MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiffs, a collective group of 75 individuals, commenced this action on July 8, 2024 against Defendant Bowlero Corp., AMF Bowling Centers, Inc., and Bowlmor AMF Corp. (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) for their alleged unlawful termination on the basis of their age, or in retaliation for opposing Defendants employment practices. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending their anticipated motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 30.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion to stay (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, all former employees of Defendants, are located in eighteen states across the nation and have collectively brought this action seeking damages for their unlawful termination on account of their age, or in retaliation for their opposition of Defendants unlawful employment practices. (See ECF No. 1 at pp. 1-2.) Specifically, Defendants allegedly engaged in an intentional, systemic pattern of terminating employees ages 40 and over, precluding members of this age group from securing employment through unlawful hiring practices, and firing employees who opposed Defendants discriminatory actions. (Id.) Consequently, all 75 Plaintiffs filed individual Charges of Discrimination (“COD”) with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for age discrimination, retaliation, and discriminatory hiring practices (Id. at 2.) Following the EEOC’s findings that “reasonable cause of discrimination” existed as towards 57 of the 75 CODs, Plaintiffs’ counsel requested Right to Sue letters for all 75 Plaintiffs. (Id. at 100.) The present action followed. On July 25, 2024, Defendants filed their first motion for a pre-motion conference to dismiss the original Complaint on grounds that Plaintiffs failed to timely file their ADEA claims, and, in the alternative, failed to plausibly allege age discrimination causes of action. (ECF No. 13.) Shortly thereafter, the parties attempted to formulate a discovery plan but fell short mainly because Defendants “articulated their intention to seek a stay of discovery pending resolution of their anticipated motion to dismiss”. (Defs. Mem. at p. 3.) At the Initial Conference before the undersigned on September 12, 2024, Plaintiffs expressed their intention to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 24.) Defendants, in response, filed a second motion for a pre-motion conference expressing their intent to move to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 28 at p. 1.) The Amended Complaint likewise alleges claims for age discrimination, discriminatory hiring practices, and retaliation against employees who opposed Defendants conduct. (ECF No. 26 at p. 2.) In their second pre-motion letter, Defendants reiterate that Plaintiffs claims are untimely and each individual Plaintiff falls short of establishing a plausible ADEA claim.1 (Id.) On October 31, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to stay discovery (ECF No. 33), pending the outcome of Defendants anticipated motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion (ECF No. 34). II. LEGAL STANDARD “‘[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” Thomas v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-5167, 2010 WL 3709923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). The mere filing of a dispositive motion, in and of itself, does not halt discovery obligations in federal court. That is, a stay of discovery is not warranted, without more, by the mere pendency of a dispositive motion. Weitzner v. Sciton, Inc., No. CV 2005-2533, 2006 WL 3827422, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2006). Rather, the moving party must make a showing of “good cause” to warrant a stay of discovery. Chesney v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 24, 236 F.R.D. 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In evaluating whether a stay of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss is appropriate, courts typically consider: “(1) whether the defendant has made a strong showing that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it; and (3) the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” Id. (citation omitted). “Courts also may take into consideration the nature and complexity of the action, whether some or all of the defendants have joined in the request for a stay, and the posture or stage of the litigation.” Id. (citation omitted); see Vida Press v. Dotcom Liquidators, Ltd., No. 2:22-CV-2044 (HG) (JMW), 2022 WL 17128638, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2022) (finding a stay of discovery was “warranted under the circumstances” after “weighing all of the relevant factors”); see also Mineo v. Town of Hempstead, No. 22-CV-04092 (JMA) (JMW), 2023 WL 7283784, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023) (granting a stay of discovery where defendants arguments appeared on their face to make a showing of untimeliness, discovery would be particularly costly, and no prejudice would result from the stay). It is against this backdrop that the Court considers the present application. III. DISCUSSION A. Whether Defendants Have Made a Strong Showing That Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Unmeritorious Defendants assert that the stay ought to be granted because Plaintiffs’ claims are likely to be dismissed on two grounds: (1) the majority of the 75 individual claims are time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations; and alternatively, (2) each individual Plaintiff fails to state a plausible ADEA claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (See Defs. Mem. at pp. 5-16.) As set forth below, the Court finds that Defendants have made the requisite strong showing that Plaintiffs’ claims are unmeritorious.2 (1) Timeliness of the Claims Defendants first argue that a majority of Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred as there were instances where a Plaintiff filed a COD “more than 180 days or 300 days from the date of termination.” (ECF No. 26 at 123.) In support of this contention, Defendants created a chart demonstrating that “at least 64 of Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely” as they exceeded the overinclusive 300-day window. (See Defs. Mem. at pp. 7-9) (emphasis in original). Moreover, Defendants argue that equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, which ordinarily excuse an untimely filing, are inapplicable as no extraordinary circumstances exist justifying such an exception. (Id. at 9-10.) Rather, Defendants maintain, Plaintiffs conclusory allegations that they were “misled into believing they were terminated for a variety of reasons” and had no knowledge that “their discharge was a pretext for age discrimination” are insufficient to toll the applicable ADEA timeline. (ECF No. 26 at 122); (see Defs. Mem. at pp. 10-11.) Conversely, Plaintiffs contend that the EEOC effectively waived any untimely claims by accepting all 75 of Plaintiffs’ CODs — most of which exceeded the applicable timeline. (Pls. Opp’n at p. 4.) Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that equitable tolling applies as they made diligent efforts to determine the basis of their termination, yet extraordinary circumstances, namely Defendants pretextual, nationwide scheme to discharge employees on the basis of age, prevented the employees from exercising their rights. (Id.) In response, Defendants contend that “discovery cannot reveal facts to revive [Plaintiffs]” especially where the overwhelming majority of Plaintiffs did not meet the 180 or 300-day deadline. (Defs. Reply at p. 2.) Such inability to meet the statutory requirements contradicts Plaintiffs assertion that they made any “ diligent efforts” towards addressing their termination. (Id.) Lastly, Defendants maintain that the alleged pretextual reasons for terminating Plaintiffs are irrelevant as pretext does not function to toll the applicable deadlines. (Id.) Here, based on the record before the Court,3 Plaintiffs’ timeliness argument appears, at least on its face, to be unmeritorious considering that Plaintiffs admitted in the Amended Complaint that there were “instances where Plaintiff filed a COD more than the 180 days or 300 days from the date of termination.” (ECF No. 26 at 123); see Riddle v. Citigroup, 449 Fed. App’x 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2011) (“To be timely, a charge [with the EEOC] must be filed within 180 days or 300 days of the date on which the plaintiff received notice of her termination….”). Additionally, Defendants’ chart notes the days between the adverse action complained of and the COD filing date which indicates that the overwhelming majority of the individual Plaintiffs have failed to timely file their claims. (See Defs. Mem. at pp. 7-9) Furthermore, equitable tolling seems inapplicable here as Plaintiffs merely assert that those who filed an untimely EEOC charge “successfully plead and proved equitably tolling”. (ECF No. 26 at 123); see Adamowicz v. Northwell Health Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01277 (OEM) (LGD), 2024 WL 1072210, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2024) (dismissing the untimely EEOC claims after concluding equitable tolling did not apply where plaintiff made “vague and conclusory allegations” unfit to prove any diligence on its part or any misrepresentations by defendants); see also Edner v. NYCTA-MTA, 134 F. Supp. 3d 657, 666 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding equitable tolling did not apply where plaintiff, in its amended complaint, “argue[d] in conclusory fashion” that he was entitled to such a procedural safeguard). Additionally, throughout the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs offer nothing but conclusory statements that the reason for their discharge “was a pretext for age discrimination.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 26 at
189, 198, 207); see Syrkin v. State Univ. of N.Y. No. 04-CV-4336 (FB) (RML), 2005 WL 2387819, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005) (collecting cases finding that equitable tolling does not apply where the reasons provided were pretextual, specifically noting that “[c]ourts have regularly held that the fact that defendants may have provided other reasons for the employment actions does not justify an inference that plaintiff was misled”) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). At this stage, it appears that Defendants have made a strong showing that a majority of Plaintiffs claims are untimely. Therefore, even if most of the individual Plaintiffs claims are deemed untimely, the matter would nonetheless proceed as to the remaining Plaintiffs who timely filed their COD with the EEOC. (2) Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Alternatively, Defendants assert that each individual Plaintiff fails to state ADEA claims, specifically that each individual Plaintiff fails to “plead age as the but-for cause of the supposed adverse employment action”. (Defs. Mem. at pp. 11-12.) Indeed, Defendants posit that the allegations Plaintiffs made in support of their ADEA claims are entirely conclusory or contradictory. (Id.) Similarly, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs reliance on the EEOC’s conclusions as proof of discrimination is inappropriate as courts need not defer to such conclusions when making its own determinations. (Id. at 12.) Lastly, though a minority of Plaintiffs assert retaliation claims, Defendants contend that even these claims fail because a but-for cause of alleged adverse employment action is still required and has not been established. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiffs argue that each Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that he or she was terminated because of their age or for opposing the discriminatory actions that Defendants allegedly took. (Pls. Opp’n at p. 7.) As such, the “litany of excuses” Defendants offer for terminating Plaintiffs was to conceal Defendants true motive for termination — their age. (Id. at 8.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs direct the Court to consider the numerous CODs detailing the reasons why Plaintiffs were discharged as these exhibits warrant some deference at this juncture. (Id. at 9.) Defendants primarily counter that rather than addressing the pleading deficiencies raised and supported through multiple examples from the Amended Complaint, like the applicable “but-for” standard for ADEA age discrimination claims, Plaintiffs merely “parrot[] the elements of an ADEA cause of action in a formulaic, conclusory fashion”. (Defs. Reply at pp. 3-4.) Here, the Court finds “good cause” to stay discovery in light of Defendants’ arguments. To establish a prima facie case for age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) was within the protected age group, (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) such adverse employment action “occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination”. Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005). In conjunction with these elements, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.” Gross v. GBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009) (noting that the ADEA mandates that age be a but-for cause, rather than “simply a motivating factor”). Such a “but for” requirement extends to retaliation claims as well. Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 304 (2d Cir. 2021) (“ADEA retaliation claims likewise require proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”) (internal quotations omitted). Age here was simply not pled as a “but for” cause. Rather, Plaintiffs offer conclusory statements that “Defendants terminated [plaintiff]‘s employment because of his [or her] age”. (See e.g., ECF No. 26 at
