OPINION AND ORDER Richard Hartnett and Aine Dempsey, (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this Action against Liberty Insurance Company (“Liberty”), John and Jane Doe 1-10, and ABC Corp. 1-10, (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging various claims in connection with a homeowner’s insurance policy. (See generally Am. Compl. (“AC”) (Dkt. No. 1-2).)2 Before the Court is Defendant Liberty’s Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”) certain claims in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (“AC”). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 8).) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted. I. Background A. Factual Background Plaintiffs are husband and wife, who, on or about December 12, 2022, purchased a primary residence at 365 Saint Johns Avenue, Yonkers, Westchester County, New York (“Premises”). (AC 1.) This property was purchased with the intent to be their permanent residence. (Id. at 3.) Upon closing on the Premises, the Plaintiffs obtained a mortgage and in accordance with the requirements of the mortgagor, a policy of insurance had to be obtained insuring the house for at least the amount of the loan obtained to purchase the property. (Id.) Plaintiffs communicated with an insurance broker who, upon information and belief, was an agent for Liberty, authorized to grant insurance policies on behalf of Liberty. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiffs allege that the information that was requested by the agent was submitted, and that, thereafter, an offer to issue an insurance policy covering the Premises was received and accepted. (Id.) Liberty issued a homeowners’ policy, which would pay the sum of $1,829.00 as for a twelve-month period by LibertyGuard Deluxe Homeowners Policy, Policy Number H37-221-828671-40 2 4 for a policy period of December 2, 2022 through December 2, 2023 (the “Policy’). (Id.) When consulting with the insurance broker and upon the initial call with the broker, Plaintiffs explained that the Premises was a “fixer-upper” and that the Premises would be immediately renovated after closing so that the insurance carrier would be on notice of this fact. (Id. at 5.) However, at all times Plaintiffs would still reside on the Premises, in the area of the home that was not being renovated. (Id.) The Policy was paid and submitted to the finance source, resulting in a closing on the property and the property being titled in the Plaintiffs’ name. (Id. at 6.) The Plaintiffs alleged, upon information and belief, that Liberty, through its agent, inspected the Premises in furtherance of the issuance of the Policy. (Id. at 7.) After the closing, the Plaintiffs moved into the Premises with their two children, giving up their prior residence, which they had rented. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs commenced furnishing the Premises, residing in the upper levels of the residence. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs contend that the insurance agent was aware that Plaintiffs intended to remodel the main living areas. (Id.) Plaintiffs commenced the process of deciding how the renovation of the residence would be completed by retaining construction professionals. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiffs lived in and maintained the Premises, which included maintaining the Premises with proper heating and utilities. (Id. at 11.) On or about February 5, 2023, a water pipe burst in the residence, causing substantial damage to the property. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiffs reported the claim to Liberty as soon as practicable but within twenty-four hours of the incident. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiffs did what was necessary and prudent to protect their home from further damage but were never authorized to begin any repairs. (Id.) It was not until October 2023, approximately eight months after the incident, that Defendant rejected the claim. (Id.) Liberty’s agent, Timothy Fitzgerald inspected the water damage to the residence on or about February 8, 2023. (Id. at 14.) During the inspection, he walked the entire building and directed Plaintiffs not to do any additional work in safeguarding the residence until coverage was awarded. (Id.) Due to the length of time it took to make a finding of coverage, the condition of the premises grew worse. (Id.) Liberty retained the services of a moisture mitigator contractor. (Id. at 15.) However, the contractor selected by Liberty was not licensed or permitted to do any work in Yonkers and could not pull a permit, and therefore, could not do any work on the Premises. (Id.) An employee at Liberty determined that Plaintiffs could not reside in the residence, and as a result, an alternative accommodation was approved for three days. (Id. at 16.) The authorized accommodations were insufficient for two adults and two children, so Plaintiffs resided with family. (Id.) Plaintiffs assert that Liberty failed to provide information of specific contractors that Plaintiffs could use. (Id. at 17.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs requested a plumber and electrician to prepare estimates and other information to submit to Liberty, as it had requested. (Id.) Moreover, with the intent to mitigate additional damage to the property, Plaintiffs requested and received from the Yonkers Building Department on February 17, 2023, a permit to mitigate water damage. (Id. at 18.) A report was submitted, indicating that the moisture readings in the Premises was 100 percent. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that the failure to properly mitigate caused additional damage to the Premises. (Id.) On or about March 7, 2023, Plaintiffs submitted estimates obtained from other contractors, concerning the work necessary to mitigate the water damage, as requested by Liberty. (Id. at 19.) Because the damage costs and expenses exceeded $100,000.00, Liberty assigned a second adjuster, Michael Sarris. (Id. at 20.) On March 13, 2023, a Liberty representative walked the property again, with its contractor, who drafted an estimate for the repairs that required completion. (Id.) However, Sarris directed that no work be completed, as Liberty would not be responsible for the costs and expenses of work that was not authorized and approved. