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An Essex County Superior Court judge denied a motion for summary judgment by a subsidiary of human resources firm ADP in a suit by a woman suing over claims that she was terminated because of her pregnancy.

In its motion, ADP TotalSource II Inc., a subsidiary of Roseland-based Automatic Data Processing Inc., contends it was no longer an employer or co-employer to plaintiff Stephanie Perez during the time when the alleged events occurred.

ADP asserted that Perez's primary employer, Tricenna, had ended its contract for human resources services with ADP in December 2017, prior to the time frame that Perez claims she was fired in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

Superior Court Judge Keith Lynott wasn't convinced.

"The Court finds there is sufficient factual basis to permit further discovery leading to a more complete record concerning the defendant ADP TotalSource's conduct in relation to the plaintiff and her employment status," the judge wrote in a Sept. 18 decision. "Accordingly, the Court denies the motion without prejudice to subsequent renewal following a period for such discovery."

Lynott said the case was "in its nascent stages" and that discovery was needed.

Meghan Chrisner-Keefe of Smith Eibeler in Holmdel is representing Perez in the case.

"We are pleased with the judge's decision, and Ms. Perez looks forward to her day in court against those she believes are responsible for her unlawful termination," Chrisner-Keefe said in a phone call.

David Walsh from Jackson Lewis in Morristown is counsel for ADP TotalSource. Walsh was not available to comment.

Elizabeth Butler from Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan in Parsippany is representing defendant Tricenna, along with pro hac vice attorney Joan Gilbride. Butler was not available for a comment.

Perez began working for DG TRC Management Co., also known as Tricenna, and The Dermatology Group, P.C., in September 2017, and that fall, announced to Tricenna that she was pregnant, according to Lynott's decision.

At the time, Tricenna had a contract with ADP as a "Professional Employer Organization" (PEO) to provide support for the human resources function at Tricenna. The contract lasted until Dec. 24, 2017, the decision noted.

In January 2018, Perez asked for family and medical leave for the expected time of the birth of her child. Tricenna determined that Perez was not eligible for family and medical leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act or state law, and denied the request, according to the decision.

Later in 2018, Perez asserts in the suit, she asked Tricenna to accommodate her pregnancy in her work responsibilities, and claims that Tricenna failed to engage her in the legally required dialogue on such an accommodation, according to the decision.

In May 2018, Perez experienced complications from her pregnancy and requested medical leave, Lynott noted. Tricenna granted her a two-week medical leave but said it would seek to fill her position if she didn't return after those two weeks, the decision said.

When Perez did not return to work after the two-week medical leave, Tricenna terminated her employment.

Perez filed her complaint earlier this year, claiming she was discriminated against based on her pregnancy beginning in January 2018, when she allegedly requested and was denied family and medical leave.

In its motion for summary judgment, ADP contended that it was no longer an employer or co-employer of Perez by that time.

Lynott disagreed, noting there was enough evidence to show otherwise at this stage of the case.

"The record reflects a sufficient basis for a trier of the facts to conclude that, during 2017, that ADP TotalSource was a co-employer of Perez for purposes of applying the Law Against Discrimination," wrote Lynott, noting that Perez received pay stubs during that time identifying ADP as her employer, and that the employee handbook distributed to Perez identified ADP numerous times as the party to direct human resources inquiries and grievances to.

Perez, in opposing summary judgment, contended that she should be able to pursue discovery concerning what role, if any, ADP played in decisions involving her employment status in the fall of 2017, when she disclosed her pregnancy, and when ADP was still providing services to Tricenna.

Lynott agreed.  "A court should ordinarily grant a motion for summary judgment only after the non-moving party has had a reasonable opportunity for discovery. At this early juncture in the proceedings, that simply has not yet occurred," he said.

Lynott added that contrary to ADP's assertions that it was no longer the PEO for Tricenna after 2017, the firm "could have played a material role" in the decision-making with respect to her employment status before that, facts that would come to light through discovery.

"It is more than conceivable that the defendant ADP TotalSource discussed the plaintiff's pregnancy and the applicable employment policies and procedures in relation to such circumstance," the judge wrote.

"It is also conceivable that the defendant ADP … determined and/or influenced the manner in which the defendant Tricenna addressed the plaintiff's situation and responded to her request for leave and, subsequently, for accommodations."