OPINION & ORDER Before me are Plaintiff Krisha Dass’s objections to Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang’s order denying her leave to amend her First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”) and denying her request to depose Ester Rodriguez-Chardavoyne (“Rodriguez-Chardavoyne”), Marquee Poole (“Poole”), and either Ann Paguay (“Paguay”) or Diania Kreymer (“Kreymer”). For the reasons set forth below, Dass’s objections are SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part. I assume familiarity with the facts chronicled in my earlier orders, (see, e.g., Docs. 40, 181), and will refer only to the facts necessary to explain my decision. I. Legal Standard When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order, the district court must review the objections and “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). An order is “clearly erroneous” when “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). A decision is “contrary to law” when it “fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Weiss v. La Suisse, 161 F. Supp. 2d 305, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party may serve and file any objections to a magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive matter within 14 days after being served with a copy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). II. Discussion Dass raises two objections to Judge Wang’s rulings. First, Dass argues that Judge Wang incorrectly concluded that Rule 16(b), rather than Rule 15(a), governs her motion to amend the FAC. (Doc. 173-1 at 9-18.) Second, Dass argues that Judge Wang erroneously denied her request to depose three additional witnesses, without having considered her paramount interests in taking the depositions. (Doc. 173-1 at 18-25.) After addressing the issue of timeliness, I discuss each of these objections in turn. A. Timeliness Before turning to the merits of Dass’s objections, I consider whether they were timely filed. Under Rule 72(a), parties have fourteen days to file written objections to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive ruling, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), and failure to do so timely waives further judicial review, see Small v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (“We have adopted the rule that failure to object timely to a magistrate’s report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate’s decision.”). Judge Wang issued an oral ruling denying Dass leave to amend and to depose additional witnesses on September 13, 2022. (See Doc. 168 at 4:6-7 (“I find here the plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause to modify the scheduling order in this case.”); id. at 4:22-24 (“I am denying the motion for leave to depose Ann Paguay…or Diania Kreymer.”); id. at 5:11-12 (“Same with witness Poole,…same reasons to deny leave to [de]pose Poole.”); id. at 44:4-7 (“Based on the record before me, I find that deposition of Ms. Rodriguez-Chardavoyne would be unreasonably cumulative to what has already been done.”).) Yet Dass did not file her objections until September 29, 2022 — sixteen days later. (Doc. 173.) Judge Wang’s oral ruling was memorialized in writing on September 15, 2022. (Doc. 167.) An oral ruling, however, “has the same effect as a written order,” Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., No. 99-CV-1930, 2002 WL 1628802, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2002), and is sufficient to “trigger” the “period to file objections,” Scharff v. Claridge Gardens, Inc., No. 88-CV-2047, 1990 WL 186879, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1990). See also Yi Xiang v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc., No. 16-CV-4923, 2018 WL 6582802, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2018) (holding that a Magistrate Judge’s ruling “triggered the fourteen-day deadline to object prescribed by Rule 72 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even though his decision was rendered orally and was not formally noted on the docket”); Samad Bros. v. Bokara Rug Co., No. 09-CV-5843, 2011 WL 4357188, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2011) (finding that the 14-day window to object began running on the date of the Magistrate Judge’s oral ruling instead of the date of the Magistrate Judge’s subsequent written clarification); Wigglesworth v. Maiden Holdings, Ltd., No. 19-CV-05296, 2023 WL 1794788, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2023) (“an oral decision made on the record, by itself, is sufficient to preserve the record, facilitate review, and trigger the fourteen-day window for filing objections” (collecting cases)). Accordingly, Dass has waived her right to object to Judge Wang’s decisions. However, the waiver rule is non-jurisdictional, and I “may excuse the default in the interests of justice.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985). “Such discretion is exercised based on, among other factors, whether the defaulted argument has substantial merit or, put otherwise, whether the magistrate judge committed plain error in ruling against the defaulting party.” Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir. 2000). Because Dass’s objection to Judge Wang’s decision denying her leave to amend has “substantial merit,” I conclude that it is in the interest of justice to excuse her default. By contrast, Dass’s objection to Judge Wang’s decision denying her request to take additional depositions are meritless and her arguments are therefore waived. I have nonetheless considered Dass’s objections on the merits and, for the reasons set forth in Section II.C., adopt that aspect of Judge Wang’s ruling. B. Leave to Amend1 1. Applicable Law Determining whether a motion to amend is governed by Rule 15(a) or Rule 16(b) turns on the timeliness of the motion under the court’s case management plan. Where a motion to amend is timely filed, Rule 15′s liberal standard governs. See Soroof Trading Dev. Co. v. GE Microgen, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 142, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Untimely motions, however, are also subject to Rule 16′s more stringent standard, under which a plaintiff must show “good cause.” Id. Rule 15 provides that courts “should freely give leave” to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “it is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny leave to amend.” Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to grant Rule 15 motions in the absence of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007) (“A district court has discretion to deny leave for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”). The party opposing the amendment has the burden of establishing prejudice, bad faith, and futility of the amendment. See Grant v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. 10-CV-2955, 2010 WL 5187754, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (citing Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 250 (2d Cir. 1993)). Rule 16(b) requires a district court to set a case management plan that “limit[s] the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). Once such a case management plan is issued, it “may be modified only for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Therefore, notwithstanding the more lenient standard of Rule 15(a), “a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the pleadings after the deadline set in the scheduling order where the moving party has failed to establish good cause.” Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000). A party cannot establish good cause where “the proposed amendment rests on information that the party knew, or should have known, in advance of the deadline.” Perfect Pearl Co. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Application As an initial matter, I must decide whether Rule 15 or 16 applies to this case. On June 15, 2020, I issued a Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order, which provides: 4. Except as provided by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no additional parties may be joined without leave of the Court. 5. Except as provided by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no additional causes of action or defenses may be asserted after without leave of the Court. (Doc. 45