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs received communications, on or about March 14, 2023, from Holly Evans, who notified them that she was the new adjuster assigned to this matter. (Id. at 21.) Evans stated that she did not understand why Plaintiffs did not submit a claim for personal property. (Id.) Plaintiffs offered to Evans any and all information required to further review the claim, to which they did not receive a response. (Id.) Plaintiffs followed up, requesting a status update and a copy of the adjuster’s estimate, which also went ignored. (Id. at 22.) On or about March 22, 2023, Con Edison contacted Plaintiffs, inquiring whether Plaintiffs authorized Con Edison to release Plaintiffs’ billing information. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiffs later learned that Liberty representative Evans, without Plaintiffs’ consent or authorization, directly contacted Con Edison. Plaintiffs claim that, upon information and belief, Evans misrepresented herself as the owner of the Premises to Con Edison to gain access to Plaintiffs’ records. (Id.) Con Edison confirmed that the email address they were to send records to was Evan’s email. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs communicated with Liberty agent Joe Scambia to determine whether his office contacted Con Edison. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiffs seem to allege that Scambia responded to Plaintiffs, expressing to them that Liberty contacted Con Edison without Plaintiff’s consent. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that they requested Liberty a number of times to authorize the work that needed to be commenced on the residence because the delays were causing further damage to the Premises. (Id. at 25.) However, Liberty never responded. (Id.) On or about March 27, 2023, another Liberty representative, Jeffrey Kaffman, contacted Plaintiffs. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiffs requested that Kaffman send them in writing precisely the information he needed and any other steps he wanted Plaintiffs to take. (Id.) Kaffman requested that Plaintiffs each give a verbal statement outside of the other’s presence. (Id.) Plaintiffs cooperated with this request. (Id.) Plaintiffs contend that, even though it is not specifically set forth in communications, Liberty wrongfully denied Plaintiffs coverage based on the fact that Plaintiffs made material misrepresentations as to their occupation of the Premises. (Id. at 27.) However, Plaintiffs aver that such a statement, regarding their representations as to their occupation of the Premises, is false. (Id.) To the contrary, Plaintiffs did occupy the Premises as evidenced by photographs and Liberty’s agents’ walk-through of the Premises, both of which showed that the Premises contained all of Plaintiffs’ personal property to be used at the residence. (Id.) Plaintiffs requested that Liberty’s full file on Plaintiffs’ claim be produced. (Id. at 28.) To date, Plaintiff’s requested information, including a copy of all statements, copies of document requests, estimates and reports from Liberty’s investigators, and other reasonable information, has not been provided to Plaintiffs. (Id.) Plaintiffs have and continue to comply with all reasonable requests for information relative to the loss. (Id. at 29.) Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that they have complied fully and completely with the Policy issued, but to date, Liberty has and continues to refuse to comply with the terms and conditions of the Policy. (Id. at 30.) Liberty in accordance with the Policy had an obligation to expeditiously take reasonable and necessary steps to safeguard the property, to supply reasonable alternate accommodations suitable for two adults with two children, to submit all reasonable and necessary information as requested, and to authorize and permit mitigation and repairs to the property be insured. (Id. at 31.) In addition, pursuant to the Policy, Liberty was supposed to pay Plaintiffs all reasonable and necessary costs and expenses regarding repair of the damages that resulted from the water damage that occurred on February 5, 2023. (Id.) Plaintiffs alleged that the property damage and notice of the damage to Liberty occurred on or about December 12, 2022. It took over eight months for Liberty to conduct its investigation, preventing Plaintiffs from making any repairs to the Premises due to the risk of being denied their claim outright, which occurred anyway. (Id. at 34.) As a result, Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable and permanent harm. (Id. at
34-35.) B. Procedural History On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs commenced the instant Action by filing their Complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York County of Westchester. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The Action was removed to this Court on January 4, 2024. (See id.) Defendant filed a pre-motion letter regarding a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ AC on January 11, 2024, (see Dkt. No. 4-5), to which Plaintiffs did not respond, (see Dkt.). On January 26, 2024, the Court set a briefing schedule for Defendant’s Motion. (See Dkt. No. 6.) Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on February 26, 2024. (See Not. of Mot.; Decl. of Marshall T. Potashner in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Potashner Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 9); Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 10).) Plaintiffs filed their Response on March 27, 2024. (See Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Opp.”) (Dkt. No. 12).) Defendant filed its Reply on April 11, 2024. (See Def.’s Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 14).) II. Discussion A. Standard of Review The Supreme Court has held that while a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570. However, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will…be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘shown’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and “draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same). B. Analysis Defendant seeks to dismiss some of Plaintiffs’ claims, including claims regarding breach of fiduciary duty; quality of life; New York Insurance Law §2601 and 11 CRR-NY 216.0; New York General Business Law (“GBL”) §349; punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. (See Def.’s Mem.) The Court addresses these claims in turn. 1. Fiduciary Duty The Court begins with Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim. (See AC
