OPINION AND ORDER On September 24, 2024, the Government filed a five-count indictment (the “Indictment”) against Defendant New York City Mayor Eric Adams (“Adams,” or “Mayor Adams”) on bribery and other charges. The Indictment alleges, inter alia, that Adams accepted illegal campaign contributions and bribes consisting of various forms of luxury travel. Mayor Adams now moves to dismiss Count v. of the Indictment on the ground that the Government’s allegations do not meet the legal standard for bribery under 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B). For the reasons detailed below, Mayor Adams’s Motion to Dismiss Count v. is DENIED. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On a motion to dismiss, the Court reads the Indictment in its entirety. See United States v. Hernandez, 980 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir. 1992). This Opinion summarizes various allegations relevant to the alleged bribery scheme, which the Court assumes to be true solely for the purposes of adjudicating this motion. See United States v. Goldberg, 756 F.2d 949, 950 (2d Cir. 1985).1 Adams became Brooklyn Borough President in January 2014. In 2018, he announced plans to run for mayor of New York City. In July 2021, Adams won the Democratic Party primary for the 2021 New York City mayoral election. In November, Adams won the general election, and he assumed office on January 1, 2022. The Indictment alleges that between 2015 and 2022, Adams maintained a relationship with several Turkish government officials and businesspeople (including the “Turkish Official” and the “Turkish Airline Manager”). He also traveled multiple times on a Turkish national airline (the “Turkish Airline”). I. The Government’s Allegations In 2015, while serving as Brooklyn Borough President, Adams took two trips to Turkey. See Indictment 10, ECF No. 1 (“Ind.”). The trips, which were in August and December, were arranged and/or paid for in part by the Turkish Consulate, a Turkish University, and Turkish business organizations. Id. at 10-11. Adams disclosed the trips to the New York City Conflict of Interest Board (“COIB”). Id. at 10. In 2016 and 2017, Adams and various of his affiliates received travel benefits worth tens of thousands of dollars from his Turkish contacts in connection with travel to India, Turkey, Sri Lanka, China, France. Id. at 12-15. In his COIB disclosure forms for those years, Adams represented that he had neither received any gifts exceeding $1,000 from persons or entities having no business dealings with the City, nor any gifts exceeding $50 from persons or entities who did have business dealings with the City. Id. at 15c. In 2017, construction began on Turkey’s new, 36-story building at 821 United Nations Plaza in New York City. Id. at 38b. The building is known as the “Turkish House” and now serves as the headquarters of multiple Turkish diplomatic missions, including the Turkish Consulate. Id. In 2018, Adams announced his plans to run for Mayor of New York City. See id. at 1. That year, he and his domestic partner traveled to Hungary via Istanbul and received business class upgrades worth more than $10,000. Id. at 21. Adams did not disclose this travel benefit on his 2018 COIB disclosure form. Id. In 2019, Adams’s partner received a business class upgrade on the Turkish Airline on a trip to Turkey, Jordan, and Oman. Id. at 22. During that trip, Adams and his partner received free hotel stays, dinners, and a boat trip. Id. at 23. Adams did not report these benefits on his 2019 COIB disclosure form. Id. at 24. In June 2021, a member of Adams’s staff reached out to the Turkish Airline Manager to arrange travel for Adams and his partner from New York to Istanbul. Id. at 34. Expressing a concern that “[Adams's] every step is being watched right now,” the Adams staffer requested that the discounted price “be somewhat real.” Id. at 34a. Adams paid $1,100 for each economy class ticket, but received an itinerary for business class tickets valued at more than $10,000. Id. For this trip, Adams also arranged to stay at the Four Seasons hotel in Istanbul. Id. at 34c. In text messages to the Adams staffer, the Turkish airline manager promised that “[Adams] is not going to pay” and that “his name will not be on anything.” Id. at 34b. Adams also agreed to pay $720 for other activities included on this trip, including a yacht tour and a beach resort stay, representing a discount of nearly $8,000. Id. at 34c. This trip was ultimately canceled, and Adams’s payment for the economy class tickets was refunded. Id. In late June 2021, Adams’s chief fundraiser for his 2021 Campaign traveled to Istanbul. Id. at 35. The Turkish Official and Turkish Airline provided this fundraiser free transportation from the airport, a free hotel stay, and free access to a VIP room in an airport lounge. Id. On June 27, Adams texted the Turkish Official offering to pay for the fundraiser’s travel. Id. at 35a. The Turkish Official responded that no payment was needed and sent Adams a fabricated bill for the hotel stay. Id. Adams was declared