DECISION/FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER AFTER TRIAL The parties have one child-in-common, E.M. (hereinafter “E”). On February 23, 2024, the mother, N.P. (hereinafter “Mother” or “Ms. P”) filed a support petition against the father, D.M. (hereinafter “Father” or “Mr. M”). See Petition for Support (P, 02/22/2024), Nassau County Family Court Docket Number F-01630-24. Despite attempts to settle the matter, the parties were unable to resolve the case. Thus, on October 25, 2024, a trial in the matter commenced and was completed. Ms. P was represented by Adam Howard Moser, Esq. (hereinafter “Mr. Moser”); Mr. M was represented by Carolyn Kersch, Esq. (hereinafter “Ms. Kersch”) and Vanessa Laloudakis, Esq. (hereinafter “Ms. Laloudakis”). After having considered the evidence, the parties’ arguments, and the law, the Court’s determination follows: EVIDENCE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE Ms. P’s Testimony Ms. P testified that the parties have one child together, E, born on July 29, 2020. She told the Court that based upon the parties’ custody order, she has residential custody of E and the parties share legal custody of him. She stated that she lives with E in a one-bedroom apartment that she rents for $3,000.00 a month. Ms. P testified that she has known Mr. M for five years. She told the Court that the parties resided together for approximately eight months when E was about three years old. She stated that she knows Mr. M is employed by U.C., a company owned by his father. Ms. P testified that during the time that the parties lived together, Mr. M worked Mondays through Fridays, and sometimes performed side jobs on Saturdays. She admitted that she did not know what Mr. M was earning then, but stated that he once told her that he made over $2,500.00 weekly. Ms. P testified that Mr. M’s father pays him in cash, and that Mr. M told her that he only accepts cash for side jobs. She stated that she would sometimes visit Mr. M on job sites and he was working in luxury homes, making multi-million dollar improvements to them. Ms. P testified that she is aware that Mr. M has Type 1 Diabetes for which he takes medication. She told the Court that never stopped Mr. M from going to work while they were together. She told the Court that Mr. M would start his work days between 7:00 A.M. and 8:00 A.M. and finish between 4:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. Ms. P testified that she is a licensed hairdresser and the owner of H.B. by N.J. She told the Court that she pays $2,500.00 monthly rent for her salon, along with many other expenses, including utilities, supplies, insurance, and towel service. She stated that although her salon can accommodate eight stylists, she does not rent chairs there. She told the Court that she has one assistant who helps her keep the place tidy and shampoos her clients. Ms. P testified that her clients mostly pay by credit card and she receives tips in cash. She estimated her weekly tips to be approximately $100.00. Ms. P is proud of her ability to maintain her own salon, stating that she is “committed” to it. She told the Court that the current trend in the hair industry is to service clients in salon suites. She stated that although it would be less expensive for her to conduct business in one of those, she prefers the prestige of having her own independent salon. Ms. P testified that she works by appointment only. She told the Court that she typically does not schedule appointments on Mondays and she rarely works after 3:30 P.M. unless there is a specific client demand. Ms. P told the Court that although her revenue is approximately $140,000.00 annually, with all of her voluminous business expenses, her income is approximately $30,000.00 annually. She testified to the truth and accuracy of her financial disclosure affidavit, and acknowledged that monthly personal expenses for herself and E total $7,740.00. She told the Court that she drives a 2023 Mercedes E-350, which she leases through her business, and the cost of her cellular telephone is written off as a business expense. She stated that all of her salon profits are deposited into her business bank account and she transfers money to pay her personal monthly expenses. Ms. P testified that E is enrolled in publicly funded health insurance. She told the Court that she is aware that she has an obligation to cover him through private health insurance in light of her status as a business owner, and she intends to do so. Ms. P testified that she feels it is important for E to attend Pre-K so that he can become socialized and start his education. She told the Court that she enrolled E in M.R., a family-based and educationally-based private school with religious components. She stated that she informed Mr. M that she planned to do so. Ms. P testified that E attends Pre-K and extra-curricular activities there. She told the Court that she transports E back and forth to the school, and pays his $800.00 monthly tuition. She stated that