In Oasis Therapeutic Centers Inc. v Wade, the Appellate Division held that it is a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) to discriminate against a buyer of real property for use as a group home for autistic individuals “because of the disability of a person intending to live on the premises, even if the buyer does not fit within the protected class,” and “and that it is, with a discriminatory intent, unlawful to interfere with” such a purchase. The court reversed the dismissal of a LAD claim and rejected the trial court's determination that the defendants' “alleged interference with plaintiff's attempt to secure a monetary grant from a nonprofit foundation to assist with its purchase” was protected by the United States Supreme Court opinion in E.R.R. President's Conference v Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 US 127 (1961) “because it was not shown that the foundation was a governmental or quasi-governmental body.”  Noerr protects those who assert First Amendment rights of free speech and to address grievances before such bodies. Finally, the court held that the trial judge should have permitted plaintiff to amend the complaint to include tortious interference with plaintiff's contract and economic opportunity.

The suit was commenced against those who interfered with the purchase, opposed and campaigned against plaintiff's receipt of a grant from the Monmouth Conservation Foundation (MCF), made a “sham offer” to buy the property, “offered to pay the seller $250,000 to break his contract” and interfered with the use and enjoyment of the property after the sale finally closed.

The court first held that plaintiff was a “person” with standing under LAD both because of its actual loss and “based on conduct directed toward it because of the benefits it provides to others in a protected class.” We agree with that interpretation in this case. We also recognize that the latter basis could result in numerous LAD claims filed by “persons” not themselves members of a protected class, but seeking to support them, particularly because of the ability to collect counsel fees under the fee shifting statute, but expect that the courts will keep the scope of application reasonably constrained.

Substantively, LAD was interpreted to prohibit actions “alleged to have induced or attempted to induce a discriminatory result,” here by interfering with the seller's dealings with the purchaser, opposing the MCF grant, and preventing plaintiff's use of the property.

We are pleased that the court did not stand on technicalities, construe LAD, or the definition of “person” therein, narrowly, or read the Noerr defense broadly. As a result, the Appellate Division achieved a result that, in many analogous circumstances, can significantly help members of a protected class who cannot otherwise protect themselves.