the winner of the Democratic mayoral primary election in July of 2021. Id. at 8. In the summer of 2021, construction was completed on the Turkish House. Id. at 38d. Turkey planned on opening the building for the Turkish President’s visit to New York during the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021. Id. at 38c. By late August of that year, however, the building had not yet been inspected by the Fire Department of New York (“FDNY”), and the FDNY had not issued a “letter of defect” identifying remaining fire safety issues with the building. Id. at 38d-e. Without that letter, the building could not receive a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy (“TCO” or “permit”) from the New York City Department of Buildings allowing it to open. Id. In early September 2021, Adams, his staffer, and the Turkish Official communicated electronically and via phone call about the TCO issue for the Turkish House. Id. at 38g. The Turkish Official, on a phone call with the Adams staffer, stated that “because Turkey had supported [Adams], it was now his turn to support Turkey.” Id. When the staffer relayed this message to Adams, Adams responded: “I know.” Id. Adams then sought a call with the FDNY Commissioner. Id. at 38j. Prior to that call, in August, Adams had declined to commit to retaining the Commissioner were Adams ultimately elected Mayor. Id. On September 8, Adams messaged the FDNY Commissioner describing Turkey’s need for the TCO. Id. The FDNY Commissioner responded that he would “get on it tomorrow,” and Adams, thorough a member of his staff, then texted the Turkish Official that he was “on top of this.” Id. at 38k. On September 9, after reviewing a letter describing the Turkish House’s fire alarm system, an FDNY employee sent the following message to the Fire Prevention Chief: After reviewing the letter, I do not see any way we would be willing to accept it. They have some major issues like central station and fan shutdowns which would be an automatic violation order. Aside from that, he gave us a list with over 60 defects and some of them list 5-10 problems in each one. FAIU would not go beyond 20 defects without issuing a violation order. In my opinion, this document does not take any liability that we would be comfortable with. I believe it actually tells us this building is not safe to occupy. Id. at 38l. The next day, on September 10, Adams messaged the FDNY Commissioner inquiring about the inspection. Id. at 38m. Referring to the Turkish Official, Adams wrote, “[t]hey really need someone…by today if possible. If it is[ im]possible please let me know and I will manage their expectation[s].” Id. In response, the FDNY Commissioner relayed that “[t]here seems to be a difference of opinion between the inspector” and the private alarm engineer, but that the FDNY Commissioner was “trying to iron it out.” Id. That same day, Adams messaged the FDNY Commissioner that “[t]hey said the hire [sic] ups at FDNY did not give the inspector authorization to come. Id. at 38n. He continued, “[t]he inspector indicated he needs authority to come to day [sic].” Id. The FDNY Commissioner responded, “[w]orking on that as we speak.” Id. Adams then messaged his staffer that he had again spoken with the FDNY Commissioner, and “[h]e again told me he is on the phone as we speak to try and resolve this.” Id. That afternoon, the FDNY Chief of Department called the Fire Prevention Chief to a meeting and explained, “in substance, that if the FDNY did not assist the Turkish Consulate in obtaining a TCO, [both of them] would lose their jobs.” Id. at 38o. After that meeting, the Fire Prevention Chief drafted an “unprecedented” “conditional letter of no objection” for the Turkish House. Id. The letter indicated that the FDNY did not object to the Department of Buildings issuing a TCO so long as the FDNY received assurances that the fire alarm system functioned properly and “assum[ing] the Department of Buildings has inspected, tested and approved the installed water-based fire suppression systems.” Id. After hearing this news, Adams messaged the Turkish Official that the letter was being drafted. Id. at 38p. The Turkish Official expressed thanks and called Adams “a true friend of Turkey.” Id. Four days later, on September 14, 2021, Adams messaged his staffer, “directing her to secure tickets to Pakistan for a trip from November 30 to December 8, 2021.” Id. at 39a. The staffer explained that Adams would “pay the economy class price,” and asked if he could “upgrade later.” Id. In November 2021, Adams was elected Mayor of New York City. Id. at 8. At the end of November 2021, Adams traveled to Ghana (rather than Pakistan) on the Turkish Airline and received free business class upgrades worth more than $10,000. Id. at 39d. On this trip, Adams had a nine-hour layover in Istanbul, where he received complimentary airport pickup in a luxury vehicle, dinner, and drinks from the Turkish Official. Id. at 39e. Adams entered office as Mayor of New York City on January 1, 2022. Id. at 42. II. The Indictment On September 24, 2024, the Government