Decision THE COURT: Okay. I’m not certain about what exactly happened with regard to that stay, but the Court is prepared to render a ruling. First of all, just because there might have been a stay by me, I don’t see how a case involving blacklisting practices relates to a separate action with regard to rent stabilization in Index Number 450245 of 2019 and here, the Attorney General is investigating the tenant blacklisting practices under RPL Section 227-F, and the basis for doing so, as the Court has been told, is that there were applications to determine and looked into by the landlord on matters about which there may be no blacklisting. The Court also finds that the subpoena is valid and complete on its face. The Attorney General, under Executive Law Section 63 subdivision 12, may investigate illegal actions. Investigatory power is broad, so that the Attorney General can protect the public. The investigative subpoena is enforceable if materials have sought — the materials sought have a reasonable relation to the subject matter under investigation and for the public purpose to be achieved. Here, the Attorney General obtained information from the tenants screening bureau that Zara has continued to seek Landlord and Tenant Court data in screening applicants for residential housing after the passage of the tenant blacklisting law, and the Attorney General initiated an investigation. Based on that, in September of 2023, the Attorney General issued the investigative subpoena requesting production of documents related to that tenant screening process for the period from July 15, 2019 when the tenant blacklisting law took effect until today. The subpoena on its face refers to an investigation under the Executive Law of the Real Property Law Law and CPLR Rule 2302 subdivision A, seeking screening protocols, staff training materials, discussing screening criteria, and tenant applications where a tenant screening report or a court record was obtained. The documents are reasonably related if they exist to a potential violation of RPL Section 227-F and the subpoena at hand properly states the authority for issuance. Zara has not demonstrated the Attorney General’s lack of authority to issue the subpoena or based on relevancy or its factual basis for its issuance. The Court finds that the subpoena is not overbroad. It’s not burdensome. It’s not oppressive. It might seek a lot of information, but it’s none of those things, and finds that it is not — does not constitute an improper fishing expedition. Even if the documents demanded by the subpoena are in fact voluminous, a subpoena should not be quashed or limited because it requires the production of a large number of documents. It is relevancy and not quantity that determines the outcome. The subpoena is not overbroad. It demands documentation and communications relating to tenant blacklisting documents and communications related to the screening process of applicants and figuring out what the outcomes were. The Attorney General seeks documentation for applicants involved in past or pending landlord/tenant proceedings and the period is limited to the going into effect of the blacklisting law of July 15, 2019. So the Attorney General is seeking documents within the scope of its law enforcement authority and the documents are plausibly relevant to investigating landlord/tenant records and whether they’re used or were used to deny housing applications. The Court finds that the subpoena is valid and it directs compliance with the subpoena under the cross-motion which is granted to compel compliance. Zara shall respond to the subpoena by producing all responsive documents within 30 calendar days from today. The Attorney General is not obligated to represent that it will not use the information from this case in its other case, but with regard to the other case, the Court will render a decision as quickly as possible and I’m not sure that I see a connection between the two matters in any event. So the petitioner’s motion is denied and the respondent’s cross-motion is granted. That concludes today’s oral argument. Thank you very much. I wish you well. MR. SEUSING: Can we request 60 days? Is that possible? THE COURT: Maybe. Let’s see what the AG has to say. MS. LANDRY-REYES: I’m sorry. I didn’t hear you, Mr. Seusing. THE COURT: He’s asking for 60 days, not 30. MS. LANDRY-REYES: 45. MR. SEUSING: We are bargaining. THE COURT: I hear 45. MS. LANDRY-REYES: 45 given we waited nine months. MR. SEUSING: We will take 45 if that’s the best and final. THE COURT: If it can’t be done in 45 days, send us an e-mail or something and I might grant you more time. MR. SEUSING: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: I’m not looking for this process to be overly difficult and I thank you so much. Good afternoon. MR. SEUSING: Thank you. MS. LANDRY-REYES: Thank you. CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF THE ORIGINAL MINUTES TAKEN OF THIS PROCEEDING.
