01-2-4060 In the Matter of Russell S. Cline, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (16 pp.) Russell Cline appealed from the final agency decision of the Motor Vehicle Commission, which approved the suspension of his driver's registration privileges, and conditioned reinstatement upon his satisfaction of unpaid tolls and administrative fees owed to the New Jersey Turnpike Authority. Cline had accrued unpaid tolls by using an E-ZPass lane while the credit card linked to his account repeatedly declined payment. During this period, the account was also closed for being underfunded, as provided for in the E-ZPass contract. Thereafter, MVC notified Cline it would suspend his privileges unless he paid all outstanding tolls and administrative fees. Cline requesting a hearing, claiming the fees were erroneous. At a hearing before an ALJ, a manager for Xerox, the company contracted to run the E-ZPass system in New Jersey, testified that his company had a record of the date, time, and location of each of Cline's toll violations, and further testified that it charged a $25 (later increased to $50) administrative fee for each toll violation to cover the costs of enforcing violations, such that Cline had amassed $912 unpaid tolls and $12,200 in associated administrative fees. Cline asserted that MVC's records were incomplete, noting inconsistent dates between records of violations and notices he received in the mail, and argued that he could not afford the administrative fees and should not have been obligated to pay them due to the late notices. On appeal, the court affirmed the suspension of Cline's registration pending satisfaction of the outstanding tolls, finding that he had sufficient notice and was not prejudice by the delay in the administrative hearing. However, the court remanded for further development of evidence to sustain the amount of administrative fees, finding that the record failed to support the amount of the fee as matching the actual cost of violation enforcement.

09-2-4093 Kaufman v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (5 pp.) Appellants filed a putative class action suit alleging respondents failed to include a precise delivery date language on its sales invoices in violation of the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warrant and Notice Act as well as the Consumer Fraud Act and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1 to 5.4. Plaintiffs did not allege any defects or deficiencies or that they suffered actual damages; plaintiffs only sought statutory civil penalties for each alleged violation and attorneys' fee. On motion, the law division granted dismissal as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The law division judge concluded “a plain reading” of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d) showed the term “household furniture” did not include hardwood flooring and found no reason to include nonmoveable improvements to real property in the regulatory definition of “household furniture.” The dispositive issue on appeal was whether the hardwood flooring appellants purchased constituted “household furniture” under N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d). On appeal, the court affirmed holding the long-established canon of ejusdem generis provided that “where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 584 (2012) The objects provided to illustrate the limits of the regulation's reach clearly excluded items such as hardwood floors which constituted permanent improvements to property. Accordingly, the court affirmed.

11-2-4061 Dexter & Kilcoyne, Esqs. v. Arturi, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (9 pp.) Law firm appealed the dismissal of its suit against second law firm for a share of the fees from a personal injury case. Injured client hired first law firm to represent her on a contingency basis but discharged that firm and hired second firm which reached a settlement in the suit. First firm represented client for almost a year and obtained her medical records, spoke with potential expert witnesses, obtained key physical evidence, corresponded with manufacturer of defective product and prepared a form of complaint. First firm sent second firm the client file and a copy of the invoice for the hours spent and the disbursements made. Second firm asserted it had no obligation to share any portion of the fee or the client's recovery with first firm. First firm claimed a lien on the client's recovery and recovery of the reasonable value of its services. The trial judge found that the controlling law offered first firm no recourse. The court agreed that first firm had no basis to assert a lien but was entitled to the quantum meruit value of its services. Its efforts were not manifestly “incidental' and the reasonable value of the services implicated genuine issues of fact that should not have been resolved through summary judgment.