filed a five-count indictment against Adams, alleging (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, federal program bribery, and to receive campaign contributions by foreign nationals (18 U.S.C. §371) (Count I); (2) wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§1343, 2) (Count II); (3) solicitation of a contribution by a foreign national (52 U.S.C. §§30121, 30109(d)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. §2) (Count III); (4) solicitation of a contribution by a foreign national (52 U.S.C. §§30121, 30109(d)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. §2) (Count IV); and (5) bribery (18 U.S.C. §§666(a)(1)(B), 2) (Count V). Mayor Adams seeks to dismiss Count v. of the Indictment, which charges that: From at least in or about the summer of 2021, through at least in or about the summer of 2022, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, ERIC ADAMS, the defendant, being an agent of a local government, to wit, the City of New York, which, in a one year period, received benefits in excess of $10,000 under a federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, and other form of federal assistance, corruptly solicited and demanded for the benefit of a person, and accepted and agreed to accept, a thing of value from a person, intending to be influenced and rewarded in connection with business, a transaction, and a series of transactions of the City of New York involving a thing of value of $5,000 and more, to wit, ADAMS solicited and accepted free and heavily discounted luxury travel benefits from the Turkish Official and others in exchange for intending to be influenced in connection with the City of New York’s regulation of the Turkish House, located at 821 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 666(a)(l)(B) and 2.) Ind. 63. LEGAL STANDARDS I. The Requirements of an Indictment “‘The Fifth Amendment made the’ right to indictment by grand jury ‘mandatory in federal prosecutions in recognition of the fact that the intervention of a grand jury was a substantial safeguard against oppressive and arbitrary proceedings.’” United States v. Gonzalez, 686 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959)); see also U.S. Const. amend. v. (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury[.]“) The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In effectuating this constitutional mandate, Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the “indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged” and that “[f]or each count, the indictment…must give the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law that the defendant is alleged to have violated.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).2 “The Supreme Court has held that an indictment is sufficient if it (1) ‘contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend’ and (2) ‘enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.’” United States v. Benjamin, 95 F.4th 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. _, 2024 WL 5112284 (Dec. 16, 2024). II. A Motion to Dismiss an Indictment Rule 12 permits a defendant to seek dismissal of an indictment for failure to charge an offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). On a motion to dismiss an indictment, the Court assumes as true all factual allegations therein. See Benjamin, 95 F.4th at 66 (citing Goldberg, 756 F.2d at 950); accord United States v. Bankman-Fried, 680 F. Supp. 3d 289, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (same). An indictment challenged before a verdict does not carry a presumption of sufficiency. See United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). “[A]n indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.” Benjamin, 95 F.4th at 66-67 (quoting United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1998)). However, “a citation to a statutory section alone is not sufficient to cure a defective indictment that fails to allege all the elements of an offense.” Hernandez, 980 F.2d at 871 (citation omitted). Moreover, “each count of an indictment must be treated as if it were a separate indictment,” and “the validity of a count cannot depend upon the allegations contained in any other count not expressly incorporated.” Id. “An indictment, however, need not be perfect, and common sense and reason are more important than technicalities.” De La Pava, 268 F.3d at 162. STATUTORY BACKGROUND I. Federal Program Bribery under 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B) Count v. charges Mayor Adams under 18 U.S.C. §666, which is entitled “Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds,” and is often colloquially referred to as “federal program” or “federal funds” bribery. The statue makes it a crime when: [A]n agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof — corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more. 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B). Put simply, §666 prohibits bribery by state and local officials, as well as agents of private organizations that receive a certain amount of federal funds. But as the Supreme Court has made clear, the “prohibition is not confined to a business or transaction which affects federal funds.