OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Arnold Thomas brings this putative class action against defendant Colgate-Palmolive Company (“Colgate”). Plaintiff alleges defendant negligently manufactured, marketed, and sold Fabuloso-branded cleaning products (“Fabuloso”) that were contaminated with bacteria, harming plaintiff and others who purchased and used Fabuloso. Now pending is defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s class allegations pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. #28). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(d). BACKGROUND The following background is drawn from the amended class action complaint. (Doc. #18 (“Am. Compl.”). In deciding the pending motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Defendant is a New York corporation that manufactures numerous consumer products, including Fabuloso. Defendant markets Fabuloso as safe to use on an array of household surfaces. On February 8, 2023, defendant recalled 4.9 million bottles of Fabuloso produced between December 14, 2022, and January 23, 2023, one million of which had been released for sale to the public in the United States. Defendant issued the recall because “a preservative was not added at the intended levels during manufacturing,” creating the “risk of bacteria growth in the recalled products.” (Am. Compl.
20-21). That error left the affected Fabuloso bottles susceptible to contamination by the Pseudomonas species bacteria — a type of bacteria that can “enter the body if inhaled, through the eyes, or through a break in the skin” and cause “serious infection that may require medical treatment,” especially for “people with weakened immune systems, external medical devices, or underlying lung conditions.” (Id. at 21). Responding to the recall, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) advised consumers to stop using Fabuloso immediately. Plaintiff purchased a Fabuloso bottle, included under defendant’s recall, allegedly containing pseudomonas. After using the product, plaintiff asserts he suffered “significant abdominal pain, diarrhea, dehydration, sores[,] and symptoms and injuries commonly associated with a Pseudomonas infection.” (Am. Compl. 27). He sought medical treatment, and his treating medical professional allegedly informed plaintiff “she believed his injuries were caused by Pseudomonas.” (Id.). Plaintiff now brings putative class action claims for products liability and negligence against defendant. He seeks to represent a proposed class of “all consumers who purchased any of the contaminated [Fabuloso] Products in the United States during the Class Period and were physically injured after using the Products.” (Am. Compl. 33).1 DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review To qualify for class certification, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the putative class meets the four requirements set forth in Rule 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011).2 The Second Circuit also requires a plaintiff to demonstrate compliance with a fifth requirement respecting class ascertainability. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 2006). If the plaintiff meets these five criteria, he or she must also demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class satisfies “at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).” Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 345. Rule 23 allows courts to “require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation of absent persons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D). Typically, a court makes such a decision after the plaintiff moves for class certification and class discovery has concluded, but “a party may move to strike class claims even before discovery.” Kassman v. KPMG, LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Motions to strike class allegations may be granted “where they address issues separate and apart from the issues that will be decided on a class certification motion, or where the movant demonstrates that it would be impossible to certify the alleged class regardless of the facts the plaintiff may be able to obtain during discovery.” Staubitz v. Arthrex, Inc., 2024 WL 4350669, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2024). “In determining whether it would be impossible to certify a class, courts in this circuit generally look to whether the facts alleged in the complaint plausibly support certification.” Id. As a general matter, the Second Circuit has cautioned against dismissing class allegations without “the benefit” of a plaintiff’s motion to certify “and the evidence relevant to that motion.” Parker v. Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 2003). Motions to strike are thus “generally looked upon with disfavor and a motion to strike class allegations is even more disfavored because it requires a reviewing court to preemptively terminate the class aspects of litigation, solely on the basis of what is alleged in the complaint and before plaintiffs are permitted to complete the discovery to which they would otherwise be entitled on questions of class certification.” Chen-Oster v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). As such, “courts in this Circuit have frequently found that a determination of whether Rule 23 requirements are met is more properly deferred to the class certification stage, when a more complete factual record can aid the Court in making this determination.” DeSimone v. Select Portfolio Servicing. Inc., 2024 WL 4188851, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2024). II. Analysis Defendant argues plaintiff’s class action allegations must be struck because the facts alleged in the amended complaint do not plausibly support certification. First, defendant maintains there are several insurmountable deficiencies in the amended complaint, creating individualized questions of causation and injury ill-suited to resolution in the class-action context. Second, defendant asserts the amended complaint includes no plausible allegation that there are any class members other than plaintiff sufficient to support numerosity. The Court disagrees. A. Individualized Questions and Prematurity Defendant argues plaintiff’s proposed class cannot be certified because “no amount of discovery will change” plaintiff’s failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s requirements. (Doc. #29 (“Def. Mem.”) at 6). In defendant’s view, individualized questions of fact and law will predominate over any common issues. These questions include: (i) whether each class member was exposed to bacteria; (ii) in what amounts; and (iii) what damages, if any, each class member suffered. In addition, defendant argues individual choice-of-law determinations would overwhelm any common questions of law. As such, according to defendant, a class action would not be superior to individualized litigation here. Defendant may be right. Its points regarding “the distinct challenges to certifying a product-liability class” may well succeed at the class certification stage. Carr v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., 2023 WL 3504662, at *4 (E.D.N.Y May 17, 2023). Indeed, as courts in this circuit have emphasized, “the class action device typically is not very useful in mass tort cases, which tend to ‘present significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, affecting the individuals in different ways.’” In re Fosamax Products Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Window, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)). But defendant’s arguments do not clear the high bar of showing “the supposed defects in the class allegations [are] so plain from the face of the complaint that it would be impossible to certify the alleged class regardless of the facts the plaintiff[] may be able to obtain during discovery.” Ostenfeld v. Laundress, 2024 WL 967124, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2024). Other courts deciding motions to strike class allegations in product liability cases have acknowledged such allegations generate significant obstacles to certification, especially vis-à-vis typicality and predominance, but also recognize these arguments “are generally considered at class certification, rather than through a motion to strike.” Staubitz v. Arthrex, 2024 WL 4350669, at *3. For instance, the district courts in Carr v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., 2023 WL 3504662, at *4, and Ostenfeld v. Laundress, 2024 WL 967124, at *4, denied motions to strike even after acknowledging the difficulty the plaintiffs might face at the class certification stage. This case is the same. Plaintiff’s amended complaint “alleges — at least facially — some issues of fact or law that may be common and typical to all class members, including: a common course of misconduct by defendant”; a common method of injury suffered by members of the putative class; and “common questions of…whether defendant was aware of the dangers [of Fabuloso], and whether defendant failed to adequately inform consumers about those dangers.” Staubitz v. Arthrex, 2024 WL 4350669, at *3. These issues are best suited for resolution after discovery and class certification briefing. See Garcia v. Execu
