01-1-3406 In the Matter of the Enforcement of New Jersey False Claims Act Subpoenas, N.J. Sup. Ct. (Patterson, J.) (13 pp.) The Court concurs with the Appellate Division panel's conclusion that the language of the NJFCA does not authorize the Attorney General to invoke his or her administrative subpoena power in a given matter after the right to intervene in the qui tam action has expired. After the Attorney General declines to intervene in a qui tam action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-5(g) and leaves that action in the relator's control, the Attorney General loses the authority conferred by N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-14(a) to issue administrative subpoenas.

15-2-3392 Woodlands Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mitchell, N.J. Super. App. Div. (Currier, J.A.D.) (11 pp.) The court considers whether a lender's assignee that takes possession of a condominium unit when the owner/mortgagor has defaulted on the loan, and thereafter winterizes the unit and changes the locks, is considered a “mortgagee in possession” of that unit, and responsible for the payment of condominium fees and assessments. Because we conclude that those discrete actions are not sufficient to render the lender's assignee a mortgagee in possession of the unit, we reverse the entry of summary judgment. Whether a mortgagee or its assignee is in possession of property is determined on a case-by-case basis. We must consider whether the mortgagee is exercising control and management over the property. Indicia of control and management include elements of possession, operation, maintenance, use, repair, and control of the property such as paying bills or collecting rents. The minimal efforts taken here by defendant of changing the locks and winterizing the unit are not sufficient to convert itself into a mortgagee in possession. Defendant has not taken over the control and management of the unit nor exercised the requisite dominion over the property short of securing the unit. (Approved for Publication)

20-2-3419 T.M.S. v. W.C.P. N.J. Super. App. Div. (Mawla, J.S.C.) (15 pp.) In the court's review of a reinstated final restraining order entered pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 – 35, we conclude the court may not sua sponte reinstate a final restraining order absent a Rule 4:50-1 application by plaintiff. Due process requires the party seeking to reinstate a final restraining order file a motion so defendant may have an opportunity to adequately defend the reimposition of a final restraining order. (Approved for Publication)