iStock/Susan Chiang

At this time of heightened attention to immigration issues, the Third Circuit decision in Yoc-Us v. Attorney General of the United States, decided on July 31, 2019, provides a "teachable moment" with regard to the role of, and limits on, local law enforcement in detentions of undocumented aliens. In Yoc-Us, a Pennsylvania state trooper stopped a van for speeding. In the back seat were two undocumented aliens from Guatemala (the petitioners) who had lived and worked in New York since 2008. There were also eight other people, including the driver and the van's owner in the front seat. After asking for the driver's license and vehicle registration and obtaining certain information from the driver, instead of checking that information, the trooper opened the side passenger door and told all of the passengers to show their immigration papers, passport and ID. Petitioners admitted they were citizens of another country and had no such papers.

The trooper then ordered them to drive to a nearby rest stop, positioning his car so that the van could not be moved any further and interrogated the passengers about their immigration status. During the ensuing 1½- to 2-hour period, the trooper would not allow anyone to use a rest room, would not give them food or water, and would not let them turn on the air conditioning in the van even though the weather was "humid." Petitioners stated at a later hearing that they believed they could not leave and that the trooper detained them only because they "all look Hispanic."

At some point well into the stop, the trooper called ICE agents, who arrived an hour later. Petitioners were then handcuffed, taken to an immigration office and then moved to a local prison. Eventually, a removal hearing was held at which petitioners moved to suppress evidence obtained during the stop, claiming it had violated their Fourth Amendment rights. They also requested an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

Both the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied these requests and ordered petitioners removed to Guatemala. The immigration judge held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to cases involving intergovernmental sovereigns, and that the Immigration Court "lacks authority to provide any remedy for [another] sovereign's misconduct." The BIA affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies only to "egregious Fourth Amendment violations;" that the initial stop for speeding was lawful; that petitioners had not established a prima facie case of egregious conduct by the trooper or ICE agents; and that no evidentiary hearing was warranted.

In a carefully analyzed, thoughtful opinion, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the immigration judge should have held an evidentiary hearing because petitioner's allegations, if proven, would show an egregious Fourth Amendment violation. The court said the trooper's lengthy extension of the stop beyond the time needed to issue the speeding ticket was unreasonable and a Fourth Amendment violation; and the allegation that the detention was based solely on petitioners' race or ethnicity also was a factor showing egregiousness. The trooper's demand for immigration papers immediately upon seeing the passengers before even interacting with them showed that he assumed, based on their appearance, that they were not United States citizens.

As to the applicability of the exclusionary rule when the misconduct is that of a different sovereign, the court stated that the trooper lacked authority to enforce civil immigration law and could not legally stop a person only to investigate their immigration status as such detention would "disrupt the federal framework established by Congress." Moreover, even though a local law enforcement officer may inquire about immigration status when a stop for another reason is lawful, he may not prolong the stop beyond the time needed to complete the original mission, which here, was issuing the traffic ticket. Nonetheless, said the court, the exclusionary rule should not be "generally available" in removal proceedings based on the acts of a non-federal sovereign because such punishment is not likely to provide significant deterrence to one without general responsibility for enforcing federal law. But ruling out its use altogether "would require courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law." Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Third Circuit concluded that the exclusionary rule should be applied where the Fourth Amendment violation is egregious and that since factors here pointed in that direction, these petitioners should have been afforded the chance to prove those factors at an evidentiary hearing.

The opinion is a carefully analyzed, thoughtful discussion of this area of the law, and makes enlightening reading for those interested in knowing the bounds of local officers' authority in enforcing immigration law. It would make a useful training tool for the officers themselves.

Editorial Board Chairman Rosemary Alito recused from this editorial.