In the Matter of DRB Capital, LLC, Petitioner v. Pablo Santana, Pacific Life and Annuity Services, Inc., and Pacific Life and Annuity Company, Respondents for approval of transfer of structured settlement payment rights in accordance with General Obligations Law §5-1701 et seq.1 The following numbered papers were used on this petition: NYSCEF Document Numbers 1-12. DECISION, ORDER & JUDGMENT Upon the foregoing papers, having heard oral argument, and due deliberation having been had, the within petition for approval of a proposed transfer of structured payment settlement rights is determined as follows. Introduction In the within special proceeding, petitioner DRB Capital, LLC (“DRB”) has applied, pursuant to the Structured Settlement Protection Act (hereinafter “SSPA”), General Obligations Law §5-1701 et seq., for the approval of the transfer of 125 monthly payments of $570.54 due Pablo Santana (“Mr. Santana”), commencing September 23, 2024 through and including January 23, 2035, under a structured settlement agreement dating back to a lawsuit commenced following a motor vehicle accident which occurred in 2009. The sum of these monthly $570.54 payments is $71,317.50. In the accident, Mr. Santana was riding a motorcycle when injured by a vehicle, according to his testimony, in which he also claimed resulting injuries to his jaw (surgery took place and a new surgery is necessary), left foot, left hand, and ribs. He also claims paralysis to his left side. This special proceeding was commenced by DRB, having been brought on by way of an order to show cause in which Mr. Santana, Pacific Life and Annuity Services, Inc., and Pacific Life and Annuity Company were named as “Interested Parties.” DRB’s petition states that in exchange for Mr. Santana assigning his rights to the aforesaid settlement proceeds DRB would pay him $38,925.00. This Court is charged with determining whether the transfer is in the “best interest” of Mr. Santana (General Obligations Law §5-1706 [b]) and compliant with other requirements. Legal Background Prior to approval or denial of an application to transfer future proceeds from a structured settlement, it is the duty of the court to analyze the details surrounding the request. “Enacted in 2002, the purpose of the SSPA, as reflected in the legislative materials, was to establish ‘procedural safeguards for those who sell settlements that are awarded as a result of litigation,’ due to a recognition that ‘[m]any of the people who receive such settlements are being compensated for very serious, debilitating injuries, and have been unfairly taken advantage of in the past by the businesses that purchase their settlements’ ” (Pinnacle Capital, LLC v. O’Bleanis, 214 AD3d 913, 915 [2d Dept 2023] [quoting Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537 at 5].) The Court of Appeals has stated: The factoring industry has been criticized for preying on structured settlement tort victims, encouraging them to enter into transactions that are not financially sound (see Assembly Mem. in Support, 2002 McKinney’s Session Laws of N.Y. at 2035, 2036 [discussing factoring companies' use of "aggressive advertising, plus the allure of quick and easy cash, to induce settlement recipients to cash out future payments, often at substantial discounts, depriving victims and their families of the long-term financial security their structured settlements were designed to provide"]; see also Laura J. Koenig, Note, Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics? Structured Settlements, Factoring, and the Federal Government, 82 Ind LJ 809, 813 [2007]) (Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Serv. Corp., 39 NY3d 399, 404-405 [2023]; see Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC v. Melvin, 33 AD3d 355, 357 [1st Dept 2006]). “Structured settlements serve strong public policy objectives in that they afford long-term financial protection for injury victims and their families. They protect against loss or premature dissipation of lump sum recoveries. They avoid the shift of responsibility for victims’ care to public assistance programs. [ ] In the past several years there has been an explosion of efforts by unregulated entities, known as “factoring companies,” to separate recipients of structured settlement payments from those payment streams. The subsequent factoring of structured settlement payments undermines the public policy objectives of structured settlements. They deprive injury victims and their families of the long-term financial security their settlements are designed to provide. The transfer can involve discounts corresponding to over 50% interest per year.” (Letter from Life Ins. Council of NY, Inc., Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537.) Yet, “The sale of structured settlements can serve the interest of a victim who has been awarded compensation for injuries or other damages, particularly if the victim has immediate needs that must be met. However, such persons may be particularly vulnerable to the overbearing sales tactics of structured settlement purchasers. The mandated judicial review of all such sales, coupled with the required disclosures of amounts that will be realized from the sale and the discount rate, should help ensure that the best interests of the payee, and his or her family, are served.” (NY Atty Gen Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537.) “Any purported transfer entered into after July 1, 2002 without court approval is unenforceable, and payees may not waive their rights under the Act” (Matter of Law First Fin., LLC v. Jamestown Life Ins. Co., 72 Misc 3d 1207[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50672[U] [Sup Ct, Erie County 2021], citing General Obligations Law §§5-1706, 5-1708 [a]). “[L]egislative history makes clear that to avoid the victimization so prevalent in the industry, the courts are intended to examine the various statutory criteria and determine whether the proposed sale will truly serve the ‘best interest’ of the payee” (Matter of 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v. Martinez, 11 Misc 3d 892, 895 [Sup Ct, New York County 2006]; see General Obligations Law §5-1706 [b]). “Clearly, the New York State Legislature in enacting SSPA and in empowering the courts with the discretion to determine whether the terms of a proposed transfer of future payments are fair and reasonable did not intend for the courts to be mere rubber stamps” (Matter of Settlement Capital Corp. (Ballos), 1 Misc 3d 446, 461 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2003]). When the original 2002 legislation enacting SSPA was amended in 2004 to clarify that hardship was not a prerequisite for approving a sale of structured settlement proceeds, the Attorney General wrote that “we do note that there has been a very positive trend among members of the Judiciary to be sparing in approval of such sales, as was intended where the original legislation was drafted. Therefore, while hardship may not be required as a specific finding should this bill be approved, there is in our view, no reason for judges to refrain from weighing that factor, along with any other consideration they deem relevant in determining the ‘best interest’ criterion.” (NY Atty Gen Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2004, ch 480.) Accordingly, in the present situation, the Court looks first to the statutory requirements of the SSPA, followed by an analysis of Mr. Santana’s best interest. Compliance with Procedural Requirements The SSPA contains various requirements. The Court finds that in its submitted papers, Petitioner DRB complied with the following requirements: At least ten days before the structured settlement transferor2 signs a transfer agreement, the transferee must provide a disclosure statement to the transferor, setting forth nine informational matters (see General Obligations Law §5-1703). NYSCEF Doc No. 5 contains the disclosure statement provided to Mr. Santana. The special proceeding seeking approval of the transfer shall be commenced by order to show cause in the Supreme Court of the county where the transferor resides or where the structured settlement was approved (see General Obligations Law §5-1705 [a], [b]). Mr. Santana resides in Kings County, so commencement of this special proceeding via order to show cause in Supreme Court, Kings County, by DRB, is proper. A copy of the order to show cause and petition must be served upon all interested parties at least twenty days before the time at which the petition is noticed to be heard (see id. §5-1705 [c]). This was effectuated (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 10, 11). The transferor has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived such advice in writing (see General Obligations Law §5-1706 [c]). Mr. Santana acknowledged receipt of the advice and waived his right to seek independent professional advice (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6). A petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall include a copy of the transfer agreement, a copy of the disclosure statement and proof of notice of that statement pursuant to General Obligations Law §5-1703, and a listing of each of the payee’s dependents, together with each dependent’s age (see General Obligations Law §5-1705 [d] [i], [ii], [iii]). These were all complied with (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 1,
