Nichole Q.,1, Plaintiff MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Presently before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff’s counsel, the Law Offices of Kenneth R. Hiller PLLC (the “Hiller Firm”), for $21,651.19 in attorney’s fees under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §406(b) following Plaintiff’s receipt of $130,041.00 in past-due disability benefits. (Dkt. No. 21). The Commissioner of Social Security “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request for attorney’s fees,” asserting that it is “for the Court to decide if the request” is reasonable. (Dkt. No. 24, at 2). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted. II. FACTS On June 10, 2020, Plaintiff signed a fee agreement, hiring the Hiller Firm to represent her on a contingency-fee basis whereby Plaintiff agreed to pay 25 percent of any past-due benefits awarded. (Dkt. No. 21-2, 15; Dkt. No. 21-5, at 1). On June 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §405(g) seeking review of the Commissioner’s denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income and Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits. (Dkt. No. 1). On March 24, 2022, after considering the Administrative Record, (Dkt. No. 10), and briefs by both parties, (Dkt. Nos. 13, 16), the Court reversed Commissioner’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings, (Dkt. No. 17). On remand, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), issued a fully favorable decision finding Plaintiff disabled and granting her claim for benefits. (Dkt. No. 21-4). The Social Security Administration issued a Notice of Award on March 6, 2024, indicating that Plaintiff was entitled to $101,304.65 in past-due benefits and that $32,510.25 had been withheld to pay attorney’s fees.2 (Dkt. No. 21-3, at 2-3). Plaintiff previously moved for, and was awarded, $6,648.35 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. §2412. (Dkt. Nos. 19, 20). The Hiller Firm now moves for $21,651.19 in attorney’s fees3 and asserts that Attorney Justin Goldstein, a senior attorney at the Hiller Firm, spent 30.6 hours representing Plaintiff at the federal district court level, (Dkt. No. 21-2, 13; Dkt. No. 21-6, at 2-3), reflecting an hourly rate of $707.55, (Dkt. No. 21-2, 16, 19; Dkt. No. 21-1 at 8). III. DISCUSSION Section 406(b)(1) of the Social Security Act provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant…the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee…not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. §406(b)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has stated that “§406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Rather, “§406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Id. The Second Circuit has “held that ‘where there is a contingency fee agreement in a successful social security case, the district court’s determination of a reasonable fee under §406(b) must begin with the agreement, and the district court may reduce the amount called for by the contingency agreement only when it finds the amount to be unreasonable.’” Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845, 852-53 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 371 (1990)). “In evaluating the reasonableness of the contingency agreement in a given case,” a court must “determine whether the contingency percentage is within the 25 percent cap…whether there has been fraud or overreaching in making the agreement, and…whether the requested amount is so large as to be a windfall to the attorney.” Id. at 853 (quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit has “explained that a court may reduce the amount of attorney’s fees ‘provided it states the reasons for and the amounts of the deductions.’” Id. (quoting Wells, 907 F.2d at 372). Factors a court “might consider in conducting this reasonableness analysis” include (1) “the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved”; (2) whether ‘the attorney is responsible for delay,’ lest the attorney ‘profit from the accumulation of benefits’ during a delay that the attorney caused”; and (3) whether “‘the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case’ — the so-called ‘windfall’ factor.” Id. at 853. (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). The fee agreement in this case states that the “attorney fee will be 1/4 (25 percent) of the past due benefits” awarded. (Dkt. No. 21-5, at 1). There is no suggestion that the fee requested is out of line with the character of the representation or the results the Hiller Firm achieved, nor is there any suggestion that Plaintiff’s counsel delayed or attempted to delay resolution of this litigation. Accordingly, the Court must determine whether an award of the attorney’s fees requested would amount to a windfall for the Heller Firm. When determining whether an award of attorney’s fees constitutes a windfall, the factors courts have considered include: “the ability and expertise of the lawyers and whether they were particularly efficient, accomplishing in a relatively short amount of time what less specialized or less well-trained lawyers might take far longer to do.” Fields, 24 F.4th at 854. The Hiller Firm’s practice is “devoted largely to representing claimants seeking Social Security Disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income.” (Dkt. No. 21-2, 2). Attorney Goldstein, who performed the majority of the work in this case, has been admitted to practice since 2000 and has handled more than 475 Social Security disability cases since 2010. (Id.
