MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Plaintiff Shilen Amin moves for reconsideration of this Court’s August 16, 2024 order denying his second motion for a preliminary injunction. (Pltf. Second Recon. Mot. (Dkt. No. 61)) This motion is Plaintiff’s third attempt to obtain injunctive relief before discovery. For the reasons stated below, the motion for reconsideration will be denied. BACKGROUND1 Plaintiff owns trademarks for the terms SOUTH ASIAN FILM FESTIVAL (Serial No. 88669916) and the acronym SAFF (Serial No. 88669927), and SOUTH ASIAN INTERNATIONAL FILM FESTIVAL (Serial No. 88669905) and the acronym SAIFF (Serial No. 88669941). (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1) 12) In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have infringed on his marks by holding competing film festivals that use these terms. (Id.
41-53) With the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Defendants “from using the trademarks registered to Plaintiff or any variations thereof or similar marks” in Defendants’ film festival scheduled to take place the next day. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 6-8) In arguing that the marks related to his film festival are entitled to protection, Plaintiff’s sole argument has been that his marks “are entitled to a presumption of validity,” because he owns “certificate[s] of registration” for them. (Pltf. First PI Br. (Dkt. No. 8) at 3; see also Pltf. First PI Reply (Dkt. No. 33) at 3 (arguing that Plaintiff’s “trademarks are protected because they are registered with the [United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")]“); Hearing Tr. (Dkt. No. 50) at 17:4-13, 17:23-18:6 (Plaintiff arguing that “there’s value to getting a registration,” and “once you get a trademark…it’s a rebuttable presumption that something is distinctive”)) In a September 21, 2023 bench ruling, this Court denied Plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction. (See Hearing Tr. (Dkt. No. 50) at 16:4-10, 22:15-23:5; Order (Dkt. No. 38)) While acknowledging that “marks that have been registered with the [Patent and Trademark Office] are afforded a presumption of validity,” this Court noted that “the presumption…is rebuttable.” (Hearing Tr. (Dkt. No. 50) at 7:21-8:5; see also id. at 17:14-22 (“What the PTO does is not binding on [this Court].”)) As to the marks SOUTH ASIAN FILM FESTIVAL and SOUTH ASIAN INTERNATIONAL FILM FESTIVAL, this Court concluded that “the Complaint does not adequately plead facts demonstrating that these [descriptive] marks have acquired secondary meaning[.] [Accordingly,] these marks do not provide a basis for me to grant injunctive relief.”2 (Id. at 11:17-22) In October 2023, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of this Court’s September 21, 2023 bench ruling denying his application for a preliminary injunction (Pltf. First Recon. Mot. (Dkt. No. 42)), and moved again for a preliminary injunction, seeking substantially the same relief as in his first application. (Pltf. Second PI Mot. (Dkt. No. 46)) As to the protectability of his marks, Plaintiff argued that “the Court did not correctly apply black letter law…[that] the registered trademark holder enjoys a presumption of secondary meaning,” and that “the burden of proof on issues like secondary meaning falls on the alleged infringer.” (Pltf. Second PI Br. (Dkt. No. 49) at 9; id. (arguing that “the Court stood the burden of proof on its head” in denying his first application for injunctive relief)) In connection with his second application for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff submitted several exhibits that he says were “introduced at the [PTO] examiner and [the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)] levels,” and that demonstrate that his marks have secondary meaning. (Id. at 9-10) Plaintiff maintained, however, that “such proof [is] not required,” because marks held by “registered trademark holders” enjoy a presumption of secondary meaning. (Id. at 10) In sum, Plaintiff has consistently argued to this Court that — because he holds registered marks — he is “not legally required to prove anything.” (Id. at 9; see also Pltf. Recon. Br. (Dkt. No. 44) at 3 (arguing that “[t]he presumption of secondary meaning that carried the day for Plaintiff in his successful trademark application should, under prevailing law, have satisfied Plaintiff’s obligation to produce a prima facie case in this proceeding”)) In an August 16, 2024 order, this Court denied Plaintiff’s second application for a preliminary injunction. The Court began its analysis by noting that the Complaint asserts trademark infringement under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1114, 1125(a). (Aug. 16, 2024 Order (Dkt. No. 59) at 10-11) (citing Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1), Second Cause of Action,
