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David Minsavage had been a teacher at Hanover Park High School for more than 24 years when, in August 2014, he was diagnosed with terminal cancer. In November of that year, following advice provided by a representative of the New Jersey Education Association, he selected the option of "early retirement" on a retirement application. In fact, that option required 25 years of teaching service, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:66-113.1. In December 2014, as his illness progressed, Mr. Minsavage stopped teaching. On April 9, 2015, he died. His school listed his last day of teaching service as the day before his death. Because he had not completed 25 years of service at that time, the Division of Pensions and Benefits notified his wife that his retirement application would not be approved. In June 2015, his wife sought to modify retroactively his retirement application so as to select "ordinary disability" rather than early retirement. The facts adduced subsequently established that he would have been entitled to far greater benefits had he selected and qualified for ordinary disability rather than early retirement.

The board of trustees of the Pension Fund denied Mr. Minsavage's wife's request to amend the retirement on the ground that the regulations of the fund did not permit retroactive disability applications and that the same become effective only on or after the date of filing. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the pension board and held that the wife could not alter her late husband's retirement application because the proofs did not establish incapacitation and because the language of N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.3 indicated that it only applied to a retirement application that the Board had already approved. In the case of Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, (A-48-18) (081507), decided Oct. 24, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division.

The attorney general of New Jersey had argued to the Supreme Court that the Appellate Division's decision should be affirmed because the pension fund membership terminated upon the deceased's death and that a newer modified application could not thereafter be submitted. The attorney general further contended that the application as submitted had never been approved and therefore had never become due and payable.

The court rejected the position of the attorney general, pointing out that "neither membership nor prior approval of a retirement application is necessary to modify an application where good cause, reasonable grounds and reasonable diligence are shown." The court held that pension statutes should "'should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefitted thereby.'" (Citing Steinmann v. Dep't of Treasury, 116 N.J. 564, 572 (1989) and cases referenced therein.

In its unanimous per curiam decision, the court pointed out that for seven decades it had held that administrative agencies have the power to reopen proceedings in order to serve justice and the policy of the law. The court said that under the common law, the board could have honored the pensioner's request to reopen the retirement selection upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds and reasonable diligence. The court further said that it "… had never held that a retirement selection cannot be modified unless the application has been approved." Further, such application, "… may be reopened and modified upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds and reasonable diligence."

In reversing the decision of the Appellate Division and the pension board, the court said that had the family of Mr. Minsavage received only reimbursement of the pension funds which he had contributed, the amount would have provided only a nominal benefit compared to what would have been received by way of ordinary disability benefits. Accordingly, the court found that the pension board had acted unreasonably and that the Appellate Division erred in affirming the board's decision. The matter was remanded to the board to give Mrs. Minsavage the opportunity to prove at a hearing that she had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to modify her late husband's application. We are gratified at the Supreme Court's decision and point out that both the pension board and the Appellate Division seemingly failed to consider in a reasonable fashion prior Supreme Court decisions that would have permitted this application to be revised retroactively upon the exercise of due diligence and good faith.