DECISION AND ORDER Defendant Anthony Watkins has filed a pro se motion (Dkt. No. 67) for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Government filed a response in opposition (Dkt. No. 69). For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute is DENIED. BACKGROUND Defendant was originally sentenced in 14-CR-120 on October 8, 2015, to 84 months’ incarceration, after his guilty plea to violating 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition). The Court ordered that the 84-month sentence imposed was to be served consecutively to the 12 months imposed in 8-CR-186, for violating a condition of his supervised release (“You shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.”),1 for an aggregate term of 96 months. On March 5, 2021, Defendant began serving his 3-year term of supervised release in 14-CR-120. On September 27, 2021, U.S. Probation Officers and law enforcement officers conducted a search of Defendant’s residence and recovered approximately 148 grams of a substance containing cocaine base, 112 grams of a substance containing both cocaine and methamphetamine, a digital scale, and drug paraphernalia. The controlled substances were packaged in a manner consistent with distribution, rather than personal use, and Defendant admitted that he possessed these controlled substances with the intent to distribute them. On July 21, 2022, Defendant entered a guilty plea to Count 1 of the instant five-count Indictment, charging possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and Charge Number 1 of the Petition for Offender Under Supervision in 14-CR-120, in violation of the condition of his supervised release that ordered Defendant “shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.” With respect to 21-CR-165, Defendant was facing a maximum of 20 years, and with a Criminal History Category IV and a total offense level 27, his Guidelines range for imprisonment was 100 to 125 months. As part of the plea agreement, the Government agreed not to oppose the Court’s consideration of the powder-to-crack cocaine disparity under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a); if the Court treated the cocaine base as cocaine, there would be a downward variance the equivalent of four levels, to a total offense level 23 and a range of imprisonment of 70 to 87 months. As to 14-CR-120, Defendant was facing a Guidelines range (also the maximum) term of imprisonment of 24 months, and the parties agreed that the Government would recommend any sentence imposed in 14-CR-120 be run concurrent to any sentence imposed in 21-CR-165. The Court scheduled sentencing in both 21-CR-165 and 14-CR-120 for November 28, 2022. Prior to Defendant’s entry of his pleas of guilty in 21-CR-165 and 14-CR-120, the Court granted Defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 34) for temporary release pending sentencing, with strict conditions, so Defendant could spend time with his terminally ill father.2 In granting the motion, however, the Court ordered that Defendant was to self-surrender on the November 28, 2022, sentencing date, regardless of any subsequent sentencing adjournments (see Dkt. Nos. 42, 43). Sentencing was ultimately adjourned, and on April 4, 2023, the Court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate term of 94 months in custody, i.e., 70 months in 21-CR-165, to run consecutive to 24 months in 14-CR-120. The Court further imposed a 3-year term of supervised release in 21-CR-165, and revoked Defendant’s outstanding term of supervised release in 14-CR-120, with no further supervised release imposed. In imposing sentence, the Court noted it had sentenced Defendant at the low-end of 70 to 87 months, after granting the equivalent of the four-level downward variance as recommended by the Department of Justice. The Court commented that the instant offense constituted Defendant’s third federal conviction, and fifth felony conviction. Moreover, the Court stated that incarceration previously imposed, regardless of the term, had ineffectively deterred Defendant’s criminal behavior. It stated: “the sentence is based upon a need to protect the community from further crimes, and to sufficiently admonish you for your pattern of antisocial behavior…and consistent breach of trust for committing all offenses while you’re on supervised release.” Dkt. No. 63 (Sentencing Tr.), p. 27. Defendant is currently housed at FCI Loretto, with a projected release date of February 27, 2028.3 Defendant seeks a sentence reduction to time served, and a term of supervised release “with any and all conditions the Court deems necessary.” DISCUSSION Preliminarily, Defendant attaches to his motion a written request to the Warden at FCI Loretto for compassionate release, dated February 27, 2024. Dkt. No. 67, p. 16. Defendant represents that as of May 1, 2024, he had not received any response to this administrative request for compassionate release.4 As the Second Circuit has held, “[n]ot a jurisdictional limitation, §3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule[] and accordingly may be waived or forfeited by the government.” United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In its response papers dated September 20, 2024, the Government does not dispute that Defendant has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement. Thus, the Court will assess Defendant’s motion on the merits. Under the compassionate release statute, a district court may “reduce the term of imprisonment” and may “impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment[.]” 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). A district court is permitted to reduce a term of imprisonment if, “ after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction…and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (alterations omitted). It is a defendant’s burden to show that he or she is entitled to a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute. See United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). “A district court has broad discretion when considering a motion for compassionate release.” United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam). I. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances Defendant relies upon a policy statement added to the federal Sentencing Guidelines on November 1, 2023, providing that “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the parent” can be an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, §1B1.13(b)(3)(C). Defendant argues that since he was sentenced, his father’s medical condition has continued to deteriorate due to both his years-long terminal condition and the effects of aging, and his father is no longer able to care for himself. The Court finds that Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that (a) his father is incapacitated, and (b) Defendant is the only available caregiver for his father. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 707 F. Supp. 3d 233, 237-38 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2023). The Court is well-aware of Defendant’s father’s unfortunate, terminal medical condition, and it was aware of this family circumstance at the time of Defendant’s sentencing. Indeed, it permitted Defendant’s temporary release for approximately three months before his sentencing so that he could spend time with his father. While Defendant’s release motion noted that Defendant would assist in his father’s care should he be temporarily released, the motion was not predicated on Defendant’s father requiring care that only Defendant could provide. Rather, Defendant argued the following: “[g]iven the nature of his father’s diagnosis, coupled with the sentence [Defendant] is facing, the time between the plea and sentencing will likely be the only time [Defendant] will have to spend with his father while he is still alive. This constitutes an exceptional circumstance that warrants [Defendant's] release.” Dkt. No. 34,
