The following numbered papers were read on these motions: Submitted by Defendant in Support of Motion NYSCEF Doc Nos. 115-131 Submitted by Plaintiff in Opposition NYSCEF Doc Nos. 132-139 Submitted by Defendant in Reply NYSCEF Doc No. 140 DECISION AND ORDER Upon the foregoing papers, the Court having elected to determine the within motions on submission pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-f and IAS Part 2 Rules, Part II (Motions & Special Proceedings), Subpart C (Appearances & Post-Order Matters), Section 6 (Personal Appearances) (“All motions presumptively are to be argued in person unless the Court informs the parties at least two days in advance that it has made a sua sponte determination that a motion will be determined on submission.”), and due deliberation having been had thereon, the within motion is determined as follows. Plaintiff Ayanna Anderson commenced this action seeking to recover for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on May 28, 2018, when the vehicle she operated was contacted by the one operated by defendant Elena Iltcheva (see NYSCEF Doc NO. 118, complaint). Defendant now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the asserted ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined in Insurance Law §5102 (d), as required by Insurance Law §5104 (a) (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 115, notice of motion). The latter provides in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other law, in any action by or on behalf of a covered person against another covered person for personal injuries arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in this state, there shall be no right of recovery for non-economic loss, except in the case of a serious injury, or for basic economic loss (Insurance Law §5104 [a]). “Serious injury” means a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment (id. §5102 [d]). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if no triable issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]). The issue of whether a claimed injury falls within the statutory definition of “serious injury” is a question of law for the Court, which may be decided on a motion for summary judgment (see Licari v. Elliott, 57 NY2d 230 [1982]). Moving defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, by the submission of evidentiary proof in admissible form, a prima facie case that Plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury from the subject motor vehicle accident as a matter of law, i.e., that there are no material issues of fact (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). A failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851). If moving defendant has made such a showing that plaintiff has not suffered a serious injury from the subject motor vehicle accident as a matter of law, the burden shifts to plaintiff to submit evidence in admissible form sufficient to create a material issue of fact necessitating a trial (see Franchini v. Palmieri, 1 NY3d 536 [2003]; Grasso v. Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 [1991]). In her bill of particulars, plaintiff alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar areas of her spine, right knee, and right quadriceps (see NYSCEF Doc No. 120, bill of particulars §5). “As a result of this occurrence, plaintiff sustained serious injuries as same are defined in the Insurance Law of the State of New York in that plaintiff sustained permanent injuries, a significant disfigurement, disabling injuries for a period in excess of 90 out of the first 180 days following this occurrence; significant limitations of use of bodily functions or systems, permanent loss of a body organ, member, functions or systems; plaintiff sustained permanent consequential limitations of use of a bodily organ and/or member…” (id. §15). In moving for summary judgment, defendant relies on several affirmed medical reports and a biomechanical expert report. Based on these reports, the Court finds that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case to the effect that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury. In terms of the issue of proximate causation of the injuries complained of by plaintiff, defendant argues that any injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine areas and the right knee were not caused by the subject, May 28, 2018 motor vehicle accident. In making that argument, it relies on a biomechanical expert report of Dr. Calum McRae, who holds a Master of Engineering degree in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D. in Biomechanical Engineering. (See NYSCEF Doc No. 117, Overbeck aff