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997). While §666 does not on its face contain a requirement to show a quid pro quo agreement, the Supreme Court has explained that it requires one. See generally Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024) (holding that §666 bribery applies only to quid pro quo exchanges and not gratuities); cf. Benjamin, 95 F.4th at 67 (assuming without deciding that §666 requires proof of a quid pro quo). Quid pro quo means “this for that” or “these for those.” United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2007). To prove a quid pro quo, the government must prove that a defendant had “a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an…act.” United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 777 n.2 (2d Cir. 2021) (emphasis omitted) (citing United States v. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999)). In quid pro quo bribery schemes, the quid is a thing of value that the defendant agrees to accept, the quo is an act that the defendant agrees to perform in exchange for the quid, and the pro is the link between the two: an agreement by the defendant to accept the quid in exchange for being influenced to perform the quo. The Second Circuit has held that, while a “quid pro quo must be clear and unambiguous,” the “showing of a quid pro quo [agreement]…may be based on inference and need not involve an express statement.” Benjamin, 95 F.4th at 68, 71. That is, the agreement, or the pro, may be “implied from the official’s and the [briber's] words and actions.” Id. at 78. “[T]he agreement must be explicit,” which means that it is “plainly evident but not necessarily expressly stated.” Id. at 68 (quotation marks omitted). II. Section 201 and Section 666 A brief overview of §666, its history, and its relationship to a different bribery statute — 18 U.S.C. §201 — is helpful for the Court’s discussion, because, as explained below, the parties’ arguments are based in large part on a disagreement about how the two statutes relate to each other. A. “Official Act” in Section 201 and the Supreme Court’s 2016 Decision in McDonnell Section 201 is entitled “Bribery of public officials and witnesses,” and is known as the general federal bribery statute. It makes it a crime for a public official to “receive or accept anything of value…in return for: being influenced in the performance of any official act.” 18 U.S.C. §201(b)(2)(A). Section 201 prohibits quid pro quo bribery agreements. See McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 573-74 (2016). To prove a quid pro quo under §201, the Government must establish that a public official agreed to perform a particular kind of quo — an “official act,” which is defined in the statute as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity.” 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(3) (emphasis added). In McDonnell, the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of construing §201, an “official act” essentially has two components: (1) “the public official must make a decision or take an action” on (2) “something specific and focused that is ‘pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official.” 579 U.S. at 574 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(3)). With respect to the first component, McDonnell explained that a “decision or action may include using [one's] official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act,’ or to advise another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another official.” Id. But simply “[s]etting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling an official (or agreeing to do so) merely to talk about a [matter]…does not qualify as a decision or action on the pending question…as long as the public official does not intend to exert pressure on another official.” Id. at 573 (emphasis added). As for the second component, McDonnell explained that “[t]he ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ [pending before a public official] must involve a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court.” Id. at 574. To qualify, the matter “must be…focused and concrete,” such as “whether researchers [at a state university] would initiate a study of [a particular drug or nutritional supplement].” Id. at 570. But more general issues like “[e]conomic development,” “national security,” or “justice” broadly are “not naturally described as…matter[s] ‘pending’ before a public official — or something that may be brought ‘by law’ before him.” Id. The question or matter must be “relatively circumscribed — the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress, and then checked off as complete.” Id.; see also United States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538, 557 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[A] promise to perform some act to create jobs or lower taxes, or to ‘benefit the payor,’ without more, cannot