11-2-3945 Markeim-Chalmers, Inc. v. Willingboro Urban Renewal, LLC, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (36 pp.) Defendant sought a new tenant for its property. Plaintiff's open listing agreement with defendant provided for a five percent commission if a “sale or exchange” occurred before a specified date and the prospective buyer had been “registered” with defendant. The parties' “lease commission agreement” required defendant to pay a commission if the property was leased to a “registered” third party by a specific date. Plaintiff “registered” a potential buyer with defendant, buyer negotiated directly with defendant, plaintiff's listing agreement expired, defendant and buyer formed a limited liability company which leased the property for 99 years and LLC then subleased the property after the open listing and lease commission agreements expired. Plaintiff argued it was entitled to commissions under the open listing commission and the lease commission. Defendant asserted plaintiff's commission was only due on a sale, which did not occur. The court agreed with the trial court that the 99-year lease was effectively a sale and triggered the commission but remanded the calculation of the commission. Plaintiff was not entitled to a sublease commission because both commission agreements expired before the sublease occurred but plaintiff's unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy and tortious interference claims required remand.

15-2-3946 U.S. Bank National Assoc. v. Ferreira, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (10 pp.) Appellant executed a note and non-purchase money mortgage encumbering his residential property; the mortgage was subsequently assigned to respondent. Following appellant's failure to maintain payments on the mortgage, respondent initiated foreclosure proceedings and a final judgment was entered. The parties attempted several loan modifications but a sheriff's sale was ultimately conducted. Appellant moved to vacate the sale arguing he was not notified before the sale that his appeal of the denial of his latest loan modification application had been denied. In denying the motion, the trial court noted the motion was untimely and appellant's multiple applications for modification did not halt the foreclosure process, particularly in the absence of any evidence of bad faith on the part of respondent in reviewing appellant's applications while repeatedly postponing the sale to accommodate such review. On appeal, the court affirmed concluding appellant was not entitled to protections of 12 C.F.R. §1024.41(g) as such protections were to only apply to review of a single complete loss mitigation application. As appellant acknowledged that he “submitted multiple modification applications” since his default, any violations of the statute were inapplicable. Further, as the sheriff sale occurred more than six years after the mortgage loan went into default, the court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed.

15-2-3959 Santander Bank, N.A. v. Griggs, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (7 pp.) Following a default in mortgage payments, respondent, as successor, initiated foreclosure proceedings against appellants. Appellants failed to answer, explaining that they were “trying to get in touch with the mortgage lender for some time” and both were ill. A default was entered and a final judgment of foreclosure subsequently ordered. Appellants moved for, and were denied, vacation of the final judgment of foreclosure; the property was sold at a sheriff's sale. On appeal, appellants argued the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate as they “raised legally sufficient questions as to the merits of respondent's foreclosure action and legal justification.” Appellants also claimed respondent lacked standing to foreclose. The court affirmed finding respondent had standing based upon the bank's representative whom certified that respondent was the “holder of the aforesaid note.” Further, an attorney for respondent certified as required by Rule 4:64-2(d) about communications with respondent's employee who personally reviewed the affidavit of the amount due and the original note, mortgage and assignments. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate because respondent was assigned the mortgage and held the note prior to filing the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed.