The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 001) 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38 were read on this motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. DECISION ORDER ON MOTION Upon the foregoing documents, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in the moving and reply papers (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 8, 10-11, 35, 37) and the exhibits attached thereto, in which the court concurs, as summarized herein. The cross-motion of defendant Norma Moreira to dismiss the action is denied. In this insurance coverage declaratory judgment action, plaintiff seeks a declaration of no coverage for its policy holder, defendant Julia Coen, for injuries claimed by defendant Norma Moreira in an action captioned Moreira v. Coen, bearing Index No. 611949/2022, and pending before the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County (the “underlying action”). The policy provides coverage for bodily injury, except where such injury, among other things, arises out of a business engaged in by the insured, the rental of any premises owned by the insured, rented to an insured, or rented to others by an insured, other than the “insured location” (policy, NYSCEF Doc. No. 16 at 31). As relevant herein, “insured location” is defined as the “residence premises,” which in turn is defined as the premises where the insured resides and is identified in the declarations, including a two family dwelling where the insured resides in one of the units (id. at 21). The residence premises defined in the policy is located at 64 West 13th Street, Huntington Station, New York 11750 (the “underlying premises”) (id. at 5). Moreira commenced the underlying action against Coen after slipping and falling at the underlying premises on December 13, 2021 (underlying summons and complaint, NYSCEF Doc. No. 17). During its investigation of the claim, plaintiff interviewed Coen, who stated that at the time of the accident she was not living at the underlying premises but had moved to 420 Commack Road, Commack, New York 11725 (Coen statement, NYSCEF Doc. No. 18). Plaintiff then disclaimed coverage on July 23, 2022, on the grounds that the underlying premises was no longer the residence premises and was not otherwise an insured location under the policy (disclaimer, NYSCEF Doc. No. 19). Coen later testified in the underlying action in 2023 that she had moved away from the underlying premises at least five years previously and had not moved back in (Coen EBT tr., NYSCEF Doc. No. 33 at 7-10). An interpreter was present at the deposition (id. at 5). Plaintiff now seeks summary judgment declaring that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify plaintiff in the underlying action. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no disputed material facts (Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]). The moving party must tender sufficient evidentiary proof to warrant judgment as a matter of law (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). “Failure to make such prima facie showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers” (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986] [internal citations omitted]). Once a movant has met this burden, “the burden shifts to the opposing party to submit proof in admissible form sufficient to create a question of fact requiring a trial” (Kershaw v. Hospital for Special Surgery, 114 AD3d 75, 82 [1st Dept 2013]). “[I]t is insufficient to merely set forth averments of factual or legal conclusions” (Genger v. Genger, 123 AD3d 445, 447 [1st Dept 2014] [internal citation omitted]). Moreover, the reviewing court should accept the opposing party’s evidence as true (Hotopp Assocs. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 256 AD2d 285, 286-287 [1st Dept 1998]), and give the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences (Negri v. Stop & Shop, 65 NY2d 625, 626 [1985]). Therefore, if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]). Here, plaintiff has established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submission of the policy1 and Coen’s statement regarding her residence. Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment against Moreira on the same grounds, as Moreira appeared by counsel (NYSCEF Doc. No. 4) but never filed an answer to the complaint or sought an extension of her time to do so. Coen asserts that she speaks little English and did not understand the questions being put to her (Coen aff., NYSCEF Doc. No. 28, 5). Assuming this is true, Coen later testified that she no longer resided at the underlying premises under oath, at a deposition where an interpreter was present, the transcript of which she reviewed and signed (id.,