be understood to refer to a ‘formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ [because] such a promise is so lacking in definition or specificity that it amounts to no promise at all.” (quoting McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 569)). In sum, McDonnell held that under §201, the quo in a quid pro quo must entail: (1) a decision to take action or to exert pressure on another public official to do so (as opposed to “[s]imply expressing support” for something “at a meeting, event, or call” with another official, “as long as the public official does not intend to exert pressure,” 579 U.S. at 573), on (2) a specific question or matter involving a formal exercise of governmental power (as opposed to something more “nebulous,” id. at 578, or described at a “higher level of generality,” id. at 570). B. Section 666 and the Second Circuit’s 2019 Decision in Ng Lap Seng As noted, section 666 criminalizes bribery and applies to state and local officials, as well as agents of private organizations receiving federal funds. It was passed by Congress in response to confusion about whether the general federal bribery provision under §201 extended to state and local officials. See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 8 (explaining the statutory history of §666). As explained further in the Discussion, the main source of the dispute between the parties here is whether the definition of “official act” in §201 also applies to §666 — that is, whether §666 requires that the quo that a defendant performs in exchange for a bribe be an “official act” as that term is defined under §201, or whether §666 applies to a broader range of conduct. While §201(b)(2)(A) uses the term “official act” in its the text, §666(a)(1)(B) does not. Section 201(b)(2)(A) prohibits the acceptance of “anything of value…in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act.” §201(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). “By contrast, §666 prohibits bribery ‘in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of [an] organization, government, or agency.’” United States v. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110, 133 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B)). The Second Circuit, in Ng Lap Seng, noted that, “[n]owhere does §666 mention ‘official acts,’” and expressly held “that the McDonnell ‘official act’ standard, derived from the quo component of bribery as defined by §201(a)(3), does not necessarily delimit the quo components of other bribery statutes, such as §666.” Id. at 132-33 (also noting the “textual differences among various bribery statutes”). In so ruling, the Circuit relied on its previous decision in United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 291 (2d Cir. 2017). See Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d at 133. In Boyland, the Circuit reasoned that, as a matter of plain meaning, §666′s quo language — “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” — “is more expansive than [the term "official act" as used in] §201.” Id. at 133 (quoting Boyland, 862 F.3d at 291). The Circuit further noted that, while the term “official act” is defined in the text of §201 itself, §666 does not analogously “place any definitional limits on the business or transactions to be influenced — beyond requiring them to be ‘of’ the organization receiving more than $10,000 in federal funding and to have a ‘value of $5,000 or more.’” Id. at 133 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(2)). The Circuit then reaffirmed its holding from Boyland that “McDonnell’s official act standard for the quo component of bribery as proscribed by §201 does not apply to the more expansive language of §666.” Id. (citing Boyland 862 F.3d at 291) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Circuit observed that other circuits that have considered this issue have all held or reasoned similarly, see id. at 134 (citing cases), and concluded that the district court in Ng Lap Seng had erred (albeit, harmlessly) in instructing the jury that it needed to find an “official act” in order to find the defendant guilty of bribery under §666. See id. at 139. Thus, while §201 requires an “official act” — a formal exercise of governmental power with respect to a specific and focused matter to be decided upon — the Second Circuit has been unequivocal that §666 does not. C. The Supreme Court’s Recent Decision in Snyder Last term in Snyder, however, the Supreme Court used the words “official act” in connection with §666. Snyder considered whether §666′s prohibitions extended beyond bribes to also prohibit “gratuities,” and held that they do not. See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 19. Both bribes and gratuities describe a payment to a public official in return for an action, but while “bribes are payments made or agreed to before an official act,” “[g]ratuities are typically payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation.” Id. at 5. The Court held that, in determining whether something is a bribe or a gratuity, “the