Mr. M refuses to contribute towards the cost. She told the Court that E attends school from 8:15 A.M. until 2:15 P.M., and stays there for after-care until 6:15 P.M. on some days. Ms. P conceded that there are public Pre-K programs available for E, but stated that she would not be willing to send E to one of those. She acknowledged that she only researched private schooling for him. She elaborated that she wants E to continue his studies in Parochial School. Ms. P testified that she wants the Court to order Mr. M to pay his pro rata share for E’s basic support and child care. Mr. M’s Testimony Mr. M testified that he is thirty-five years old and suffers from numerous illnesses, including Type 1 Diabetes, high cholesterol, and Borderline Personality Disorder. He told the Court that his Type 1 Diabetes, from which he has suffered since the eighth grade, is the most debilitating for him. He stated that he has medical devices installed in his body and he takes numerous medications. Mr. M testified that when his blood sugar levels become unregulated, he is unable to function properly so he can not work, and sometimes has to cancel visitation with E. He stated that he had a recent episode which caused him to be hospitalized. Mr. P testified that he is being monitored and he will likely need to reassess his treatment plan with additional medical interventions. Mr. M testified that he works on a per diem basis for his father’s company, U.I. by J.M. He told the Court that he is a carpenter, who does woodworking and trim work, and installs doors and windows. He stated that he has no ownership interest in his father’s company. He told the Court that he earns approximately $180.00 daily in cash, and denied telling Ms. P that he makes $2,500.00 weekly. Mr. M testified that he had a conversation with Ms. P about enrolling E in the free Pre-K program in G.C., which he characterized as one of the top school districts in the nation. He told the Court that it was his belief that both parties agreed to apply there and he had been preparing the documents. He stated that he needed E’s birth certificate for enrollment, but Ms. P did not give the document to him when asked for it. Mr. M testified that based upon his conversations with the school district, E would still be eligible to attend so long as Ms. P provided E’s birth certificate. He told the Court that Ms. P made the decision to send E to M.R. without his permission. He elaborated that he does not like the distance or cost of M.R., and maintained that E’s attendance there limits his parenting time. Mr. M testified that he previously resided in Queens where he worked as Superintendent of a building in exchange for living there rent-free. He told the Court that he worked for his father during the day and maintained the building in the evenings. He stated that he left that job when he and Ms. P began to live together. Mr. M testified that after Ms. P abruptly left their relationship by moving out of their shared rental, he went to stay with his parents. He stated that he continues to reside there because he can not afford to live on his own. Mr. M testified that he has tremendous credit card debt and borrows money from his parents. He told the Court that his goal is to “get back on [his] feet and save some money.” He stated that despite entry into raffles, he has been unsuccessful in acquiring low-income housing for himself. He acknowledged that he has a degree in business administration with a concentration in finance, but stated that he has been unable to utilize that degree since he has a felony conviction. He told the Court that his search for a higher-earning job has been thwarted by his medical conditions and criminal history. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Ms. P admitted a copy of her signed and notarized Financial Disclosure Affidavit, dated August 22, 2024, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. Ms. P admitted a copy of her 2023 New York State S Corporation Franchise Tax Return into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2. Ms. P admitted a copy of her Federal Income Tax Return for an S Corporation into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. Ms. P admitted a copy of her 2023 Federal Schedule K-1 into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 4. Ms. P admitted a copy of her 2023 Federal Individual Income Tax Return into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 5. Ms. P admitted a copy of her 2023 New York State Income Tax Return into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 6. Mr. M admitted a copy of his signed and notarized, undated Financial Disclosure Affidavit into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit A. Mr. M admitted a copy of his 2023 e-file Activity Report, dated May 3, 2024, into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit B. Mr. M admitted a copy of his 2022 Federal Individual Income Tax Return into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit C. Mr. M admitted