A few weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously threw out the convictions of Bridget Ann Kelly and Bill Baroni—the two Chris Christie operatives central to the notorious "time for some traffic problems in Fort Lee" scheme that became known as "Bridgegate."

Justice Elena Kagan said the kinds of decisions Kelly and Baroni made—and the story they concocted to add credibility to the scheme—could not be prosecuted under federal law. Justice Kagan stated that "[i]f U.S. Attorneys could prosecute as property fraud every lie a state or local official tells in making such a decision, the result would be … 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction.'" Justice Kagan further wrote. "In effect, the Federal Government could use the criminal law to enforce (its view of) integrity in broad swaths of state and local policymaking. The property fraud statutes do not countenance that outcome."

Justice Kagan sought to make clear that the high court was not giving its blessing to the conduct of the Bridgegate conspirators, only declaring that it was beyond the reach of federal corruption laws. The court recognized the wrongdoing "jeopardized the safety of the town's residents." Justice Kagan even acknowledged that "[t]he evidence the jury heard no doubt shows wrongdoing—deception, corruption, abuse of power." Nevertheless, the court concluded that "the federal fraud statutes at issue do not criminalize all such conduct."

Justice Kagan recognized that the court's decision placing the deplorable behavior outside of the reach of federal law is that state law must fill the gap: "The upshot is that federal fraud law leaves much public corruption to the States (or their electorates) to rectify" explicitly referencing New Jersey's Official Misconduct law, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, which she noted "prohibits unauthorized exercise of official functions." New Jersey's Official Misconduct law is a powerful criminal statute designed to combat public corruption that has been on the books for decades. It provides:

A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with purpose to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or to deprive another of a benefit:

1. He commits an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized or he is committing such act in an unauthorized manner; or

2. He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.

Official misconduct is a second-degree crime unless the amount of money involved is less than $200, in which case it is a third-degree crime. If the official misconduct involves a benefit which is not pecuniary or not subject to pecuniary measurement, the offense is a crime of the second degree. There is a seven-year statute of limitations for official misconduct.

The conduct of the Bridgegate conspirators fits well within the proscription of the Official Misconduct statute. In fact, Honorable Roy F. McGeady, an experienced and well-respected jurist, determined that facts presented to him on Oct. 13, 2016, and again on Feb. 16, 2017, supported a finding of probable cause that Christopher J. Christie "refrained from ordering that his subordinates take all necessary action to re-open local access lanes to the George Washington Bridge" in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(b). Despite Judge McGeady's finding of probable cause, neither the Office of the Attorney General nor the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office would prosecute the case.

Why wasn't the Official Misconduct statute referenced in the U.S. Supreme Court's Bridgegate decision used to go after the people responsible for Bridgegate? The answer is obvious when one considers New Jersey's unique executive power. In New Jersey, the attorney general is nominated and appointed by the governor, who also nominates and appoints each of the county prosecutors. The attorney general supervises county prosecutors and is statutorily authorized to supersede a county prosecutor's decisions regarding criminal prosecution. Perhaps understandably, the then-acting Attorney General John Hoffman and county prosecutors steered well clear of prosecuting the Bridgegate conspirators.

Corruption and cronyism must be addressed through structural reform. New Jersey is one of only seven states where the voters do not elect the attorney general. A bipartisan bill was introduced on March 20, 2014, which would eliminate the appointment process and allow for an elected state attorney general. That bill was referred to the Assembly Judiciary Committee. A similar bill was pending in the New Jersey Senate. Those bills, as well as a 2016 proposal by State Sens. Peter Barnes III and Raymond J. Lesniak, did not pass before the end of their respective legislative sessions. After the Supreme Court's pronouncement in the Bridgegate case, the bill should be reintroduced and enacted into law.

Few principles run as deep in the American legal tradition as that espoused by Chief Justice Marshall 115 years ago in Marbury v. Madison: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men." But as Chief Justice Marshall admonished, our government "will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."

New Jersey needs to have a system that will hold government officials accountable, including those in the governor's office and the governor himself. Anything less allows political corruption to be ignored and undermines the public's trust in government. Each of us should urge our legislators and Governor Murphy to eliminate the appointment process and allow for an elected state attorney general accountable to the people.

Donald F. Burke is a Certified Civil Trial Attorney who practices employment and civil rights law with his son Donald F. Burke Jr. He retired in 2010 from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey where he served as the New Jersey Solicitor.