timing of the agreement is the key, not the timing of the payment.” Id. at 19. The Court acknowledged that there are instances of bribery “where the agreement was made before the act but the payment was made after the act.” Id. at 18. But the Court explained that a bribe occurs where there is an agreement (the pro) made before the defendant acts (the quo), and that if there is no agreement before the act, then anything given of value after the fact is a gratuity. See id. at 19. Notably, throughout its opinion, the Court used the words “official act” to refer to §666′s quo requirement. See, e.g., id. at 10 (“Section 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a crime for state and local officials to ‘corruptly’ accept a payment ‘intending to be influenced or rewarded’ for an official act.”). This is largely the foundation of Mayor Adams’s position in this motion — namely, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder signaled that §666 liability requires an “official act” pursuant to the §201 standard as set forth in McDonnell. DISCUSSION3 Mayor Adams moves to dismiss Count v. of the Indictment alleging quid pro quo bribery under §666(a)(1)(B), challenging the sufficiency of the Indictment’s allegations to support the quo and the pro. After careful review, the Court concludes that the Indictment sufficiently charges §666 bribery under the Second Circuit’s precedent in Ng Lap Seng, Dawkins, and Benjamin. I. The Alleged Quo To charge bribery under §666, the government must allege that the defendant agreed to act “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of [the] organization, government, or agency” of which they are an agent. 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B). Mayor Adams makes two arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Indictment as to the quo. First, he argues that, under §666, the quo must be a discrete exercise of governmental power, but his alleged interventions with respect to the “regulation” of the Turkish House were not. According to Mayor Adams, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Snyder requires that the quo in §666 bribery must be an “official act” as that term is used in the general federal bribery statute, §201, and as construed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell. See, e.g., Def. Br. at 7-8; Def.’s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 3-4, ECF No. 41 (“Def. Reply Br.”). In the alternative, he argues that, irrespective of Snyder’s use of “official act,” §666 itself requires that the official’s conduct be some sort of “specific and formal exercise of governmental power” or “discrete exercise of official authority.” Def. Br. at 10; Def. Reply Br. at 6. Mayor Adams concludes that, whether or not Snyder narrowed the quo element of §666, assisting with the “regulation” of the Turkish House “is too vague and broad” to form the quo of a quid pro quo. Def. Br. at 11; see also Def.’s Reply at 7. Second, Mayor Adams argues that the Indictment does not allege that he exercised formal governmental power for three reasons: because as Brooklyn Borough President he lacked any authority over the FDNY; because the Indictment does not allege that he used his official role as Brooklyn Borough President in reaching out to the FDNY; and/or because his alleged outreach did not amount to pressure on the FDNY. See Def. Br. at 16-20. The Court addresses each argument in turn. A. The Specificity of the Quo Under Section 666 1. Whether Snyder Clearly Undermined Ng Lap Seng The Court first considers whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder clearly undermined the Second Circuit’s holding in Ng Lap Seng that §666 bribery does not require an “official act” as defined in McDonnell. As explained below, the Court concludes that the Second Circuit’s holding on this question remains binding on this Court. There is no dispute that the Second Circuit in Ng Lap Seng clearly held that §666 does not require an “official act” as that term is defined in McDonnell. See Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d at 132-33; Def. Br. at 8; Gov’t Br. at 11. Absent clear direction to the contrary from the Supreme Court, this Court remains bound by that ruling. The Second Circuit has explained that “[i]n rare cases, a district court can decline to follow [Circuit] precedent if it concludes that an intervening Supreme Court decision has so clearly undermined [Circuit] precedent that it will almost inevitably be overruled.” Packer ex rel. 1-800-Flowers.Com, Inc. v. Raging Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 105 F.4th 46, 54 n.36 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Wojchowski v. Daines, 498 F.3d 99, 105-08 (2d Cir. 2007) (agreeing with the district court’s conclusion that Circuit precedent was no longer binding given its inconsistency with an intervening Supreme Court ruling)). This case is not one of those “rare cases” for at least two reasons. First, the question presented in Snyder was whether §666 criminalizes gratuities in addition to bribes. See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 