a copy of his 2021 Federal Individual Income Tax Return into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit D. Mr. M admitted a letter, dated October 23, 2024, from Doctor S.K. of NYU Langone Health into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit E. Mr. M admitted medical documentation, dated October 22, 2024, from the NYU Langone Hospital Emergency Department, into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit F. Mr. M admitted a copy of text messages between the parties, dated July 9, 2024, into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit G. Mr. M admitted a copy of text messages between the parties, dated August 26, 2024, into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit H. DISCUSSION MS. P’S PETITION FOR CHILD SUPPORT IS HEREBY GRANTED CHILD SUPPORT Parents have an obligation to contribute to the economic well-being of their children. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(a) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Matter of H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521, 527 (2010); Baker v. Baker, 129 A.D.3d 1541, 1542 (4th Dep’t 2015); Burr v. Fellner, 73 A.D.3d 1041, 1041 (2d Dep’t 2010); Thomas B. v. Lydia. D., 69 A.D.3d 24, 27-9 (1st Dep’t 2009). To that end, under the law, a non-custodial parent must provide child support to a custodial parent since a custodial parent is responsible for paying for a child’s daily living expenses. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§413, 440, 443, 513, 545 (McKinney’s 2024); Bast v. Rossoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 728 (1998) (Child Support Standards Act “speaks in terms of a ‘custodial’ and a ‘noncustodial’ parent.”). In New York, child support obligations continue until a child turns twenty-one years old, or emancipates themselves through marriage, military service, a job that causes them to be self-supporting, or they constructively emancipate by withdrawing from parental supervision and control. See Baker, 129 A.D.3d at 1542; see also Burr, 73 A.D.3d at 1041; Thomas B., 69 A.D.3d at 27-9; Bogin v. Goodrich, 265 A.D.2d 779, 781 (3d Dep’t 1999) (citing cases). There is no dispute that Mr. M is E’s father and Ms. P is E’s custodial parent. Thus, Ms. P is entitled to Mr. M’s contribution towards E’s support, retroactive to her petition’s filing date of February 23, 2024. The Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter “CSSA”) contains a formula for computing the basic child support calculation, based upon parental income, which is presumed to provide a “fair and reasonable sum” to meet a child’s needs within both of his or her parents’ means. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§413(1)(a) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649, 652 (1995); Moore v. Abban, 72 A.D.3d 970, 971 (2d Dep’t 2010). A presumption exists that the child support amount computed under the statutory guidelines is correct. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(f) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 653; Moore, 72 A.D.3d at 971. Such presumption may be rebutted, and a child support obligation adjusted, upon a support magistrate’s finding that the non-custodial parent’s obligation is “unjust or inappropriate.” Id. In its analysis regarding whether or not the non-custodial parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate, the court must consider the factors enumerated in New York State Family Court Act §413(1)(f). See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413 (1)(f) (McKinney’s 2024) (setting forth statutory factors); see also Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 653; Moore, 72 A.D.3d at 971-72. Thereafter, if a court decides that the non-custodial parent’s pro rata share is unjust or inappropriate, such court must issue a written order setting forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its departure from the basic child support obligation. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(g) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Moore, 72 A.D.3d at 971-72. A support magistrate is granted considerable discretion when deciding whether or not to impute income to a parent. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §413(1)(b)(5)(iv) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Qazi v. Qazi, 220 A.D.3d 660, 661 (2d Dep’t 2023); Coughlan v. Coughlan, 218 A.D.3d 569, 571 (2d Dep’t 2023); Grace v. Amabile, 181 A.D.3d 602, 604 (2d Dep’t 2020); Kennedy v. Ventimiglia, 73 A.D.3d 1066, 1067 (2d Dep’t 2010). Where a parent’s testimony is found to be incredible, a court may impute income greater than the claimed income. See Bouie v. Joseph, 91 A.D.3d 641, 642 (2d Dep’t 2013); see also Duffy v. Duffy, 84 A.D.3d 1151, 1152 (2d Dep’t 2011); Mosso v. Mosso, 84 A.D.3d 757, 759 (2d Dep’t 2011); Wesche v. Wesche, 77 A.D.3d 921, 923 (2d Dep’t 2010); Rohme v. Burns, 79 A.D.3d 756, 757 (2d Dep’t 2010). A support magistrate may base imputation on money, goods, or services provided by relatives and friends. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §413(1)(b)(5)(iv) (D) (McKinney’s 2023); see also Coughlan, 218 A.D.3d 5 at 570; Grace, 181 A.D.3d at 604; Gebaide v. Gebaide McGoldrick, 74 A.D.3d 966, 967 (2d Dep’t 2008). When a support magistrate imputes income, there must be a clear record regarding the reasons for such imputation, the imputed income’s source, and the consequent child support calculations. See Qazi, 220 A.D.3d at 661; Pilkington v. Pilkington, 185 A.D.3d 844, 846 (2d Dep’t 2020); Rohme, 79 A.D.3d at 757; Sena v. Sena, 61 A.D.3d 980, 981 (2d Dep’t 2009); Gravenese v. Marchese, 57 A.D.3d 992, 993 (2d Dep’t 2008). Ms. P is the sole proprietor of a hair salon who drives a Mercedes and expenses her business, and some of her personal, expenditures through her salon. Her tax documents reflect that her receipts total $140,559.00 annually, her ordinary business income is $30,266.00 annually, and her salary is $29,484.00 annually. Such a salary cannot be reconciled with her financial disclosure affidavit which sets forth personal monthly expenses in the amount of $7,740.00. Given Ms. P’s ability to maintain an independent salon for herself, the Court finds Ms. P’s testimony that she receives only $100.00 in tips each week to be unbelievable. Mr. M is a carpenter who works as an independent contractor for his father’s company and engages in some additional work for his own clients. Mr. M has had Type 1 Diabetes since he was in the eighth grade, yet he has been able to acquire a college degree, work for his father and perform side jobs, and work a second job for a time in exchange for free rent. While the Court believes that he suffers from a variety of illnesses, Mr. M failed to admit any substantiating medical documentation supporting the fact that he is unable to work on a regular basis because of them. See e.g. Lindor v. Crowell, 216 A.D.3d 1094, 1094 (2d Dep’t 2023) (father failed to provide competent medical evidence establishing alleged medical conditions prevented him from working); Mikhlin v. Giuffirda, 119 A.D.3d 692, 693 (2d Dep’t 2014) (father failed to demonstrate symptoms or conditions stopped him from working); Monroe v. Monroe, 103 A.D.3d 803, 803 (2d Dep’t 2013) (father failed to submit medical evidence of alleged disability); Greene v. Holmes, 31 A.D.3d 760, 762 (2d Dep’t 2006) (claimed mental health diagnosis was not established through proof). Absent such proof, it is inconceivable that Mr. M earns $18,255.00 annually as reflected on his tax return. Such is inconsistent with Mr. M’s financial disclosure affidavit which reflects $2,073.00 monthly expenses, totaling $24,876.00 yearly expenses. The Court finds worthy of mention that in his financial disclosure affidavit, Mr. M failed to delineate the amount spent on several items such as rent, utilities, laundry, entertainment, and his cellular telephone. Based upon the testimony elicited at trial, the Court surmises that Mr. M’s parents assume these costs for him. Mr. M testified that he earns approximately $180.00 daily in cash. Were the Court to calculate his annual income for a fiveday work week, his salary would be $46,800.00. Given that neither party’s account of their income appears to be credible, the Court hereby imputes income to both parents. Based upon the personal monthly expenses Ms. P listed for her and E on her financial disclosure affidavit, the Court hereby imputes $92,880.00 annual income to her. The Court finds it necessary and appropriate to impute additional income to Ms. P in the amount of $20,800.001 annually for cash tips she receives. Based upon Mr. M’s testimony that he earns $180.00 daily, the Court hereby imputes a $46,800.00 annual income to him. Moreover, the Court finds it necessary and appropriate to impute additional income to him in the amount of $2,200.00 monthly for expenses that his parents pay on his behalf and $500.00 monthly for side jobs he performs. The CSSA dictates that for one child, parents have a duty to pay 17 percent of their incomes. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(b)(3)(i) (McKinney’s 2024). The parties’ combined gross income is $192,880.00 annually and the parties’ combined adjusted gross income is $172,296.04 annually. 17 percent of $172,296.04 yields a $29,290.33 per year child support obligation for both parents. Based upon their respective incomes, Ms. P’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 58 percent and Mr. M’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 42 percent. Since Mr. M’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 42 percent, his weekly child support calculates to be $237.00. The Court finds this amount to be neither unjust or inappropriate. HEALTH INSURANCE/UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL EXPENSES New York State Family Court Act §416 (hereinafter “§416″) governs health insurance coverage in support proceedings. