the complaint fails to state a cause of action because the fees of which plaintiffs complain are authorized by law. The City contends that Municipal Home Rule Law §10(1)(ii)(a)(9-a) and Statute of Local Governments §10(5) both expressly authorize the fees charged to plaintiffs, and that VTL §1804 recognizes the power of a municipality to “charge a fine, penalty, forfeiture or any other fee or surcharge against a person found liable for violating a provision of the VTL” (Spolzino Aff. at 8). Plaintiffs in opposition contend that they have established their standing, as the voluntary payment doctrine is inapplicable in the context of an affirmative demand under color of legal authority requiring a plaintiff to submit payment or be subject to some penalty. Plaintiffs further contend that their payment of the challenged fees is a classic economic injury which confers standing. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Municipal Home Rule Law “confers broad authority to local governments” but submit that it does not permit local governments to adopt laws that conflict with the Constitution or any general State law (Opp. Mem. at 7). Plaintiffs submit that, while the Yonkers City Code provision imposing the public safety fee does not conflict with State law on its face, the City’s imposition of the public safety fee and the convenience fee in addition to the $50.00 civil penalty fine exceeds the maximum liability of $50.00 for a red light camera violation set forth in VTL §1111-b(e). Plaintiffs suggest, for example, that the City could impose a $33.00 red light camera fine, a $15.00 public safety fee, and a $2.00 online payment convenience fee, for a total liability of $50.00, and that such a schedule of fees would not run afoul of State law. It is the imposition of fees above the $50.00 statutory liability cap which plaintiffs assert is inconsistent with the law of the State and thus not a proper exercise of the authority granted by the Municipal Home Rule Law. Plaintiffs assert that, because the fees charged are unlawful as applied, their common law causes of action are sufficiently pleaded. Finally, plaintiffs assert that this case is indistinguishable from Guthart v. Nassau County, 178 AD3d 777 (2d Dept 2019), which requires denial of the instant motion. The City in reply asserts that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the sort of compulsion required to overcome application of the voluntary payment doctrine, and thus that plaintiffs’ claims are waived regardless of whether they can establish standing. The City contends that plaintiffs’ payments cannot be excused as involuntary in the absence of “a threatened and imminent loss of liberty or a threatened and imminent loss of property” (Reply Mem. at 3). Finally, the City reiterates its contention that the subject fees are authorized by the Municipal Home Rule Law and thus are not unlawful, requiring dismissal of the common law causes of action. The Court has fully considered the submissions of the parties. “A motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action prior to the service of an answer presents for consideration only the issue of whether a cause of action for declaratory relief is set forth, not the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable declaration” (Guthart v. Nassau County, 178 AD3d 777, 778 [2d Dept 2019] [quotation marks and citations omitted]). “Thus, where a cause of action is sufficient to invoke the Court’s power to render a declaratory judgment…as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy, a motion to dismiss should be denied” (id. [quotation marks and citations omitted]). “However, where the court, deeming the material allegations of the complaint to be true, is nonetheless able to determine, as a matter of law, that the defendant is entitled to a declaration in his or her favor, the court may enter the appropriate declaration” (id. [quotation marks and citations omitted]). “By contrast, if the record before the motion court is insufficient to resolve all factual issues such as the rights of the parties cannot be determined as a matter of law, a declaration upon a motion to dismiss is not permissible” (id. at 778-779 [quotation marks and citations omitted]). Plaintiffs correctly contend that the Second Department’s holding in Guthart controls and requires denial of the instant motion. In Guthart, the plaintiffs challenged a “driver responsibility fee” which was added to the statutory maximum fine for red light camera violations, asserting the same four causes of action asserted in the complaint in this matter. The trial Court found that the plaintiff had “properly pleaded a cause of action for a declaratory judgment, but that he has been unable to overcome the heavy presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the local law” (Guthart v. Nassau County, 55 Misc3d 827, 827 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2017]). The Court thus treated the motion to dismiss as a motion seeking a declaration in favor of the County and granted the motion. On appeal, the Second Department reversed, holding that “the County failed to demonstrate the absence of all factual issues so that a determination as to the rights of the parties could be determined as a matter of law” and thus that the motion to dismiss the complaint should have been denied (178 AD3d at 778). While it is not explicitly stated, the Court’s holding in Guthart necessarily entails a finding that the plaintiff’s pleadings were sufficient to present factual issues as to whether the plaintiff’s payment of the subject fees was voluntarily made and whether the County’s fee schedule as applied to the plaintiff exceeded the County’s authority under the Municipal Home Rule Law. This Court’s review of the complaint and the papers filed on the motion to dismiss the complaint in Guthart reveals no appreciable distinction from the matter at bar. In light of the virtually identical allegations in the complaint and the virtually identical arguments presented on the motions to dismiss, this Court is bound by the Second Department’s holding in Guthart, which requires denial of the instant motion in its entirety. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is denied; and it is further ORDERED that defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the applicable provisions of the CPLR; and it is further ORDERED that, within ten (10) days of the date hereof, plaintiffs shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order, with notice of entry, upon defendants, and shall file proof of said service via NYSCEF; and it is further ORDERED that the parties shall submit to the Court a fully-executed Preliminary Conference Stipulation, or shall appear for Preliminary Conference, in accordance with the dates set forth in a Notice to be posted by the Court on NYSCEF. The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: September 9, 2024