5 (stating that §666 “prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes” and that “[t]he question in this case is whether §666 also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities”). Snyder considered whether §666 criminalizes the acceptance of “payments…as a token of appreciation” after the fact if the defendant never agreed beforehand to do something in return for it. Id. In other words, Snyder’s focus was the pro, not the quo. There is no clear indication that the Court contemplated, let alone sought to define or limit, the quo requirement for §666 bribery. Importing the §201 “official act” standard into §666 without comment would have been highly unusual given that every Circuit to have ruled on this question prior to Snyder — the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh — has held that §666 does not require the same “official act.”4 While Snyder used the term “official act” repeatedly in reference to §666, it is not clear that in doing so it sought to import the precise meaning of that term as defined in §201 and McDonnell. Generally speaking, public corruption statutes prohibit, inter alia, a government or quasi-public actor from agreeing to accept something of value in exchange for certain conduct — and one might naturally describe that conduct as an “official act” of some sort, consistent with the ordinary meaning of those words. See Official, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2004) (“Of or relating to an office, post, position of trust, or service; belonging or relating to the discharge of duties; connected with the tenure of office.”); Act, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (“Something done or effected; a deed.”). So while “official act” is a term of art as defined in §201 and interpreted in McDonnell, it is not clear that the Court’s mere use of those words in Snyder was intended to invoke that precise definition — particularly given the absence of those words from §666. Cf. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d at 132 (noting the “textual differences among various bribery statutes”). Indeed, Snyder did not invoke the definition of “official act” under §201, nor did it rely on McDonnell to define that term. In the context of a case in which the defendant was a former mayor, the Court’s use of the words “official act” in Snyder, could reasonably be read according to their ordinary meaning — as a shorthand for an action or course of conduct taken by a public official, without necessarily intending a technical legal meaning. Second, even if the Court in Snyder meant the term “official act” to have the same meaning as in McDonnell, it is not clear that it sought to limit the quo element under §666. As noted, the Second Circuit held in Ng Lap Seng “that section 666…bribery [is] not textually limited to ‘official acts’ as defined in §201(a)(3) and McDonnell.” 934 F.3d at 131 (emphasis added). That is, Ng Lap Seng held that §666 captures acts falling into the “official act” definition of §201 as well as other conduct. Snyder’s language describing §666 as applying to “official acts” is therefore not necessarily in tension with that holding. Undoubtedly, the interpretation and application of federal public corruption statutes has evolved substantially in recent years.5 It is not inconceivable that the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court might, at some point in the future, hold that an “official act” as defined in McDonnell is necessary under §666, at least as to government actors. But as the Circuit has made clear, “[d]istrict courts…are obliged to follow [Circuit] precedent, even if that precedent might be overturned in the near future.” 1-800-Flowers.Com, 105 F.4th at 54 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court cannot conclude that Snyder “so clearly undermined” Ng Lap Seng so as to make this one of the “rare case[s]” in which a district court may ignore Circuit precedent. Id. at 54 n.36. Until more clearly instructed otherwise, this Court is bound by Ng Lap Seng. Accordingly, in charging §666 bribery, the Government is not obligated to allege conduct to satisfy the “official act” requirement as articulated in McDonnell.6 2. Application of the Second Circuit’s Section 666 Precedent to the Indictment The next issue is whether the Indictment sufficiently alleges a quo under §666 as interpreted by the Second Circuit. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that it does. The Government explains that there are two quos alleged in the Indictment: (1) the regulation of the Turkish House, and (2) the TCO for the Turkish House. See Mot. to Dismiss Oral Arg. Tr. 24, ECF No. 57 (“Tr.”) (“There are at least two alleged quid pro quos in the indictment, and they are nested within each other…the TCO…[and] the regulation of the Turkish House.”); see also Gov’t Br. at 16 (describing agreements “to intervene with respect to…regulatory issues with [the Turkish House],” and “to ensure the Turkish House received a temporary certificate of occupancy” (citing Ind.
