MEMORANDUM & ORDER Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s August 6, 2024, Memorandum & Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s post-trial motion for attorney’s fees and costs (“Fee Decision”), and the August 7, 2024, Judgment in favor of Plaintiff composed of the damages awarded by the jury and the fees and costs awarded by the Court (“Judgment”). (ECF No. 92.) As set forth below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND The Court presumes familiarity with the background of this unpaid wages and retaliation case, which the Court detailed in the Fee Decision. See Quintanilla v. Pete’s Arbor Care Servs., Inc., No. 19-CV-06894, 2024 WL 3675900, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2024). The Court sets forth herein only the facts relevant to Defendants’ motion. The jury verdict in this case awarded Plaintiff $1,600 for unpaid overtime wages that he earned when he worked for Defendants in 2015. (ECF No. 82.) The jury rejected the balance of Plaintiff’s overtime claims for the years 2015 through 2019 and rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants retaliated against him for complaining about his wages. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a motion that sought approximately $90,000 for attorney’s fees and costs. (See ECF No. 83-1 at 1.) The Court granted in part and denied in part that motion and awarded Plaintiff approximately $35,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. See Quintanilla, 2024 WL 3675900, at *10. The Court declined to award Plaintiff attorney’s fees for (among other things) his unsuccessful retaliation claim. Id. at *8. For that reason, the Court explicitly declined to address Defendants’ argument that any fee award must be reduced due to Plaintiff’s related claim before the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”). Id. at *8 n.9. Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s NYSDHR claim was relevant because it (1) asserted that Defendants fired Plaintiff for complaining about discrimination, which is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claim here that Defendants fired him for complaining about his wages, and (2) impermissibly sought the same relief as Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in this case. Id. The Clerk of the Court entered the Judgment accounting for the jury verdict and Fee Decision. (ECF No. 91.) Defendants then filed the instant motion — based on reportedly new evidence — for reconsideration of the Fee Decision and Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 59 and Rule 60. (ECF No. 92.) The Court directed Plaintiffs to refrain from responding to the motion. (Sept. 4, 2024, Electr. Sched. Order.) II. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 59(e) allows a party to file “a motion to alter or amend a judgment” within twenty-eight days after the judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion based on “the availability of new evidence.” Salamone v. Douglas Marine Corp., 111 F.4th 221, 232 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Metzler Inv. GmbH v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2020)). “Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (July 13, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Rather, the standard for granting a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Rule 60(b) allows a party to move for relief from a final judgment based on “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2); e.g., Metzler Inv. GmbH, 970 F.3d at 143; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (providing timing restrictions for a Rule 60(b) motion). Rule 60(b) is “a mechanism for ‘extraordinary judicial relief’” and may be “invoked only if the moving party demonstrates ‘exceptional circumstances.’” Ruotolo v. City of N.Y., 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1142 (2d Cir. 1994)). Rule 60(b) motions are “generally not favored.” Toppin v. Cnty. of Nassau, 828 F. App’x 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001)). The same standard applies to Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions based on new evidence. Metzler Inv. GmbH, 970 F.3d at 146-47 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d at 392). That standard requires the movant to establish that (1) the newly discovered evidence concerns facts that existed at the time of trial or other dispositive proceeding, (2) the movant was justifiably ignorant of those facts despite due diligence, (3) the evidence is admissible and of such importance that it probably would have changed the outcome, and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching. Id.; Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d at 392. III. DISCUSSION Defendants ask the Court to reconsider the Fee Decision and, by extension, the Judgment based on one item of “new evidence.” (ECF No. 92-1 11-16.) The purported “evidence” upon which Defendants rely is the fact that “Plaintiff’s attorneys have never corrected” their statement to NYSDHR — in a footnote — that Plaintiff “lost his job due to discrimination” (the “Footnote Statement”). (Id.
12-14.) According to Defendants, this evidence is crucial because (1) Plaintiff insisted throughout this action that Defendants fired him in retaliation for complaining about wages, not due to discrimination, and (2) Plaintiff insisted in connection with briefing his motion for attorney’s fees and costs that the Footnote Statement was a “typo.” (Id.