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §416 (McKinney’s 2024). §416(c) dictates that a “legally responsible relative” must provide private health insurance coverage for a person on whose behalf a petition is brought if such coverage is available to them. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §416(c) (McKinney’s 2024). New York Codes, Rules and Regulations defines a legally responsible relative as “any person who is legally obligated to furnish support for a child, or spouse and child.” 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §347.2. Pursuant to §416, it is a court’s duty to determine whether health insurance benefits are available to a legally responsible relative and, if so, to order coverage. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§413(6)(c)(5), 416(c), (d) (McKinney’s 2024); Chautauqua Cty. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Matteson, 126 A.D.3d 1338, 1339-340 (4th Dep’t 2015); Chemung Cty. Commr. of Social Servs. v. Beard, 101 A.D.3d 33, 35 (3d Dep’t 2012). §416(d)(2) provides that health insurance benefits are available when they are “reasonable in cost” and “reasonably accessible.” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(d)(2) (McKinney’s 2024). §416 defines “reasonable in cost” as not exceeding five percent of the combined parental gross income and/or not reducing a parent’s income below the self-support reserve. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(d)(3) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Matteson, 126 A.D.3d at 1339-340 (4th Dep’t 2015); Beard, 101 A.D.3d at 35 (3d Dep’t 2012). Moreover, a court may not order health insurance coverage where doing so would be “unjust or inappropriate” given, inter alia, “the circumstances of the case” and “the best interests of the child.” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(d)(3) (McKinney’s 2024); Beard, 101 A.D.3d at 35 (3d Dep’t 2012). §416 defines “reasonably accessible” as convenient, based upon travel time and distance, to the person for whom health insurance coverage is sought. Id. Notwithstanding, for “good cause shown,” a court may determine that health insurance coverage is not reasonably accessible. Id. Where two parents have available health insurance coverage, a court must direct, within the parties’ support order, that either or both parents immediately provide those benefits to a child. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(e)(2)(ii), 416(h) (McKinney’s 2024). Where only one parent has available health insurance coverage, a court must direct, within the parties’ support order, that parent to immediately provide those benefits to a child. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§416(e)(2)(i), 416(h) (McKinney’s 2024). A court shall pro-rate each parent’s share of the child’s health insurance premium. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(5)(ii) (McKinney’s 2024). Where the non-custodial parent is ordered to place the child on his or her health insurance, the custodial parent’s pro rata share shall be deducted from the basic child support obligation ordered. See id. Morever, a court shall pro-rate each parent’s share of the child’s future reasonable health care expenses, not covered by insurance, in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(5)(v) (McKinney’s 2024). Ms. P testified that E is currently covered under publicly funded health insurance. She acknowledged that as a business owner, she must cover E under private health insurance. The Court hereby orders her to do so, effectively immediately. Mr. M shall be required to pay his 42 percent pro rata share of E’s monthly medical premiums. Ms. P shall provide Mr. M with proof of the cost of E’s medical premiums prior to seeking reimbursement from him. With regards to E’s unreimbursed medical expenses, Mr. M shall be required to pay his 42 percent pro rata share of those costs. Ms. P shall provide Mr. M with copies of all bills, explanation of benefits documents, and proof of payment prior to seeking reimbursement from him. CHILD CARE Where a custodial parent is working, and incurs child care expenses, the non-custodial parent’s obligation towards those expenses is computed by pro-rating his or her income to the combined parental income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(4) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Capone v. Westbrook, 214 A.D.3d 975, 976-77 (2d Dep’t 2023); Ripley v. Valencia, 136 A.D.3d 831, 831-32 (2d Dep’t 2016); Bibicoff v. Orfanakis, 48 A.D.3d 680, 682 (2d Dep’t 2008); D’Avanzo v. Papa, 18 A.D.3d 658, 659 (2d Dep’t 2005); Lewis v. Redhead, 5 A.D.3d 600, 601 (2d Dep’t 2004). An award of child care expenses is mandatory, not discretionary. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(6)(c)(4) (McKinney’s 2024). In other words, all that Ms. P had to prove is that she is employed and incurs child care costs during the hours she is working. See id. When questioned by the Court for clarity purposes, Ms. P testified that she considers the M.R. Pre-K program to be “school” and not child care. Assuming arguendo she had testified that E’s Pre-K attendance is child care, she failed to admit proof of the cost. See Barmoha v. Eisayev, 146 A.D.3d 946, 947 (2d Dep’t 2017) (testimony with submission of monthly day care bill sufficient evidence of child care costs). Notwithstanding, a court may order a parent to contribute towards his or her child’s educational costs. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(c)(7) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Rabasco v. Lamar, 106 A.D.3d 1095, 1096 (2d Dep’t 2013). An award of educational expenses is discretionary, not mandatory. See Fiore v. Fiore, 150 A.D.3d 1205, 1207 (2d Dep’t 2017); see also Ocasio v. Smith, 70 A.D.3d 952, 953 (2d Dep’t 2010); Cimons v. Cimons, 53 A.D.3d 125, 127 (2d Dep’t 2008). In that regard, a court does not have unbridled discretion. See Sinnott v. Sinnott, 194 A.D.3d 868, 876 (2d Dep’t 2021); see also Pittman v. Williams, 127 A.D.3d 755, 757 (2d Dep’t 2015); Hamilton v. Richards, 119 A.D.3d 573, 574 (2d Dep’t 2014). When deciding whether to grant an application for a parent’s contribution towards private school costs, a court must consider, inter alia, the following factors: (1) the circumstances of the case; (2) the circumstances of the respective parties; (3) the best interests of the child; and, (4) the requirements of justice. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(c)(7) (McKinney’s 2024); see also Pilkington v. Pilkington, 185 A.D.3d 844, 847(2d Dep’t 2020); Casey v. Kelleran, 148 A.D.3d 800, 801 (2d Dep’t 2017); Corkery v. Corkery, 142 A.D.3d 576, 577 (2d Dep’t 2016). Ms. P’s petition did not request Mr. M’s contribution towards educational expenses nor was there sufficient evidence presented relating to the factors to be considered when determining whether such an award is necessary and appropriate. Ms. P’s argument that Mr. M should pay for E’s private Pre-K schooling because she has final decision-making authority is unpersuasive. While it is true that Ms. P has final decision-making authority, unilaterally enrolling E in private parochial schooling does not trigger Mr. M’s contribution towards such costs. Should Ms. P decide to enroll E in a child care program, Mr. M would be required to pay his 42 percent pro rata share of child care costs, with the caveat that Mr. M would only be required to pay for E’s child care during the hours that Ms. P is actually working. Given Ms. P’s testimony that she does not work every day and, when she does, her appointment schedule is erratic, Ms. P would have to provide Mr. M with a copy of her daily schedule, along with a copy of bills, plus proof of payment, prior to seeking reimbursement from him. See Capone, 214 A.D.3d at 977 (inappropriate to direct father to reimburse mother for certain child care expenses where undetermined whether mother was working during relevant time periods). CONCLUSION ADJUDGED, that Ms. P is entitled to Mr. M’s contribution towards their child’s support retroactive to her petition’s filing date; and it is further, ORDERED, that Mr. M shall pay $237.00 weekly towards the support of the parties’ child, E, through the Support Collection Unit, effective November 8, 2024, commencing November 11, 2024 and retroactive to the filing of the petition on February 23, 2024. Ms. P’s pro rata share shall be 58 percent and Mr. M’s pro rata share shall be 42 percent for medical premiums, unreimbursed medical expenses, and child care. Ms. P shall immediately enroll E in private health insurance, and maintain such coverage for him. The parties’ temporary order of support is hereby vacated. Mr. M shall receive credit for payments he made towards the parties’ temporary order of support. This constitutes the decision, opinion and order of the Court. YOUR WILLFUL FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY, AFTER COURT HEARING, RESULT IN YOUR COMMITMENT TO JAIL FOR A TERM NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS FOR CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT OR CONTEMPT OF COURT; YOUR FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY RESULT IN SUSPENSION OF YOUR DRIVER’S LICENSES, STATEISSUED PROFESSIONAL, TRADE, BUSINESS AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES AND RECREATIONAL AND SPORTING LICENSES AND PERMITS; AND IMPOSITION OF REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY LIENS. PURSUANT TO SECTION 1113 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, AN APPEAL MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER BY APPELLANT IN COURT, 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING OF THE ORDER TO APPELLANT BY THE CLERK OF COURT, OR 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE BY A PARTY OR THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD UPON APPELLANT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIEST. Check applicable box: Order mailed on [specify date (s) and to whom mailed] : Order received in court on [specify date(s) and to whom given]: Dated: November 8, 2024
