The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 89, 90, 91 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL. DECISION ORDER ON MOTION Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of alleged sexual abuse by Father John Doe, whom plaintiff alleges was a Roman Catholic cleric employed by the Archdiocese of New York, The Capuchin Franciscan Friars (the “Capuchin Friars”), and the Province of St. Mary of the Capuchin Order (the “Province”). Plaintiff alleges Father John Doe sexually abused him during youth and/or church activities at Our Lady of Sorrows church and school from approximately 1939 to 1941, when plaintiff was approximately eight to ten years old. Plaintiff asserts three causes of action against all defendants: 1) negligence; 2) negligent training and supervision of employees; and 3) negligent retention of employees. The Archdiocese’s motion to dismiss was denied as moot pursuant to the stipulation of partial discontinuance (Stipulation of Partial Discontinuance with Prejudice, NYSCEF Doc. No. 88) discontinuing the action against the Archdiocese and Our Lady of Sorrows (NYSCEF Doc. No. 89). The Court now issues this amended decision and order on Motion Number 002 to address the remaining cross-motions to dismiss by the Capuchin Friars and the Province.1 The Court will address each of the grounds upon which defendants seek dismissal in turn. Failure to State a Claim The Capuchin Friars and the Province both move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7). In a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), a court determines “whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (African Diaspora Maritime Corp. v. Golden Gate Yacht Club, 109 AD3d 204, 211 [1st Dept 2013]; Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v. East 149th Realty Corp., 104 AD3d 401, 402-03 [1st Dept 2013]). The pleadings must be liberally construed and the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff’s ‘the benefit of every possible favorable inference,’” and “determine only whether the facts as alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory” (see CPLR §3026; Siegmund Strauss, Inc., 104 AD3d at 402-03; Nonnon v. City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The standard on a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action is not whether the party has artfully drafted the pleading, but whether, deeming the pleading to allege whatever can be reasonably implied from its statements, a cause of action can be sustained (see Stendig, Inc. v. Thorn Rock Realty Co., 163 AD2d 46, 48 [1st Dept 1990]). The Capuchin Friars and the Province argue the complaint fails to state a cause of action because plaintiff does not name the individual who allegedly abused him. Plaintiff’s failure to specifically identify the alleged abuser is not a fatal insufficiency warranting dismissal of the complaint (Jones v. Hiro Cocktail Lounge, 139 AD3d 608, 609 [1st Dept 2016] ["Plaintiff's inability to identify his assailant…does not preclude him from recovery"], citing Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544, 551 [1998]). The complaint alleges plaintiff was in defendants’ custody and/or control and may therefore be owed a duty of care (see Mirand v. City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49-50 [1994]; Sokola v. Weinstein, 78 Misc 3d 842, 857, n 10 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023] [collecting cases]). This is particularly applicable where, as here, a negligence claim is asserted based on a duty of care owing directly from defendants to the plaintiff (see Sokola, 78 Misc 3d at 845-846, citing, inter alia, Pulka v. Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 782 [1976]; Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 NY2d 222, 233 [2001], op after certified question answered, 264 F3d 21 [2d Cir 2001]). Moreover, the complaint asserts Father John Doe was under defendants’ supervision, employ and/or control, which is sufficient to support plaintiff’s negligence claim (Complaint, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1, at
21, 33, 51, 59). Father John Doe’s identity may be revealed through the discovery process (see Doe v. Intercontinental Hotels Group, PLC, 193 AD3d 410, 411 [1st Dept 2021] [noting such facts may be supplemented in a bill of particulars]). Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Father John Doe is not identified by name. The Capuchin Friars and the Province further argue the complaint insufficiently pleads the prior notice element required for the claims of negligent training and supervision, and negligent retention. However, acknowledging that the Court is required to accept the allegations as true (Engelman, 194 AD3d at 33) and “greater specificity is not required at this pre-answer stage in the litigation” (Ark 55, 222 A.D.3d at 572), the Court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges the prior notice/propensity element (Complaint at
